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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

PART 2

AUGUST 9, 14, 16, 20, 22, AND 23, 1951

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CONTENTS

Testimony of—	Page
Bentley, Elizabeth T.....	403
Budenz, Louis Francis.....	513-593
Canning, William Martin.....	466
Carter, Edward C.....	449
Chambers, Jay David Wittaker.....	487
Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A.....	353
Yoshikawa, Mitsusada.....	449

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee has before it this morning General Willoughby. The Chair wishes to say to the general that his fine service in the armed services of the United States and in the Intelligence Department of the Army especially is well known to his countrymen, but never did he render a more worthy service, nor one more needed for the welfare and protection of this country, than to make known to this committee and to the people anything that savors of internal danger to this Government and to the American way of life.

The Chair wishes to congratulate the general for his presence here, and we feel certain that beneficial results will flow from his expression of his knowledge of the subject.

The general will be sworn.

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General WILLOUGHBY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY, MAJOR GENERAL, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, FAR EAST COMMAND AND UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, will you give your full name and your present military status to the committee?

General WILLOUGHBY. Charles A. Willoughby, major general, on duty as Chief of Intelligence of the Far East Command and the United Nations Command at this present time. I am under retirement procedures for disability and length of service.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, when do you expect to be separated from the service?

General WILLOUGHBY. Presumably on or about September 1.

Mr. MORRIS. General, what was your last military assignment?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have been General MacArthur's director of military intelligence on his immediate staff since the fall of 1939 without interruption.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in the Philippines with the general at the time of the Japanese attack?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I was on duty in the same capacity with General MacArthur.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make the retreat from Bataan to Australia?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I was one of the small group of staff officers selected to accompany him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you make the subsequent invasion trek back through New Guinea on to the southwest Pacific and back into Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes; I served throughout this period now known as the Campaign of the Southwest Pacific Area.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, what position did you hold with the occupation forces in Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. The same as during the campaign, that is, chief of military intelligence with the understanding that the expanded staff of General MacArthur assumed occupation or civil, primarily civil, duties under SCAP, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General Willoughby, how did your duties divide functionally while you held that position?

General WILLOUGHBY. In general terms the division of functions would continue the normal military surveillance but would assume another aspect dealing with the internal security of Japan. A rough distinction would be between military and civil intelligence, and we use that term frequently—that is, the term "civil intelligence."

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, here in the United States the duties of the FBI are the internal security and not necessarily the Army?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But over in Japan the Army took on both the functions as if they were active in the capacity of an FBI; is that about what happened?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir; I concur with your definition.

I would say that under civil intelligence we had developed agencies similar to the FBI in America, known in Japan as the Counterintelligence Service.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, while you were occupying that position which you just described, did you come into the custody of the Richard Sorge espionage documents?

General WILLOUGHBY. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances of your coming into the possession of these documents?

General WILLOUGHBY. Under the general provisions of the Potsdam declaration we released a number of so-called political prisoners. In that group we discovered shortly that there were the remnants of an international espionage ring who were then serving varied sentences. The foreign nationals who profited by this political amnesty became especially interesting.

One case was that of Max Klausen, who turned out to be the radio operator of this ring. When this man disappeared via the Soviet Embassy, we realized that we were confronted with an espionage case of great significance.

In examining the court records pertaining to this trial—and I may say that it was a trial by civil court unconnected with the Japanese Army or Navy—we encountered a number of American Communists, second-generation Nisei with long residence in California.

Obviously this link with America made it mandatory that we make a thorough examination of this entire operation.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, were all the exhibits and all the evidence concerning this espionage ring found in court records or were they to be found some place else?

General WILLOUGHBY. They were initially based on a translation of the court records supported by interrogation by us, postwar, of the judges, the investigating officers, the Attorney General, and other Japanese officials charged with this case.

In addition, we made independent postwar interrogations of the members, that is, the remaining members of this espionage ring, to verify the fact that their statements voluntarily and without pressure by the occupation would coincide with the statements previously rendered to the Japanese authorities.

One notable statement to which I invite your attention is that of Teitchi Kawai, a still living eyewitness to all the activities of the principals in this case, especially Ozaki Hotsumi, Smedley, and Stein.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Smedley an American?

General WILLOUGHBY. Smedley was an American citizen.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Stein?

General WILLOUGHBY. Stein was a British citizen, acquired citizenship in Hong Kong in 1941, an itinerant journalist of some reputation in oriental affairs who is thoroughly implicated in this case. If the fact is not known to you, he was arrested by the French secret police this spring, the Surrete Nationale, on the advice of the French Embassy. The charges were espionage, and he was deported.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you learn this through official channels?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Like all police agencies, we are in intimate liaison with international police bureaux and there is a continuous mutual exchange of information.

Mr. MORRIS. You say, General, that Guenther Stein was arrested for espionage in France in 1950?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir. The significance that I personally attach to it is that when the initial report was released in February of 1949, Guenther Stein disappeared and has not been heard of since that period except in connection with his arrest by the Paris police.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Guenther Stein in prison in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. No; he was not present at the time the espionage ring came to the notice of the Japanese police; otherwise, he would have been arrested. I will deal with his implication a little later on.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I at this point point out that the reason we are stressing Mr. Stein as this particular time, if we are stressing him, is that we had testimony from Edward C. Carter, who was the head of the Institute of Pacific Relations, that Guenther

Stein was the Chungking correspondent for the Institute of Pacific Relations in China, and that in addition he was the British delegate to the Hot Springs conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations which was held in 1945.

There are other activities of Guenther Stein which Mr. Mandel will later in in this session introduce in the record, but the significance of our dwelling on this particular name is that Guenther Stein was one of the IPR personnel whom General Willoughby encountered in his scrutiny of the Richard Sorge case.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the same individual referred to by Mr. Carter?

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same individual, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, what reason do you have to believe that these Richard Sorge espionage records are authentic?

General WILLOUGHBY. As an investigating officer of some experience, I was of course convinced of their authenticity from the start, accepting the court records as evidence. However, in view of the inferential repudiation of my initial report as of February 1949, the Headquarters in Tokyo decided to go over the entire mass of documents and employing outstanding American, British, and Japanese lawyers then on duty at Headquarters in Tokyo.

I would like to briefly quote, Mr. Chairman, and make reference to the action, opinions, and reports of these lawyers, known as consecutive exhibit No. 12.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you made a report to the Army in 1939 on this espionage case, did you not?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. It received some publicity in America, did it not?

General WILLOUGHBY. So I understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether or not that was ever recalled, or what happened to that report?

General WILLOUGHBY. If I interpret your question correctly, Senator, the report was filed by us, meaning the Headquarters in Tokyo, as a normal intelligence or internal security report of which there were many in the period. They decided to publish, to release it because it compared most favorably with the then notorious Canadian espionage case. We made, of course, no objection. Reports, which we file in Washington, are available to them at their discretion.

Senator FERGUSON. At least you figured that the release of this report would not affect adversely our security, either internally or in our foreign relations?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have rather a feeling that it would contribute toward the internal security by unmasking certain techniques, procedures, habits of the clandestine fraternity with which you are dealing.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was then released; is that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. It was released.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever withdrawn?

General WILLOUGHBY. Not by us.

Senator FERGUSON. By anybody?

General WILLOUGHBY. Actually there was what I would term an indirect repudiation based solely on Agnes Smedley's protestation at the time, including a threat of libel.

Senator FERGUSON. Agnes Smedley was an American citizen? I asked you that before.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And she was mentioned in the report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Heavily implicated.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you any reasons or to this day have you any reasons to believe that anything that was said about or in connection with Agnes Smedley in that report to the Army was not a fact?

General WILLOUGHBY. I take the same position today that I took in 1949 or at the time the report was prepared. Whatever was stated then is a fact which I am prepared to testify to, and I am about, in the quotation of this legal investigation, to give you the professional juridical views.

Senator FERGUSON. I anticipated that, but I wanted to clear the record first so that it would be clear that this was a report that was issued by your office and sent to Washington, it was released, it was then withdrawn under a so-called or, as you had learned, a threat of libel suit because of one person mentioned in it.

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And then I wanted to see whether the fact was that there was any change in your attitude as to the truthfulness or accuracy of that report, and I find that there is not.

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur with your statement, sir, in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask one question there? You say they withdrew it. Whom do you mean by "they"?

General WILLOUGHBY. The War Department public relations officer, in my recollection, as well as officials of the Secretary of War's office, then under Mr. Royall, indicated that this report should never have been published. I am at the moment not familiar with the exact phraseology but, roughly speaking, that was the statement and the intent.

The result was that no action was taken on this report. Smedley never sued for libel, though her legal representative, Mr. Rogge, threatened to do that; and the case died, you might say, because of lack of further attention.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, the publicity that could be given to that was limited because of threats of libel. Now you do not feel, do you, or do you feel as a general in the Intelligence Division that anything that you are going to say here in relation to Smedley in this report can in any way affect adversely our internal or external security?

General WILLOUGHBY. In the sense of adversely you mean the publication of data?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. Indeed not. On the contrary, anything that I say this morning—and I am in complete sympathy with the purposes of this committee—will tend to clarify, to support, to add contributory evidence to the very courses that are now under your scrutiny and investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out since we have mentioned the name of Agnes Smedley that we have introduced evidence of her activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations and for that reason we are dwelling on that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same Agnes Smedley referred to by witnesses who have testified here before this committee previously?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. I might point out that Mrs. Paul Massing has testified that she knew that Agnes Smedley was a member of the Communist Party and a member of the Soviet espionage ring of her knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore I think it is pertinent to this particular inquiry. It is not like taking an outside name.

Mr. MORRIS. General, you were about to read from the documents of the Sorge case.

General WILLOUGHBY. In line with your thought, senator, as to the quality of this evidence and in view of this, shall we say inferential repudiation, as I stated, we employed the best legal American talent then available in Tokyo to go over this entire mass of evidence running into perhaps more than a million words and thousands of photostatic exhibits, and this is the deliberate statement, opinion, and conclusion of these high-ranking American lawyers in important legal positions:

LEGAL OPINIONS OF DOCUMENTARY AUTHENTICATIONS IN THE SORGE CASE

We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before they may be introduced in courts of record of the United States or be used as a basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the authentication and verification of the documents listed in the following six pages—

meaning the raw material of the Sorge case—

and after having duly considered the testimony of witnesses and having examined their written statements and interrogations together with their seals and signatures appended thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authentication and verification of the documents, including the statements from witnesses, are in accordance with existing law and procedures.

We therefore certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and verification of each of the several documents mentioned is legally sufficient to give legal standing to their full use within the scope of the rules of civil procedures for the courts of the United States or foreign courts adhering to Anglo-American jurisprudence.

It is our further opinion that:

(a) The authentications herein referred to are good, sufficient, and legal identifications to the documents to which they relate.

(b) That such records and documents are sufficiently authenticated to permit their full use before any court of record subject to the limitations imposed by the prevailing rules of evidence, and, finally, that the procedures and methods employed in the authentication of the documents herein referred to are those that are normally used in the preparation of documents to be used for the same identical purposes for which these documents are or may hereafter be intended.

Now the signatures to that document are: J. Woodall Greene, member of the Maryland bar; J. S. Carusi, member of the Connecticut bar; Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma bar and member of the New Mexico bar; and finally, E. V. A. de Becker and Rokuro Yusami, a firm of international Tokyo lawyers who are members of the Middle Temple of London and members of the Inner Temple of London.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the date of that, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. I will have to check that date, but it is roughly in the spring of 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it after the withdrawal of the Smedley report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then was there any reaffirmation or publication of the Sorge-Smedley report, or whatever we call it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Not since that date.

Senator FERGUSON. Not since that date, notwithstanding that these civilian lawyers gave this opinion after a thorough examination of all of the evidence that went into the making of that report?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Having presented to you, Mr. Chairman, this reputable American legal opinion, I would like to continue and state the conclusions which these very men arrived at because they are pertinent to the entire juridical quality of this case. I am now speaking of the same men and, for your clarification, they were members of the legal sections of the Far East Command in the Civil Affairs Department. They practiced their profession then, their technical knowledge in legal channels continuously.

I am now reading the end part of their conclusions, which is again a numbered exhibit. By amicable arrangement with Mr. Morris, counsel, these cross-references are entirely known to him and available. When I speak of exhibits 12 and 20 he knows exactly where they are and can lay his hands on them. This is what these able and impartial lawyers have to say:

Based upon our examination of the documents listed immediately heretofore, it is the opinion of the undersigned that these evidences establish proof that Richard Sorge and his associates were espionage agents for the Russian Army and that Agnes Smedley and Guenther Stein are Communists in mind, spirit, and practice, and that they were actively and knowingly connected with the Sorge spy ring in China and Japan; and we are further of the opinion that the strong chain of evidence fully and conclusively supports the intelligence report entitled "The Sorge Spy Ring," dated December 15, 1947, a case study of international espionage in the Far East, and that such evidence amply justifies its submission to the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army, by the G-2 of the Far East Command.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, do you have anything there on the element of coercion, the freedom from coercion?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am glad you asked this question, Mr. Morris. I do.

As part of this smear campaign, to use this slightly objectionable term, in the wake of my initial publication of this report, Smedley—although I am reluctant to bring up the name of a dead woman because she is merely a type and there are hundreds of others—at that time it was immediately charged that this was an illegal court procedure. They suggested that the Japanese Army in its known cruelty was involved and that whatever testimony was obtained was under pressure, under duress, under torture.

This element, which, of course, is one of defense, was so important that we made unusual efforts, that is, the legal group which I have just listed, to determine that that element was lacking. So, we obtained the affidavit through personal interrogation by the American lawyers of the attorney general of Japan, Mr. Yoshikawa Mitsusada.

It may be of interest to the chairman to know that this attorney general is now in the States. He is on an investigative or educational journey sponsored by both the American and Japanese Governments, and is in Washington. It is my understanding that he will be interrogated by another congressional committee.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, he had first-hand knowledge of this Sorge case?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Senator FERGUSON. Because he was connected with it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Directly connected with it.

May I refer—merely a concession to age and faltering memory—to selected quick references? All of them are familiar to your counsel. These are my personal comments or briefs superimposed over perhaps 50 to 100 typewritten pages, abbreviated in order to assist not only this committee and their research staff but also the Washington authorities.

This affidavit—

I say—

is an affidavit by a Japanese Government official who was an attorney in the Tokyo district criminal court and interrogated Sorge in preliminary hearings in October 1941. The significance of this affidavit lies in the fact that Yoshikawa employed no irregular means of duress, third degree, or torture as the Smedley innuendo in her press statement at the time implied with a view of discrediting from the outset the quality of these important eyewitness statements, reports, and interrogation. The court was a normal constituted civil court. There was no pressure by the Army or Navy. The document in case was retained by Mr. Yoshikawa, as it was a corrected or edited copy of certain portions of the basic Sorge statement, and thus escaped destruction by burning as many documents were in our area of bombardments that destroyed important Japanese official buildings.

The further significance of the affidavit in substantiating the general court record is a clear picture this statement gives of the international character of Sorge's espionage ring in Tokyo and Shanghai, its military, strategic, political, and social objectives, its evident connection with the Moscow center, the Comintern, and the Soviet Army intelligence bureau.

For our purpose, if I understand Mr. Morris correctly, the emphasis is not so much on contents in addition to other evidence but the fact that no duress, no irregular means of coercion, no third degree, or torture, were applied in obtaining these statements or confessions.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I wonder if you will tell us in general the make-up and the purpose of the Richard Sorge Soviet spy ring. Who, for instance, was Richard Sorge?

General WILLOUGHBY. While this has been fairly well covered by the press at one time or another—

Senator FERGUSON. I really think, Mr. Chairman, for the purpose of the record it should be placed in the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. Though we are merely scratching the surface, I will give my own version of this case.

Richard Sorge was a Soviet professional spy working under instruction of the fourth section—that is intelligence—of the Soviet army. He went to China in 1930 under cover as a legitimate journalist. As an aside or footnote, you will find that all of these agents somehow use an otherwise honorable profession, that of journalism, as their cover. You will find Stein being arrested in Paris as the correspondent of the Hindustani News.

You find Smedley operating as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung. You find Sorge appearing as the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung. He operated both in Shanghai and Tokyo. He obtained the collaboration of Miss Agnes Smedley, who, in turn,

introduced him to several coworkers of various nationalities—American, German, Chinese, and Japanese.

Senator FERGUSON. When did he start this and when did he go there? Is that date given?

General WILLOUGHBY. That date is contained accurately in the exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. About what year?

General WILLOUGHBY. Between 1930 and 1940. He operated in Shanghai in 1930, moved to Tokyo in 1936, remained there until 1941, until his arrest and the subsequent development of this case.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Smedley used principally in China rather than Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. She was used principally in China, and so was Guenther Stein. For that reason testimony concerning those two is primarily with activities on the China mainland. There is, however, as I will develop further, an important link, in fact the link with the Japanese operations. That is in the person of Ozaki, a very interesting individual whom Smedley procured as a recruit and introduced to Sorge in China. So there is your link between the China mainland and the Japanese background.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out at this time that Mr. Ozaki was in 1936 the Japanese council delegate to the IPR conference at Yosemite?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. That makes Ozaki doubly interesting to this committee specializing in the quality of the membership of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Ozaki is a type member in good standing of the Institute of Pacific Relations in his days.

Senator FERGUSON. Not to change the subject, but did you run into the Institute of Pacific Relations when you were going over this case?

General WILLOUGHBY. Merely in the recognition that some of the protagonists here were members.

Senator FERGUSON. And were doing work in that organization?

General WILLOUGHBY. Quite.

Senator FERGUSON. That is how it came into the picture?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that is how this all comes into this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General WILLOUGHBY. I understand your specialization, entirely meritorious, and I am merely contributing collateral axillary verification.

In order to once more emphasize the character of Sorge's organization—apparatus is the pseudo or Russian term for it—I would like to quote from his diary, duly authenticated reference in the hands of the counsel. This is Sorge speaking:

As head of the Japan spy ring, I was directly affiliated with the central committee of the U. S. S. R. Communist Party. I was also under the fourth bureau (intelligence) of the Red army with respect to the technical aspects of my work and a few subject matter problems.

As I see it—

this is Sorge speaking—

my espionage group should be considered a special arm of the central committee of the U. S. S. R. Communist Party. That was its essential characteristic.

Another distinguishing feature was its technical and organization connection with the fourth bureau (intelligence) of the Red army. The espionage group which I operated in Japan, all of its members have frankly confessed that they were working to advance the cause of communism and not for money or personal gain.

Mr. MORRIS. General, approximately how many members were there in that ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. Fifteen to twenty. While the personnel of this ring varied from time to time, this skillful bank of spies—agents, if you wish—worked for nine productive years before their discovery. The famous Canadian spy case was one of the best examples of this type of espionage. I believe, however, that the Sorge efforts in Tokyo compare most favorably with this famous case.

Senator FERGUSON. How many nationalities were in this ring? Sorge was a German?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Guenther Stein was British?

General WILLOUGHBY. British citizen of German origin.

Senator FERGUSON. Smedley was an American?

General WILLOUGHBY. Was an American.

Senator FERGUSON. Any Canadians?

General WILLOUGHBY. None in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you have the Japanese and the Chinese?

General WILLOUGHBY. And a class that is important in California is the Nisei or ex-California residents who were employed, recruited in this service. There were additional American citizens or applying for citizenship then resident in California in a certain strata of Japanese local population. So that is an additional element of membership.

Senator FERGUSON. They were not in any way, as far as counsel has been able to find out, connected with the IPR?

General WILLOUGHBY. No.

Senator FERGUSON. These California Japanese?

General WILLOUGHBY. No; they are not connected with the IPR, but there are some in conformance to your interest on which I believe Mr. Morris has made a fixation there.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you in the forthcoming testimony confine your testimony to those four people, at least as much as possible, whom we have mentioned as people who are involved in the Institute of Pacific Relations? Now will you speak very briefly about Hotsumi Ozaki? In the first place, will you tell us, General, what his position in the Soviet spy ring was?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record an excerpt from the handbook of the sixth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which was held at Yosemite National Park in California, August 15 to 29, 1936. There listed among the members and group secretaries of the conference are, Japan, Hotsumi Ozaki, research member, Asahi Institute of the Far East, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun; and, secretaries, IPR, Kinkazu Saionji. They were both listed in the Handbook of the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I would like that introduced in the record as such.

The CHAIRMAN. How was the handbook secured? How do you identify the handbook?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the handbook?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the handbook referred to there from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 81" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 81

[From Handbook For the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15 to 29, 1936]

MEMBERS AND GROUP SECRETARIES OF THE CONFERENCE

Japan:

Hotsumi Ozaki, research member, Asahi Institute of the Far East, Tokyo
Asahi Shimbun (p. 49).

Secretaries: IPR: Kinkazu Saionji (p. 50).

General WILLOUGHBY. Do you desire a comment on Ozaki?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, General, if you please.

General WILLOUGHBY. Next to Sorge, Ozaki Hotsumi was by far the most important member of this ring. His death on the gallows with Sorge is somber testimony of his relative importance.

In April 1937 Ozaki became a member of the China section utilized by Prince Konoye, several times Prime Minister of Japan, which placed Ozaki in immediate contact with a most important Japanese governmental circle. This was accentuated when one of his associates in the China section became chief secretary of the first Konoye Cabinet in June 1937.

When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, the Foreign Office—that is the Japanese State Department—set up a special investigative agency to handle north China affairs and Ozaki was designated as a Tokyo liaison representative.

We thus have the picture of Ozaki, secret Communist, Soviet spy, intimate associate of Sorge, to hold first an official position as an adviser to the Japanese Cabinet from 1938 to the fall of the Government, as being attached to the entourage of a Prime Minister; in other words, unusual opportunities to obtain highly top-flight information.

Mr. MORRIS. You know, General, from your own military experience that a man who was chief secretary to a Cabinet is in a very strategic position to obtain information?

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course.

Even more important than his official position, Mr. Chairman, was his friendship with old friends of college days who became very prominent at that time, namely, Ushiba and Tomohaiko Kashi, who were private secretaries to Prince Konoye.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like, Mr. Chairman, the record to show that Ushiba was predecessor of Saionji as secretary to the Japanese council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

General WILLOUGHBY. In these two men were centered the so-called "breakfast group," an informal discussion society of the bright young men around Prince Konoye. When dinners became inconvenient, these men met at breakfast, hence the name "breakfast groups." That

is an informal gathering of the important individuals closely affiliated with the Prime Minister and with the Foreign Office.

The American equivalent would be, if a selected group of State Department advisers were in an informal gathering, having access to usually top-level information. That was the group actually in existence, and we will see presently what they did with their opportunities.

MR. MORRIS. You say, General, Ozaki was a full-fledged member of this spy ring?

GENERAL WILLOUGHBY. That I will demonstrate, or rather it is part of the attestation of the American lawyers long after we had already arrived at that conclusion. He is, next to Sorge, the most important member of this espionage organization.

SENATOR FERGUSON. General, from your facts are you of the opinion that the Institute of Pacific Relations, that is the Japanese branch, was in effect being used as a spy ring for Russian Communists and the Russian Red army because of the tie-in with the Foreign Minister's office and the others?

GENERAL WILLOUGHBY. I think that conclusion can be arrived at because of the membership, the intimacy, the association of those individuals, especially Ozaki, who had an official position and was the representative of the IPR in the Yosemite meeting. That relationship, of course, continued throughout his activity.

SENATOR FERGUSON. So it gave them a field to work in, the foreign relations of Japan and the foreign relations of America, through the American branch and the international branch of the IPR?

GENERAL WILLOUGHBY. I would say that I agree with your conclusions.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record at this time and present to the committee at this time a letter from Mr. Edward C. Carter to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field relating to the two Japanese that General Willoughby has just named, Ushiba and Saionji? Ushiba was secretary of the Japanese council of the IPR, who was succeeded by Saionji as secretary of the Japanese council of the IPR.

MR. MANDEL. I wonder if you would authenticate that document and read the pertinent sections in the record.

MR. MANDEL. I read a document from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 29, 1938, marked "private and confidential," addressed to Frederick V. Field from Edward C. Carter. The following is an excerpt from the letter:

DEAR FRED: As you know, we began early last autumn trying to get a man of the rank of Ushiba, Matsukata, or Saionji to join the international secretariat. None of these was available, but in January as you know Yasuo was nominated and has proved a very valuable member of the staff. As our work developed, we found that we needed to clear up a great many outstanding questions between the secretariat and the Japanese council, so on May 5 I cabled Dr. Yamakawa as follows:

MR. MORRIS. I think that is enough. We would like to introduce the entire letter in the record.

THE CHAIRMAN. It may be introduced in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 82" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 82

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, June 29, 1938.

Private and confidential.

FREDERICK V. FIELD, Esq.,

1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: As you know, we began early last autumn trying to get a man of the rank of Ushiba, Matsukata, or Saionji to join the international secretariat. None of these was available but in January as you know Yasuo was nominated and has proved a very valuable member of the staff. As our work developed, we found that we needed to clear up a great many outstanding questions between the secretariat and the Japanese council, so on May 5, I cabled Dr. Yamakawa as follows:

"Please cable could Saionji come New York for 1 or 2 months this summer to discuss questions arising from Dafoe's letter of February 9. We will pay all expenses."

On May 8, he replied as follows: "Will do best to comply with your request."

Now I have received a cable from Viscount Ishii, reading as follows:

"Japanese council regrets unable agree research project envisaged by international secretariat. In view of importance of problem for institute, Takayanagi sailing on July 15 to discuss matter with you. Circumstances prevent Saionji from leaving."

I have replied to Viscount Ishii as follows:

"Takayanagi most welcome. Hope he can remain at least throughout August and September. Am confident that on studying our plan of work here, he will discover that secretariat project can serve the interests both of Japan and Japanese council."

Ishii cabled Dafoe in a similar vein and Dafoe has asked me to indicate that he cannot see Takayanagi in Winnipeg, owing to the dislocation of his work by the Royal Commission, but suggesting that I urge Takayanagi to come straight through to New York preparatory to going to Lee for the week of August 10 which Dafoe is planning to spend at Lee. That is the only week he can manage to clear for the IPR between now and the end of the year.

I do not think it is in the interest of the IPR, either from the Japanese or the Pacific council point of view to publicize Ishii's cablegram. As I have stated in my reply, I feel that if Takayanagi can come and work with us for several weeks and have the unhurried week at Sunset Farm with Dafoe and others, a great deal of progress can be made.

Of course, we do not know as yet what the Japanese objections are. It may be that they want the secretariat to go ahead but with the record showing that the Japanese council voted against the project. It may be that they want the whole basis of the project altered so that the documentation of the inquiry will be similar to that of an IPR conference, namely, that it will consist in the main of national council contributions. It may be that the reports they have received of the attitude toward the conflict expressed in writing and speech by members of the secretariat makes them feel that the secretariat is incapable of directing an objective study of this sort. It may be that they feel that we made some technical mistakes in procedure in the way the project has been set up.

All of these are at this stage merely surmises on my part. The help that I want from you can be given if you will answer the following questions: (1) Do you think our procedure is sound to urge Takayanagi to come straight through to New York for consultations here just before going to Lee for the round-table conference with Dafoe? (2) If you wish a visit from Takayanagi at Pacific center, would you agree that he might render a greater service if he visited you on his way back to Japan in the autumn, rather than stopping over for a few days on his arrival on the *Chichibu Maru* on July 29? (3) Have you any advice as to whether I should go to San Francisco so as to be on the wharf with you to welcome him and bring him across the continent, or would you be willing to meet his steamer and put him on the first train east?

Takayanagi will doubtless want to have a talk with Alsberg some time while he is in the United States. Enclosed is a letter that I am sending to Alsberg today which is self-explanatory. I am wondering whether it would not be better

for Takayanagi to have his talk with Alsberg after he has cleared matters with Dafoe, inasmuch as Dafoe, in his circular letter of February 9 to the members of the Pacific council, assumed responsibility for recommending that the secretariat go ahead with the project.

By September, Takayanagi would be in a very much better position to profit fully from Alsberg's sage advice than he might be immediately on landing.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

General WILLOUGHBY. These data that are being furnished on the American IPR are as interesting to me as probably my comments are to you. This is an entirely new field. I regret only that I did not have that information in 1947, 1948, or 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, this committee just received these files within 6 months; these were the private files of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. These files were taken under subpoena duces tecum and brought from New York here.

General WILLOUGHBY. I must congratulate this committee on its fast and decisive action.

Speaking of Ozaki, in summing up his relation to the Konoye Cabinet, the intimacy with Saionji, whom we will examine under a magnifying glass presently, I would say it is obvious that Ozaki's special position gave him unsurpassed opportunities to learn the exact nature and progress of all principal diplomatic or military projects of the Japanese Government.

Does that clarify the position?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Would you say he was probably the outstanding assistant to Sorge in the espionage ring, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. That has been repeatedly asserted, and he was so recognized in the interrogations and in the official appraisal of the Japanese judges and the opinion of the American legal investigators.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, General, the next name I think we will come to will be that of Saionji. As we have stated before, General, Mr. Saionji was the secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations for a period of time. I wonder if you will tell us what his connection with the espionage ring was.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes indeed.

Saionji is a very interesting figure because of his background and the curious sidelight on Japanese social and governmental character.

To begin with, Saionji was the adopted grandson of the late famous Genro, Prince Saionji. To understand his position, the Genro are of the elder statesmen of Japan who served under the Meija restoration which launched Japan as a world power. These elder statesmen consequently enjoyed an exceptional degree of veneration by the Japanese population, and some of this prestige naturally accrued to their family, and especially this man Saionji.

Saionji was a full-fledged member of the Sorge espionage ring in addition to his other qualifications that we developed. He was arrested by the Japanese police and was found guilty of passing secret information to Ozaki, an associate of the breakfast club. Saionji was given a sentence of 3 years with a stay of execution, undoubtedly a concession to the importance of his family connections.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, is there any evidence that Ozaki and Saionji were closely associated with each other?

General WILLOUGHBY. They were intimate, and the association ranged over many years.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Saionji's position with the Japanese Government?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was a consultant of the Foreign Ministry, that is the Japanese State Department, and the Cabinet and belonged to the bright young men forming the "breakfast club," the bright young men around Prince Konoye.

Senator FERGUSON. So they had them in Japan?

General WILLOUGHBY. I concur.

Mr. MORRIS. General, what role did Agnes Smedley play in the Sorge spy ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. That has been covered generally, but here again I will give you an abbreviated pointed formation.

Smedley's association with the China spy ring of Richard Sorge dates back to 1930. Smedley introduced Sorge to Hotsumi Ozaki, that same Ozaki was his right-hand man, then a special correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun, but here again is the predilection of these individuals to seek cover in an otherwise honorable profession, to wit, correspondents of important newspapers.

Smedley was also instrumental in securing the services of Teikichi Kawai, who is still living and whose affidavit furnished freely to the American occupation authorities is one of the most important exhibits in this entire series available to the counsel. In fact, may I suggest, Mr. Morris, that you quote from exhibit 28, from the question series 100 onward, what our friend Kawai had to say.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you extract from the records the interrogation of Mr. Kawai just referred to by General Willoughby and read those portions commencing on about question 98?

The CHAIRMAN. To what records do you refer and how were the records made?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this record was a record that was in the possession of General Willoughby, which is a pertinent exhibit taken from the official files in Tokyo.

Is that right, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Duplicates are in the War Department, the same type of records which I described when I quoted the opinion of the American legal group.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, this opinion of the legal group went to the War Department and became part of the official files?

General WILLOUGHBY. It did.

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the interrogation of Kawai Teikichi, dated March 31, 1948, and April 1, 1949:

Question 98. When did serious discussions start about your second assignment?

A. I was asked if I would be able to go back to Manchuria the same night I submitted my report in Smedley's apartment.

Question 99. When were definite plans made for you to return?

A. I think we talked about that when we were walking through the park

Question 100. Describe that a little more fully.

A. At the first meeting in Smedley's apartment I was asked whether I would be able to go back or not at which time I answered that I would be able to go. When we left that night we decided to meet again the next morning at Smedley's apartment. Sorge came late after everyone else had assembled, and it was decided at that time I would go to Mukden. After the meeting at Smedley's

apartment the four of us, Ozaki, Smedley, Sorge, and I, went by automobile to the park. We made definite plans for me to go back to Mukden at that park.

Question 251. Can you tell what Smedley's influence and position were in Chinese espionage? Was she a person of high rank in the activity?

A. Yes, I did get that impression.

Question 252. In your conversations and contacts with Smedley did you get the idea that she had direct contact with Moscow or with Russia?

A. I got the impression that she had some liaison with the Comintern.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you are reading from the testimony of Mr. Kawai, a member of the espionage group, which testimony was taken in 1949; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I add to this, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General WILLOUGHBY. This interrogation was made by Mr. Woodall Greene, one of the group of American lawyers. This is a voluntary statement of a member of this ring. He happened to be a Communist belonging to the Japanese Communist Party and that party was so apprehensive at that time about his testimony that I was obliged to furnish this man police protection because of threats directed against him.

Senator WATKINS. Did I understand, General, that you said he is still living?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, he is available as a personal witness. In order to save the committee expense, in view of their known limited allocation of funds for this purpose, a completely notarized affidavit is available, and it is this affidavit that Mr. Mandel has now quoted from.

Senator WATKINS. He was a member of the spy ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was a member of the spy ring, yes.

Senator WATKINS. How did he escape punishment?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was punished. We released him in this grandiose gesture following the Potsdam Declaration in 1945. He was in jail and was released as a potential amnesty gesture, which released all the members of this spy ring.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, there were some executed?

General WILLOUGHBY. Only two.

Senator FERGUSON. Two had been executed?

General WILLOUGHBY. All the rest were imprisoned and released.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the Potsdam agreement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator WATKINS. Was he not tried by the Japanese at the time Sorge and the others were tried?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was tried. He was a member of Sorge's ring, arrested, and in due process of law was tried and convicted with all the others. When we stepped into the picture in 1945 we made a sort of grand gesture, primarily designed to protect political prisoners, that is without definition, because in the fall of 1945 we were busy disarming the Japanese Army and occupying Japan, ranging from roughly Seattle to San Diego, Calif., with four divisions.

So, this sort of thing was interesting but by no means pressing, and we released perhaps people we should have not released.

Senator WATKINS. What was the sentence given him by the Japanese courts?

General WILLOUGHBY. Is the sentence of Kawai listed there? My memory being what it is, it would be like asking Edgar Hoover the details of case No. 1560. I had a policy-making position.

Senator FERGUSON. You do know he was released in 1945 under the Potsdam agreement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. I think I can answer your question in just a moment. Ten years, and the release date of this gentry incidentally was in October 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. He did prove to be of assistance to the military authorities in Japan; did he not?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. We realized that if we could get in this group of prisoners someone of sufficient authority in his position to give us the story—us, the American occupation forces—it would be a valuable confirmation of the documentary evidence, and we proceeded then to interrogate all of them, and we found this man Kawai.

Since my interest was primarily in Stein and Smedley at the time, I concentrated on those two. We found his testimony to be conclusive of the character of which Mr. Mandel has just given you a sample. He was, therefore, of great assistance to us. He is now available on call. This affidavit is available. Given time we might produce the affidavits of all of them.

The CHAIRMAN. However, you had corroborating evidence besides his voluntary statement?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Ohashi?

General WILLOUGHBY. Ohashi was in the same category, a relatively minor individual whom we also interrogated. Both knew and worked with Smedley is the gist of their contribution.

Senator WATKINS. What surprises me about it is that he escaped execution if he was a spy and working in the spy ring.

General WILLOUGHBY. That is a very interesting comment. It is also to some extent characteristic of the civil quality of this court. They did not treat all of them in a summary fashion. They made a fine distinction on relative importance. Sorge was No. 1, Ozaki was No. 2, the rest in a descending scale of relative guilt, shall we say. However, their sentences ranged, for example, Koshiro 15, Taguchi 13, Akiyama 10, Kawai 10, Hotzumi 8—down to 2 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Repeat again the sentence imposed on Saionji.

General WILLOUGHBY. Saionji, according to this record, was found guilty of passing secret information to an unauthorized person—namely, Ozaki—was given a sentence of 3 years with a stay of execution, a suspended sentence. Talk of the time is that being the grandson of the Genro, who has the same emotional standing with Japan as the signers of the Declaration of Independence with us, got him off the hook.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you will read from the testimony of Ohashi, just referred to by General Willoughby, in connection with the supporting evidence on Agnes Smedley.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the testimony of Ohashi Haideo, May 2, 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you are reading from the same document, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From which you presented the excerpt before?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir; who is listed here as chief, Ikegmi Police Station:

Question 5. In your voluntary statement of April 16, 1949, you said that Sorge mentioned Agnes Smedley. Will you tell us what he said about her?

A. Sorge was in China before he came to Japan. He organized an espionage ring in Shanghai, and Smedley was one of the members of the ring. Sorge was introduced by Smedley to Ozaki, who later became one of the leading members of the ring in Japan. Sorge met Smedley for the first time in Shanghai, but Smedley was not a member of this group in Japan. In 1934 Smedley stopped for a day in Japan. She went to the Asahi Shimbun, where she met Ozaki, who tried to contact Sorge but was unable to do so. Smedley left the same day.

Question 6. Did Sorge tell the nature of Smedley's duties in connection with his ring in China?

A. Sorge did not go into details about the activities of any of the members of the ring in Shanghai. I merely interrogated him concerning the names of the members of his ring and did not go into details concerning their activities. I was interested only in information covering the Japanese phase.

Question 7. In your statement of April 16, 1949, you said that Sorge praised Smedley's work in Shanghai. Is that true?

A. Sorge did say she was a very intelligent woman, that she had been with the Eighth Route Army and knew quite a bit about that organization, and also that her information was very good.

I will skip now to question 9, on Sorge's mention of Smedley and her activities in connection with his spy ring in China:

Question 9. Did you infer that she was an important member of the ring?

A. Yes; I did get that impression. As far as the members of the Shanghai ring were concerned, with the exception of Paul and Smedley he only listed their names. He often mentioned Paul and Smedley, which gave me the impression that she was an important member of the Shanghai group.

Question 14. You said that Sorge considered Stein one of the top members in his ring, also that Sorge informed you that Stein's house in—

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that Mr. Mandel defer the rest of that until we come to the Stein testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. General, was Guenther Stein a member of Richard Sorge Soviet espionage ring?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was. Guenther Stein, special correspondent for a London newspaper, was a regular member of the Sorge spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge lists six members together with their aliases, and Stein was listed among the six. An intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name. In this connection, we are in possession of course of the entire series of radio code messages dispatched to Moscow by Sorge in this period, and many of the operators involved in it are mentioned not only by activity but by code references.

There is testimony by Max Klausen—Max Klausen was his radio operator at the time—that this wireless operator erected a transmission set in Stein's residence to forward reports to Russia. Stein not only was living on the premises but at the time gave his consent.

I think, Mr. Morris, that exhibit 23 has a direct quotation from this testimony, the establishment of a radio transmitter communicating with Khabarovsk, a Siberia station, is damaging activity.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, General. I would like Mr. Mandel to read from the police investigation of Max Klausen, which was made on the 25th of October in 1945. I would like Mr. Mandel to read page 9 on this Consecutive Exhibit No. 23, closure No. 1-A. This is from the interrogation of Max Klausen, whom General Willoughby has

identified as one of the leading members of the Sorge espionage ring.

The CHAIRMAN. You are reading from what again?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel will be reading from Consecutive Exhibit No. 23, which was in the custody of General Willoughby in this connection.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

GUENTHER STEIN

One night in December 1935, while I was still at the Sano Hotel, Sorge called me to his home and introduced me to Guenther Stein. Stein and I discussed radio, and he drew a map to show me where he lived. I visited him several days later at his home in Motomura-cho Minatoku, examined the house to see whether it was suitable for installation of radio equipment and decided with his consent to use two of his upstairs rooms. As previously indicated, I installed the equipment and began testing around the middle of February. I transmitted around 30 messages from Stein's home. I stopped using it in 1937—I do not recall the date—when he left for England via Siberia. Stein once confided to me that while in Moscow, a special correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt, before coming to Japan, he had been a Communist sympathizer. I did not know the nature of his previous activities in Japan, but I am sure that in addition to the above he went to Shanghai as a courier. There is no doubt that he was a member of our group.

Senator FERGUSON. General, you might just clear that up.

Of course, the man who was speaking was a member of the espionage organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Max Klausen.

Senator FERGUSON. They are the group of men mentioned.

General WILLOUGHBY. The organization.

Mr. MORRIS. General, would you prefer that Mr. Mandel read a continuation of the Ohashi testimony, or is your testimony now coming up more appropriate?

General WILLOUGHBY. On the subject of Stein?

Mr. MORRIS. Guenther Stein.

General WILLOUGHBY. If I may make a suggestion—

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

General WILLOUGHBY (continuing). I am at your disposal, being a Government employee, soon to be on half pay.

You can continue on this theme, and you will merely reiterate that that he set up the radio station in his house, furnishing the cover of a fairly respectable position at the time, while the Japanese Secret Service was running around in nervous apprehension as to where the code messages to Russia were coming from. They didn't think of Stein, of course.

There is your story.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read, then, the next two questions in the Ohashi testimony, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Question 14. You said that Sorge considered Stein one of the top members in his ring, also that Sorge informed you that Stein's home in Motomura-Cho Minato-Ku Tokyo-To was used by Max Klausen for the transmission of messages to Russia. The testimony of Sorge and Klausen contains that information also. Did Sorge give you any additional information about Stein?

A. Not that I recall.

Question 15. You referred to a notebook which was confiscated from Sorge and in which were listed the top members of his ring, including Richard Sorge,

Branko de Voukelitch, Max Klausen, Stein, Ozaki, and Miyagi. Did you see that notebook?

A. Yes; I did see that book.

Question 16. Did you actually see the name Guenther Stein in Sorge's handwriting in this notebook which listed the top six members of his ring?

A. I do not remember clearly whether Guenther Stein was listed as such, or not, but his pseudonym was listed.

Question 17. Were all the names listed as aliases in the book?

A. In that book some members were listed by their real names, some by their aliases, some by more than one alias, but I do not remember clearly whether Stein's name or his alias was listed, but to anyone knowing these individuals by both their real names and by their aliases as I did, it meant the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. General, will you tell us something about the influential position that Guenther Stein was able to assume in Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. He had a wide range of contacts, naturally, in the press fraternity. He also had some entree in the British Embassy, being a British subject.

Generally speaking—and this is based on inquiries from people who have known him—they rated him as an individual with access to important international information.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder, General, if you think it would be appropriate if Mr. Mandel would read further from the confession of Richard Sorge on the important position that Guenther Stein was able to achieve in Tokyo at the time.

I offer you this volume, General, and ask you if you will identify the excerpt he is about to read.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

For your information, Mr. Chairman, this is a sample of actually over 150,000 pages, translated from Japanese text court records. This is the story as written by Sorge himself, not in the nature of a confession, because he was interrogated in a series of Attorney General's interrogations, but he wrote a sort of diary.

He was under the impression that, in view of the importance that he held in the Soviet hierarchy that he might be released at the last moment.

Waiting 3 or 4 years, his resistance perhaps weakened and he began to jot down in an informal diary type his thought and feelings, his record. That is a part of this record.

Mr. MORRIS. When was he executed, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. Executed in 1944, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. And arrested in 1941?

General WILLOUGHBY. 1941; yes, sir.

An interesting sidelight in the international field, if I am not imposing too much on your time, is that the Japanese Government was then on a neutrality basis with Russia, as you know, until 5 minutes to midnight. They came in in August of 1945, after we had accomplished the Pacific War. The Japanese were very anxious, of course, not to upset this neutrality balance, and in one of the commentaries on this case, the Attorney General warns his individuals, his subordinates, to be sure that the conduct of the trial, the interrogation, and so forth, would be of such a humanitarian plane that the Soviet Embassy, if they should become interested in the end, could take no offense or register objection.

So this is as close to a voluntary statement by Sorge, this diary, which we entitled in our translation as Sorges' own story, typewritten, typed by himself at a leisurely pace.

He even made editorial and stylistic corrections.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read from the document so described by General Willoughby.

Mr. MANDEL. Referring to Stein:

He was a sympathizer but never an actual member of my group. Actually, however, he did give us positive cooperation.

Stein was closely associated with Ambassador Dirksen, whom he had known since Moscow, and who looked upon him as an intelligent and important person. More significant for our work was the connection with the British Ambassador which he enjoyed by virtue of the fact that he represented a British newspaper. He was especially close to the famous Sir Sansom in the British Embassy. From the British Embassy he was able to obtain information chiefly on general diplomatic policy. At times he had opportunities to talk to the then British Ambassador and British naval attaché.

As Stein was also on very intimate terms with all the foreign newspapermen, especially the British and American reporters, he sometimes wanted interesting individual facts from them. Lastly, he had close connection with Domei and hence like Voukelitch was able to scent out the general political undercurrent and atmosphere there. He was also very valuable as a source of information in that he had studied the Japanese economic situation very conscientiously and had written complete books about it. His economic studies clarified many facts hitherto little understood. His chief fields of study were Japans' foreign trade and financial problems.

Senator FERGUSON. May I just inquire whether, in connection with Stein, you ever heard the name Herbert Norman?

General WILLOUGHBY. That name does not appear in what we have now classified as the Sorge record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, at this point, I think it might be appropriate if I point out that we had Dr. Karl Wittfogel, who is a distinguished professor of Columbia University. He is head of the Chinese language project of Columbia University. We had him on the stand here on Tuesday. He identified as a member of a Communist study group and as a member of the Communist Party Herbert Norman.

Herbert Norman is today, Mr. Chairman, Chief of the American Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs of Canada. That is a place of great importance.

I was wondering, General Willoughby, if you knew Herbert Norman at all when you were in Tokyo.

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, I knew Herbert Norman. He was the Canadian Minister in Tokyo in the period 1946 to 1950.

Mr. MORRIS. He was then only the Canadian Minister to Tokyo?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. He has since assumed this high position.

General WILLOUGHBY. The Canadian Minister.

Technically, all diplomatic representatives maintain their diplomatic classification, ambassador, minister, chargé d'affaires. They were attached to SCAP.

In other words, he was the chief of the Canadian diplomatic mission attached to SCAP.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I think at this place in the record we might make reference to the testimony of Wittfogel on page 318.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. It will bring out who Herbert Norman was back in 1938 and his connection with the Pacific Affairs and the IPR.

I think the letter on pages 319 or 320, No. 72, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore, under the name of "Dear Owen," is signifi-

cant in the light of Wittfogel's testimony, and if it is referred to in the record here it could be of importance to this testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from the letter No. 72, in the record, on page 319 or 320, from Carter to Owen Lattimore. It begins: "Dear Owen"—and that has been identified as Owen Lattimore.

Here is the paragraph that I think ought to be put in here:

I think that Norman may be able to do some writing for Pacific Affairs on contemporary matters providing he writes under a nom de plume.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that the letter, Senator, which referred to the using of Mr. Norman as a conduit for transmission of information?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And that he used a fictitious name rather than his own name because he would be connected with the Canadian Embassy.

The reason I thought of that General, was that when you brought Stein as being connected with the Canadian Embassy in a way—

General WILLOUGHBY. British Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you also said Canadian. Did you not?

General WILLOUGHBY. What was the quotation?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not say both Canadian and British when you read that about Stein, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. British.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. It covered both. That is why I thought the Norman testimony was significant.

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course, I was not aware and I am intensely interested in this Wittfogel testimony on that particular name. But, of course, I am in no position to—

Senator FERGUSON. That is the reason why I want to know whether or not he came into the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. He did not come into this record we are now dealing with, and of course my personal acquaintanceship in Tokyo was that of a SCAP official with a foreign diplomatic representative, and I am reluctant to dwell on this.

Senator FERGUSON. I would not want you to do so. I want the testimony emphatic that if it was as it is now, that he was not mentioned at all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, would you want me to read into the record today the testimony of Dr. Wittfogel, or do you think it is clear enough?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would clarify it if you read an excerpt from it, so as to tie it in with Wittfogel's testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. I am now reading from the testimony of Karl August Wittfogel, of last Tuesday. This is page 318. The question put to Dr. Wittfogel was:

Who were some of the other students at this student group?

This is a Communist student group that met on Cape Cod in the summer of 1938.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. There was a talented and pleasant young man who was studying in the Japanese department at Columbia. His name is Herbert Norman.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of this study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, did he know that it was a Communist study group?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes. It was obvious.

Mr. MORRIS. To you.

Dr. WITTFOGEL. I think it was obvious in general.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it obvious, therefore, that he was a Communist?

Dr. WITTFOGEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce in the record first of all a letter that would indicate Herbert Norman's associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a record taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 30, 1940, from Edward C. Carter to Owen Lattimore. It reads as follows:

"Herbert Norman was in the office about a fortnight ago on the eve of his sailing for Tokyo, with language officer in the Canadian Legation. He is very eager to continue active contact with the institute and in the field of Japanese political history. He would like to do some writing on the key figures of the Meiji period. I am sending a copy of this letter to Holland as it may be that he will see ways of using Norman on writing that might not be quite within the scope of Pacific Affairs."

The CHAIRMAN. Right there, Mr. Morris, can we get the tie-in between the Norman referred to by Senator Ferguson in interrogating the witness and the Norman referred to by Wittfogel? Are they one and the same?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Dr. Wittfogel described Herbert Norman as a Canadian.

Senator FERGUSON. He was going to the Embassy at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. The witness identifies him as the consul.

General WILLOUGHBY. As the Canadian chief of the diplomatic mission in Tokyo approximately 1946 to 1950.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to see if they are one and the same person.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I think the next letter bears on that point.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, is the letter you just read dated much earlier than 1946?

Mr. MORRIS. It was 1940.

I am reading from another letter dated September 5, 1940, which was introduced into the record of last Tuesday on page 601.

Mr. Mandel, there is another letter, apparently a memorandum, headed "E. C. C. from W. L. H.," apparently from Mr. Carter to Mr. Holland, dated September 5, 1940.

It is on a typed letterhead of the Gianini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.:

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuto's Industrial Japan. Among the other manuscripts to be sent to him very shortly will be Laura Thompson's book on Guam for the American Council, Wentworth's Philippine Living Standards in Hawaii, the new catalog, and Wittfogel's monograph on oriental society. I am hoping to have the two big books by Mills and Kesting published commercially in this country. Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6 and can be reached in care of the Japanese IPR.

This is the significant sentence, Mr. Chairman:

Any very secret messages might be sent in care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation. Phil will cable us after he arrives about whether the Japanese want him to remain for an extra week or two to help them with their publications.

So in 1940 Herbert Norman was associated with the Canadian Legation.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

What is the question now?

General WILLOUGHBY. I might make a remark. As a police officer, this is a most interesting statement by Dr. Wittfogel on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. The Chair understands that at this present time Herbert Norman is Chief of the American Far Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs of the Canadian Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record an extract showing the number of articles that Guenther Stein has written for the Institute of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Mandel, will you describe that compilation that appears on that page before we introduce it into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the source of the information?

Mr. MORRIS. It is a compilation by Mr. Mandel. I am asking him to testify, Mr. Chairman, as to what that represents.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the source of his information?

Mr. MANDEL. These are articles from Pacific Affairs, the official organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and also another one of its publications, called Far Eastern Survey, and lists the writings of Guenther Stein.

Just by way of sample, let me read a few titles: "Japanese State Finance," in the December 1937 issue of Pacific Affairs.

In the Far Eastern Survey we have "What's Free China," June 29, 1942, and so on, giving a list of approximately 15 titles.

Also, Mr. Stein was coauthor of a study of American trade with Pacific countries, which was slated for fall publication in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. We offer that document as the next exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 83" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 83

GUENTHER STEIN

Writer of articles in Pacific Affairs:

Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader, pages 177-190, June 1936.

Japanese State Finance, pages 393-406, December 1937.

The Yen and the Sword, pages 5-19, March 1939.

China's Price Problem, pages 322-333, September 1941.

Free China's Agricultural Progress, pages 339-343, 1943.

Book "The Challenge of Red China" reviewed, page 199, June 1946.

Book review of American Business with East Asia, page 105, March 1948.

Writer of articles in Far Eastern Survey:

China's Inflation Menace, June 1, 1942, page 124.

What's Free China, June 29, 1942.

People's Political Council Reorganizing, July 13, 1942.

Chungking Considers the Future, September 7, 1942, page 190.

The Chinese Press Weighs Allied Strategy, June 14, 1943, page 117.

Japan's Army on China's Fronts, July 14, 1943, page 141.

Free China's Industrial Production, August 11, 1943, page 161.

China's Fiscal Program, August 25, 1943, page 169.

China's Internal Transport System, October 20, 1943, page 208.

Overseas Chinese Look Ahead. November 17, 1943.

China's Forbidden Crisis, March 12, 1947, pages 49-52.

Listed on research and publication program of the Institute of Pacific Relations, May 9, 1947.

Study of American Trade with Pacific Countries by Guenther Stein.

Shirley Jenkins and an advisory committee of businessmen versed in problems of far eastern trade. Publication date—fall, 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we find anywhere that Stein ever wrote under a fictitious name, an alias?

Mr. MANDEL. I have no record of that.

Senator FERGUSON. Norman was supposed to, was he not? Is not there evidence in the hearing, a letter?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in introducing this compilation of Mr. Mandel's, I would like to have the record show that there were 21 contributions through the years by Mr. Guenther Stein to the Institute of Pacific Relations in one of its subdivisions.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to tie this in properly.

Mr. MANDEL, in your listing here, from what source did you get the information?

Mr. MANDEL. From the Index to Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey, as published by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You found it where?

Mr. MANDEL. In the actual index that they publish.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean you looked at the magazines yourself, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. At the index.

Mr. MORRIS. And you made up this compilation having the official records in front of you?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. Can I contribute something?

Mr. MORRIS. Very well, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. This is a purely impromptu, off-the-cuff contribution, but as you are establishing, I take it, the literary quality of Mr. Stein, this is what we thought about that field.

Lately I have read a most illuminating study by Mrs. Irene Kuhn on the subject of, to me a revealing subject, of how Communist-slanted books bought, sold, reviewed, peddled, propagandized, log-rolled or log-jammed, as the case may be.

I am quoting from this article.

After an absence of 13 years from the United States, I am, of course, avid for information that would give me the modern landscape.

Mrs. Kuhn's article, which had its fifth reprint in the American Legion, deals with the technique of propagating, peddling, and supporting Communist-tainted books.

Guenther Stein's reports by their titles, I would say, look rather innocuous. But this is what one of our investigators has to say about him:

Late in 1944 he was one of a group of six who visited Yenan.

Yenan is a hot-land of Chinese Communists, the cradle of Chou Teh and other gentlemen with whom we are now engaged in North Korea.

He was one of the two correspondents whose accounts of Communist China were published as books. His *Challenge of Red China* (McGraw-Hill, 1945) has the outward appearance of thoughtful reporting. His book has had a great deal of effect in perpetuating the legend that Chinese Communists aren't Communists and are not in any way connected with the Soviet Union—a legend started and kept alive so much earlier by Agnes Smedley. Like Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein was an established Soviet agent, and one can be certain that neither of them was publishing the truth about Chinese Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Again, that is a memorandum from one of your staff; is it?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes, and filed with the War Department, and is part of the original report of 1947, 1948, and 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the one that was later suppressed after it was released.

General WILLOUGHBY. It was later, shall we say, released and then given the "cold shoulder."

Mr. MORRIS. And you think, Senator, it is significant that when Herbert Norman did write for Pacific Affairs, Carter and Lattimore wanted him to write under a nom de plume?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right. I think that ought to appear in the record, owing to Wittfogel's testimony.

Senator WATKINS. Would that not be because he was a member of the Canadian Foreign Service and could not write, without getting into trouble, under his own name?

Mr. MORRIS. It may well be.

I would like to introduce into the record at this time, Mr. Chairman, a memorandum dated June 24, 1942, from Mr. "W. W. L."—presumably Mr. Lockwood—to "E. C. C. and W. L. H."—presumably Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland. This reads:

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff—

Now, at that time Mr. Fairbank was associated with the OWI—who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however.

I would like to introduce this into the record, Mr. Chairman, as evidence of the fact that the Office of War Information at that time was expressing a great deal of interest in seeing Guenther Stein's—as Mr. Lockwood says—"stuff" in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute.

Will you identify that, please?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as an authentic document?

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get it? Where did it come from? What is its authenticity?

Mr. MANDEL. I identify this memorandum dated June 24, 1942, from "W. W. L. to E. C. C." marked also "W. L. H." as taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 84" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 84

JUNE 24, 1942.

W. W. L. to E. C. C., W. L. H.

A further comment on circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank, he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return. I am leaving the matter for you to handle, however.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I wonder if you would tell us what this espionage ring was able to accomplish by way of transmitting secret information to the Soviet Government and aiding the Soviet foreign policy?

General WILLOUGHBY. There is an enormous amount of information of records on that subject, Mr. Morris. I will touch upon the high lights for this committee.

For example, under interrogation from memory alone, in the initial stages, Sorge dispatched more than 50 reports, Klausen another 50. The decoded radio messages added much greater detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Radio messages from whom to whom?

General WILLOUGHBY. From Sorge via Klausen to his Russian superiors. The relays were either via Harbin or direct to Khabarovsk.

However, the year 1941 was naturally the crucial year for all of us, and I think you will get an impression of the quality and importance of those reports if I limit myself roughly to that year, 1939-40, with emphasis on 1941.

For example, the relation of Russia with the Central Powers, with Germany, was of an immense interest in that year. Sorge, having a position as press attaché of the German Embassy, on the one hand, and having a direct access to Prince Konoye—that is, the Japanese Premier—and/or their State Department, through Ozaki, was in a position of not only obtaining the details of the German negotiations, which he relayed promptly to his Russian masters, but he was able to get the reaction or actions of the Foreign Office and do likewise.

Now, that information, if the Allies had known it—had had advance notice of this in that critical year 1941—might have changed the course of history.

For example, the quality of this man's reports is an example: An appraisal of the Japanese output of munitions, which, from a military viewpoint is, of course, terribly important to all those who were then contemplating or considering Japan as a potential enemy.

He made periodical reports beginning with February of 1940 throughout 1940 and 1941.

In August 1941 he reported an item which the American Navy was intensely interested in, had they known it; namely, the record of petroleum storage and stockage available to the Japanese military forces.

His report was that there was in storage in Japan sufficient petroleum for 2 years' use by the Navy, half a year by the Army, and half a year by the nation at large. That became a prime military objective for use in the course of the war.

On the 20th of May, through his connections, of course, with the German military attaché in the Embassy, of which he was a member—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe, General Willoughby, exactly what his relationship was?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was the officially designated press relations officer of the German Embassy in Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to whom now?

General WILLOUGHBY. Sorge.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the German Ambassador at that time?

General WILLOUGHBY. General Ott, whom he had known in China and by a process of friendship probably got this assignment.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, did Richard Sorge hold a military rank in the Soviet Army?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was, as he stated, "a subordinate to the Fourth Bureau," which is the intelligence section of the Soviet Army, and had the assimilated rank of colonel.

In other words, you find a Russian intelligence officer being the press attaché, with diplomatic immunity, at the German Embassy, at a time when the relationship of these two nations was one of crucial international balance.

Mr. MORRIS. And this time you are now describing is May 1941? That is just 1 month prior to the Hitler invasion of the Soviet Union?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes.

The type of Sorge's reports was due, of course, probably not to inherent talent, but to the advantages of his unusual position.

On the 20th of May 1941, he flashed a warning—meaning to Russia—that the Reichswehr would concentrate from 170 to 190 divisions on the Soviet border, and on the 28th of June would attack along the entire frontier; the main effort, however, would be made in the direction of Moscow.

This attack did occur on the 22d of June.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, General, that brings me back to many of the things that happened at the Pearl Harbor hearings. We were slightly interested in knowing whether Japan was going to attack America, Russia, or Britain in her colony.

General WILLOUGHBY. Right.

Senator FERGUSON. And if we had Americans like Smedley in this spy ring, they may have been able to acquire, through various rings, for instance, here in Washington—we have learned about papers being taken from the State Department—that Japan was getting some information through this same spy ring to her as to what our intentions were.

Is that not possible?

General WILLOUGHBY. Your point is well taken, Senator, and I think I can give you a connecting link here.

The potential of Japan to attack Russia via Siberia or to attack south, which would involve the Philippines—that is, United States and the British—was of equal interest to Russia, but it was also of equal interest to us. And the deduction which is permissible, if Smedley was in a position of intimacy with this bird Sorge, is that she might have obtained that information, too, had she been on the right side of the fence.

But regardless of that, sir, actually that became Sorge's main mission. He was ordered to concentrate on what Japan was going to do, because without that knowledge the Russians would not withdraw from the Siberian mainland the divisions they maintained.

Once having assurance that Japan would go south—that is, an attack which would involve the United States—they were then free to denude their Siberian border and put their troops into the defense of the frontier then in existence.

Actually, they came in time to save the situation in the German advance—well, their farthest advance in that period: Smolensk, Stalingrad.

So it might be said that, predicated on the information furnished by this superbly competent agent, the Russian situation on the west front depended as a life and death question. He gave them the answer.

This is very interesting—always with a background of your own and pre-Pearl Harbor inquiries, which I remember very well, indeed.

Sorge maintained a concentrated watch on United States-Japanese negotiations during the summer and fall of 1941. His information was full and accurate; naturally so, since Ozaki was so close to Prince Konoye, the keyman in these negotiations.

During early October, Sorge reported on this mobilization, that it was completed in mid-September and that men from 25 to 35 years had been called up—mobilization of an expansion in forces as a prelude to war.

By the 15th of October, Sorge transmitted his final sober conclusions that the Japanese had decided to move south, and that there now was no serious danger of an attack through Manchuria in the direction of Siberia. He felt that his mission was completed.

He drafted a dispatch, suggesting his recall to the Soviet Union. His radio operator Klausen argued that his request was premature, and the message was never sent. Three days later Sorge and Klausen were under arrest.

Mr. MORRIS. It is significant, General, that they were arrested just a few days after their mission was accomplished; is it not?

General WILLOUGHBY. The throw of the dice—the fortunes of war.

Mr. MORRIS. General, we have had testimony before this committee that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified as members of the Communist Party, exerted great efforts in November 1941 to prevent a 90-day truce being worked out between Japan and the United States.

This committee has that testimony both in executive and open session, namely, that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified as members of the Communist Party, made great efforts to prevent a 90-day truce being worked out between the United States and Japan.

I wonder if you would care to comment on that and possibly correlate any information or evidence that you have with that testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, the calendar is to be called on the floor. The chairman of this committee has many bills on that calendar. Will you kindly take the chair and carry on for me?

General, I am sorry to have to leave. I will be back to see you again.

Senator SMITH. Will you proceed, Mr. Morris?

Mr. MORRIS. Does the general understand the question?

General WILLOUGHBY. Would you mind repeating it?

Senator FERGUSON. Before you proceed with that, if I might refer back, I would like to introduce a memorandum from the Pearl Harbor hearings, joint hearings, page 1160, held in 1945. The memorandum is dated Chungking, November 25, 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. That can be marked the next exhibit number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 85" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 85¹

[Exhibit taken from hearings on Pearl Harbor attack, 1945, p. 1160]

CHUNGKING, November 25, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE: After discussing with the generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never

¹ Previously used as exhibit No. 24.

seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any *modus vivendi* now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. To get back to the question, General:

We have introduced into the record documents and testimony to the effect that high officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, some of whom have been identified before this committee in executive and open session as members of the Communist Party, or connected with the Communist Party, were making efforts in November 1941, to prevent the United States and Japan from effecting a 90-day truce at the time, at the request of the military leaders of the country, namely, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A 90-day truce was sought in order to prevent any outbreak of hostilities. We had evidence, as I say, introduced, General, that IPR officials, top officials in the IPR, were trying to prevent that truce from being effected.

I wonder if any evidence or information that you acquired while you were in Tokyo would have any bearing on the testimony that we have already taken before this committee on that score, General Willoughby.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say that this is a very complicated question, since it deals with activities in the United States when I was absent in the Philippines at that time, since 1938.

And, of course, I must delegate activity to other officers and cannot specifically point to anything that is in the nature of concrete evidence.

With this limiting background and based purely on recollection, and guided solely by a desire, of course, to assist this committee in its hard-working enterprise, I will say that, as a student of history and of Japan, that I have the impression that Prince Konoye was desperately serious in effecting a last-minute understanding with the United States and that there was, in the opinion of many Japanese of substance and probity, there was a fear that certain elements, unidentified in the States, were opposed to such an understanding.

That is probably an unsatisfactory answer, but it is the best I can do.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Ferguson has made reference to a dispatch sent by Owen Lattimore, who at that time was personal adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Lauchlin Currie, who was then executive assistant to the White House, in which Lattimore urged that the *modus vivendi* be rejected. The date of that is November 25, 1941.

Further, General, we had testimony here from Mr. Carter that he was called down to Washington by Harry Dexter White, who was

then Under Secretary of the Treasury, asking Mr. Carter to use his influence to prevent any—as he described it—sell-out of China at that time.

At that time they were showing a concern for China, when this took that form.

General WILLOUGHBY. Amazing, amazing.

Mr. MORRIS. This has already been introduced into the record.

Now, in connection with Guenther Stein, I would like to point out, General, that you have been testifying through your records that Guenther Stein was doing espionage work for the Soviet fourth bureau, fourth army.

General WILLOUGHBY. There is his association, with Sorge as one of his associates. If we established that he was a trusted and important associate of Sorge—and that, I think, is established—I will take out the words, “I think”; we’ve got it all, cross-reference of Klausen, his wife, Kawai, et cetera.

So if we classify him as a bona fide member of this ring, then, of course, the reference of reporting to the fourth army is to be understood in that light.

He didn’t report directly. He reported to Sorge, and it was Sorge who relayed the information.

I think it is a fine distinction which I may be exaggerating, but I am making it.

Mr. MORRIS. General, I would like to point out that he has written 21 articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations and two more letters, which Mr. Mandel will authenticate and read into the record on Guenther Stein, as well as the letter from Mr. Lockwood to Mr. Carter and Mr. Holland that the Office of War Information and the Institute of Pacific Relations was circulating—to use their own words—“Guenther Stein’s stuff in Washington.”

I see here in this letter we have already introduced Lockwood says:

When I mentioned it to John Fairbank—

who was then head of the China section of OWI—

he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest.

In other words, the Office of War Information was actively promulgating Guenther Stein’s material. So it apparently served another function at that time, did it not, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. I would agree with you; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, the evidence clearly shows that he was an agent of the Comintern, so that he at all times, whether they be two or one, the Red army and communism in Russia, he was serving both those according to the documented record. Is that not right?

General WILLOUGHBY. He was; in his capacity as an indispensable and important member of the Sorge organization, whose complete purposes were for these two agencies that you mentioned, the army, on the one hand, the Comintern, on the other.

I haven’t the slightest hesitancy personally, if you wish to ascertain that, that Stein is as guilty as Smedley or any of the others listed.

Senator FERGUSON. And you have no doubt, have you, from these records, that Stein was a Communist?

General WILLOUGHBY. None; none whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. Smedley was a Communist?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have no doubt about that, personally.

And I notice there is a reference, which Mr. Morris has, that Sorge recommended her to the clearinghouse in Moscow, who pass on the bona fides of these agents, and he needed the supporting certification of another card-bearing member and he got it from somebody.

Anyway, that is a very unusual step to have taken, and I base my feelings about her on this.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have not any doubt that she was one, have you?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have no doubt.

Mr. MORRIS. About Guenther Stein's present activity, General, do you know from official authority that he was arrested for espionage in France in 1950?

General WILLOUGHBY. Yes. Of course, Mr. Morris, when you begin to sum up or draw conclusions, my opinion, or, rather, my thought process is probably not any better than yours, but when I know of an individual with that record disappearing at the time a report was published—he disappeared within 24 hours after the War Department released the 1949 version—and then remains incognito at large and then picked up by the French police in the spring on an espionage charge, he is one of the boys who continued to be in the same business.

Conversely, talking about Smedley, with due deference to her demise, you find her being pictured by a columnist at the time, and notably Mr. Harold Ickes, as an upright American woman, of unimpeachable reputation, veracity, and political coloring, and then find her willing her ashes to Chou Teh, the commander in chief of the Chinese Communist Army, with whom we are now engaged in Korea, and having her ashes placed in a special shrine in Peking, under actual governmental ceremony of extreme value in the heartland of Asiatic communism.

You don't have to be either a police officer or investigative genius to draw your almost inescapable conclusion on these two characters.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read into the record two letters which bear on Guenther Stein's position and activity in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I read one letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 6, 1942, addressed to Mr. Richard R. Sanger, Economic Intelligence Division, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C., from W. L. Holland:

In reply to your letter of June 29 to Mr. Lockwood, of the American council, I am glad to send you under separate cover our latest radio letter from Guenther Stein in Chungking.

Some of this material will probably be used in a forthcoming issue of the Far Eastern Survey, but you may be interested to have it in the meantime.

As far as possible we shall try to send you these reports from Stein as soon as they come in.

Sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into evidence as further evidence of Guenther Stein's activity through the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 86" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 86

NEW YORK CITY, July 6, 1943.

Re: OW-S-FES.

Mr. RICHARD H. SANGER,

*Economic Intelligence Division, Board of Economic Welfare,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. SANGER: In reply to your letter of June 29 to Mr. Lockwood, of the American Council, I am glad to send you under separate cover our latest radio letter from Guenther Stein in Chungking.

Some of this material will probably be used in a forthcoming issue of the Far Eastern Survey, but you may be interested to have it in the meantime.

As far as possible, we shall try to send you these reports from Stein as soon as they come in.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MANDEL. I have another letter here, addressed to W. MacMahon Ball, of the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin, at 177 Collins Street, Melbourne, Australia, dated February 3, 1939, from Owen Lattimore. I read one sentence:

Guenther Stein, who is by long odds the best economic journalist in the Far East, writes an article on the inherent weakness of Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. This is now from Mr. Lattimore, is it, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is still from Mr. Lattimore's letter:

If an authority of the standing of Stein makes a case as strong as this in an article on the weakness of Japan, should the instinctive response be "what is on the Japanese side?" Should it not be "If this is true, how does it affect Australian interests?"

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence as the next exhibit the letter just read from by Mr. Mandel.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 87," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 87

300 GILMAN HALL, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., February 6, 1939.

Dr. W. MACMAHON BALL,

*Austral-Asiatic Bulletin,
Melbourne, C. 2, Australia.*

DEAR BALL: To my unspeakable chagrin I have missed a cog. I made a mental note that your boat sailed on February 9, and was going to catch you by air mail. Today I had the article ready for mailing and on turning up my written note found that you had sailed on February 1. I am terribly ashamed of this as I like to make a point of hitting my assignments on the nose.

Anyhow I am sending the article herewith by air mail to Los Angeles, hoping it will catch a fast mail from there. If it arrives too late, has to be held over an issue, and thereby gets out of date, throw it in the wastebasket and blame me.

I am sending a carbon copy to E. C. Carter, who may overhaul the original with a fast letter to you asking you not to publish. I am making a general practice of submitting everything I write to Carter so that he can reprove me whenever I say anything unbecoming a propagandist and a gentleman.

Following up our conversation at lunch, I have read the December-January issue of the Bulletin, the latest to arrive here. This issue contains an example of what I shall rudely call exaggerated neutrality. Guenther Stein, who is by long odds the best economic journalist in the Far East, writes an article on the inherent weakness of Japan. One of your editors hastened to soften the shock and to avoid any impression that the Bulletin is anti-Japanese by writing an

article in which he seeks to prove that there is a lot to be said on the other side. The impression thus created is that the war in the Far East is no business of Australians. Australians can look at it from a safe distance and say "Well, well, how interesting. A lot to be said on both sides, evidently."

Is this true? If an authority of the standing of Stein makes a case as strong as this in an article on the weakness of Japan, should the instinctive response be "What is to be said on the Japanese side?" Should it not be "If this is true, how does it affect Australian interests?" For the fact of the matter is that you in Australia and we in America have the same kind of interest in the outcome of this war. We are not distant and disinterested spectators. A victory for Japan would mean one kind of world, in which we should be vitally interested. A victory for China would mean another kind of world, in which we should also be vitally interested. I am distressed at the lack of realization of this in both America and Australia. We keep balancing "what can be said for China" with "what can be said for Japan" dodging the really important questions, which are "Where do we come in, or where do we get out?"

As far as the Bulletin is concerned, all of this is none of my business. Consider, therefore, that the seat of my pants presents a broad target, and deliver me a long-distance kick in the middle thereof at your leisure.

I hope we'll be meeting again.

Very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. General Willoughby, I understand that there is a slight conflict here in the date of Guenther Stein's arrest in Paris. Apparently the testimony conflicts. You said last spring, and again I think you said in 1950.

General WILLOUGHBY. Of course, I am not a walking file case, naturally, having this type of information at my fingertips.

Have you got a translation which I will identify as having been made by me? That is a message from the French Ambassador to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we have that, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. That will give you the date. It must have been this spring.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, we will get that, General.

General WILLOUGHBY. The INS carried it as a news item. I am so impressed with the accuracy of intelligence reporting by journalistic professionals that I consider their reportage as always a part of my evidence. So if you cannot locate it there, I know of an INS dispatch at that time. It must have been around February, I should say, offhand speaking.

If the INS hasn't got it, then I am sure AP has. If not, Mr. Bett.

Mr. MORRIS. While we are getting that, General, I would like to ask you about certain leaders of the IPR who were active at headquarters during the war.

During last Tuesday's session, General, we had testimony from Prof. Karl Wittfogel that T. A. Bisson was a member of the Communist Party when Dr. Wittfogel knew him back in 1935—I think the date was.

Do you know that Mr. Bisson was assigned to your headquarters and served there until 1948, General Willoughby?

General WILLOUGHBY. I have a recollection that Bisson was a Department of Army civilian employee in one of the civil sections of SCAP, probably the Government section, in the period 1946-48.

Here again the exact dates you have to indulge the fact that I do not have the details of every investigative case at my fingertips.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask a question, if I might, please.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. General, are you under the same ban as other witnesses who came here, that they are unable to testify in relation to personnel files and so-called loyalty files?

General WILLOUGHBY. I am.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, your lips are closed to this committee and you are unable to give to this committee anything in relation to a personnel file?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So if there is or is not a personnel file and its contents on any of these people that we are talking about in the United States Government, the people cannot learn through this committee what that file shows, or anything that is in that file, or your knowledge as to that file; is that correct?

General WILLOUGHBY. Will you permit me, Mr. Chairman, as this is a question of administrative significance, that I answer that in my way?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; you may answer it your way. I do not call for a yes or no answer. I just want the evidence. I want the facts.

General WILLOUGHBY. The point was brought up by the counsel yesterday in which he requested from me information on Mr. T. A. Bisson, one Miriam Farley, and one Grajdanzev, who has since changed his name to Grad.

Mr. MORRIS. And they, General, are people who have been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations, are they?

General WILLOUGHBY. I realize that.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were employed at your headquarters, who were assigned to your headquarters by executive authority in the United States?

General WILLOUGHBY. Correct. They were hired in the States and unloaded on Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. I think the word "unloaded" may enable us to draw some conclusions from that word.

General WILLOUGHBY. In which case, Mr. Chairman, you must permit me an editorial rescission.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I understand that.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would like to put it this way: Mr. Chairman, as a citizen, I am naturally most desirous to assist this important committee. However, as a Federal officer, I am expected to observe Army orders and Presidential directives.

I invite your attention to a Department of Army circular letter dated August 21, 1948, on the subject, Release of Personnel Records and Information. I quote:

No information of any sort relating to the employee's loyalty and no investigative data of any type, whether relating to loyalty or other aspects of the individual's record, shall be included in material submitted to a congressional committee.

The provision of the Presidential directive of March 13, 1949, I intended to apply to records of former employees as well as persons now in the Federal service.

These people, Bisson, Farley, Grajdanzev, fall under the category of former employees.

Still quoting the regulation :

Any individual who may appear as a witness before a congressional committee will respectfully decline to testify concerning the loyalty of any person or as to the contents of any investigative files and will state that he is forbidden to answer such questions by pertinent directives of the Army.

Senator WATKINS. I take it, General, that the order of that directive is not classified.

General WILLOUGHBY. No. The basis is the Presidential directive of 13th of March 1948.

You can find it in Bulletin No. 6, Department of the Army, on the 17th of March 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. We have had high military officers and others quote the same in the hearings where the present Chair was chairman.

In other words, you are unable to give us this information?

General WILLOUGHBY. Based on the precise wording of this.

Senator FERGUSON. I shall, however, ask the chairman of this subcommittee if he will not again ask the President to allow this committee to have access, through you or someone else, to personnel files in relation to activities of certain people whose names are brought to the attention of the committee, particularly those connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to show that I join in that request.

General WILLOUGHBY. May I add the following?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I desire to further clarify my position in this matter and say that the personnel files and records are within the purview of Counterintelligence.

While this investigation unit, like the Four Hundred and Forty-first CIC in Tokyo, is a subdivision of G-2, my personal and prior attention was concentrated on the Korean War effort and on military intelligence in the Far East.

Ultimately you must obtain information from officers whose sole business it was to develop and maintain personnel investigations.

I am, of course, not familiar with the details of literally thousands of file references or case histories.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently the same rule applies not only to personnel files and those that have been employed, but it applied to Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field, who made an application for a position as an official in the Intelligence Branch of the United States Military Service.

The present Chair asked for that file, and all that is in it is merely a medical report, but no application for the position or letters of recommendation, or anything else. Nothing is in the file except a medical report.

Senator WATKINS. That is notwithstanding evidence to the fact that numerous other persons had made statements referring to said letters.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; notwithstanding their testimony.

I want to express my opinion to the witness, the able general in Intelligence, that he does feel that he is bound by a Presidential and a military superior order, and he has given the reason for not giving this information and not answering these questions, that I accept his explanation.

But that does not prevent me, as a Senator and temporary chairman, from advocating to the chairman and to the counsel that we again, in behalf of the people of the United States, ask for this information, because I think it is valuable to our internal security and our defense.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in this connection, I would like to point out that the reason we are asking for these particular three files is that Mr. T. A. Bisson, Miss Miriam Farley, and Mr. Andrew Grad have been active people in the Institute of Pacific Relations, who in addition were assigned to General Willoughby's headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will further identify from the exhibits already introduced, and letters that we may introduce now, something about the identity of those three people.

Senator FERGUSON. I might say in reply to that that is true, and it is always our duty, as members of this committee, to produce all the evidence we can outside of what the official records show, which would aid us greatly.

But it creates an impossible burden on many occasions upon this committee to complete its investigation.

Senator WATKINS. This record is from the letters taken from the IPR files, is it?

Mr. MORRIS. Some of the letters and some from exhibits already introduced, Senator.

Mr. MANDEL. It has been previously introduced that the Windows On the Pacific biennial report of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, dated 1944 to 1946, on page 11, refers to T. A. Bisson, of the international secretariat.

Another exhibit previously introduced was a letter to Mr. Bisson from Wilma Fairbank, dated October 19, 1943, which referred to Mr. Bisson as the acting editor of Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. So he was a member of the secretariat as well as the acting editor of the Pacific Affairs before he was assigned to General Willoughby's headquarters in Tokyo?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Grajdanzev?

Senator WATKINS. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. MANDEL. The date of the letter was October 19, 1943, and the date of the report was 1944-46.

Mr. MORRIS. They have already been introduced, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. You may proceed.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated November 26, 1941, addressed to Mr. Robert K. Straus, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y., from Robert W. Barnett.

I read a portion of this letter which refers to Mr. Grajdanzev:

A month ago one department of the United States Government, and then later three departments, asked the institute for a monograph on the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway together with a full analysis of the differentials in east to western movement of goods, the location of repair shops and round houses, the various points where congestion occurs, etc. Mr. Grajdanzev prepared a monograph which has been hailed in three Government departments as far more accurate than anything which they themselves could have prepared. This is just a sample of the kind of work which the institute is able to do and explains why the governments in this and other countries are so eager to get the services of members of the institute staff.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman, and have that marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 88," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 88

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

Mr. ROBERT K. STRAUS,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. STRAUS: In response to your request for me to do so, I have tried to set down in this letter how the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations has risen to the demands of the national emergency.

From the Army, Navy, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Department of Commerce, the Administrator of Export Control, and the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supplies have come repeated calls for assistance which have been fulfilled by our research staff. Owen Lattimore, as you know, the editor of Pacific Affairs, was loaned to serve, on the nomination of President Roosevelt, as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's personal political adviser. We loaned first to the Universal Trading Corp. and then to the American, British, and Chinese Governments Ch'ao-ting Chi to serve as Secretary General of the A. B. C. Currency Stabilization Fund. We are glad that the War Department has recognized the ability of our expert on the Netherlands East Indies, Miss Ellen van Zyll de Jong, by giving her a research appointment. We assisted in arranging that Irving Friedman, a former member of the Secretariat, enter the division of monetary research of the Treasury Department. William W. Lockwood, on temporary leave, has worked as secretary of the American Committee for International Studies, and simultaneously for General Maxwell's and for Colonel Donovan's offices in Washington, but recently has taken over the secretaryship of the American Council. Both Mr. Carter and I have been invited to serve on the staff of the office of the Coordinator of Information, but have remained here because the necessity for popular education and private research seemed now more urgent.

A month ago one department of the United States Government, and then later three departments, asked the institute for a monograph on the carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway together with a full analysis of the differentials in east to western movement of goods, the location of repair shops and round-houses, the various points where congestion occurs, etc. Mr. Grajdanzev prepared a monograph which has been hailed in three government departments as far more accurate than anything which they themselves could have prepared. This is just a sample of the kind of work which the institute is able to do and explains why the governments in this and other countries are so eager to get the services of members of the institute staff.

Our service to governments has not, happily, lessened thus far our aid to business groups, the press, and university and secondary-school circles. The demands for institute services from all these groups is greater than ever before. We provided indispensable information to the Fortune staff as it prepared its far eastern issue. We have assisted teachers' organizations to carry out their far eastern projects. We have set up some 13 regional conferences. Under the leadership of Catherine Porter, Miriam Farley, Dorothy Berg, and Kurt Bloch, a greatly enlivened Far Eastern Survey reaches a wider and more attentive audience. We broadcast weekly over CBS. We are publishing inexpensive pamphlets, among them Showdown at Singapore, Philippine Emergency, Japan Strikes South, Our Far Eastern Record, American Aid to China, and the Soviet Far East.

In the international field only in France and Holland has the work of the institute been curtailed. The Royal Institute in London has recently augmented its studies of the Far East and the far-eastern program of the Canadian and Australian institutes is more fundamental and better supported than at any period in the past.

You will agree with me, I feel sure, that the reasons which led to your support of the American Council last year are doubly valid now. May I suggest that you raise your 1940 contribution of \$25 to \$50 for 1941-42? This may prove to be the year of the long-awaited Japanese-American war—or, of Japan's surrender to ABCD economic pressure. Either development will greatly increase the

American Council's responsibilities to our Government and to the American public.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT W. BARNETT.

Senator FERGUSON. For the purpose of explaining to the members of the committee, who are Mr. Straus and this man Barnett?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Straus is of no significance in this instance, Senator, but Mr. Barnett served as secretary of the Washington office, I believe, and is now an important official of the United States State Department.

Senator WATKINS. Do the records show that?

Mr. MORRIS. In other places, Senator.

As I say, at this point we say that Mr. Straus has no significance in this.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated July 10, 1941, addressed to Lt. Col. Frederick D. Sharp, room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Our research has shown that Colonel Sharp was at that time connected with Military Intelligence.

The letter states:

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: I am sorry for the delay in answering your questions on the Siberian railways. I had hoped to put one of my colleagues at work on it, but his schedule has been a little dislocated through learning that his father and two other members of his family were killed in the German bombing of Belgrade.

Instead, I have asked another of my colleagues, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev, to turn up as much material as possible. Without sources he has drafted the enclosed very tentative memorandum, a copy of which I enclose.

Neither he nor I wish you to regard this interim report as authentic or definitive. To give you anything really satisfactory will take about 12 days of very thorough research. Mr. Grajdanzev and I hope we can send you something to meet your requirements not later than July 22. Will that be too late for your purposes?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Then there is another letter addressed to a Mr. Thurber. No initial is given. It is under date of July 23, 1941, addressed to the same address, room 811, 1207 Sixth Avenue, which was the office at that time of Military Intelligence:

My colleague, Andrew Grajdanzev, has handed me the first draft of his notes on the Trans-Siberian Railway. I have not had an opportunity to check through this, nor have I had any of my other colleagues check on it. However, knowing that you are in a hurry for this first draft, I am sending it over today and will send you any corrections as soon as they reach my desk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Finally, I have a letter to Mr. Carter, Edward C. Carter, dated July 24, 1941, from Lt. Col. Frederick D. Sharp, G. S. C.:

DEAR MR. CARTER: I have received the report on the Trans-Siberian Railroad drawn up so ably by your colleague, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev.

To thank both you and him in proportion to its value would be difficult. May it suffice to say that our own researches are at an end with such a reference source, and that Mr. Thurber, of my office, will be sorely tempted to draw on your knowledge of industries and raw materials east of the Urals, which is the next goal.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received in evidence and marked the next consecutive exhibits.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 89, 90, and 91," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 89

NEW YORK, N. Y., July 10, 1941.

Lt. Col. FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,¹
New York, N.Y.

DEAR COLONEL SHARP: I am sorry for the delay in answering your questions on the Siberian railways. I had hoped to put one of my colleagues at work on it, but his schedule has been a little dislocated through learning that his father and two other members of his family were killed in the German bombing of Belgrade.

Instead, I have asked another of my colleagues, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev, to turn up as much material as possible. With sources he has drafted the enclosed very tentative memorandum, a copy of which I enclose.

Neither he nor I wish you to regard this interim report as authentic or definitive. To give you anything really satisfactory will take about 12 days of very thorough research. Mr. Grajdanzev and I hope we can send you something to meet your requirements not later than July 22. Will that be too late for your purposes?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 90

NEW YORK CITY, July 23, 1941.

Mr. THURBER,
Room 811, 1270 Sixth Avenue,
New York City.

DEAR Mr. THURBER: My colleague Andrew Grajdanzev has handed me the first draft on his notes on the Trans-Siberian Railway. I have not had an opportunity to check through this, nor have I had any of my other colleagues check on it. However, knowing that you are in a hurry for this first draft I am sending it over today and will send you any corrections as soon as they reach my desk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 91

NEW YORK, N.Y., July 24, 1941.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.

DEAR Mr. CARTER: I have received the report on the Trans-Siberian Railroad drawn up so ably by your colleague, Mr. Andrew Grajdanzev.

To thank both you and him in proportion to its value would be difficult. May it suffice to say that our own researches are at an end with such a reference source, and that Mr. Thurber, of my office, will be sorely tempted to draw on your knowledge of industries and raw materials east of the Urals, which is the next goal.

Gratefully yours,

FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.

Mr. MANDEL. I have another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 3, 1942, addressed to Mr. George H. Kerr, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.:

DEAR Mr. KERR: Thank you for your letter of April 2 about Grajdanzev's report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy

¹ New York Office, Military Intelligence.

of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments, and if there are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that you let me know in the next day or two, as we may want to insert an errata slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactory set of proofs.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Finally, on April 2, 1942, George H. Kerr writes to William L. Holland, on the stationery of the War Department, War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Room 2628, Munitions Building:

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of further writing.

Some weeks ago there came to our MID files—and my Formosa section—a set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinarily good work, which I first saw briefly in your office and now have read thoroughly. No covering letter came with it to me and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our files. If it is not a loan, I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan, I shall keep it intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We live very largely on loans these days.

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few very minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.

With every good wish,

GEORGE H. KERR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I think that will suffice for Mr. Grajdanzev, who, as the record will show, has now changed his name to Mr. Grad.

Mr. Chairman, we offer that letter from Mr. Holland to Mr. Kerr, and the letter from Mr. Kerr to Mr. Holland, as the next consecutive exhibits.

Senator FERGUSON. They will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 92 and 93," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 92

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.,

April 3, 1942.

Mr. GEORGE H. KERR,

Military Intelligence Division, War Department,

Room 2628, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. KERR: Thank you for your letter of April 2 about Grajdanzev's report on Formosa. Under separate cover I am sending you an advance copy of the book which is now being bound. I have already sent copies to Remer in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and to Bisson on the Board of Economic Warfare.

Both Grajdanzev and I would be glad to have your comments, and if there are any points which you think should definitely be corrected I would suggest that you let me know in the next day or two, as we may want to insert an errata

slip in the book. The book itself is unfortunately a makeshift piece of manufacturing because we had to work with an incomplete and unsatisfactorily set of proofs.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

EXHIBIT No. 93

WAR DEPARTMENT, GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2,
Washington, April 2, 1942.

Mr. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I regret that my sudden coming to Washington in February precluded further talks with you about Formosa, to say nothing of further writing.

Some weeks ago there came to our MID files—and my Formosa Section—a set of galley sheets of Dr. Grajdanzev's extraordinarily good work, which I first saw briefly in your office and now read thoroughly. No covering letter came with it to me, and so it is not clear whether this is a loan or a final gift to our files. If it is not a loan, I shall be free to divide it according to subjects and distribute it among my folders. If it is a loan, I shall keep it intact and forward it to you as soon as some of the statistical material can be digested. We live very largely on loans these days.

Please tell Professor Grajdanzev that it will give me great pleasure some day to talk with him. His work is certainly excellent. There are only a few very minor suggestions I might make, none of first importance.

Have the added chapter or chapters on strategy been set up? I would not be free to add anything attributable to my sources here, but I would be glad to read through the chapter again to make sure that some errors in judgment have not crept in. Needless to say, such checking must be done anonymously.

With every good wish,

GEORGE H. KERR.

My residence address: 2700 Wisconsin Avenue NW.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder, Mr. Mandel, if you can just tell us briefly who Miss Farley is, in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and possibly one letter indicating that she was looking forward to her activity in Tokyo?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an excerpt from the volume entitled "Security in the Pacific," a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, at Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945.

On page 159 Miriam S. Farley is listed as having participated in the conferences of 1936, 1939, and 1942. She is listed here also as an editor of the American Council Pamphlet Series, research associate, American Council, IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. She was the editor of the Far Eastern Survey; was she not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. We offer that document as the next exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 94" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 94

[From Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945]

CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP, UNITED STATES

Miriam S. Farley (1936, 1939, 1942), editor, American Council Pamphlet Series, research associate, American Council, IPR (p. 159).

(Years in parentheses after names indicate attendance at previous IPR conferences.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have here another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated April 8, 1946, addressed to "Dear Bill."

Senator FERGUSON. Who could "Bill" be?

Mr. MANDEL. It may be William L. Holland, or William W. Lockwood.

I read only the last paragraph, as follows:

I've been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's Monthly report. There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

Yours,

MIRIAM.

This is addressed from "M. S. Farley, GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A. P. O. 500, Care Postmaster, San Francisco."

Senator FERGUSON. This would indicate that on April 8, 1946, Miriam whose name was—what?

Mr. MANDEL. Farley.

Mr. MORRIS. Miriam S. Farley?

Senator FERGUSON. "M. S. Farley, GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A.P.O. 500, care of Postmaster, San Francisco." She was then a Government employee on General MacArthur's staff and she was writing to someone in the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this is in the file and you obtained it from that file, and the paragraph was as she had written it.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You have identified this from the files; have you not, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was that personnel file that we were asking the general about that we might get some information from. That is correct; is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I will receive the whole letter because we do not want to take a section out of context.

Mr. MORRIS. The whole letter is introduced into evidence and will be marked as the next consecutive exhibit number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 95," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 95

APRIL 8, 1946.

DEAR BILL: Matsuo asked me to send this on to you after I had read it. It is a report which he did for the political adviser's office, and is not for publication.

I saw Yasuo last week. He looks well though much older, and is working 10 hours a day as editor of the English edition of Jiji Press. He has a year-and-a-half-old son. He told quite a tale of the days of the surrender. It seems he was instrumental in breaking the story of the first note (accepting Potsdam terms on condition that Emperor, etc.). Domei, with which he then was, got hold of the note somehow from the Foreign Office and was not authorized to make it public. After consultation between Yasuo and his chief, they did so nevertheless—put it on the radio. Within half an hour they got a reaction from San Francisco. Then the Kernpietal (Gendarmerie) descended on them and they had quite a rough time for 3 days. Y.'s chief was locked up for a while. To cover themselves they claimed to have gotten the story from the Moscow radio.

I've been put to work doing the political section of MacArthur's monthly report. There will be a certain sporting interest in seeing how much I can get by with.

Yours,

MIRIAM.

M. S. FARLEY,

GHQ, SCAP, Government Section, A. P. O. 500, care of Postmaster, San Francisco.

P. S.—I forgot to say that Yasuo wanted to be remembered to you, Phil Lillienthal, and others at the IPR.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we do not want to restrict our request for files to those particular people.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that. The request may be in connection with all that you may list.

MR. MORRIS. That are other particular people about whom we would also like a file, because we understand that there are such files in the Tokyo headquarters.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. I think this would be a sufficient example and this will be the last we will cite, Hugh Deane, who was an active member of the IPR.

MR. MANDEL. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Hugh Deane, Radio News Room, Coordinator of Information, Washington, D. C., January 12, 1942, and signed by Miriam Farley:

It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us; we are standing on our heads.

MR. MORRIS. And that was addressed to Mr. Hugh Deane at the Office of the Coordinator of Information?

MR. MANDEL. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. And what was the date?

MR. MANDEL. January 12, 1942.

MR. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced in the record, Mr. Chairman, as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 96" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 96

JANUARY 12, 1942.

MR. HUGH DEANE,

*Radio News Room, Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR HUGH: It is good to know that you are working in our propaganda department because I know that you have a lot to contribute to it. I am passing on your letter to several of my colleagues, including Bill Lockwood, and you will probably be getting lots of suggestions from us. If you don't keep after us; we are standing on our heads.

One rather obvious suggestion that occurs to me offhand is to plug Hull's note of November 26 and other American statements such as our note of December 1938 indicating that the United States was always willing to consider the peaceful alteration of the status quo including economic concessions to Japan. "We made you a fair offer but your military leaders rejected it and chose war," etc. Another rather obvious line which has doubtless already occurred to you is, "the Nazis are not your friends, they look down on the Japanese race and are just using you for their own purposes." This can be backed up by quotations from Nazi writings, the kind of thing that is found in the special section of Asia magazine for November 1941.

For our part we shall of course be much interested to know the kind of stuff that our Government is broadcasting to Japan. Would it be possible for us to obtain a file of transcripts of these broadcasts? It seems to me that it would be a very good thing if at a little later date the Far Eastern Survey could carry a short article describing American propaganda to Japan providing that this is consistent to the policy of your department.

You will be interested to know, in case you have not already heard, that we are about to open an office in Washington for the purpose of keeping in touch with all of the various departments of the Government which are working on the Far East. Bob Barnett is to be in charge and some of the rest of us will doubtless get down occasionally. I know that Bob will want to look you up as soon as he gets established.

I am passing your order for the Far Eastern Survey on to the subscription department.

Sincerely yours,

MIRIAM FARLEY.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the record also to show that previous exhibits have described Mr. Hugh Deane as the editor of a publication now being circulated and printed in Shanghai, which is Communist China.

Hugh Deane was listed as an associate editor of the Shanghai Monthly Bulletin, which is now published from Shanghai.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know how long he has been connected in that capacity in Shanghai?

Mr. MORRIS. No. We have just introduced particular volumes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FERGUSON. Hugh Deane was so associated in Communist China?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, at the time China was under Communist control.

Mr. Chairman, we have planned to introduce many more exhibits, such as those we have just introduced, but in consideration of the fact that the general is here and has been here all morning, I think we would like to discontinue the hearing at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to ask the general something. I know he has been ill.

Mr. MORRIS. The general has one more thing.

Senator FERGUSON. He has been ill, but I want to ask him one more question.

General, in your experience in the Far East, have you found that the policies of communism, the Communist Party line, has been affecting in any way United States relations with and in the Far East?

General WILLOUGHBY. If I interpret your question correctly, Senator, you want me to give you a statement of the impact of communism on the Far East, with particular reference to Japan?

Senator FERGUSON. No. The United States and its relations in the Far East.

General WILLOUGHBY. Perhaps it is the fatigue, or the late morning hour, but would you mind stating that again, sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Here is what I want to find out, if you can give me the information: If you have seen any evidence of communism, as practiced by Russia, and the principles of communism in the Far East, having any bearing or relations to our policies, American policies, in the Far East?

General WILLOUGHBY. I will try to give you a series of perhaps disconnected comments, hoping that at the end the mosaic will become clear.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say that the impact of communism, as practiced by the Russians, of course, is by now pretty well known. It affects all Communist parties in all countries. It affects the Japanese Communist Party, and inferentially, of course, created a problem for the occupation forces, that is, America as exemplified by the occupation forces, in which we had either to take a stand or support the Japanese Government in taking a stand against the Japanese Communist Party and what it stood for.

We felt that that party was not a national party at all. It has no political independence or identity, that it took its orders from the master mind, the Politburo, like so many other Communist parties of national origin.

We felt that if we could not maintain American predominance in the sense of political ideals, that someone else would move in; that if we create a vacuum in the Far East, that that vacuum, on the basis of pure applied physics, would be filled by someone.

That someone is Soviet Russia.

Then we talk about the problems of the Far East now and in the past 10 years. We really mean the corrosive influence exercised by the power politics of the Soviet against and upon neighboring areas.

You had that example in what they have done to North Korea, liberated by us in 1945, and within a space of 5 years, converted to a warlike opponent of the United States.

You have seen the same thing in China. And unless the American policy is firm along this outpost of western civilization, that runs from, roughly, Alaska through Japan, through the Philippines, down to and including the British and Indonesian areas; if we create or permit the development of a vacuum there, that great and sinister power will move into it as it has moved into it on other occasions.

Whether that falls within the purview of a calculated policy by the United States, in that case the policy of our Government, I am not in a position to comment in either approving or disapproving manner.

But to any student of a geographical strategic problems, we must accept that the western frontier runs roughly from British Malaya through Siam, through Indochina, where there is an active front in Chungking; through the Philippines and the island chain leading ultimately to Alaska.

That is an opinion which is a blend of geopolitical military strategic factors, predicated on the raw materials which we must seize or not permit to fall into opposing hands.

In other words, it is a global problem of such complexity that it is probably difficult to answer in a brief summation statement.

And I may be disappointing to you, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. No; I am glad to get that opinion.

I would like to have this answered: We found that there was an attempt to get Guenther Stein's works that he had written, to exert an influence. We find from this evidence that he was and is a Communist and was a Russian spy as a Communist.

Do you find any evidence that the writings of such people have had an influence upon America's foreign policy in the Far East?

I cite merely his writings as one example that he was writing here these many articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

General WILLOUGHBY. I will attempt to give you a reply considering the moral importance of this committee, or any congressional committee, which earnestly seeks to arrive at demonstrable facts, and it is within the obligation of citizenship, immigrant or otherwise, to assist those committees.

In an appraisal of my reply, which I am developing as I go along, you must discount my absence from the United States since 1938. I am a sort of oriental Rip Van Winkle, who is returning now in a series of shattering disillusion.

But I will say that, in general, your thesis that that type of writing is corrosive, objectionable, deteriorating to public opinion, cannot be challenged, and I agree with you. I think that there is a deliberate attempt to circulate, to public relation, to sell this type of book by every channel which these people are capable of, and I again refer to the illuminating article of Irene Kuhn in the American Legion, and Ralph Toledano's in Mercury, which are some of the outstanding articles that I have read since my return from abroad; that they show how that type of book is promoted, supported, book reviewed in calculated channels of subversion, while other books which would establish a balance of judgment are suppressed, belittled, criticized.

So in general terms, taking Stein or Smedley, or the ubiquitous Grajdanzev, to build up their stuff as the last word in reliable, technical, and expert information is part of a pattern of conversion of the mind, which is going on, and has been going on apparently for some time.

Does that answer your question?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, it does; because we get from the file of the Institute of Pacific Relations, June 24, 1942, "W. W. L. to E. C. C." and "W. L. H.", a further comment:

On circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington: When I mentioned it to John Fairbank he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his Chinese staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his officer might be asked to trade certain information in return.

And I underscore:

John suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return.

It continues:

I am leaving the matter to you to handle, however.

Mr. MORRIS. John Fairbank, Mr. Chairman, was head of the China desk of OWI at the time.

General WILLOUGHBY. I would say, as an interested bystander, that this letter is almost conclusive and highly indicative of the techniques that they employ in recommending each other and disseminating their work.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you mean Communist work?

General WILLOUGHBY. People that range from communism to fellow traveling, befuddled liberals, and whatever that category that has been described so often in the current press reports.

Senator FERGUSON. In your work in the Far East, you naturally came in contact with Communists and their activities, and that is

the reason that I asked you the question, because I know that you could not perform your functions as a general in the United States Intelligence Service, major general, without having contact and experience. I know that your opinion will be of great value to this committee.

Now, General, you had something you wanted to present.

Mr. MORRIS. This clears up, Mr. Chairman, a conflict that may have come into the testimony earlier, about the time of Guenther Stein's arrest in Paris. The general has an official document there which he will identify and which will be introduced into the record.

General WILLOUGHBY. I will act as assistant to the counsel to file this. It is a message from the French Embassy to me in response to a query on the whereabouts and activities of Guenther Stein. In order to preserve its authenticity I will read it in its original French, and give you the translation immediately.

Entre en France dans le courant de 1949, Guenther Stein a obtenu le 18 octobre de la même année une carte de correspondant de l'Hindustani Times, quotidien de New Delhi.

* * * Entered France during 1949, Guenther Stein obtained, on the 18th of October of the same year, an identification card as accredited correspondent of the Hindustani Times, which is a daily of New Delhi.

A son arrivée, il a produit un passeport délivré le 2 septembre 1941 par les autorités de Hong Kong, ville où il avait été naturalisé citoyen britannique le 6 août 1941.

At his arrival, he produced a passport, which he obtained on the 2d of September 1941, through the authorities of Hong Kong, the town where he obtained naturalization papers, as a British citizen, on August 6, 1941.

Il a été expulsé de France pour espionnage, en vertu d'un arrêté du 14 novembre 1950 et s'est dirigé sur l'Angleterre.

He was expelled from France for espionage—

The term is "espionage"—

following his arrest on the 14th of November 1950 and apparently left for England.

Il est probable qu'il se trouve encore actuellement dans ce pays.

It is likely that he at this time is actually in that country.

Mr. MORRIS. Who signed that, General?

General WILLOUGHBY. It has no signature because it is a carbon copy, but I will identify it as a report from the French Embassy in Tokyo to me.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have it introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit, having been identified by General Willoughby.

Senator FERGUSON. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 97" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 97

NOTE

Confidential

Entré en France dans le courant de 1949, Guenther Stein a obtenu le 18 octobre de la même année une carte de correspondant de l' "Hindustani Times," quotidien de New Delhi.

A son arrivée, il a produit un passeport délivré le 2 septembre 1941 par les autorités de Hong Kong, ville où il avait été naturalisé citoyen britannique le 6 août 1941.

Il a été expulsé de France pour espionnage, en vertu d'un arrêté du 14 novembre 1950 et s'est dirigé sur l'Angleterre.

Il est probable qu'il se trouve encore actuellement dans ce pays.

GUENTHER STEIN

Translation:

Entered France during 1949, Guenther Stein received a press card for the Hindustani Times, a daily of New Déphi on October 18 of the same year.

On his arrival, he produced a passport issued on September 2 1941, by the Authorities of Hong Kong, the city where he obtained naturalization papers, as a British citizen, dated August 6, 1941.

He was expelled from France, on a charge of espionage, following his arrest on November 14, 1950, and has left for England. It is probable that he is actually in that country.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I want to thank you for coming before us this morning. I realize that there has been some handicap by virtue of Executive order. I hope that it is not found that you have violated any of the sections of that order and that, as the chairman has expressed, it is this committee's desire that there be no retaliation against any Government employee for testifying before this committee.

Again I want to thank you. I know that you have been ill. We appreciate your coming down. We regret the length of the session.

General WILLOUGHBY. Not at all.

Senator FERGUSON. We will recess now. I do not want to say that we are through with your examination, because we may call you at another time.

We will meet again at 10 o'clock on Tuesday. Counsel will tell you as to whether or not you are desired.

Again I want to tell you that we appreciate your coming down.

General WILLOUGHBY. Glad to be of service.

(Thereupon, at 12:55 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Tuesday, August 14, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Miss Bentley, will you stand and be sworn, please?

You do solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Miss BENTLEY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

TESTIMONY OF ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY, CLINTON, CONN.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the stenographer, please?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, my full name is Elizabeth T. Bentley.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you speak loudly enough so that all can hear you, please?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. My address is Clinton, Conn.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, I wonder if you would tell us briefly of your formal education.

Miss BENTLEY. I have an A. B. degree from Vassar College, a master's degree from Columbia University, and a year's study at the university in Florence, Italy.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first join the Communist Party of the United States?

Miss BENTLEY. In the middle of March 1935.

Mr. MORRIS. How long did you stay in the open Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. The so-called open Communist Party, that is, where I was attached to a unit of some twenty-odd people, for 3½ years up until about October 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. You say about 3½ years?

Miss BENTLEY. About 3½ years.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you then discontinue all connection with the Communist Party, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I went with what they called the underground; that is, I was working for an Italian Fascist contact. I was put under a person under whom I worked.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were working for the Italian Fascist Party, you had infiltrated?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. From there you went into what?

Miss BENTLEY. I was put in contact with one person to whom I reported.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Miss BENTLEY. Jacob Golos, G-o-l-o-s.

Mr. MORRIS. Jacob Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was his position?

Miss BENTLEY. He was quite high up in the NKVD, which is the OGPU. He was also a member of the three-man control commission.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was a member of a three-man control commission of the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. That is practically the outfit that runs the American Communist Party. They are the disciplinary committee that can take action against the members.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know who the other two members were at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know offhand. It's on record some place.

Mr. MORRIS. But you know he was one of three men?

Miss BENTLEY. He was one of three men.

Mr. MORRIS. You say he was also connected with the NKVD?

Miss BENTLEY. He had been connected with it as far back as the early twenties.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the NKVD?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't think I know what it means in Russian, but it's the internal security police, translated. It includes all of the Soviet espionage work whether military intelligence or rounding up the recalcitrants.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, it is the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. That is right, operating abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Abroad, from the Soviet Union?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You say Golos was a representative of the NKVD for the Soviet Union?

Miss BENTLEY. And a high-up one.

Mr. MORRIS. And a high-up one?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us the nature of your assignment with Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, after I had left the Italian Library of Information, which was the Italian Fascist outfit I mentioned, I stayed on with Mr. Golos as my contact, doing odd jobs for him. Finally the odd jobs came into contacting undercover Communists to get information. It started with a gentleman by the name of Abraham Brothman. He was doing espionage work.

Mr. MORRIS. He is the man who recently was convicted in New York?

Miss BENTLEY. He was recently convicted in New York for obstructing justice.

Mr. MORRIS. You were a witness in that case?

Miss BENTLEY. I was a witness in that case.

It gradually worked up to picking up people who were working for the United States Government and gathering information.

Mr. MORRIS. While you had that job, I wonder if you would describe what your relation was to Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. I never dealt with Mr. Browder until after Mr. Golos' death, at which time I took over his job.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your relation?

Miss BENTLEY. I was the boss, and he took the orders on intelligence matters.

Mr. MORRIS. On intelligence matters?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. If we wanted people to run cover businesses for agents, he would provide them. In one case that I recall a Soviet intelligence agent was about to be drafted into the Army, and he was to contact the NMU fraction—that is, the Communist group in the union—and get him shifted into the merchant marine.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

Miss BENTLEY. 1944—the beginning of 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. Who would you contact to get him shifted to the merchant marine?

Miss BENTLEY. I didn't do that; it was his job.

Senator FERGUSON. That was his job?

Miss BENTLEY. That was his job.

Senator FERGUSON. At that time Browder was the head of the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Browder was the head of the American Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. Since then he is not connected in your opinion with the American Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. I doubt if he is connected with the American Communist Party?

Senator FERGUSON. What about the International Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. What gives you that opinion?

Miss BENTLEY. He was in 1946, and I see no reason to change my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you were the assistant to Mr. Golos from what year?

Miss BENTLEY. From the middle of October 1938 until his death in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. So for that 5-year period you were the assistant to Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened upon the death of Golos?

Miss BENTLEY. Upon the death of Golos, because evidently no plans had been made within the secret police, I took over his job temporarily.

Senator FERGUSON. Was his death from natural causes?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he died of a heart attack. He had an extremely bad heart.

Mr. MORRIS. So at that time, after you had succeeded Golos, your relationship to Browder would be that of his superior in intelligence work?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know about the Institute of Pacific Relations at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I did vaguely before 1943, but much more closely starting with the summer of 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. What were your dealings with the Institute of Pacific Relations and concerning the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, it happened rather by accident. I had better go back a little bit on that and mention that in February, I think it was 1941, we took on a new Communist agent, and that was Mary Price, who at that time was secretary to Walter Lippmann. The Soviet Intelligence felt that Lippmann had valuable material in his files, and therefore we had taken her on to get us copies of it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get copies?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, we got complete copies—or so, at least, she told us.

Senator FERGUSON. You know you got some copies?

Miss BENTLEY. We got a tremendous amount. I know I went down one time and typed a pile like that [indicating].

Mr. MORRIS. When you say “came down,” what do you mean by that?

Miss BENTLEY. From New York to Washington. I was living in New York, and I would come down on trips to Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. Where would you go in Washington? In other words, when you say you came to Washington?

Miss BENTLEY. I went to Mary Price's house. She was living on Olive Avenue at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. You never went to Mr. Lippmann's place?

Miss BENTLEY. Oh, no; because Mr. Lippmann did not know anything about it.

Senator FERGUSON. She was a secret agent?

Miss BENTLEY. She was a secret agent.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were attempting to steal things out of Mr. Lippmann's files?

Miss BENTLEY. Not only attempting, but we succeeded.

Senator FERGUSON. You succeeded. What were these things you copied? Do you recall any of them?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. A number of them were documents dealing with our relations with Britain. Some of it was material that seems to have had some relation to the War Department and things of that sort.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, you stated that your dealings with Mary Price at that particular time brought you into contact with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder if you would explain that.

Miss BENTLEY. Mary got into rather bad health in the late spring of 1943 and went to Mexico on a vacation. She suggested that we keep in contact with her through Mildred Price, her sister. Mildred Price was a member or executive secretary of the China Aid Council.

Mr. MORRIS. Member or executive secretary?

Miss BENTLEY. Executive secretary, which is tantamount to being the head of it. That was a Communist-dominated organization.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the name of that organization?

Miss BENTLEY. The China Aid Council. At that time it was located, I think, around Twenty-third Street and Fifth Avenue. At first we looked on Mildred as a means of getting word back and forth to Mary. Then when we began talking to her we began realizing that there was a fertile field from which to get intelligence and that is when we began to get interested in the IPR.

Senator FERGUSON. This China Aid was for Communist China?

Miss BENTLEY. China Aid Council. I would say so.

Senator FERGUSON. There were different names for China aid, and I wondered.

Miss BENTLEY. The China Aid Council was particularly concerned with the Eighth Route Army and the Communist-dominated part of China.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the China Aid Council completely dominated by the Communist Party?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; according to what she told me.

Mr. MORRIS. She was executive secretary?

Miss BENTLEY. Executive secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any way that you can amplify that?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; Mr. Golos told me the same thing, and later Earl Browder told me the same thing.

Mr. MORRIS. Mildred Price's assistant was the woman named Mentana Sayers?

Miss BENTLEY. Michael Sayers' wife.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know her to be a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred told me that.

Mr. MORRIS. But Mildred Price did tell you that Mentana Sayers, her assistant in the China Aid Council, also was a Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Is this the Mary Price that came from North Carolina and ran for public office down there?

Miss BENTLEY. I understand that. I believe Senator Hoey told me at one time she was running on the Progressive ticket. Was that it?

Senator SMITH. Something like that.

Miss BENTLEY. She went back to Greensboro, having come from there, in 1945.

Senator SMITH. It was some State office, I believe.

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same one.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer into evidence two letterheads with incidental letters of the China Aid Council into the record at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. From what source are you getting these?

Senator SMITH. May I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Is this the same girl that was connected with the Southern Council for Human Welfare?

Miss BENTLEY. She went with the Southern Council for Human Welfare in the spring of 1945 and how long she stayed with them I don't know.

Senator SMITH. Was she a Communist at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. She had been one for at least 10 years before I met her. She was a charter member of UOPWA.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record three letterheads. Mr. Mandel will identify the source, but I would like to show these to ask Miss Bentley if the organization that she has just testified about is the organization referred to on these letterheads.

First is a letterhead of the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy. I would like to offer that to Miss Bentley and ask her if that is the same organization that she has just testified about.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, I imagine that is the same one. There wasn't any League for Peace and Democracy at the time I knew the organization, but I was told, again second-hand, that that was an offshoot of it.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Here I show you a letterhead dated November 24, 1941, China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans, and ask you if that is the same organization about which you are testifying.

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same organization. It has the same phone number and same address.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you notice who the executive secretary and the administrative secretary to the executive secretary are? I think it is at the bottom of the list.

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred Price is the executive secretary, and Mentana Sayers is administrative secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Now I offer you a third letterhead, Miss Bentley, and ask you if you will identify that organization. That is a letterhead dated March 1, 1944, I believe; is it not?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, this is after the organization moved up to around Columbus Circle.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. It left its quarters at 200 Fifth Avenue.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that that is the same organization about which you have testified?

Miss BENTLEY. That is the same organization, but it moved uptown into a building with, I understand, other Chinese organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. That organization was Communist-controlled, you say, and you were dealing with Mildred Price, executive secretary, who, according to your testimony, virtually ran the organization?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now will you authenticate those exhibits?

Mr. MANDEL. The letter dated March 1, 1944, from the China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans is addressed to William Holland of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Being the same letter that has just been shown to the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes; and going from Mrs. Edward C. Carter, president. It is a part of the Institute of Pacific Relations files which were turned over to us.

Now the letterhead reading "China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy" is not a part of the institute files, but comes to us as a result of our research, and I might note that the American League for Peace and Democracy has been cited as a Communist front by Attorney General Biddle.

We have another letterhead from the China Aid Council combined with the American Committee for Chinese War Orphans dated November 24, 1941, signed by Arthur Upham Pope, chairman, American Committee for Chinese War Orphans.

The CHAIRMAN. Being the same exhibit as was shown to the witness?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. This is also a part of the institute files.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the members of the executive committee on that last letterhead?

Mr. Chairman, in the course of our investigation we are going to show that many of the personnel of the Institute of Pacific Relations were connected with the China Aid Council, so I think at this time as an example I would like to point out the list of people who were on the executive board as shown on the last letterhead, which I believe is a 1941 letterhead.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. You wanted only people connected with the institute read, or all of them?

Mr. MORRIS. Put the whole list in.

Mr. MANDEL. The chairman is Dr. Claude E. Forkner. Then we have the honorary vice chairmen—

Mr. MORRIS. Leave the honorary vice chairmen out.

Mr. MANDEL. Next we have Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer. Then we have the executive committee, consisting of Dr. Henry A. Atkinson, Dr. Henry L. Bibby, Lyman R. Bradley, Mrs. Edward C. Carter, Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi, Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, Mrs. Lucy Forkner, Margaret Forsyth, Talitha Gerlach, Dr. Claude E. Heaton, Philip J. Jaffe, Sally Lucas Jean, Mrs. Philip C. Jessup, Duncan Lee, Mrs. Lin Yutang, Dorothy McConnell, Edgar H. Rue, Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany, Mildred Price, executive secretary, and Mentana G. Sayers, administrative secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Miss Bentley, in connection with your development of your association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You had mentioned Mildred Price and then had gotten to the China Aid Council.

The CHAIRMAN. Does counsel want these exhibits to go into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce these three letterheads and have them marked as the next three consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so marked and entered into the record. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 98" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 98

CHINA AID COUNSEL COMBINED WITH THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE WAR ORPHANS

NEW YORK 19, N. Y., MARCH 1, 1944

Mme. Wei Tao-ming, honorary chairman
Mrs. Edward C. Carter, president
Arthur Upham Pope, vice president

Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton, treasurer
 Sally Lucas Jean, chairman, children's division
 Dr. Claude E. Heaton, chairman, medical division
 Board of directors:

Dr. Phyllis Ackerman
 Dr. Henry A. Atkinson
 Samuel L. M. Barlow
 Dr. Leona Baumgartner
 Dr. Henry L. Bibby
 Dr. Peter Bloss
 Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi
 Mrs. Angelika W. Frink
 Talitha Gerlach
 Philip J. Jaffe
 Mrs. Philip C. Jessup
 Beatrice Kates
 Dr. Lawson G. Lowrey
 Mrs. C. Reinold Noyes
 Dr. Max Pinner
 Mrs. John Tee-Van
 Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany
 Dr. George M. Wheatley
 Mildred Price, executive secretary
 Mentana G. Sayers, executive assistant

Participating in National War Fund, Inc., through United China Relief, Inc.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 99" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 99

CHINA AID COUNCIL COMBINED WITH THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR CHINESE
 WAR ORPHANS

200 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY, NOVEMBER 24, 1941

Dr. Claude E. Forkner, chairman
 Honorary vice chairmen:
 His Excellency, Dr. Hu Shih
 His Excellency, Dr. W. W. Yen
 Arthur Upham Pope, treasurer
 Executive committee:
 Dr. Henry A. Atkinson
 Dr. Henry L. Bibby
 Lyman R. Bradley
 Mrs. Edward C. Carter
 Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi
 Mrs. Elizabeth B. Cotton
 Mrs. Lucy Forkner
 Margaret Forsyth

Talitha Gerlach
 Dr. Claude E. Heaton
 Philip J. Jaffe
 Sally Lucas Jean
 Mrs. Philip C. Jessup
 Duncan Lee
 Mrs. Lin Yutang
 Dorothy McConnell
 Edgar H. Rue
 Mrs. Gordon M. Tiffany
 Mildred Price, executive secretary
 Mentana G. Sayers, administrative
 secretary

Participating in United China Relief

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 100" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 100

No 5801

"GIVE TO SAVE LIVES IN CHINA"

Name _____
Address _____
City _____

捐 助 醫 藥 給 中

GIVE
FOR
MEDICAL
AID
TO
CHINA

CHINA AID COUNCIL AMERICAN LEAGUE
for PEACE and DEMOCRACY

捐 助 醫 藥 給 中

THE CHINA AID COUNCIL
of the
American League for Peace and Democracy
has the co-operation of

AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE
CHINESE HAND LAUNDRY ALLIANCE JAPANESE PEACE SOCIETY
CHURCH LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
METHODIST FEDERATION FOR SOCIAL SERVICE, LEAGUE OF WOMEN SHOPPERS
and many other organizations

Some of the individual sponsors are:

Sherwood Anderson
Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi
William E. Dodd, Sr.
Sherwood Eddy

Prof. Frank Graham
Max J. C. Duggenheimer
Prof. Robert M. Lovett
Bishop Francis J. McConnell
Dr. Harry F. Ward

Bishop Robert L. Doddard
A. Philip Randolph
Prof. Eugene Stanley
Marshall Stewart
Reb'l Stephen S. Wise

Miss BENTLEY. During the summer and fall of 1943, we became interested in the far eastern field and in the IPR group.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. Mildred Price at this particular point was Communist unit organizer for the unit operating in the far eastern field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that a little more fully, please, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. As you probably know, the Communist Party, the lowest echelon is made up of what they call the unit. That contains anywhere from three people on up. In the so-called head of that for purposes of party work is the unit organizer. Mildred, being a very energetic person and willing to take on a great deal of labor, was elected as unit organizer.

Since she was unit organizer of that far eastern unit, which included the IPR and the other organizations, we turned to her to see if there were people in the IPR and others of those far eastern organizations that came within our sphere of influence who would be useful for intelligence work. I once asked Mr. Golos why we just didn't take on the Institute of Pacific Relations itself, and he said, "No; they are operating much too loosely."

Mr. MORRIS. What did he mean by that?

Miss BENTLEY. He meant by that that they were operating so much in the open and they were making so many blunders that it would be a mercy if the FBI didn't get them.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean the Communists in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. The Communists in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Miss Mildred Price indicate to you the degree of control that the Communists exercised in the institute?

Miss BENTLEY. She told me it was one of our organizations in the sense that we exercised a control over it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Golos confirm that?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you amplify on that?

Miss BENTLEY. He told me it was an organization that originally had not, as far as he knew, been much under our control but later came under our control.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you call an instrument?

Miss BENTLEY. It would be a Communist-front organization of a sort. It is hard to find the exact technology for it.

Mr. MORRIS. At the time he told you that you were his assistant working for the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. But, he said the members in that were operating in what he said was a dangerous method and therefore he said he didn't think we should take it on en masse. However, we did go through the list of Communist members in the IPR to see if there was anybody to salvage. We had already picked up Duncan Lee, who had to go to Washington in 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Duncan Chapin Lee?

Miss BENTLEY. Duncan Chapin Lee.

Mr. MORRIS. What had he been doing?

Miss BENTLEY. He had been working for a law firm in New York, and then he received a position as a lawyer in OSS.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you had taken him out of the institute?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he had been brought to our attention by Mary Price through Mildred Price, and we found that he would be very close to General Donovan. Therefore, we relayed word to Mildred to disconnect him with that unit and put him in contact with us.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you meet him?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I did. Mary Price took care of him for, I believe, 6 months, and then I took him over personally.

Mr. MORRIS. You say you took him from the institute for work in your particular undertaking?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was he completely a member of your organization at that time?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he had been a Communist Party member I gathered for some little while. He paid his dues to me, I brought him his literature, and he was under Communist discipline. He was quite definitely a member.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he at that time working for Donovan?

Miss BENTLEY. He was one of that circle of lawyers who worked around Donovan. I don't know what they were called—advisers, probably.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any information from him?

Miss BENTLEY. Quite a bit.

Senator FERGUSON. Out of the OSS?

Miss BENTLEY. I think he was our most valuable source in the OSS.

Senator FERGUSON. He delivered the material directly to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the nature of the material that he delivered to you, in what form, in manuscript?

Miss BENTLEY. Most of it was given to me orally because he was frightened to death of what he was doing and afraid to pass it on. Some of it he had written on scraps of paper.

The CHAIRMAN. You got no microfilms?

Miss BENTLEY. No, no; we only had two people doing our micro-filming.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, was there anyone else whom you got into your organization via the IPR?

Miss BENTLEY. There was one other, Michael Greenberg. He was not strictly speaking a member of the American party, being at that time a Britisher, and the policy of the party at that time was not to have aliens as members.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this Michael Greenberg, we have had testimony last Tuesday on Michael Greenberg and at the same time we introduced into the record a series of exhibits showing his connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I just would like to review those at this time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. While he is looking that up, was Greenberg connected with the United States Government in any way?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I think it was the summer or fall of 1943 that he came down to Washington and took a position as sort of assistant to Lauchlin Currie, who was then I believe in the White House.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Greenberg ever deliver any papers to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; he delivered information via Mildred Price to me. He was extremely temperamental and I thought it unwise to have him meet me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this information come out of the White House?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; it was mostly on the Far East, on China.

Senator FERGUSON. It came out of the White House and he was assistant to Lauchlin Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; or one of the assistants. I don't know whether he was the only one.

Mr. MORRIS. The nature of the exhibits is they showed that Greenberg succeeded Owen Lattimore as editor for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to what exhibits?

Mr. MORRIS. Exhibits 8, 7, and 51.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. All I want you to do is to identify the exhibits and their connection with the party named.

Mr. MORRIS. We will have to get that, Senator. I would like to comment upon exhibit No. 67, which was taken from the institute files. It is from Michael Greenberg on the letterhead of the White House in Washington, addressed to Miss Hilda Austern, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR HILDA: Mr. Currie has asked me to write you about the sending of IPR publications to William D. Carter in New Delhi, India. He says that he is baffled by the problem.

The only thing I can suggest is that you select a few books and try to get them out via OWI.

Sincerely yours,

MICHAEL.

That was introduced as exhibit 67 at the open hearings of August 7, 1951.

I would like to introduce, Mr. Chairman, at this time a letter dated May 23, 1943, from Mr. Y. Y. Hsu to Mr. Carter. I will ask Mr. Mandel if he will verify that that was taken from the institute files.

Mr. MANDEL. This letter was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is dated May 23, 1942, addressed to "Dear Mr. Carter," and it is from Yung-ying Hsu.

Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request. Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same problem. She also suggests my participation. The present memorandum is based upon findings in my two previous memos which have been submitted to you and Mr. Holland. There are a few new points which I intended to examine more closely as a part of my research work. These have been included in the present document in the form of general statements. I believe they are reasonably correct. I have not been able to secure an additional copy of the present memo for Mr. Holland. I am sure you will make the enclosed copy available to him as you see fit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 101" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 101

OFFICE, May 23, 1942.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Enclosed please find a memorandum which Miss Mildred Price worked out with my assistance. She has submitted a copy to Mr. Mills, of the CIO Greater New York Industrial Council. The memo is written, by the way, on Mr. Mills' specific request.

Miss Price would like to have a conference with you to discuss the same problem. She also suggests my participation.

The present memorandum is based upon findings in my two previous memos which have been submitted to you and Mr. Holland. There are a few new points which I have intended to examine more closely as a part of my research work. These have been included in the present document in the form of general statements. I believe that they are reasonably correct.

I have not been able to secure an additional copy of the present memo for Mr. Holland. I am sure you will make the enclosed copy available to him as you see fit.

Sincerely yours,

YUNG-YING HSU.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we will have the exhibit presently showing that Michael Greenberg succeeded Owen Lattimore as editor of Pacific Affairs, which is the publication of the International Institute of Pacific Relations.

THE CHAIRMAN. Very well.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did Earl Browder ever come to you to talk over about the degree of control the Communist Party had or its interest in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MISS BENTLEY. Did he come to talk to me about it?

MR. MORRIS. Yes.

MISS BENTLEY. It arose from the fact that this particular Communist Party unit of which Mildred was the organizer and took care of business in the field, had as its political commissar Frederick Vanderbilt Field. He was to give them directives as to what they were to do and to relay messages to the top Communist leaders, especially to Browder. Browder had been personally in China and was interested in the far eastern situation.

MR. CHAIRMAN. What did you call Mr. Field?

MISS BENTLEY. I said that the closest I could come to his function re the far eastern field would be political commissar.

MR. MORRIS. So, Miss Bentley, you testify therefore that the Communist Party exercised control over the institute through Earl Browder through Frederick Field?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes; and through other groups, the party nucleus, the party units within the far eastern field.

MR. MORRIS. Who headed that unit within the far eastern field?

MISS BENTLEY. Miss Mildred Price, but Frederick Vanderbilt Field was the man who was higher up than Mildred Price.

SENATOR FERGUSON. During what period would he be the commissar in the Far East?

MISS BENTLEY. During the period I knew it, I can say from my own experience, certainly in 1933 and 1934. I know that three times Mildred Price complained to me that Fred Field had not shown up to have conferences and they did not know how to apply the party line in the Far East; that they needed instructions, and would I go to Browder and complain. She couldn't go directly. Three times I went to Browder and said, "Will you get Fred Field on the job he should be doing?" and he, Browder, said, "I will do that."

Senator FERGUSON. So he was the man steering the organization and laying down the party line to Mildred Price as far as the party line concerned the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. In other words, he relayed the line. I wouldn't say he made up the party line.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He was the man responsible for telling, at least, Mildred Price what the party line was?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the way that people are steered to the party line, through someone like Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Miss BENTLEY. Not entirely, This was an unusual situation. Usually you have a pyramiding from your unit to your section to your district, but this was considered to be such an important unit that they couldn't risk having it go through all these levels of Communist Party development, and therefore it went specially.

Senator FERGUSON. From a man like Field down through to her so that she could work the party line and hew to it in the Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct, and it was done that way so that there would be less danger.

Mr. MORRIS. You testified that her other activity was that she was executive secretary of the China Aid Council?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. There was no conflict between that assignment and the assignment in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY. No, rather they complemented each other.

Mr. MORRIS. May I introduce into the record after Mr. Mandel identifies this letter as a copy of a letter to Michael Greenberg, managing editor, Pacific Affairs, dated April 28, 1942. This is by way of showing that Michael Greenberg was connected with Pacific Affairs.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a copy of a letter dated April 28, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. Michael Greenberg, managing editor of Pacific Affairs, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City, signed by F. V. F., presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say that is a copy of a letter, did it come from the files in this form or have you the original?

Mr. MANDEL. We have the original, and that is a carbon.

The CHAIRMAN. The original was in the files?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a true and correct copy?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The original is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Could I inquire for the record when Frederick Vanderbilt Field applied for a commission in the United States Army in the Intelligence Section? What was the date of that?

Mr. MORRIS. I believe it was May 1942, is my recollection.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that come in the time when he was Communist Commissar for the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. It could have been that. From what Mildred said he had been for some time, and that was in the summer of 1943, so it could be.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that be an important position, to have the commissar on our intelligence staff, for the Communists, I mean?

Miss BENTLEY. The Soviet Intelligence didn't like to lose anybody to the Army unless they could get into strategic positions—that is, not the infantry but with Intelligence they would consider that very good.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be an important position?

Miss BENTLEY. That would be an important position.

Senator FERGUSON. As you say, though, you tried to keep your members out of the real fighting because they could give you little aid?

Miss BENTLEY. They could give us little aid, and they would also get knocked off. We tried to get them into Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. You tried to get them into a safe spot.

Senator SMITH. Did you know about the efforts and maneuvers made to get Frederick Field in the Intelligence Service of the Army?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I didn't.

Senator SMITH. At that time, I mean.

Miss BENTLEY. No. I had heard of Fred Field before, but I had really not come up against him until 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified that Michael Greenberg was taken from the Institute of Pacific Relations and sent to Washington. Would you tell us a little bit about his assignment in Washington?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid I probably told you most of what I know. He was simply one of the assistants to Lauchlin Currie in the far-eastern field, which he knew well.

Mr. MORRIS. Lauchlin Currie was then executive assistant to the President?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. Right on the heels of that I believe he became, was it the head of FEA or Far Eastern Division?

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have in the record when Greenberg became a United States citizen?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we have that later on, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. That will go into the record?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, I at this point think we should discuss Mr. Lauchlin Currie.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 102" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 102

APRIL 28, 1942.

Mr. MICHAEL GREENBURG,

Managing Editor, Pacific Affairs,

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR MICHAEL: I have read the letter which George Taylor has written to Pacific Affairs regarding my review of his book. I understand from you that the editors have opened the way for him to write this letter and intend to print it in the same issue which will contain my review. I also understand that this is the first time in the history of the journal that the editors have permitted a reviewer to be attacked in this manner and without allowing his review to stand unchallenged for at least one issue.

Let me say that I regard Taylor's letter as nothing more nor less than an attempt to smear me personally. I am naturally sorry to find my former

associates so frightened of their shadows as to lend themselves to this method and procedure.

I shall not offer any reply to Taylor's letter. My review stands; it expresses about all I wish to say on the matter. Anything further would simply add to a personal controversy in which I have no interest. A counterreply on my part would make the magazine look even more ridiculous than it will under present circumstances.

In order to point out to you, and for the record to show how thoroughly irresponsible I believe this matter to have been handled, let me review what happened:

1. Bill Holland telephoned me to ask if I would be willing to review the Taylor book. I replied that I had not read it, but would be glad to do so and write a review. After reading the book I felt that I should not review it for a journal like *Pacific Affairs* because my review would have to be extremely critical. I telephoned you to explain this and asked you to find a substitute. You replied that you wished me to go ahead with the review, knowing that it was to be strongly critical.

2. I turned in the review a few days later. As you were not in your office when I went to the I. P. R. I gave the message to Hilda Austern. At this point I want to clear up what appears to be another misunderstanding. In asking Hilda to give you the review I asked her to request you to make no changes in the copy without my having the opportunity to approve them. I specifically did not take the unreasonable and dogmatic position that no changes were to be made. Simply that I wanted to see them if they were made. I checked this with Hilda today and find that she agrees that this was the message she passed on.

3. Finally, I was informed that the editors had decided to let Taylor write an answer for publication with my review, and you then gave me a copy of his letter.

I would have regarded this as entirely appropriate if I had originally been asked to contribute to a political discussion of the main impressions given Mr. Taylor's book—I say "main impressions" because, as you are well aware, somewhere in the book he says everything, therefore, the reviewer can only comment on the general impressions he conveys. But I was not asked to do this. I was simply asked to write a review for a supposedly scholarly journal. I myself thought I was not the person to do this, but on calling this to your attention I was urged to go ahead. Taylor, on the other hand, was apparently let loose to write a slippery political rebuttal packed with ridiculous innuendoes about my "revelation" received of course straight from Moscow.

A final word. In printing Taylor's letter I should like to ask the favor that you print it precisely as you showed it to me, with no editing, no deletions whatsoever. I shall count on its being sufficiently absurd to thoughtful persons to vindicate my judgment of his book and, by inferences, of his work.

I said that was a final word, but obviously there must be one more. If you and the other editors want to forget the whole business, I suggest that you withdraw my review, get someone else—any of a hundred "scholars" with whom you are in contact—to review it for the next issue, forget the entire episode yourselves, and give me the very great privilege and pleasure of so blanketing this out of my mind that I retain the high respect for my I. P. R. colleagues that I am most anxious to preserve.

With most cordial personal regards,

F. V. F.

Mr. MORRIS. We have exhibits to show that Mr. Lauchlin Currie was a very active adviser and participant in the Institute of Pacific Relations work. While we are introducing those exhibits, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Miss Bentley if she will testify concerning the relationship that Lauchlin Currie had to her particular activities in that period.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. One of the espionage groups that I handled in Washington, which I roughly call the Silvermaster group because the man who headed it was N. Gregory Silvermaster.

Mr. MORRIS. Approximately how many people were in that group?

Miss BENTLEY. I think there were 8, 9, or 10.

Senator FERGUSON. Silvermaster was in what section?

Miss BENTLEY. FSA, which is the Farm Security Administration, which is a part of the Agriculture Department, although for 6 months I think he was in the Board of Economic Warfare.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have trouble or difficulty in moving these agents that you had into strategic positions in Government or in the Army that you were talking about, that you did not want them where there was danger but you wanted them in strategic positions? For example, Silvermaster, did you have trouble moving people such as that, or how were they moved to strategic positions so that you could get your information?

Miss BENTLEY. We didn't have too much trouble. In the case of Silvermaster, he pulled strings and got in there.

Senator FERGUSON. What were your avenues for placing people in strategic positions?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say that two of our best ones were Harry Dexter White and Lauchlin Currie. They had an immense amount of influence and knew people and their word would be accepted when they recommended someone.

The CHAIRMAN. Harry Dexter White was in what department?

Miss BENTLEY. Under Secretary of the Treasury, under Mr. Morgenthau.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, Currie and White were your instrumentalities in putting people in strategic positions?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say they were our most important ones.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did you have any other ones?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. I mean, whoever we had as an agent in the Government would automatically serve for putting someone else in. For example, Maurice Halperin was head of the Latin American Section in OSS, and we used him to get Helen Tenney in. Once we got one person in he got others, and the whole process continued like that.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you desired to shift a person from one position to another position you would use White and Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. We would use White and Currie if we could.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know who White's principal contacts were in the Government so that he could place people in Government?

Miss BENTLEY. It was my understanding that he knew practically everyone in Washington who had any influence.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know who he would contact?

Miss BENTLEY. No, not specifically; that was his affair, and we did not inquire into it.

Senator FERGUSON. As I recall the Far East, Mr. Morgenthau at the time before Pearl Harbor had drawn a plan for the Far East, it was the Morgenthau plan. Did you know anything about it?

Miss BENTLEY. No, the only Morgenthau plan I knew anything about was the German one.

Senator EASTLAND. Did you know who drew that plan?

Miss BENTLEY. Due to Mr. White's influence, to push the devastation of Germany because that was what the Russians wanted.

Senator FERGUSON. That was what the Communists wanted?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely Moscow wanted them completely razed because then they would be of no help to the Allies.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that Harry Dexter White worked on that?

Miss BENTLEY. And on our instructions he pushed hard.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard of the Morgenthau plan that was set up for the Far East?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't recall it.

Senator EASTLAND. Who else participated in drawing up the Morgenthau plan besides Harry Dexter White?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid I don't remember now.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sol Adler have anything to do with it?

Miss BENTLEY. As far as I remember Sol Adler was in China.

Mr. MORRIS. He was in China?

Miss BENTLEY. He was a Treasury Department expert, but most of the time he was in China. I am quite sure he hadn't returned by that time.

Senator EASTLAND. What you say is that it was a Communist plot to destroy Germany and weaken her to where she could not help us?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. She could no longer be a barrier that would protect the Western World.

Senator EASTLAND. And that Mr. Morgenthau, who was Secretary of the Treasury of the United States was used by the Communist agents to promote that plot?

Miss BENTLEY. I am afraid so; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. What do you mean by "I am afraid so"?

Miss BENTLEY. Certainly Secretary Morgenthau didn't fall in with Communist plots.

Senator FERGUSON. But you know it to be a fact?

Miss BENTLEY. I know it to be a fact.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not qualify it, do you?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't qualify it. I didn't want to give the thought that he did it knowingly.

Senator SMITH. He was unsuspectingly used.

Senator FERGUSON. So you have conscious and unconscious agents?

Miss BENTLEY. Of course, The way the whole principle works is like dropping a pebble into a pond and the ripples spread out, and that is the way we work.

Senator FERGUSON. Some are conscious and some are unconscious as to what they are doing?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct. A good many of our most valuable items came from the fact that many people in the Pentagon couldn't contain themselves, and they had to confide in our people.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us for our record the relationship that Harry Dexter White had with your work.

Miss BENTLEY. Harry Dexter White, I couldn't tell you that he had actually been a member of the party, but to all intents and purposes he was because he followed its discipline. According to Nathan Silvermaster he was afraid to meet people like myself. He had for some years been working for an agent who had turned sour, later identified as Whittaker Chambers. That had given him a terrific fright, and he had stayed away for a while from these activities.

Then he had met the Silvermasters and they had brought him back into their group. His attitude was that I am going to help you, but my right hand doesn't want to know what the left is doing. Therefore, he didn't want to meet anyone he knew to be a Soviet agent, he wanted to pass it through Silvermaster to me.

Senator FERGUSON. This idea of Chambers going sour on the Communist Party was learned by the State Department because he made his report to the State Department, did he not, so that the people knew that he had gone sour? That was before he testified in court or in the open, was it not?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know, but the Communists know when their people go sour before anybody else does usually.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you first learn that Chambers had given information to the American Government officials who were anti-Communist?

Miss BENTLEY. I didn't know anything about Whittaker Chambers at all except as a man called X who had handled a number of my people in 1948.

Senator FERGUSON. So his name you did not learn?

Miss BENTLEY. No. They gave a name such as Sam or Al and you don't know his real name.

Senator FERGUSON. So White did not name Chambers as the man who went sour?

Miss BENTLEY. No. I don't know whether White knew Chambers. Certainly he didn't give it to Silvermaster.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have a confidential Government record come to you from White?

Miss BENTLEY. Many of them, all labeled from "Harry" because Soviet agents like to know who is providing what.

Mr. MORRIS. How many copies of such reports would you receive?

Miss BENTLEY. How many copies?

Mr. MORRIS. Would it come in duplicate?

Miss BENTLEY. Sometimes it was a carbon copy. Many, many times those documents were photographed in the Silvermasters' cellar because they couldn't be spared.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you give us a concrete example of your dealings with Harry Dexter White?

Miss BENTLEY. In the way of material?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. Who gave it to you, for instance?

Miss BENTLEY. Well, in the early days Lud Ullmann, who was then working in the Treasury, used to bring it out. Sometimes Harry was leery about bringing it out himself. Sometimes it would be given to Bill Taylor.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is William Taylor?

Miss BENTLEY. He was another Communist Party member in the Treasury who paid his dues and was a member of the Silvermaster group.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Ullmann in the same category?

Miss BENTLEY. Ullman was in the same category. I knew Ullmann as well as the Silvermasters.

Mr. MORRIS. Let us take Ullmann. Would he give you a report and tell you it was a report from Harry White?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, and he would also type on it "from Harry."

Mr. MORRIS. What would you do?

Miss BENTLEY. I would take that back, and when Mr. Golos was alive I would give it to him and after he passed on I would give it to the successor agent.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom?

Miss BENTLEY. To the succeeding Soviet contact I had; there were three of them.

Mr. MORRIS. In any case, were they ever microfilmed?

Miss BENTLEY. Many cases. In many cases the volume got too big, and they had to be microfilmed.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that done?

Miss BENTLEY. In their basement. They had a home-made affair there where they put their camera.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you describe where that was?

Miss BENTLEY. The Silvermaster home?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. Right off Chevy Chase Circle, I think it was 5515 Thirty-fourth. I have forgotten the exact number.

Mr. MORRIS. You have been there?

Miss BENTLEY. I was there almost every 2 weeks, I should—

Mr. MORRIS. What was your purpose in going there?

Miss BENTLEY. My purpose in going there was to collect Communist dues and all the information collected during the 2 weeks.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, the bulk got so large that you could not carry it to New York?

Miss BENTLEY. Physically I could have carried it, but it would have been unwise to go hauling large bundles around like that.

Senator FERGUSON. And you got it into microfilms so that you could take them into New York without being seen and having a package?

Miss BENTLEY. There was also the problem with lots of documents that you could only take them overnight and return them in the morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, would you testify about an idea of Harry Dexter White whereby he was going to perfect your intelligence organization?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't quite understand the question.

Mr. MORRIS. You have testified in executive session that Harry Dexter White had a plan whereby he was going to integrate all intelligence matters coming into your ring.

Miss BENTLEY. Do you mean the trading of information between Government agencies?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Miss BENTLEY. He not only had a plan, but we put it into effect.

Mr. MORRIS. Tell us about that.

Miss BENTLEY. We were so successful getting information during the war largely because of Harry White's idea to persuade Morgenthau to exchange information. In other words, he would send information over to Navy, and Navy would reciprocate. So there were at least seven or eight agencies trading information with Secretary Morgenthau.

Mr. MORRIS. You say this plan of trading information was initiated by White?

Miss BENTLEY. This plan was initiated by White because he knew it would come across his desk.

Mr. MORRIS. He being the Executive Assistant?

Miss BENTLEY. He was the Under Secretary, next man down the ladder.

Senator EASTLAND. Who negotiated that agreement?

Miss BENTLEY. From what I was told, it was Secretary Morgenthau himself.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was initiated by White?

Miss BENTLEY. It was initiated by Harry White.

Senator EASTLAND. You testified he used Morgenthau?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, I wonder if you would tell us exactly what your relations were with Lauchlin Currie.

Miss BENTLEY. Lauchlin Currie was not, as far as we knew at that time, a member of the Communist Party, but he was very close to various members of the Silvermaster group, including George Silverman, whom he knows very well, and Silvermaster. He was willing to bail them out when they were in trouble, when they were being fired for disloyalty or when they needed help to get a job.

Besides that he was passing on information to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Currie was passing it on?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us any information on what you received through Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. Most of it was far eastern. There was the time when he relayed the information that the Soviet code was about to be broken.

Mr. MORRIS. Broken by whom?

Miss BENTLEY. The United States authorities.

Mr. MORRIS. He discovered that the United States authorities had broken the code, and he relayed it to you?

Miss BENTLEY. Were about to break it. I relayed it back, and my Russian head said, "Which code?"

Senator EASTLAND. Did he say which code?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I was unable to get back and find out. He just said the Soviet code.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you get that information?

Miss BENTLEY. That information came from White via Silverman, as I recall it.

Senator FERGUSON. From Currie?

Miss BENTLEY. From Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that a highly classified fact at the time?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely. I don't know enough about Government labelings, but it was certainly something you wouldn't pass around.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it your understanding, Miss Bentley, that Lauchlin Currie was a full-fledged member of the Silvermaster group?

Miss BENTLEY. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he always act in that capacity or was he reassigned in some fashion?

Miss BENTLEY. It was my understanding he was going to be reassigned when I left the group in September, I think it was, 1944. My Soviet contact told me that they did not believe in having such large groups for security reasons because if someone turns sour they know too much; that he intended to put White directly in contact with a Soviet superior, and Lauchlin Currie also in direct contact with a Soviet agent, and possibly with some of the smaller fry he could put

two or three in one group. But he definitely mentioned putting White and Currie in direct contact.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was it that mentioned them?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know his real name, he was known to me as Bill.

The CHAIRMAN. He was living where?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know whether he lived in Washington or New York.

Mr. MORRIS. But he was your superior in the Soviet military police?

Miss BENTLEY. He was my superior in the Soviet military police and also I am quite sure it went through.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what particular agent Currie was going to be assigned to?

Miss BENTLEY. No, I don't.

Senator FERGUSON. Why do you say you think it went through?

Miss BENTLEY. Because after this Soviet contact had taken over the Silvermaster group he requested me to stay on with them for 3 months. In talking with Silvermaster he told me they had already put the plan into effect, and they were about to make contact with Soviet agents, so I am convinced it went through.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think at this time we should point out what Lauchlin Currie's relations were with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I therefore ask Mr. Mandel if he will call to our attention some few of the exhibits that we have selected to show what Lauchlin Currie's role was in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are these exhibits to which you refer being made a part of the record?

Mr. MORRIS. We will introduce them.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the foundation, the source, and how you got it.

Mr. MANDEL. First I refer to the testimony of Edward C. Carter on July 25, 1951, in which he identified Lauchlin Currie as a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Now I have here a photostat of a letter dated October 27, 1942, addressed to Joseph Barnes at 430 West Twenty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Where does the instrument come from?

Mr. MANDEL. The instrument comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it an original instrument or photostat?

Mr. MANDEL. It is a photostat. It is signed by Edward C. Carter and the letter reads as follows:

DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope that some day when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon.

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the White House exchange.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that letter into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and entered into the record (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 103" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 103

NEW YORK, N. Y., *October 27, 1942.*

JOSEPH BARNES, Esq.,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington Lauchlin Currie expressed to me the hope that some day soon when you are in Washington you would give him the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and he would find a great deal in common, not only in matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope that you can see him soon.

His office is in the State Department Building, but you reach him through the White House exchange.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a memorandum from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated November 30, 1942, and the memorandum is addressed to Mr. Carter, copy for Mr. Jessup at Mont Tremblant. This is in connection with the Mont Tremblant conference of the IPR.

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of Mont Tremblant committee, I am putting down the following suggestions.

This is signed by William W. Lockwood.

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup so that they are merely tentative for the present.

The Pacific Council: Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in the chair so presumably another American should represent the Council. I believe Kizer is the best choice.

Program Committee: Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later.

International Research Committee: Dennett is the best person, in view of his availability afterward for continuing responsibility. I would hope that Frank Coe could at least sit in on the meetings, in addition.

International Finance Committee: Brayton Wilbur; alternate, Brooks Emeny.
Publications Committee: Tentatively, Len De Caux.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that received into the evidence as the next exhibit, pointing out that the significance of this document is that Lauchlin Currie, about whom we have had testimony, on November 30, 1942, was proposed by Mr. Lockwood in official capacity to Mr. Jessup as chairman of the program committee of the Mont Tremblant conference, which was the triennial conference and one of the important functions of the IPR.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit will be properly marked in sequence and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 104" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 104

NOVEMBER 30, 1942.

Memorandum to: Mr. Carter.
Copy for: Mr. Jessup, Mont Tremblant.

In response to your request for designations of American Council members of Mont Tremblant committee, I am putting down the following suggestions.

These should be reconsidered at Mont Tremblant after checking with Jessup so that they are merely tentative for the present.

The Pacific Council: Jessup, the regular American Council member, will be in the chair so presumably another American should represent the council. I believe Kizer is the best choice.

Program committee: Currie would be an excellent member, with Field as alternate. Currie may not wish to be burdened with this, however, and I understand you have Field in mind as program committee secretary, which would be excellent. The final decision here I would like to leave until later.

International research committee: Dennett is the best person, in view of his availability afterward for continuing responsibility. I would hope that Frank Coe could at least sit in on the meetings, in addition.

International finance committee: Brayton Wilbur; alternate, Brooks Emeny.

Publications committee: Tentatively, Len De Caux.

WM. W. LOCKWOOD.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 18, 1941, addressed to Dr. Ch'ao-ting Chi from Edward C. Carter and reads as follows:

DEAR CHI: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable as the following:

"LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

"American Embassy, Chungking:

"If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's unified resistance."

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific for China to start a two-front war.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit pointing out at the same time that Dr. Chi is a man who has been identified by several witnesses here as an important member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 105" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 105

NEW YORK CITY, February 18, 1941.

DR. CH'AO-TING CHI,

New York City.

DEAR CHI: What would you think of my sending to Chungking some such cable as the following:

"LAUCHLIN CURRIE,

"American Embassy, Chungking.

"If press could report you had visited Chow Enlai this might help public opinion in view present crop ugly rumors regarding serious break in China's unified resistance.

It is a very ticklish matter, and I do not want to make things worse. However, it is certainly not in American interest or that of any country in the Pacific nor China to start a two-front war.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. This is another letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is dated March 10, 1944, addressed to Dr. John Fairbank, care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie, the White House, Washington, D. C., signed by W. L. Holland.

DEAR JOHN: Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the APO in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via APO

to Mac Fisher or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

No more stuff seems to have come from Hsiang. Is there any way you could get a note to him via Kates or Mac Fisher asking whether anything has been transmitted for the use of the IPR?

As Carter probably told you, we have now prodded the University of California into taking some action about our friend and have offered to advance them a travel fund immediately.

P. S.—As a project in the field of cultural relations with China, I wonder what you and Wilma would think of the idea of getting an American publisher to reissue all or most of the chapters in the Symposium on Chinese Culture.

Mr. MORRIS. The significance of this document, Mr. Chairman, is that John Fairbank received his mail care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie at the White House. I would like to have that introduced as the next consecutive exhibit in the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 106" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 106

MARCH 10, 1944.

Dr. JOHN FAIRBANK,
Care of Dr. Lauchlin Currie,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN: Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the APO in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through to Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via APO to Mac Fisher or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

No more stuff seems to have come from Hsiang. Is there any way you could get a note to him via Kates or Mac Fisher asking whether anything has been transmitted for the use of the IPR?

As Carter probably told you, we have now prodded the University of California into taking some action about our friend and have offered to advance them a travel fund immediately.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—As a project in the field of cultural relations with China, I wonder what you and Wilma would think of the idea of getting an American publisher to reissue all or most of the chapters in the Symposium on Chinese Culture which the China IPR published in Shanghai in 1932. One or two chapters, for example, on industry are a little out of date but the book is still constantly being quoted and asked for though it has long been out of stock. If you thought the scheme worth while, I might ask Hu Shih and perhaps one or two other Chinese here to add supplementary chapters which would serve to bring the book partly up to date. There's such a demand from the publishers today for books from the Far East that I don't think we would have any difficulty in finding a publisher.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is another memorandum dated June 20, 1942, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "1942 conference personnel, interview WWL," presumably with W. W. Lockwood, "with Lauchlin Currie, June 17, regarding IPR 1942 conference."

1. We may proceed on the assumption that the administration looks with favor on the idea of the conference and will put no official obstacle in the way of participation by Government people. (This implies no guaranty, of course, that any particular individual will be able or will agree to attend.)

Currie himself would like to be at the conference and presumably we can count on his being present.

Official participation will be essential to success.

2. Wallace and Perkins would be ideal, if available. Currie also suggested Harry White of the Treasury and Jim Baxter of the Office of Strategic Services.

As for the State Department, it is awkward to choose among four or five individuals. Berle would be important to secure, but he is always bracketed with Acheson. Similarly, Hornbeck and Hamilton are usually bracketed together. Pasvolsky is very important in the whole postwar set-up of the State Department.

Currie evaded a direct answer to the question as to whether we must include the old-line far eastern people, but indicated by inference that it would be rather awkward not to do so. He also said that if Alger Hiss were invited and Hornbeck were not, it would put the former in an impossible position. Currie's suggestion was that ECC see Welles, extend the courtesy of an invitation to him personally, and then invite his suggestions as to which of the other top State Department people should be included. Currie also mentioned Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, which takes in India and Burma. He expressed no opinion as to Murray's personal qualifications.

There is no strong reason from the Washington viewpoint to prefer September to December or vice versa. Currie himself, however, thought that last year's plan of catching people at the end of the summer was a good one.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into evidence, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit, the item referred to. The purpose of introducing this exhibit is to show the role that Lauchlin Currie played as a high adviser in connection with the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 107" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 107

[1942 conference personnel, June 20, 1942]

INTERVIEW WWL WITH LAUCHLIN CURRIE JUNE 17 REGARDING IPR 1942 CONFERENCE

1. We may proceed on the assumption that the administration looks with favor on the idea of the conference and will put no official obstacle in the way of participation by Government people. (This implies no guaranty, of course, that any particular individual will be able or will agree to attend.)

Currie himself would like to be at the conference, and presumably we can count on his being present.

Official participation will be essential to success.

2. Wallace and Perkins would be ideal, if available. Currie also suggested Harry White of the Treasury and Jim Baxter of the Office of Strategic Services.

As for the State Department, it is awkward to choose among four or five individuals. Berle would be important to secure, but he is always bracketed with Acheson. Similarly, Hornbeck and Hamilton are usually bracketed together. Pasvolsky is very important in the whole postwar set-up of the State Department.

Currie evaded a direct answer to the question as to whether we must include the old-line far eastern people, but indicated by inference that it would be rather awkward not to do so. He also said that if Alger Hiss were invited and Hornbeck were not, it would put the former in an impossible position. Currie's suggestion was that ECC see Welles, extend the courtesy of an invitation to him personally, and then invite his suggestions as to which of the other top State Department people should be included. Currie also mentioned Wallace Murray, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, which takes in India and Burma. He expressed no opinion as to Murray's personal qualifications.

3. There is no strong reason from the Washington viewpoint to prefer September to December or vice versa. Currie himself, however, thought that last year's plan of catching people at the end of the summer was a good one.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a group of telegrams, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One telegram is addressed to Edward C. Carter :

Glad to see you at 12 : 30 Wednesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

The telegram does not show a date, but the subsequent telegram will undoubtedly indicate the date of the correspondence.

The next is a copy of a telegram dated September 17, 1941, to Lauchlin Currie, White House, Washington, D. C. :

Wire collect could I see you 10 minutes any time Thursday or Friday preferably Thursday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Here is another telegram dated October 7, 1942, to Lauchlin Currie, Executive Offices of the President, the White House, Washington, D. C. :

Visiting Washington tomorrow Thursday will telephone you in morning for appointment.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another one dated October 7, year not given, the White House :

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Eighth any time would be better if convenient.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Here is another dated June 26, 1942, a note addressed to Currie :

I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2, and hope you can see me in the forenoon of that day.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another telegram, a copy of a telegram, June 23, 1942, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, Washington, D. C. :

Washington visit postponed until next week.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Another copy of a telegram dated May 5, 1942, addressed to Lauchlin Currie :

Wire collect can you spare 5 minutes any time Wednesday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

And then we have another here, dated April 25, 1942, a telegram to Edward C. Carter.

Planning to attend conference Tuesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

The telegram is marked as coming from the White House.

Mr. MORRIS. Are they samples of correspondence that you have discovered in the files between Lauchlin Currie and Edward C. Carter?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. They are not all of the correspondence between these two people, are they?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these telegrams just read by Mr. Mandel into the record, and have them marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The purpose of these telegrams is to show the relationship that existed between Lauchlin Currie and Edward C. Carter, namely, that Carter frequently went to Washington and conferred with Lauchlin Currie in the White House. Mr. Carter, at that time, was the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. These will be inserted into the record.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 108" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 108

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., April 25, 1942.

EDWARD CARTER,
129 East Fifty-second Street:
Planning to attend conference Tuesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

MAY 5, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
White House, Washington, D. C.:
Wire collect can you spare 5 minutes any time Wednesday.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

JUNE 23, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.:
Washington visit postponed until next week.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

NEW YORK CITY, June 26, 1942.

Mr. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Administrative Assistant to the President,
White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: I am going to be in Washington on Thursday, July 2, and hope you can see me in the forenoon of that day.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., October 7.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:
Eighth any time would be better if convenient.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

OCTOBER 7, 1942.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
Executive Offices of the President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.:

Visiting Washington tomorrow, Thursday, will telephone you in morning for appointment.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
White House, Washington, D. C.:

Wire collect could I see you 10 minutes any time Thursday or Friday, preferably Thursday?

EDWARD C. CARTER.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations:

Glad to see you at 12:30 Wednesday.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a brief memorandum, dated July 10, 1941. "W. L. H." presumably W. L. Holland, from "E. C. C." presumably E. C. Carter.

I am, of course, delighted that you have persuaded Chi to allow us to go ahead with his book suppressing only those passages which are likely to affect Chi's work.

My acquiescing in Chi's request did not derive from a desire to defer to Washington bureaucrats, but simply and solely to my desire to refrain from doing anything which would defeat the purposes of Chen Han-sen, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, Harry White, and Morgenthau in their very big program in China.

I had a feeling that you would be able to persuade Chi to approve of precisely what you have secured his approval for. I am naturally delighted.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit. I understand that Senator Ferguson has a question he would like to ask about it before we pass it on.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know anything about this program, and concerning which I was talking about previously, in China? Did that come to your attention?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I am afraid not. I was pretty new in the game at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. You knew about it in the one in Germany but not the one in China?

Miss BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to point out at this time that we have thus far introduced into the record evidence that Chen Han-seng, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, and Harry White are the four people mentioned in this memorandum as having had former connections with the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibits will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 109" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 109

JULY 10, 1941.

W. L. H. from E. C. C.

I am, of course, delighted that you have persuaded Chi to allow us to go ahead with his book suppressing only those passages which are likely to affect Chi's work.

My acquiescing in Chi's request did not derive from a desire to defer to Washington bureaucrats, but simply and solely to my desire to refrain from doing anything which would defeat the purposes of Chen Han-seng, Chi, Lauchlin Currie, Harry White, and Morgenthau in their very big program in China.

I had a feeling that you would be able to persuade Chi to approve of precisely what you have secured his approval for. I am naturally delighted.

Mr. MANDEL. Another exhibit coming from the file of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated June 15, 1942. "E. C. C." presumably Mr. Carter, from "W. W. L." presumably W. W. Lockwood.

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in

the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

Then follows a list of individuals. Under the heading of "Government," we have Ernest H. Gruening.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Mandel, we do not have to go into that list. I think, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as evidence of the fact that the Institute of Pacific Relations, and, in this case, Mr. Lockwood writing to Mr. Carter, considered that the competent advice should be gotten from Currie, who is Lauchlin Currie, Barnes who is Joseph Barnes, and Jessup who is Philip Jessup, again to establish that Mr. Currie was looked upon by the institute as one of the senior advisers of that organization.

As such, I would like to have it introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so inserted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 110" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 110

JUNE 15, 1942.

E. C. C. from W. W. L.:

In response to your request I have hastily jotted down a number of suggestions for the American group at the conference. It's a long list, of course, but I believe we should add to it considerably, and then get competent advice—say that of Currie, Barnes, and Jessup—on elimination. This list runs too much in the regular groove as regards non-Government people. So far as Washington is concerned, we need more intimate knowledge as to who really are in the key positions.

GOVERNMENT

Gruening, Ernest H., Governor, Alaska
 Bean, Louis, Board of Economic Warfare
 Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare
 Riefler, Winfield, Board of Economic Warfare
 Shoemaker, James H., Board of Economic Warfare
 Stone, W. T., Board of Economic Warfare
 Wallace, H. A., Vice President, Board of Economic Warfare
 Staley, Eugene, Bureau of the Budget
 Barnes, Joseph, Coordinator of Information
 Bunche, Ralph, Coordinator of Information
 Fahs, C. B., Coordinator of Information
 Hayden, J. R., Coordinator of Information
 Wheeler, Leslie, Department of Agriculture
 Ropes, E. C., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Trade
 Berle, A. A., Department of State
 Davies, Joseph, Department of State
 Grady, Henry, Department of State
 Hiss, Alger, Department of State
 Hornbeck, S. K., Department of State
 Sayre, Francis B., Department of State
 Stinebower, L. D., Department of State
 Vince, Jacob, Treasury Department
 White, H. D., Treasury Department
 Gulick, Luther H., National Resources Planning Board
 Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration
 Nathan, Robert, War Production Board

OTHERS

Bassett, Arthur, American Red Cross
 Bates, Searle, International Missionary Council
 Beukema, Col. Herman, West Point
 Binder, Carroll, Chicago Daily News

Clapper, Raymond, Washington columnist
 Cowles, Gardner, Des Moines Register and Tribune
 Dennett, Tyler, historian
 Dollard, Charles, Carnegie Corp.
 Emeny, Brooks, Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland
 Field, Frederick V., New York
 Herod, W. H., International General Electric
 Jessup, Prof. Philip C., Columbia University
 Kizer, Benjamin H., Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission
 Lochhead, Archie, Universal Trading Corp.
 Luce, Henry, Time, Inc.
 Molyneaux, Peter, Texas weekly
 Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute
 Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States District Court, Spokane, Wash.
 (ex-Senator)
 Sproul, Allan, Federal Reserve Bank, New York
 Sweetland, Monroe, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief
 Voorhis, Jerry, House of Representatives
 Wilkie, Wendell, attorney
 Willits, Joseph H., Rockefeller Foundation
 Wilson, C. E., General Electric
 Yarnell, Admiral H. E., United States Navy, retired

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel has just one more, Mr. Chairman, bearing on this point of Lauchlin Currie's position in the IPR.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a letter dated August 28, 1941, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, Executive Offices of the President:

DEAR CURRIE: A Chinese scholar who ought to know better has written recently to at least three of my friends criticizing at length Lattimore and Lattimore's appointment, the IPR, etc. All three of his correspondents have referred the letters to me.

It is not terribly important, but I would like to send copies of the letters to Lattimore, but in such a way as to make certain that they are not read by others before reaching him. Have you any means of getting a letter of mine to Lattimore if I were to send it to you to forward?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom was that addressed?

Mr. MANDEL. This is addressed to Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. At the White House.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is the reply, dated September 2, 1941, on the stationery of the White House, addressed to Edward C. Carter:

DEAR CARTER: I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore uncensored. Since it will not be official business I will have to ask you for airmail postage as far as Hong Kong.

Sincerely,

LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 111" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 111

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, August 28, 1941.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,

Executive Offices of the President,

White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: A Chinese scholar who ought to know better has written recently to at least three of my friends criticizing at length Lattimore and Lattimore's

appointment, the IPR, etc. All three of his correspondents have referred the letters to me.

It is not terribly important, but I would like to send copies of the letters to Lattimore, but in such a way as to make certain that they are not read by others before reaching him. Have you any means of getting a letter of mine to Lattimore if I were to send it to you to forward?

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 2, 1941.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR CARTER: I will be glad to get the letters you mentioned to Lattimore uncensored. Since it will not be official business I will have to ask you for air-mail postage as far as Hong Kong.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Lauchlin Currie.
LAUCHLIN CURRIE.

MR. MORRIS. The purpose of introducing those exhibits was to show the connection of Lauchlin Currie, about whom we have had testimony this morning, with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Miss BENTLEY, do you know Sol Adler?

Miss BENTLEY. Not personally; no.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know about Sol Adler?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Solomon Adler was, again, a member of the Silvermaster group. He paid his dues through Mr. Silvermaster to me. Most of the time I was in charge of that group, he was over in China. But he did send reports to various people, including Harry Dexter White in the Treasury Department, which were relayed on to us.

MR. MORRIS. Now, what were the natures of those reports, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Reports on internal Chinese politics, mainly, as to what the Nationalists were doing and what the chances were for the Eighth Army people and the Communists in China.

MR. MORRIS. What was his Communist assignment in China? Can you tell us a little bit about that, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. When he went over there he was told—that was before my day, so I didn't participate in it—he was told that he should follow the party line in China, and carry out to the utmost whatever Moscow wanted in the Far East.

Senator EASTLAND. Who was that?

MR. MORRIS. This is Sol Adler, Senator, who was one of the high officials in the Treasury Department, and who was in charge of the Treasury Department for China.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

MR. MORRIS. I wonder if you can tell us something more about Solomon Adler, Miss Bentley? Anything more about Solomon Adler that you can tell us would be helpful.

Miss BENTLEY. In what respect?

MR. MORRIS. About his connection with the organization.

Miss BENTLEY. I understand that he had been connected with the organization for a few years before I came along.

He not only was connected with the Silvermaster organization, but he had Communist contacts within China. One of those was Chi. I have forgotten his first name.

Mr. MORRIS. Dr. Ch'ao Ting Chi?

Miss BENTLEY. He was the man proposed to be the Chinese delegate to the United Nations. Is that the same one?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Miss BENTLEY. Well, he had dealings with him, both in this country and in China, and with numerous others of the Communists in China, although he was supposed to cultivate the Nationalists on behalf of our own Government, and also to forward the Communist plan.

He was really quite friendly, for example, with Madam Chiang Kai-shek. I remember one report that came through on Adler at one time that complained that he was not tending to business and influencing the quarters he should be. He was playing too much bridge with Madam Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know a man named Israel Epstein?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know him personally, no. I know about him.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us what you know about him, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. In February 1941, I helped set up a cover business, to cover the espionage activities, with funds supplied by Earl Browder, of the American Communist Party, and with a contact from a Soviet agency which had been arranged by Soviet Intelligence. We needed personnel, and Israel Epstein's then wife, Mrs. Edith Epstein, had just returned not too long before from China, and we considered her. So Mr. Golos got her dossier and discovered that Israel Epstein had been a member of the Russian Secret Police for many years in China, and because Mrs. Edith Epstein was his wife, she would be fit to take on as part of our personnel in the business.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any doubt in your mind that Israel Epstein was an important Soviet agent?

Miss BENTLEY. No doubt at all. Mr. Golos checked up on him and had heard a great deal about him.

Mr. MORRIS. How reliable would a report like that, from Mr. Golos about Mr. Epstein as a Soviet agent, be as far as you are concerned?

Miss BENTLEY. Any report which I would get from my Soviet superior on those things would be reliable on that.

Mr. MORRIS. So there was no doubt in your mind that Israel Epstein was what he told you he was?

Miss BENTLEY. No doubt whatsoever.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever take his wife on as an agent?

Miss BENTLEY. No, we simply used her in the office. It turned out she was not as far left as her husband, and we did not like our agents to know too much about us. Since we hired her in the office, it would be unwise to take her as an agent.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did put her in the office?

Miss BENTLEY. We did put her in the office because we thought she would be discreet and protect us in case anything came up.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you can bring forth the exhibit to show Israel Epstein's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Mr. Epstein was the author of the article entitled "Hong Kong, Past and Present," in the Far Eastern Survey for April 24, 1946.

Mr. MORRIS. Is the Far Eastern Survey a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. It is an official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Here is a letter dated September 6, and the year is not given. It is addressed to "Dear Holland" signed by "I. Epstein."

The CHAIRMAN. That was obtained from where?

Mr. MANDEL. It was obtained from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters on Saturday. One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions.

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would like to have these back when you are through.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York.

Sincerely,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit bearing on Israel Epstein's activities with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 112" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 112

DEAR HOLLAND: I clean forgot about giving you the particulars for the letters on Saturday.

One letter should be written for me, and the other for Miss Liu Wu-Kou, Kweilin. It is not necessary to have any for anyone in Chen Ta's or other academic outfits, because they can work from their own institutions.

Enclosed also are the excerpts from the translation of Chiang's book. Would like to have these back when you are through.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

When are you leaving? Are you returning here if you do go down to Kweilin? I ask because we will be requesting you to take some stuff to New York.

Sincerely,

(Signed) I. EPSTEIN.

SEPTEMBER 6.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know anything about John K. Fairbank, who was mentioned in the last letter?

Miss BENTLEY. Only that he was sometimes used by Mildred Price to bring material back from China. You see, it was difficult to bring things back from China that wouldn't go through the censorship or wouldn't otherwise get opened and looked at. Mme. Sun Yat-sen and a number of other people in China, a few Communists, were sending material to Mildred for the China Aid Council. So, anyone who was sympathetic or one of the boys would bring them back on their trips.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you know that Mildred Price did use John K. Fairbank to bring back messages from whom?

Miss BENTLEY. From Mme. Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. MORRIS. To?

MISS BENTLEY. To Mildred Price, from China, because I know at least one occasion when he did bring all these documents back.

MR. MORRIS. Was Mme. Sun Yat-sen a Communist?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes.

MR. MORRIS. Could you develop that a bit for us?

MISS BENTLEY. As to show Mme. Sun Yat-sen was?

MR. MORRIS. Yes; and her relations with your organization.

MISS BENTLEY. Mme. Sun Yat-sen, as far as I know, had been a Communist for quite some time, and was very important in the Communist movement over there. And, therefore, she was in contact with the China Aid Council, which was going all out to help the Communist area.

MR. MORRIS. So, you do know that she was working with the China Aid Council?

MISS BENTLEY. Quite definitely. They got consistent letters from her, and they wrote back, and their aid was going to Communist areas in China.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, would you try to place a date of the time when John K. Fairbank brought a message back from Mme. Sun Yat-sen to Mildred Price? Was it during the time he was the head of the China Division of the Office of War Information?

MISS BENTLEY. I don't know exactly when he was head of that. I would say it was in 1944. It was after Mr. Golos' death. It must have been 1944, or the tag end of 1943.

MR. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, could you tell us what you know about Philip Jaffe?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. His name first came up when, as I told you, we had been canvassing the IPR through Mildred Price to see if we could find good intelligence material. We had gone through them. It didn't look hopeful; a lot of them were too temperamental, and our best prospect as an intelligence worker seemed to be Philip Jaffe, according to Mildred, although she did say that she was very much afraid that he was rather too well known as a Red and, therefore, he wouldn't be too useful.

In undercover work, you have to have people who are inconspicuous and not too well known. So, we decided not to go on with that project. But she described him as being a very loyal comrade and reliable.

MR. MORRIS. So, it is your testimony that you did not take Philip Jaffe from the Institute of Pacific Relations for espionage because he was too open a Communist?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. We got that information from Mildred Price.

MR. MORRIS. And, for that reason, he wouldn't be suitable?

MISS BENTLEY. That is correct; yes.

MR. MORRIS. Were you ever warned against associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. I was told to be very careful in dealing even with Mildred. As a matter of fact, I think Mr. Golos' phrase was: "It was as red as a rose, and you shouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole."

MR. MORRIS. The IPR?

MISS BENTLEY. Yes. He felt, from the point of view of good undercover work, they were far too bungling and they were too much in the open, and it was far too dangerous to be associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations. It might get us in trouble.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever hear of Edward C. Carter's relationship to the Communist organizations mentioned?

Miss BENTLEY. I know very little about Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about him?

Miss BENTLEY. I know that Mildred Price brought his name up, inasmuch as they were associated, and she said he was O. K., and by that she meant that he was a reliable person that she could trust.

Mr. MORRIS. That she could trust in connection with the party work?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Whether or not he was actually a party member is something I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more you know about Edward C. Carter, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. Not that I can think of at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a Miss Harriet Lucy Moore?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. I knew Harriet Moore personally. This forum, that I told you we set up as a cover business in 1941, had a license to ship parcels to Russia. Right after we had set it up in February, you remember, the Germans attacked Russia. And the result of that was that we got the brilliant brainstorm of wanting to send packages to Russia, and the Russian War Relief was born not too long after that. And in connection with that, I had dealings with Harriet Moore, and I was told by Mr. Golos, by the people downtown in the Communist Party, that she was a comrade and I should deal with her as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record a long series of exhibits showing Harriet Lucy Moore's connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

In the middle 1940's, she was acting secretary of that organization. Prior to that, Mr. Chairman—I think it was 1941—she was chairman of the nominating committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations. At that same year she was also a member of the executive committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a member of the board of trustees.

Mr. Chairman, those exhibits have already gone into evidence, together with many others, showing that she was very actively associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Miss Bentley has now testified about knowing her as a member of the Communist Party.

What do you know about Frederick V. Field, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I don't know him personally. I know, as I have stated before, being told by Browder and by Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Your dealings with him were through Browder?

Miss BENTLEY. My dealings with him were through Browder, because I was not getting into the IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever have a meeting at Field's house?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. Earl Browder very often used Fred Field's house to meet people where it had to be highly underground.

Mr. MORRIS. Field was not there?

Miss BENTLEY. Field was not there; no. He just loaned the house to Browder, and Browder was there when I went with a couple of people that he didn't want to come out in the open. They met there. I understand that was done quite frequently on undercover meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of that particular meeting?

Miss BENTLEY. That particular meeting was in connection with what should happen about the cover business.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did it last?

Miss BENTLEY. The cover business?

Mr. MORRIS. No; the meeting?

Miss BENTLEY. I would say we were there a good 2 hours, probably. We had quite a number of things to talk about.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, do you know of an organization called the American Friends of the Chinese People?

Miss BENTLEY. I have heard about it; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about it, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I have been told that it, again, was in the Communist sphere of influence.

Mr. MORRIS. By whom?

Miss BENTLEY. I think I was told that by Mildred Price.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about the publication Amerasia?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about Amerasia?

Miss BENTLEY. I was also told that that was Communist-dominated.

Mr. MORRIS. Who told you that?

Miss BENTLEY. Both Golos and Mildred Price.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you know anything about Owen Lattimore?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't know Lattimore.

Senator EASTLAND. You do not know whether he is a Communist or not?

Miss BENTLEY. No; I don't.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Robert Miller?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes; I know Robert Miller. Robert Miller was one of the Communist Party members that I took on as an espionage agent way back in 1941. He worked for the CIAA. That is Nelson Rockefeller's Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, I think it was called. I think he was in the Political Division of that outfit. I think in 1944 he migrated from there to the State Department. He was one of the people I dealt with directly, collected his dues and got his information.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you ever have any direct relations with John P. Davies?

Miss BENTLEY. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever have anything to do with any of his reports, official State Department reports?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, through the Silvermaster group. I was told that he was quite sympathetic to our cause, and I remember one report of his that they gave to me which definitely showed that fact.

Mr. MORRIS. You were shown a report written by John P. Davies?

Miss BENTLEY. I think it was just after he came back from India. I wouldn't swear to it, but I think so.

Mr. MORRIS. What did the report show, Miss Bentley?

Miss BENTLEY. I remember at the time saying, "Yes; they were quite right about his sympathies," because the report showed it.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know James S. Allen?

Miss BENTLEY. I may have met him once. I am not sure.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know about James S. Allen?

MISS BENTLEY. Not too much. You see, he was more or less in the open party, and I was undercover. So, if I met him at all, it was in the early days in the party, when I could associate openly with people.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I might point out that these people that we are asking Miss Bentley about are people who are connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and have been shown to be such by previous exhibits.

I would like to point that out, Mr. Chairman.

Do you know Frank Coe?

MISS BENTLEY. Not personally. He, again, was a member of the Silvermaster group, worked in the Treasury Department. I collected his Communist Party dues from the Silvermaster group, and it was my understanding from the Silvermasters, again, that he had been a member of the party for quite some time.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have already introduced the exhibits into the record which show that Mr. Frank Coe attended conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Mandel, have you anything further?

MR. MANDEL. This is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, marked "Private IPR Discussion Group on United Nations Cooperation," dated March 15, 1943, at 700 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. On this list is Dr. Frank Coe, Michael Greenberg, and others.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

THE CHAIRMAN. That was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

MR. MANDEL. They all came from the files of the institute.

THE CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record at this point.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 113" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 113

PRIVATE IPR DISCUSSION GROUP ON UNITED NATIONS COOPERATION, MARCH 15, 1943, WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMBERS EXPECTED

The Honorable Frances Bolton, House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Ralph Bunche, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Edward C. Carter, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Dr. Frank Coe, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Cabot Coville, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Mrs. Judith Daniel, Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Michael Greenberg, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.

Dr. George H. C. Hart, Research Chairman of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council, Washington, D. C.

Mr. W. L. Holland, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Mr. William C. Johnstone, dean, junior college, George Washington University, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Kan Lee, China Defense Supplies, Washington, D. C.

Miss Katrine Parsons, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Mr. L. B. Pearson, Minister-Counselor, Canadian Legation, Washington, D. C.

Sir George Sansom, British Embassy, Washington, D. C.

Mr. R. Tirana, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington, D. C.

Dr. A. P. Tixier, Fighting French Delegation, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Alan Watt, Australian Legation, Washington, D. C.

ATTENDANCE UNCERTAIN

Mr. Wilfred Benzon, International Labor Office, Montreal.

Mr. Joseph Jones, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. David Weintraub, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Len DeCaux, Publicity Director, CIO, Washington, D.C.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know anything about Joseph Barnes?

Miss BENTLEY. Not personally; no. He was a friend of Mr. Golos. Mr. Golos worked with him, and Mr. Golos told me he was O. K.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean by "he was O. K."?

Miss BENTLEY. That meant that he could be worked with and would take directives.

Mr. MORRIS. Communist directives?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Miss Bentley, did you know Vladimir Kazakevich?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us what you know about Vladimir Kazakevich?

Miss BENTLEY. He was originally a White Russian who came to this country, I think, in the twenties, and then fell in with some Communist Russians on the west coast in the early thirties, never actually becoming a member in the sense that he was possessed with a book or that he was considered one, but to all intents and purposes was just as good. He was a propagandist for the Russians. He lectured for them. He wrote articles for them, and he had continuous dealings with Mr. Golos.

Whenever he found any interesting information, he brought it in to him, knowing where it was going. In fact, Mr. Kazakevich even told me several times he knew that. At one time he got a job at Cornell University giving courses on Russian civilization to Army students. But someone discovered him, I think it was Mr. Woltman on the then World Telegram, and he was exposed. I understand that he has now gone back to Russia. At least, I read it in a newspaper article.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you can tell us what you know about Alger Hiss?

Mr. Chairman, we have had previous testimony showing that Alger Hiss was an adviser of the IPR, and a member of the board of trustees of the IPR. For that reason, we are going to ask Miss Bentley if she had any connections, indirect or direct, with Alger Hiss.

Miss BENTLEY. They were indirect ones, but to my mind conclusive ones.

In 1944 I took on a group of people I called the Perlo group.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Perlo?

Miss BENTLEY. Victor Perlo is a gentleman that I understand was a quite brilliant statistician with the War Production Board. He is now out of the Government. At the last I heard of him, I think he is in the Jefferson School in New York.

One of the members of the group was a Mr. Harold Glasser, in the Treasury.

In the process of checking everyone's past, I found that Mr. Glasser had, at one time, been pulled out of that particular group and had been turned over to a person whom both Mr. Perlo and Mr. Charles

Kramer refused to tell me who it was, except that he was working for the Russians, and later they broke down and told me it was Mr. Alger Hiss.

Of course, I immediately checked that with my Soviet superior, because it could have been somebody else's intelligence service, and could be dangerous. Word came back to me "that is all right. Lay off the Hiss thing. He is one of ours, but don't bother about it any more."

Mr. MORRIS. And you did not bother about it?

Miss BENTLEY. No. When you were told by your superior to lay off, you laid off.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have more testimony from Miss Bentley in the executive session, but I think it is of such character, particularly inasmuch as it involves foreign governments, that we should have an executive session on that score.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we adjourn until after lunch and commence with an executive session at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The chairman will be unable to preside after lunch. I have another committee meeting.

Senator Smith, could you preside?

Senator SMITH. I have another committee meeting also. I could probably be here for a little while. I think my committee starts at 3 o'clock.

Mr. MORRIS. It is important testimony, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I was wondering if we could meet at a later hour in the afternoon, when I might get through. What would you say to 4:30? It would be a little late.

Mr. MORRIS. That would be all right, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. I might be able to be here for an hour, at 2 o'clock.

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will be able to finish in an hour, Senator Smith.

The CHAIRMAN. How about at 4:30?

Mr. MORRIS. That will be fine, Senator.

Senator SMITH. You spoke about collecting Communist dues and making your rounds.

How often did you make these rounds? I believe you said every 2 weeks.

Miss BENTLEY. I came down every 2 weeks. Once in a while it would be less frequent, if people were on vacations, and once in a while more frequently if there was extra data. I didn't collect them every time.

Perhaps I should explain. Ordinarily, in the open party, they try to collect them regularly. When it comes to undercover work, it is done more or less as a matter of tightening your hold on a person. In other words, the money that you get out of him isn't so important, it is impressing on him that he has one more link in the party.

Senator SMITH. Did you collect the dues in other spots than Washington?

Miss BENTLEY. Yes. For example, the Perlo group came up to New York to meet me, and I collected them there.

Senator SMITH. What is the amount of the dues?

Miss BENTLEY. That is one of the most awful things for anyone to try to get. I don't know whether you have ever seen a Communist

dues scale, but no one short of a financial wizard can keep them straight, and they change all the time.

All I can remember of my own dues is that at one time when I earned \$25 a week, I paid 25 cents a week dues. But it was broken down in categories, almost like an income tax, and then a surtax after so much.

Senator SMITH. Did you have any trouble collecting from your members?

Miss BENTLEY. Very often. Very often, at least they said, they were financially embarrassed.

Senator SMITH. Did you get any money for this work from Russia?

Miss BENTLEY. No; in our case we didn't, no. As a matter of fact, it went the other way around. People were paying dues, including myself, for the privilege of being Communists. We were not being paid by Russia. But then, that is good espionage practice. The Russians told me that they felt that a person who thought something of it would be able to go up higher.

Senator SMITH. They train you also on that phase, do they?

Miss BENTLEY. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would put into the record additional evidence that Harry Dexter White was associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations? We have already put in some, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. Taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is a memorandum dated November 3, 1942, for Miss Harriet L. Moore, Prof. Philip C. Jessup, and Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, entitled "Invitations Issued for the American Group, Mont Tremblant Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations."

Listed here as representing the White House, Currie, Lauchlin (attendance probable); Treasury Department, White, Harry D. (in London).

Others mentioned are Frank Coe, William T. Stone, and others.

Mr. MORRIS. That was for the Mont Tremblant Conference in 1942, is that right, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. That is right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 114" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 114

NOVEMBER 3, 1942.

For: Miss Harriet L. Moore
Prof. Philip C. Jessup
Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer

INVITATIONS ISSUED FOR THE AMERICAN GROUP, MONT TREMBLANT CONFERENCE, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

White House: Currie, Lauchlin (attendance probable.)
State Department: Hornbeck, Stanley K. (attendance probable.)
Treasury Department: White, Harry D. (in London.)
Board of Economic Warfare:
Perkins, Milo (declined.)
Coe, Frank (accepted for part time.)
Stone, William T. (accepted for part time.)
Office of Strategic Services:
Remer, C. F. (accepted.)
Despres, Emile (accepted.)
Bunche, Ralph (accepted.)
Brown, Norman (accepted.)

Federal Reserve Board: Hansen, Alvin H.
 Office of War Information: Barnes, Joseph (declined.)
 Office of Price Administration: Emerson, Rupert (declined.)
 Congress: Coffee, John M.

Journalism:

Luce, Henry R. (declined.)
 Reid, Mrs. Ogden.
 Waymack, W. W.

Business and law:

Kizer, Benjamin H. (accepted.)
 Herod, W. R. (declined.)
 Grady, Henry F. (attendance probable.)
 Hoffman, Paul G.

Labor:

DeCaux, Len (CIO) (accepted.)
 Shiskin, Boris (AFL.)

Academic:

Sproul, R. G.
 Earle, Edward M. (accepted.)
 Shotwell, James T. (declined.)
 Moore, Harriet L. (accepted.)
 Wilbur, Ray Lyman.
 Jessup, Philip C. (accepted.)
 Emeny, Brooks.

TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN GROUP

Governmental:

Acheson, Dean, Department of State.
 Barnes, Joseph, Office of War Information.
 Baxter, James P., Office of Strategic Services.
 Berle, Adolf, Department of State.
 Beukema, Col. Herman, United States Military Academy.
 Currie, Lauchlin, White House.
 Emerson, Rupert, Office of Price Administration.
 Hamilton, Maxwell, Department of State.
 Hornbeck, Stanley K., Department of State.
 Nathan, Robert, War Production Board.
 Perkins, Milo, Board of Economic Warfare.
 Stone, William T., Board of Economic Warfare.
 Studebaker, John W., United States Office of Education.
 Wallace, Henry A., Vice President.
 Welles, Sumner, Department of State.
 White, Harry D., Treasury Department.

Nongovernmental:

Bates, Searle, University of Nanking; International Missionary Council, New York City.
 Binder, Carroll, foreign news editor, Chicago Daily News, Chicago.
 Clapper, Raymond, Scripps-Howard columnist, Washington.
 Dennison, Eleanor, National League of Women Voters, Washington.
 Earle, Edward M., Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.
 Eliot, Thomas, United States Congressman from Massachusetts, Cambridge.
 Field, Frederick V., New York City.
 Gibson, Hugh, New York.
 Grady, Henry F., president, American President Lines, San Francisco.
 Herod, W. R., vice president, International General Electric Co.; president, United China Relief, New York City.
 Jessup, Philip C., Columbia University, New York City.
 Kizer, Benjamin H., chairman, Northwest Regional Planning Commission, Spokane.
 Luce, Henry R., Time, Inc., New York City.
 Moore, Harriet L., American Russian Institute, New York City.
 Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B., United States district court, Spokane.
 Sproul, Robert G., president, University of California, Berkeley.
 Sproul, Allan, president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City.

Sweetland, Monroe, director, National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief, Washington.

Viner, Jacob, University of Chicago, Chicago.

Wilson, C. E., president, General Electric Co., New York City.

Wilson, Howard, Harvard University; American Council on Education, Cambridge.

Yarnell, Admiral Harry E. (retired), Newport.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a letter from the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated October 21, 1942, addressed to Robert W. Barnett, from William W. Lockwood, and I read a few excerpts:

The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless OSS policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservation; also he is not yet sure of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for 2 or 3 days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and these I'll take up with you later.

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his return.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 115" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 115

OCTOBER 21, 1942.

Mr. ROBERT W. BARNETT,

I. P. R. 700 Jackson Place NW.

DEAR BOB: The interviews with conference invitees yesterday were quite successful on the whole. Remer and Bunch definitely will come unless OSS policy prevents. Despres makes the same reservation; also he is not yet sure of being able to get away for that time. Coe and Stone accept tentatively, although uncertain about whether they can get away for the full period. Emerson doubts very much that he can free himself to attend. Coe and Stone have agreed to take up the question with Perkins, and have hopes that he will attend for 2 or 3 days, though no longer than that. Other possibilities developed in discussion, and these I'll take up with you later.

Meanwhile there are one or two specific things I'd like you to do.

Harry White is in London, I am told, though I didn't call his office. I am mailing a formal invitation to him, and suggest that you call his secretary to say that this is something about which we should like to talk with White on his return.

I also invited Len De Caux, CIO publicity director and editor of the CIO News. He immediately gave his tentative acceptance. I got a very favorable impression from conversation with him, and Michael knows him.

De Caux suggested Boris Shiskin of the A. F. of L. as another good labor person for the conference. He is the research director, I believe. If the nominating committee approves, I'd like you and Michael to see him at the Washington headquarters and extend an invitation. Before doing this, however, you had better wait for further word from me.

In the opinion of Hiss, Coe, and Despres, we ought to try to get Berle or Acheson, or both. More about this later, too.

One important gap in the present line-up is India. The Washington possibilities are Paul Alling, now political adviser and formerly chief of the State Department's Near Eastern Division; Wallace Murray, present chief; Eric Beecroft, and Norman Brown. From what I learned of the two State Department men, neither would be very useful to us. As between Beecroft and Brown,

I'd like your opinion and Michael's. Despres says that the written work of Brown's section is first rate—imaginative and pointed. He doesn't know Brown's qualifications as a conference participant. Remer thinks well of Brown as more than the conventional academician. In his favor are not only his position, but also his academic standing. Although we are paying little attention to this consideration in making up the American group, it would be desirable, other things being equal, to include at least one person with senior rank among scholars in the Asiatic field. But this shouldn't decide the matter unless on other grounds as well Brown is the best nominee.

Another possibility we might consider is someone from Knox's office or Stimson's. Coe and Hiss mentioned Adlai Stevens, one of Knox's special assistants. Hiss also suggested with some approval Harvey Bundy, former assistant Secretary of State and now special assistant to Stimson. Then there is General Little, a Marine general formerly in China, now retired (?). Also General Magruder, whereabouts unknown. Despres suggested Admiral Hart, saying that it wouldn't be a bad idea to have someone who would give a pretty forthright and orthodox Navy view, as this view will greatly influence the postwar settlement.

Still other suggestion include Robert Sherwood, head of the OWI's Overseas Section, and Gardner Cowles.

Ben Kizer probably will write Congressman Coffee a personal letter, and leave it to us to follow up with an interview.

In a day or so I'll send a revised list indicating where we now stand on invitations and acceptances.

Read Hager, by the way, would like very much to see you, and took down your telephone number. He has been with Rupert Emerson in the office of the OPA regional administrator handling Territories and possessions. Next week he probably will shift to the civilian staff of the Munitions Assignments Board. This will put him in a key position, as a member of the group, working for Hopkins in this field. His home address is 2031 Huidekoper Place.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, *Secretary*.

Mr. MORRIS. You see there that Harry White is represented as invited as representing the Treasury Department.

Senator SMITH. I think, Mr. Chairman, that maybe the statement should be made there that that does not mean, the introduction of this exhibit does not mean, that all of the people on here, whose names are on here, are called suspects because there are names of a great many.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it is introduced for a purpose, to connect Harry Dexter White.

Mr. MORRIS. It is introduced to show that Harry Dexter White was interested in IPR activities.

In this particular case, he was a delegate to the Mont Tremblant Conference in 1942.

Senator SMITH. I see names of a great many American citizens here on these two sheets of paper, and I was wondering about it.

The CHAIRMAN. The exhibit does not refer to them at all.

Senator SMITH. That is exactly what I wanted.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, further along those lines, Mr. Chairman, you have pointed out that incidental association between people whom we have named as Communists here, which association reflects only mere association and nothing significant, that we have asked the members of the committee to withhold any conclusions about their particular identity with the Communist organization.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. One more question.

Could you tell us what you know about Joseph Eckhart.

Miss BENTLEY. Yes, quite a lot about Joseph Eckhart. I met him originally in November 1936 because he needed a secretary, or so the excuse was, to edit his letters, because his English wasn't too good.

I was introduced to him by the then organizational secretary of the city office of the League Against War and Fascism.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that?

Miss BENTLEY. Beatrice Carlin.

That organization, of course, has been thoroughly branded as being Communist dominated; not only that, the organization originated in Moscow. It was understood that Mr. Eckhart was a Communist.

As time went on, he was unable to use me because he had come to this country, I understand, for the express purpose of trying to get airplanes to Spain. That was during the civil war. He was going to sneak them out through Mexico. The Neutrality Act intervened along in there, and he stayed on until 1938, and found that he couldn't use me.

But I discovered that he was a highly important person at that point, that he had come from Moscow without the usual strings of reporting to superiors, and I knew him, as I said, from November 1936 until January, I guess it was, 1938.

I found out later on that he was a Soviet military intelligence person. Mr. Golos told me that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have introduced that testimony into evidence not immediately connecting the Institute of Pacific Relations with that individual person.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Is that all you have to offer?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, until we have an executive session, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The committee will stand in recess until 4:30 when we will have an executive session.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., Tuesday, August 14, 1951, the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., Thursday, August 16, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 16, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senators McCarthy and Mundt; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS, your witness?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I am going to call on Mr. Carter first. Mr. Canning and Mr. Chambers, I wonder if you would accommodate the gentlemen of the press by letting them have the pictures?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to the witnesses that they are not required or do not have to have their pictures taken in this committee. If there is no objection on their part, they may sit up here and the press may take pictures, otherwise they will not be taken.

Mr. CHAMBERS. In my case one more will not matter.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter?

The CHAIRMAN. Now again may I say that the acoustics in this room are not very good, and when it is crowded it makes it just a little bit worse. Will you kindly bear with the committee and try to be as quiet as possible, especially if you have to speak to your neighbor, in which case please resort to the whisper method only.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris, the witness has been sworn.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of calling Mr. Carter in today is that we have run into a certain amount of difficulty in determining the identity of a person mentioned in one of the exhibits. Since Mr. Carter was the recipient of the letter involved I thought it would be best to have him in here to answer this particular question. We had one day last week testimony by Prof. Karl August Wittfogel of the School of Chinese Studies in Columbia University, testimony that Herbert Norman was in 1938 a Communist.

In filing our exhibits at the time there was a possibly significant letter that we introduced at the time, which reads as follows, and this is a letter now which was introduced as an exhibit on that occasion. It is a letter from W. L. Holland to Mr. Carter dated September 5, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the origin of that letter?

Mr. MORRIS. It was identified by Mr. Mandel as taken from the IPR files.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the exhibit number?

Mr. MORRIS. What is the exhibit number, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Exhibit No. 72.

Mr. MORRIS. I will read the letter. The significant paragraph reads as follows:

Phil is leaving tonight and is taking with him Landon's book on the Chinese in Siam and the major part of Yasuo's Industrial Japan.

It goes on to list other things that this Phil is taking with him to Japan.

Phil will be in Japan from about September 18 to October 6, and can be reached care of the Japanese IPR. Any very secret messages might be sent him care of Herbert Norman at the Canadian Legation.

We do not know who Phil is, Mr. Carter.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that counsel is now reading from Exhibit 72 of the hearing of the committee.

Mr. MORRIS. We thought we would ask Mr. Carter who Phil is, in this letter that you received from Mr. Holland.

Mr. CARTER. I will be very glad, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Just tell us who Phil is, that is the question.

Senator FERGUSON. Identify him by his last name.

Mr. CARTER. Lilienthal.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the answer.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to say something?

Mr. CARTER. If I may. In view of the introductory remarks of Mr. Morris regarding Mr. Norman, I wish to say that the reiteration by the counsel of this committee of Dr. Wittfogel's slanderous attack on Mr. Norman is, I think, out of keeping.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the end of the answer, that is sufficient.

Senator FERGUSON. Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman, what the secret information was that you wanted to send or was being sent?

Mr. CARTER. May I answer this question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Lilienthal was at that time research assistant to Mr. W. L. Holland, whose office that year was provided by the University of California in the offices of the Giannini Foundation, and we had a large number of research manuscripts which Mr. Lilienthal was taking to Shanghai to be printed there for two reasons, one because costs in Nationalist China for printing were very low, and second, Shanghai was a very good distribution point for the whole Pacific. Mr. Lilienthal took these manuscripts, but was to stop in Tokyo to visit the Japanese IPR.

It was a somewhat tricky situation because at that time Japan and China were at war, and the Japanese were opposed to the IPR at that time because the IPR writers usually supported actively China's resistance to Japan under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There might be some necessity of communicating with Mr. Norman, but it was undesirable to involve the Chinese and the Japanese in any fur-

ther controversy, and so we used, or it was proposed by Mr. Holland, that the facilities of the Canadian Legation be used.

As a matter of fact, there was no occasion for using them, and no message was sent.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you not use our Embassy, the American Embassy?

Mr. CARTER. You would have to ask Mr. Holland that.

Senator FERGUSON. And the secret messages were these documents that were to be printed?

Mr. CARTER. No, they weren't the documents; they were simply——

Senator FERGUSON. Manuscripts to become documents?

Mr. CARTER. The manuscripts were to become documents, but it was not about those manuscripts that were to become books, it was in the case the Japanese, who were very critical of the international IPR and the American IPR at that time because they regarded the IPR as pro-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-Japanese, it was simply in case some misunderstanding of that sort came up that this precaution was taken but never exercised.

Senator FERGUSON. Now Herbert Norman.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he representing the IPR in Japan?

Mr. CARTER. No; he had been a research assistant in the International Secretariat sometime before, and after he had finished his Rockefeller Fellowship at Harvard he wrote one of the really great books in the IPR shelf, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State. Because of his eminence in the Japanese field, after he terminated his work with the IPR the Canadian External Affairs Ministry appointed him to their Legation in Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. Your only reason then for using Norman was that he was a member of the Legation?

Mr. CARTER. Two reasons. One was, he was a former member of our staff and was still interested in the institute, and his book was continuing its sale, and he was there in the Legation. Mr. Lilienthal would see him, and it was thought that it might be a convenient post-office address, but as I said, it was not used. There was no occasion to use it.

Senator WATKINS. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator WATKINS. Did not the Japanese at that time have a unit in the IPR in good standing?

Mr. CARTER. Oh, yes.

Senator WATKINS. Whatever material you sent out would be sent to them the same as to other countries that had units?

Mr. CARTER. The final product would be sent to them just as it was to all the other countries in the Pacific.

Senator WATKINS. In view of the nature of your organization, why was it necessary to have secrets?

Mr. CARTER. Because Japan and China were in a state of violent war, although I think technically it was undeclared.

Senator WATKINS. That is the only reason?

Mr. CARTER. Obviously.

Senator WATKINS. I do not think it is so obvious, otherwise I might have caught it before you gave your answer.

Mr. CARTER. It was obvious to me. I am sorry I did not make it obvious to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter here, and while we have Mr. Carter on the stand I would like to ask him a few questions on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. We had testimony yesterday, day before yesterday, by Elizabeth Bentley that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent. That was brought out in the regular course of her testimony, and she knew that from her official dealings in the Communist Party.

Now this letter concerns itself with The Unfinished Revolution in China, which was written by Israel Epstein, and this letter, which Mr. Mandel will identify, was one of the letters taken from the IPR files.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify that as a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated June 12, 1947. Would you like it read?

Mr. MORRIS. May I have a copy of that, please?

I think, Mr. Chairman, if we have this read paragraph by paragraph and then I will ask Mr. Carter a few questions about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read the first two paragraphs?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if you have copies of that letter, would you give a copy to Mr. Carter?

Mr. MANDEL. This is marked "Private and confidential."

DEAR MISS FORD:

The reference is to Miss Ann Ford, publicity director, Little, Brown & Co.—

This is to acknowledge Epstein's *The Unfinished Revolution in China*, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives; John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have you thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would be all to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. Sometimes, for mercenary reasons, they make substantial cuts.

Mr. MORRIS. That is enough for the time being. Why were you so interested, Mr. Carter, to have the leaders, the heads of our State Department, John Foster Dulles, John Carter Vincent, and Secretary of State George Marshall, read *The Unfinished Revolution in China* by Israel Epstein?

Mr. CARTER. And Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives. It struck me as a human document by a man who had been long in China and seemed to me to have a rather broad and deep knowledge of things Chinese and the Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not know that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you recognize the book as a Communist publication?

Mr. CARTER. I did not. I would hardly have sent it to as astute and wise and patriotic men as this list if I had thought that it was Communist propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that you never knew Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. At that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Or a special pleader for the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was, Did you know him to be?

Mr. CARTER. I did not know him to be a Communist on June 12, 1947.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you changed your mind since then as to whether or not he was?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you could answer that question "Yes" or "No" and then make your explanation. It would save time, Mr. Carter, if you do that.

Mr. CARTER. I am terribly sorry, Senator McCarran, but this is one of the things that you can't say "Yes" or "No."

The CHAIRMAN. Read the question and see whether you can answer "Yes" or "No."

Senator FERGUSON. Let me put the question again. Have you changed your mind as to Epstein being or ever having been a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. I have reconsidered and have not reached a final conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. You are now in doubt?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. You are familiar with this book, are you not, *The Unfinished Revolution in China*?

Mr. CARTER. I haven't read it for a long time.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I would like to have the clerk of the committee put some of these paragraphs in here, but I do not want to delay this examination this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will designate, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I will have them designated and see that they go in the record here, and I will have a copy of that furnished to you and then ask you, and get an answer later, about what you think in the light of your reconsideration.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Might I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The witness has made a statement that on June 12, 1947, he did not know Mr. Epstein to be a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. So that we might have a comprehensive answer on that point, Mr. Carter, did you on June 12, 1947, know Mr. Epstein ever to have been a Communist or ever to have worked for the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would read the next to the last paragraph in the letter—that is, the next to the last in the P. S.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

P. S.—Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, what did you mean there, that Epstein was a special pleader?

Mr. CARTER. He was pleading for the Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your interpretation of the expression “many will say that Epstein is a special pleader”?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He was pleading also for a new kind of world, was he not? Do you not say that?

The CHAIRMAN. It is the P. S., I think.

Mr. MORRIS. He has it, I believe.

Mr. CARTER. He is “pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders.”

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Mr. Epstein was there pleading for what you thought was a sound analysis of the world?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of the fact that we had Israel Epstein identified as a Soviet agent as of that time, does it surprise you about your own opinions of the world situation at that time?

Mr. CARTER. Not completely because some of the identifications alleged in this room haven't convinced me of their authenticity.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony then that you do not believe that Israel Epstein was a Soviet agent at that time?

Mr. CARTER. I had no knowledge at that time that he was a Soviet agent, and I do not know today whether he was or was not.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read one paragraph here about you saying that he was a special pleader for a new kind of world and ask you whether it was this kind of world that you were talking about. This is page 411.

The only point in this formulation with which a student in political science might quarrel was the phrase “Communitistic form of government.” Communism is not a form of government but an economic society.

Now, is that what you were talking about, that he was a special pleader for that?

Mr. CARTER. Well, not having read the book for some time and being confronted with a few sentences out of a big book—

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.

Mr. CARTER. At the moment I don't feel that I would help the committee at all by making an answer. I would be very glad to study it and send you in writing my reaction and my answer to your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you were saying that he was a special pleader for a particular form of government or kind.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you not think that Epstein was advocating communism in this book?

Mr. CARTER. I don't want to be difficult, but I would like to read the book unhurriedly.

Senator FERGUSON. I will ask you questions later on it then.

Mr. CARTER. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, there was reference there to—

I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I think it would be appropriate to make excerpts from Mr. Lattimore's review, which appeared in the New York Times.

Senator FERGUSON. First, I would like to ask Mr. Carter the question, Did you think that Owen Lattimore would give the same kind of review of this book as you had in mind, a new form of government that was appropriate?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember what I had in mind. I did regard and still regard Owen Lattimore as very knowledgeable about China, and this was a book by a man who knew a great deal about China. Whether I had in mind any particular emphasis on this or that point in the book I can't for the life of me remember this morning.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you were all for the book?

Mr. CARTER. I thought it was a good book, and that it should have wide circulation, and that it should come to the attention of our most thoughtful Americans.

Senator FERGUSON. And you felt that if Owen Lattimore reviewed this book he would take the same slant on it as you have taken?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I thought he probably would see that it was a useful book.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. You anticipated that he would follow the same thinking on it as you had?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you say "I hope other publications will make as wise a choice."

Mr. CARTER. I thought he was a qualified reviewer, and I hoped that other papers would get equally qualified reviewers.

Senator FERGUSON. And you anticipated that he would recommend it?

Mr. CARTER. I thought it was likely.

Senator WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith, I think, wanted to ask a question.

Senator SMITH. I was wondering if Mr. Carter would read the last paragraph on sheet 2 and tell us what he meant by that.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you kindly read that, Mr. Carter?

Senator SMITH. Out loud.

Mr. CARTER (reading):

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles—

That is the son of Sumner Welles—

Christopher Rand and Arch Steele. Sun Fo, Madame Sun Yat-sen and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

Senator SMITH. What did you mean by that paragraph, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I thought that it certainly should be in the hands of our Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, who has a lifelong knowledge of China, some of our principal American correspondents, and Sun Fo, who was a member of the Chiang Kai-shek cabinet, Madame Sun Yat-sen, who was a member of the Soong family, and others.

It seemed to me that I was suggesting that this book come to the attention of first, correspondents from the Times and Tribune and other American papers.

Senator SMITH. When you put in quotation marks "forbidden list," what did you mean by that?

Mr. CARTER. I knew at that time that the war-weariness following the war, the difficulty of reorganizing China at that time after the devastation of the Japanese and so forth, that some agencies of the Nationalist Government were very sensitive to any criticism of the regime and that they might, that some bureaucrats might, put this on a forbidden list.

Senator SMITH. You regard this book as inimical to the Nationalist interests then?

Mr. CARTER. No, I thought it could be very useful to the Nationalist Government, but I thought that some of the less intelligent bureaucrats in the Nationalist Government might think it was hostile.

Senator SMITH. Do you not think it was hostile to the Nationalist Government?

Mr. CARTER. On what point?

Senator SMITH. The book.

Mr. CARTER. I think I said I would comment after I had read the book. But I think it was critical of certain features in the Nationalist Government, features that our own Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, was aware of and constantly labored in private with Chiang Kai-shek to reform.

Senator SMITH. Do you not regard the book as being one that would add to the blame, so to speak, of the Nationalist cause and encourage the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not so regard it.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not regard it as an open espousal of the Communist cause?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you reconcile the fact that Israel Epstein in your opinion was a special pleader for Communist China? It was your testimony that he was a special pleader for the Chinese.

Mr. CARTER. I felt that Leighton Stuart was a special pleader for the Chinese.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question.

Mr. MORRIS. In view of your testimony when you discussed the idea of Israel Epstein being a special pleader, you felt he was a special pleader on the part of Communist China?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How can you reconcile this paragraph which Senator Smith has been just examining you on where you say that the book would probably be put on the forbidden list by China?

Mr. CARTER. Put on the forbidden list, as I said, by some bureaucrat.

Mr. MORRIS. By the Chinese Government? Obviously it is an official list you are talking about?

Mr. CARTER. The dichotomy in the various bureaus of the Chinese Government, or multichotomy, were such that, as in some other governments, one section of the government doesn't know what the other section's right hand and left hand is doing.

Senator WATKINS. Modeled after our own?

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't make that aspersion.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like an answer, Mr. Chairman, to my question whether this book was an open espousal of the Communist Chinese cause.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask a question. You at least thought, Mr. Carter, that this book was more favorable to the Communist element in China than it was to the then existing Nationalist Government?

Mr. CARTER. I wouldn't affirm that without reading the book again.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you wanted to get it to Madame Sun Yat-sen?

Mr. CARTER. Yes, and Sun Fo, members of the Cabinet.

Senator FERGUSON. But Madame Sun Yat-sen, you wanted to get it to her?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. She was more favorable to the Communist side at that time?

Mr. CARTER. She was very keen on the united front.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, the united front meant to some of those people victory for the Communists, did it not?

Mr. CARTER. I suppose it did to the Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Now was she not favorable to the Communist side?

Mr. CARTER. She is apparently living now under Communist rule. I don't know whether she is having a good time or bad time.

Mr. MORRIS. She is an official of the Government, is she not?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Have you any doubt that she is sympathetic to the Communist Government?

Mr. CARTER. Pretty nearly everyone—the Chinese Communist Government, the Communist Government of China, contains hundreds, thousands of former Chiang Kai-shek officials.

Senator FERGUSON. But that does not say that they are not Communists?

Mr. CARTER. They may or may not be.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think the present Chinese Government in China proper is not a Communist Government?

Mr. CARTER. The leaders are Communists and are following definitely an out-and-out Communist line, but there are employed in high positions in that Communist Government a great many Chinese who were loyal supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and the National regime. Which category Madame Sun Yat-sen is in today I don't know. I have read a great many attacks saying that she has gone over hook, bait, and sinker to the Communist cause.

I have heard other statements that she is very critical of many of the features of the Communist regime and not having been on the spot I am not able to reach any balance.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not want to say then that this book was more favorable to the Communist side of the Government, of the people in China, that were represented?

Mr. CARTER. Not until I have read it.

Senator FERGUSON. But notwithstanding this statement that you were fearful that it was going on the forbidden list and would be kept out?

Mr. CARTER. As I said, there were cliques, there are opposition groups, within the Kuomintang government, and as the Senator hinted, as there exists elsewhere.

Senator WATKINS. I was referring to the fact that you said one group would not know what the other group was doing. I thought that perhaps you meant they were following what our people were doing.

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you find Owen Lattimore more sympathetic to the Communist China side than to the Kuomintang side?

Mr. CARTER. I did not.

Senator FERGUSON. But you thought he was a wise choice to review this kind of a book?

Mr. CARTER. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have Mr. Mandel read excerpts from this review by Owen Lattimore, which has been referred to in testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. This review is taken from the New York Times book review section, June 22, 1947, pages 5 and 29. I will read excerpts:

* * * From Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China to Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China the list of names is distinguished—and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company * * *.

* * * The writers either throw their weight into criticism of the Kuomintang, like Mr. White and Mr. Jacoby, or into outspoken support of the Chinese Communists, like Mr. Epstein * * *.

There is no question about Mr. Epstein's partisanship. He not only justifies Chinese Communist policy but he justifies it and Russian policy in relation to each other and in relation to American policy. * * * Mr. Epstein has presented enough facts for this reviewer, at least, to form an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Who wrote that?

Mr. MORRIS. Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Did that disappoint you when you said that you hoped other publications would make as wise a choice?

Mr. CARTER. This was written over 4 years ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you recall now that Lattimore said that about the book?

Mr. CARTER. I don't. I am very glad to see it and discover that Lattimore was writing frankly and honestly about the book.

Senator FERGUSON. Now your opinion of Lattimore, does that bring you to the conclusion that this book was more favorable to the Communists than to the non-Communists?

Mr. CARTER. It does; certainly.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt about it?

Mr. CARTER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Your letter of June 12, 1947, is the one that had the paragraph that I directed your attention to just now. I notice this review was published in the New York Times June 22, 1947, 10 days after you wrote the letter?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Had you seen Lattimore's review that was going to be published at the time you wrote your letter of the 12th?

Mr. CARTER. No; I hadn't seen it. Well, I don't remember. I think it's unlikely, but I can't swear to it. Mr. Morris might bring up something.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, are you now going to change your testimony, namely, that you did not recognize that to be an open espousal of the Chinese Communist cause on further thought?

Mr. CARTER. I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that on piecemeal quotations I would like to read the book.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, Are you going to change your mind?

Mr. MORRIS. I have two other reviews that I think are appropriate.

Senator FERGUSON. You agreed with this opinion of Lattimore? You usually agreed with Lattimore's opinion on China; did you not?

Mr. CARTER. Usually, not invariably.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you now in conflict with this opinion? Does this not refresh your memory?

Mr. CARTER. Well, it tells me what Lattimore's reaction to the book was.

Senator FERGUSON. You never got that reaction?

Mr. CARTER. I can't remember. I am not trying to stall.

Senator FERGUSON. Does it not seem strange to you now, not having to use hindsight, that you would recommend a book to George Marshall, Senator Vandenberg, my distinguished colleague, and others mentioned in this article, that Owen Lattimore talked of in this language? Does that not now seem strange to you?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I have such high respect for the intellectual ability and integrity of all those men that I must have thought they would make up their own minds.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you want to get this side at least to them, the Communist side?

Mr. CARTER. I had no desire to do that.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, how do you reconcile that with Lattimore's judgment that you respect so much, on China if this was not a Communist propaganda book?

Mr. CARTER. Of course, I have to let you do the reconciling.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you ever know a Communist to do some writing that he did not infiltrate his writings with Communist propaganda? You have been a great reader and a student. Have you ever known a Communist to write and not infiltrate his writing with Communist propaganda?

Mr. CARTER. I have read translations of Soviet Russia, presumably Communist scientists on fish, on forests, on cattle breeding, where I could never discover a Communist line. That is my answer.

Senator FERGUSON. Let us get a little closer. I will change my question a little. You did answer that, I think, by some avoidance when you got to fish and cattle. Let us go into the political field.

Have you ever known a Communist writer to not infiltrate his political writings with Communist propaganda?

Mr. CARTER. I think it's their usual pattern.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Not only usual.

Mr. CARTER. Invariably, you would say?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder—

Senator FERGUSON. Do you want that answer to stand about the fish now, or do you want to strike it out?

Mr. CARTER. No; I would leave it in. Put reindeer in also.

Senator FERGUSON. I still think the Commies have a line on the fish question.

Mr. CARTER. The Japanese think so.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you read excerpts from two other reviews of the same book?

Mr. MANDEL. I read excerpts from a review by Frederick V. Field appearing in the New Masses for July 22, 1947, on pages 20 and 21. The New Masses is a Communist magazine.

The main subject of the Unfinished Revolution in China is the history, first, of China's war of resistance against Japan, and second of the struggle of the Chinese people against the Kuomintang dictatorship and American imperialism. * * *

Then we find further down the following:

* * * During the war against Japan it was in those parts of China where the people were moved to organize themselves by Communist leadership that resistance was successful and that Chinese history spurred forward. * * *

The next is a quotation from the Daily Worker of June 18, 1947, a review of the same book by Samuel Sillen.

We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years, books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Gunther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's Unfinished Revolution in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Had you read either of those reviews, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I don't subscribe to either the New Masses or the Daily Worker. I see them occasionally on subway stands.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recognize now that the three reviews are very much similar, in fact, Sillen's analysis of the thing, talking about the distinguished company, almost coincides completely with Lattimore's?

Mr. CARTER. Well, not quite; Lattimore does not mention Smedley, Guenther Stein, or Harrison Forman.

Mr. MORRIS. He mentioned Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China, and Ted White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China, and says:

Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company.

Mr. CARTER. Is that from the Daily Worker?

Mr. MORRIS. No; that is from the review by Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that distinguished company?

Mr. CARTER. Lattimore thought so. You will have to ask him.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Carter, with respect to the thing by Field, published in the New Masses 10 days after your letter, had you seen Mr. Field's review at the time you wrote your letter?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator SMITH. Were not you and Mr. Field working very closely at that time, June 1947?

Mr. MORRIS. He was a member of your executive committee, was he not, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I have forgotten the exact date. Perhaps you could refresh my memory as to when he resigned from the board's executive committee. He had a long time previously resigned as a member of the staff, and when he resigned as a member of the staff my weekly or monthly or daily contact with him ceased. He was working on other things mostly.

Senator SMITH. Did you subscribe to what Field said in his review?

Mr. CARTER. I don't remember seeing it until this morning. Which particular point?

Senator FERGUSON. About the American imperialism.

Senator SMITH (reading):

that their foreign oppressors are today primarily American imperialists—

Mr. CARTER. That was the usual Communist line all over the world, that the people of the United States of America were imperialists if we had taken over the job from the French, and so forth.

Senator SMITH. This was a review of that book?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Is this one of the reasons why you wanted this book to be distributed in China to slant the people further in favor of the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. What I was concerned about, Senator, was that the most intelligent people in this country could get an understanding of various points of view and stresses in China. I felt that unless the Kuomintang cleaned house economically, administratively, militarily, the Communists were bound to take over, and I hoped that public opinion in this country could be so informed that before it was too late Chiang Kai-shek and the better elements in the Nationalist Government could listen to our Ambassador Leighton Stuart, listen to others, clean house, and prevent the Communists from taking over China.

Senator SMITH. But your paragraph here was referring to getting the book circulated in China.

Mr. CARTER. Well, my focus first of all with the American edition was to get it circulated in the United States. A second suggestion was that there be a Chinese edition in the hope that it would reach as many Chinese as possible who were in a position to aid in the reform of the Kuomintang and shoring it up and making it so democratic, so efficient, that the Chinese Communists would have nothing to offer and that Chiang and the better element around him would remain in China. And we now know he is not in China but is in Formosa.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Carter, did you then think that the way to change the Chiang Kai-shek government was to espouse the cause of communism?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Is not that just what this book did? Is that not exactly what the book did?

Mr. CARTER. If that is your opinion.

Senator FERGUSON. I take these men who wrote about it. Is that not what they say it did?

Mr. CARTER. It certainly looks like it.

Senator FERGUSON. You read it before you recommended it?

Mr. CARTER. I read the book, I think, in manuscript or galley proof.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Do you now think that that was the way to change the Government of China, was to advocate the Communists?

Mr. CARTER. I did not; I just said that I thought we were playing for time as a chance that Chiang, with American aid, could save the situation and stop the Communist avalanche.

Senator FERGUSON. All right. Do you know of any other books of similar nature that you recommended to our Secretary of State and those that were in the Far Eastern Division or people in Congress that had something to say in relation to foreign policy that was similar to the Epstein book?

Mr. CARTER. It was our practice to send to appropriate officers of our Government copies of all our publications. Of course, they automatically went to the Library of Congress, they went to those few people in Congress who were members of IPR, the Far Eastern Division, the Secretary of State's Office, and so on.

Senator FERGUSON. It was your purpose to influence public opinion in America in the Far East?

Mr. CARTER. It was our purpose to provide facts and diverse opinion so that the public could make up its own mind. Mr. Root, Mr. Hughes, many of our Secretaries of State have said that the Government has great difficulty in acting intelligently because of the lack of an informed public opinion. So far as the Pacific was concerned we conceived our role to get the facts, to provide a variety of opinions, analyses from all sorts of points of view so that the public, the Government, press, and business could make up its own mind.

Senator FERGUSON. You did hope, however, that it would follow the suggestions that you were making?

Mr. CARTER. The institute as such didn't make suggestions on policy at all.

Senator FERGUSON. You were hoping that this book, the Unfinished Revolution in China, would influence American public opinion?

Mr. CARTER. We thought it should be; I thought it should be considered.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "we" who do you mean, Mr. Carter? Mr. Lattimore?

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Larrimore was not on the staff of Pacific Affairs at that time. I meant my colleagues on the staff. I wish now to speak for myself. I hoped that this and other books would aid because I think you remember, Senator McCarran, always throughout our history we have concentrated on Europe. We teach French, Italian, German, and Spanish. It is only recently that we have taught Chinese and Japanese. We wanted the public to have ample data on the Far East.

The CHAIRMAN. So for that reason you wanted a Communist doctrine spread in this country; is that right?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did you mark this "private and confidential" when you wanted so many people to know about it?

Mr. CARTER. Well, I was writing to a publisher, Little, Brown & Co. in Boston using the names of eminent people whom I had not consulted. I had not consulted Senator Vandenberg or General Marshall. I simply said, "You may wish to get this book into the hands of these people."

Senator FERGUSON. Was the reason that you wanted this private and confidential that you were saying that this book would be forbidden in your opinion in Nationalist China?

Mr. CARTER. It could be.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be a reason for keeping this confidential?

Mr. CARTER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, without laboring this point too long I would like three more paragraphs read into the record at this time. Would you read the first three paragraphs in the P. S.?

The CHAIRMAN. Of what?

Mr. MORRIS. From the letter of Mr. Carter to Miss Ford.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

P. S. 2.—Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who could get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, why were you so anxious that John Carter Vincent read the book?

Mr. CARTER. Wasn't he Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department at that time?

Mr. MORRIS. As such did he have access to General Marshall?

Mr. CARTER. Well, through, I suppose, the Under Secretary of State. I never knew whether he went directly to General Marshall or not.

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you say here—

If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Mr. CARTER. John Carter Vincent's official duty at the that time was to handle the China administration of the State Department, and he would probably be regarded in a formal organization of the Department by General Marshall as one of the far eastern experts.

The CHAIRMAN. And you thought that this book would be a good book for General Marshall to be guided by naturally?

Mr. CARTER. I thought it would be a good thing for him to read.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you mean when you said, Mr. Carter:

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically.

What did you mean by that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. I thought John Carter Vincent was very open-minded, I still do, and I thought that there would be very little material that was in it new to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Why do you say that, Mr. Carter?

Mr. CARTER. Because his whole machinery of the State Department, War, Navy, Treasury, Agriculture, the data, the intelligence, of that whole area came automatically to him and his colleagues.

Mr. MORRIS. Including Communist doctrine?

Mr. CARTER. Well, the State Department's job was to find out what was going on, whether the people who were operating were friends or foes. Their duty was to study Communist China. They sent people to study. Any government that is on its job has its intelligence officers going into what is called enemy territory and our Government apparently did.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Carter, did you ever consider John Carter Vincent to be a Communist?

Mr. CARTER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these two documents received as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 116" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 116

JUNE 12, 1947.

Private and confidential.

MISS ANNE FORD,

Publicity Director, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass.

DEAR MISS FORD: This is to acknowledge Epstein's *The Unfinished Revolution* in China, which you so kindly sent me a few days ago. I have already read two-thirds of it and hope to complete it within a few days.

I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department. You will know better than I how to make certain that they read it in the near future. A letter from me on the subject might lead a few of them to think that I was recommending it because I was an admirer of Epstein's and for that reason they might slightly discount my recommendation.

I have another suggestion to make. The book is so full of profound understanding and admiration of the Chinese people that I think it is equally important to find ways and means of getting a wide circulation in China. Have you thought of a Chinese edition? In the past there has been a tendency for Shanghai publishers to get out pirated editions in English. This would be all to the good if the printing was done accurately and the full text was reprinted. Sometimes, for mercenary reasons, they make substantial cuts.

Would it be out of the question for you to consider at an early date printing a cheap paper cover edition for maximum circulation in India, the Philippines and China with the expectation that some orders would come in from Indochina, Siam, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies?

The book combines in one volume several books. It is a penetrating history of China during the war years. It is a sociological document of importance, and it is a military handbook that might have been of enormous value to the Maquis in France and even to the little handful of anti-Hitler Germans in Germany. It might become a military and political handbook for Viet-Nam and in other Asiatic areas if the imperialist powers try to reassert their pre-Pearl Harbor domination.

The book is not so much needed in the Communist areas in China as it is in the Kuomintang areas where its authoritative accounts would give new hope, as well as new methods, to the millions of Chinese who are dissatisfied with the right wing Kuomintang domination. You have only to read the newspapers to discover what a large potential market for Epstein's book there is amongst non-Communist professors and students in the Chinese universities. The history of the last few decades proves conclusively that the Chinese student

movements are far more influential in China than in many other countries in starting new and creative political and social movements.

More than at any other time in recent years, there is a large British public both in the United Kingdom, Canada, and also in Australia and New Zealand which would find the book illuminating, not only with reference to China, but in their thinking with reference to a great many movements in the continent of Europe and elsewhere.

I congratulate Little, Brown & Co.'s unerring wisdom in deciding, not only to publish this book, but in leaving no stone unturned in getting a very wide circulation.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

P. S.—I have not consulted Epstein with reference to this letter. I hope, however, that it may meet with his approval and elicit further concrete suggestions from him. To that end I am taking the liberty of sending him privately a copy.

P. S. 2.—Referring to General Marshall, I wish you could find someone who would get him to read the book from start to finish and not simply the end with Epstein's analysis of Marshall. It seems to me he would need the cumulative effect of the preceding chapters to make him reassess objectively his own role.

I assume that John Carter Vincent would read the book with a very open mind. Probably he is generally acquainted with most of the material, but he has probably never seen it organized so logically. If he were sold on the book he might persuade General Marshall to read it from cover to cover.

Of course, many will say that Epstein is a special pleader. I think this is probably true, but I think he is pleading for a more sound analysis of the world than many of the other current special pleaders. I hear that the New York Times has asked Owen Lattimore to review the book. I hope other publications will make as wise a choice.

I imagine the Kuomintang government will put the book on the "forbidden" list for import in China. I would hope that you could get it into the hands of Ambassador Leighton Stuart and some of the American correspondents like Benjamin Welles, Christopher Rand and Arch Steele, Sun Fo, Madame Sun Yat-sen and a few others, before the bronze curtain falls.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 117" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 117

REVIEWS OF THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION IN CHINA, BY ISRAEL EPSTEIN, BOSTON, MASS., LITTLE, BROWN & CO.

(By Owen Lattimore, New York Times, Book Review, June 22, 1947, pp. 5 and 29):

* * * From Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China to Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China the list of names is distinguished—and most of these writers won their distinction solely or primarily by what they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company. * * *

* * * The writers either throw their weight into criticism of the Kuomintang, like Mr. White and Mr. Jacoby, or into outspoken support of the Chinese Communists, like Mr. Epstein * * *

There is no question about Mr. Epstein's partisanship. He not only justifies Chinese Communist policy but he justifies it and Russian policy in relation to each other and in relation to American policy. * * * Mr. Epstein has presented enough facts for this reviewer, at least, to form an opinion.

He convinces me that the trend of the civil war in China is not toward the triumph of an ideology or the winning of dictatorial power by individual generals or politicians. * * *

(By Frederick V. Field, New Masses, July 22, 1947, pp. 20-21):

* * * The people of China have arisen against both their native and foreign oppressors and because it happens that their foreign oppressors are today primarily American imperialists the story of this great historical event is especially pertinent to the political life of the American people.

There is no other book that so faithfully or expertly records this momentous turning point in history as Epstein's * * *

What distinguishes Epstein's work from the notable contributions of the others is, first, that his is more comprehensive both at the contemporary and historical levels, and second, the amazing wealth of detail which he has assembled. * * *

The main subject of *The Unfinished Revolution In China* is the history, first, of China's war of resistance against Japan, and second of the struggle of the Chinese people against the Kuomintang dictatorship and American imperialism. * * * He writes about the American missionary who sold out to the would-be emperor Yuan Shih-Kai and the reader recognizes the present Congressman who now parallels his infamous role.

* * * During the war against Japan it was in those parts of China where the people were moved to organize themselves by Communist leadership that resistance was successful and that Chinese history spurted forward. * * *

The Unfinished Revolution In China deserves to be widely read.

(By Samuel Sillen, *Daily Worker*, June 18, 1947, p. 11) :

We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years—books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Gunther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's *Unfinished Revolution In China*.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, that that is all we want on this particular point at this time.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you call Mr. Canning?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Canning, will you come forward, please?

Will you raise your right hand? You do solemnly swear in the testimony that you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, it will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CANNING. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM MARTIN CANNING, CINCINNATI, OHIO

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, will you give your name and address to the stenographer, please?

Mr. CANNING. William Martin Canning, 789 North Crescent Avenue, Cincinnati, Ohio.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, will you tell us your most recent employment?

Mr. CANNING. I was until recently on the staff of Xavier University of Cincinnati.

Mr. MORRIS. You are a graduate of what college?

Mr. CANNING. College of the City of New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a graduate degree?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, I have a master's degree from Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year did you obtain that, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Canning, did you ever join the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. I did.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you join the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. In the early part of 1936 I joined the Communist Party unit at the City College.

Mr. MORRIS. And how long did you remain a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. A little over 2 years, until the latter part of 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, during that period were you ever in a position that you were able to discern people in the Communist movement and learn of their identity?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. I, of course, was active in the City College unit and as a student at Columbia I knew others there at Columbia who belonged to other units of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position in the Communist fraction there, Mr. Canning.

Mr. CANNING. At City College?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. CANNING. Well, I had various positions at one time or another. I assisted in the editing of a secret publication distributed among the staff, the City College Teacher-Worker. I was also literature director for another period.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder generally, Mr. Canning, could you give us an idea of how many members of the City College faculty were in the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. Somewhere between 40 and 50. I have forgotten that now.

Senator FERGUSON. Out of a total number of how many?

Mr. CANNING. The total staff?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. CANNING. The total staff consisted perhaps of 300, at least 300.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, you also had occasion to know who some of the people on the Columbia faculty were who were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. Not so much on the faculty, but I did know graduate students who were members of the Columbia unit.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the schools have separate cells?

Mr. CANNING. That is right; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of calling Mr. Canning here today is to ask him to identify some of these people that he encountered in City College and at Columbia whose affairs have come into the Institute of Pacific relations, and we are going to discuss that.

First, of all, Mr. Canning, did you know a man named Lawrence Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what you know about him?

Mr. CANNING. I knew Lawrence Rosinger while he was a student at City College and subsequently when he continued on at Columbia in graduate work. I knew Lawrence Rosinger to be a member of the Columbia University unit of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any doubt in your mind whatever that Mr. Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions did you meet him?

Mr. CANNING. Quite frequently.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you estimate it as much as possible?

Mr. CANNING. I would meet him at Columbia several times a week during 1936 and 1937, in that period.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, I wonder if you would introduce into the record at this time evidence of Rosinger's activities within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. I would just like to ask a question. Did you discuss communism with Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. I did; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And you feel certain that he was a member of the Columbia unit?

Mr. CANNING. There is no doubt in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. No doubt?

Mr. CANNING. No.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. These excerpts have been taken from the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations and from books written by Mr. Rosinger and I read some of these excerpts.

Author of China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44, Princeton University Press in cooperation with the International Secretariat of the IPR, published in 1944.

On the jacket of Mr. Rosinger's book entitled "State of Asia," and this book is issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1951, I quote:

Lawrence K. Rosinger has covered far-eastern events as a member of the research staffs of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. His books include China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44—

and so forth.

He is listed as a member of a meeting staff and round table recorder in a volume entitled "Problems of the Pacific, 1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Seventh Conference, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18, December 2, 1939," page 275.

He is listed as a conference member of other conferences in 1939 and in 1949. The one held in New Delhi, India, was in 1949.

Then his writings in the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations, including the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs, are here listed.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, I would like to have that received as the next consecutive exhibit.

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 118" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 118

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

Author of China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44 Princeton University Press in cooperation with the International Secretariat, IPR, 1944.

"Lawrence K. Rosinger has covered far eastern events as a member of the research staffs of the American Institute of Pacific Relations. His books include China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44; China Crisis; Restless India, and India and the United States." (Jacket of State of Asia. By Lawrence K. Rosinger and Associates. Issued under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951).

Listed as a meeting staff and round table recorder (Problems of the Pacific—1939, Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Seventh Conference, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18, December 2, 1939, p. 275).

Listed as a conference member:

"Lawrence K. Rosinger (1939). Far Eastern Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association." (Security in the Pacific, A Preliminary Report of the

Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945, p. 160).

"L. K. Rosinger, associate member, American Delegation India-American Conference, New Delhi, December 1949, listed as research associate, American Institute of Pacific Relations." (Source: Indian-American Relations, Proceedings of the India-America Conference held in New Delhi in December 1949 issued under the joint auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs and the American Institute of Pacific Relations. P. 72.)

"Mr. Rosinger is a member of the staff of the American Institute of Pacific Relation; and of the editorial board of its magazine, the Far Eastern Survey." (Jacket of India and the United States by Lawrence K. Rosinger, An Institute of Pacific Relation Book, 1950).

Writer of the following articles for the Far Eastern Survey:

Book Reviews, 1944, pages 73 and 133.

India in World Politics, 1949, pages 229-33.

The White Paper In Brief, 1949, pages 205-208.

Book Review, 1949, page 95.

Writer of the following articles for Pacific Affairs:

Book Review, 1936, pages 610-611.

Book Review, 1937, pages 102-103.

Book Review, 1938, pages 421-432.

Book Review, 1939, pages 186-188.

The Far East and the New Order In Europe, 1939, pages 357-369.

Politics and Strategy of China's Mobile War, 1939, pages 263-277.

Book Review, 1940, pages 366-367.

Book Review, 1940, pages 111-113.

Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1940, pages 263-278.

Book Review, 1941, pages 480-482.

Book Review, 1942, pages 117-118.

Book Review, 1944, page 347.

China's Wartime Politics, 1937-44, book reviewed, 1945, pages 287-288.

Book review, 1946, page 97.

Senator FERGUSON. What year were you discussing these matters with Rosinger?

Mr. CANNING. As I recall, throughout this period of my own membership he was also a member of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. The years again?

Mr. CANNING. From the early part of 1936 to the latter part of 1938.

Senator FERGUSON. So it is just before these writings?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Some of them even while you were doing the discussing?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, did you make available to the proper authorities your knowledge that Rosinger was a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you will extend that just a little bit. Tell us to what extent you made that known to the authorities.

Mr. CANNING. Well, my first testimony on these matters of the City College Communist unit and Columbia University activities was in 1940 during the hearings of the New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools, Coudert committee.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, you testified publicly that Lawrence Rosinger was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. As I recall.

Mr. MORRIS. That fact was probably reported in all the press at the time?

Mr. CANNING. As to the publicity, I did testify on all of these matters both in private testimony and in public but, Mr. Morris, I don't recall whether or not the public testimony carried this information.

• Senator FERGUSON. When did you leave the party, if you did leave it?

Mr. CANNING. In the latter part of 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have any other letters showing Mr. Rosinger's activities with the Institute of Pacific Relations? I would like to have you read them if you have.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here dated August 9, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. Edward Carter and signed by Lawrence K. Rosinger. I read the first paragraph as follows:

On returning from my vacation, I found that a letter had arrived from the New York City Board of Education, appointing me to a high-school teaching position, beginning with this fall. I wish that I were not confronted with a choice between this and devoting all my time to the Far East, but I have decided to accept. Refusal now would simply make it necessary to accept 6 months hence or to be removed from the list and might involve going to a far less satisfactory school than the one I have been assigned to.

Another letter, dated August 19, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations headed "E. C. C.," presumably E. C. Carter, from "W. L. H.," presumably William L. Holland. I read from the paragraph referring to Rosinger as follows:

Speaking of Rosinger, I am of course delighted to hear that he has landed a job and I think that he is wise in taking it. I should like your advice on his request that we extend the research grant of \$500 to apply for a longer period. Since the grant has already been authorized and is to be turned over to the custody of the American Council, I suppose there is no real objection to this procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was that writing, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. That is E. C. C., presumably E. C. Carter, to E. C. Carter from W. L. H., presumably W. L. Holland.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like the chairman to take cognizance of the fact that this was dated 1940. I would like to have this entered into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit together with this previous one.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 119 and 120" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 119

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.,

New York City, August 9, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
Lee, Mass.

DEAR Mr. CARTER: On returning from my vacation, I found that a letter had arrived from the New York City Board of Education, appointing me to a high-school teaching position, beginning with this fall. I wish that I were not confronted with a choice between this and devoting all my time to the Far East, but I have decided to accept. Refusal now would simply make it necessary to accept 6 months hence or be removed from the list and might involve going to a far less satisfactory school than the one I have been assigned to. Besides, as you know, I expect to be married in the near future, and it may be well to secure a steady position as soon as possible.

This will not interfere with my IPR work, except that it will slow down the pace. I have practically finished the research for my inquiry report on China's recent political development and will begin writing next week. By the beginning of the school term (September 9), I should have about 50 printed pages done (i. e., approximately one-third of the book). Teaching will not prevent my going forward with the rest in the evenings and over weekends, and the entire

report should be finished some time in the fall (let us say, by the end of November).

As you know, Bill Holland assigned me \$500 for 5 months' research (September 1940-January 1941) on another book, which is to be my doctoral dissertation as well as an IPR publication: Nationalism and National Unity in China, 1924-35. The fact that the inquiry report will extend into the fall means that I shall not be able to start on this second project until a few months after the expected date. Besides, teaching will make it necessary to devote part time rather than full time to the new research. I would therefore like to suggest that the \$500 grant apply to a period of 12, instead of 5 months, i.e., cover the entire year, September 1940-August 1941. I feel that this is a logical arrangement that will be fair to the IPR as well as satisfactory to myself. I have not yet written to Bill Holland about this, since I am awaiting your approval. If you find it satisfactory, I will write to Bill, and perhaps you will want to do the same.

I have received the pamphlet, Total Defense, and will send you my comments in a few days.

I was very sorry to learn of your sister's death and wish to extend my condolences.

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER.

EXHIBIT No. 120

BERKELEY, CALIF., *August 19, 1940.*

E. C. C. from W. L. H.

Many thanks for your letter of August 14, about the Fahs manuscript. I think you have reached a most statesmanlike compromise and I am very pleased that Fahs has agreed to accept so many of the changes. I know that Fahs regretted that we did not put the long marks over the vowels of Japanese words. I recognize that there is a good deal to be said for including them, but our decision was based simply on the fact that Hilda and I had gone into the question when Norman's book was being printed and had come to the conclusion that the extra expense was not warranted, since there were really no instances where the omission of the marks would have resulted in error or ambiguity. Having once established that rule we felt that we should follow it in the case of Fah's manuscript, where the number of Japanese words was even smaller. I would be perfectly happy to be overruled in this matter, particularly if the printer can insert the marks without having to do substantial resetting. I personally feel that inserting them would be both unnecessary and pedantic. In fact in many of Fah's references I felt that he was being unnecessarily learned by quoting the full Japanese titles of laws, which for the purposes of the inquiry might better have been given in the English translation, as in Allen's book, since there was nothing peculiarly Japanese about the language. If Fah's had had occasion to quote rather long passages of Japanese or to discuss the meaning of certain Japanese terms, then I should have had no hesitation in making full use of the long remarks.

I am interested in his report of the opinions expressed by Borton and Norman. Phil and I were both surprised to hear that Norman had raised any question since he and Phil and I had extensive correspondence over the bibliography and Norman usually had no hesitation in expressing his desires. Neither Phil nor I recollect that he raised any objections to the manner of quoting French titles.

I am sending a further personal note to Fahs to thank him for having come so far in meeting our wishes. I shall be interested to hear his reaction to the letter from Ushiba.

I have read Angus' memorandum on Pepper's report with great interest. While I do not often agree with Angus' interpretations, I have great respect for his clarity and powers of criticism. It seems to me that his comments are important, and that it would be a good idea for you to make a rather strong personal plea with Pepper to attempt some means by which those comments and also those made by Dennery Condliffe and myself could be at least mentioned in the report. As you know, Toynbee takes account of criticisms in footnotes, but if necessary they could be lumped together in an appendix, together with any specific replies or general remarks that Pepper cared to make. In addition to this, I think it would be desirable for Pepper or you to explain in the preface to the book that it is necessarily different in character from other reports in

the inquiry series because it must be frankly a personal view and somewhat speculative in character.

I am a little perturbed to know that Angus is still not in favor of publishing his own memorandum nor of enlarging and revising it as we had hoped. I don't know what we can do about this, but it seems to me that we had reason to expect a good deal more from Angus for the money that was paid to him in one way or another. Perhaps there is some totally new subject that he would prefer to write on, not strictly in the legal field. At any rate, I hope you will let him know that we feel the inquiry will not be complete unless it has a substantial report from him on this or some other topic.

I shall send you my comments on Roth in a day or two. In the meantime I have been wondering what the situation is on the manuscripts by Harriet Moore and Keenleyside. There is also the same question of Borton's report. At one time I thought Leaning had screwed himself up to the point where he thought he could attempt a rewrite job. However, the political situation in Japan has been changing so fast that I now think it might be a better idea for you to discuss the whole question afresh with Borton, and ask whether he would not rather let you attempt a fairly substantial revision in which he could omit the greater part of the economic sections, including the materials on agriculture and population which are now being covered more fully by Miriam Farley. I would also suggest a working arrangement by which either Shepherd or Leaning could go over Borton's revisions from week to week, so that we should not have a substantial rewrite job at the end. It might even be desirable to offer Borton a further \$40 or \$50.

If this plan could be followed, I believe that we might salvage something pretty useful from the study. Something should be done because there will be a serious gap in the inquiry documentation if we omit a study on Japanese political developments. It will parallel the corresponding Chinese study by Rosinger. Speaking of Rosinger, I am of course delighted to hear that he has landed a job, and I think that he is wise in taking it. I should like your advice on his request that we extend the research grant of \$500 to apply for a longer period. Since the grant has already been authorized and is to be turned over to the custody of the American Council, I suppose there is no real objection to this procedure. The only slight reservation I have is that we stretched a point or two in making this grant to Rosinger, largely on the ground that it would enable him to devote 4 or 5 months full time in the American Council to completing a study on which he has already done considerable research. However, I know that high-school salaries are pathetically low, especially for anybody contemplating marriage, and I also have high regard for Rosinger's scholarship. So, if you are prepared to back me up, I shall be willing to accede to Rosinger's proposal.

I enclose a letter from Miss Cleeve, which you may want to read and return to me. The last paragraph refers to a suggestion I made some months ago, urging that something pretty decisive should be done about leasing or ceding some of the British West Indian possessions to the United States as a means of getting American good will and increasing material support, and also taking the wind out of the sails of the extreme isolationists in this country. Miss Cleeve is lukewarm, as I suspected she would be. It was ironical, however, that her letter arrived on the very day that the papers announced that actual negotiations were in progress about this scheme.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated June 6, 1940, to Mr. Carter from Owen Lattimore.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you read that, I would like to inquire. Mr. Canning, did you ever know whether or not Rosinger either publicly or privately withdrew from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. During the period that I was in the Communist movement he did not withdraw.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear that he had after that?

Mr. CANNING. No; I never did.

Senator FERGUSON. Either in a public manner or private manner?

Mr. CANNING. No; I had no knowledge of his having left.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you read anything by Mr. Rosinger in the last few years, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. I have read several articles of his; yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they impress you as the writings of a man still in the Communist movement?

Mr. CANNING. It would be hard to say. There is no open sign that what he is writing is Communist propaganda, but the tendency is toward support of the Red Chinese group.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, they are not the writings of a man who has broken with the Communist Party, in your opinion?

Mr. CANNING. I think the writings would give no evidence of his either being in or out of the party; that is, the few that I have read.

The CHAIRMAN. What is next?

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter, dated June 6, 1940, to Mr. E. C. Carter from Owen Lattimore, refers to "Rosinger's promised article on Soviet policy ought to interest him; and so should Brandt's article on the Far East and the World Market." I cite also the testimony of Mr. William L. Holland in company with Edward C. Carter in executive session on June 21, 1951. Mr. Morris asked:

How about the grant to Rosinger?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think, either late in 1949 or early 1950, I requested from the offices of the Rockefeller Foundation a special grant to be made to the American IPR to enable Mr. Rosinger to undertake a comprehensive survey of the post-war Far East. This book, entitled "The State of Asia," edited by Rosinger, with contributions by some 13 other Far East experts, had just been published by Alfred Knopf.

It continues the quotation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this is a reading of testimony that already has been presented to the committee. The point of that is to show that it would indicate from that testimony that Mr. Carter had obtained two grants from the Rockefeller Foundation for Mr. Rosinger to continue his work.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations a typed list of some experts on China, Netherlands Indies, and Manchuria, and among those listed is the name of Lawrence Rosinger, Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades, 220 East Sixty-third Street, New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the last two letters read by Mr. Mandel introduced in evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 121, 122, and 122-a" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 121

BALTIMORE, MD., June 6, 1940.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for sending me Corbett's comments. I am glad to see that plans for the next issue of Pacific Affairs fit in with his suggestions. Rosinger's promised article on Soviet policy ought to interest him; and so should Brandt's article on the Far East and the World Market.

I might also be able to make an article on What Japan Knows About Outer Mongolia, from the translation of a Japanese book which Grajdanzev is to send me.

With regard to Corbett's idea for a "substantial review article combining Buell and Bingham * * * working out in practice their plan of Pacific

association," wouldn't you consult with Corbett to see whether he himself would undertake such an assignment? His qualifications and his outlook indicate that he is the man to give such an article depth as well as breadth.

If he should want to do it for the September issue, the copy would have to be in my hands at the end of this month.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

EXHIBIT No. 122

[Executive session, vol. 53, June 21, 1951]

EXCERPTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF EDWARD C. CARTER AND WILLIAM L. HOLLAND, (P. 260)

Mr. MORRIS. How about the grant to Rosinger?

Mr. HOLLAND. I think, either late 1949 or early 1950, I requested from the offices of the Rockefeller Foundation a special grant to be made to the American IPR to enable Mr. Rosinger to undertake a comprehensive survey of the post-war Far East. This book, entitled "The State of Asia," edited by Rosinger, with contributions by some 13 other leading Far East experts, has just been published by Alfred Knopf.

Now you may also be referring to the fact that in late 1949 the Rockefeller Foundation—I think on the request of my predecessor, Mr. Clayton Lane—made a travel grant of, I should imagine, something like \$2,000 to Mr. Rosinger to enable him to go to India to attend the India-American Conference which was held jointly by the American IPR and the Indian Council of IPR in Delhi, in the summer of 1949.

EXHIBIT No. 122-A

SOME EXPERTS ON CHINA, NETHERLANDS INDIES, AND MANCHURIA

(This list is by no means comprehensive. In certain categories it could be added to extensively)

China:

Economic:

William W. Lockwood, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J.
W. L. Holland, Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley
C. F. Remer, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
John E. Orchard, Columbia University, New York
Ch'ao-ting Chi, Universal Trading Corp., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York
Kurt Bloch, Fortune Round Table and Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Economic and political:

William W. Lockwood. (See above.)
W. L. Holland. (See above.)
Robert W. Barnett, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York
Lawrence K. Rosinger, Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades, 220 East Sixty-third Street, New York
Owen Lattimore, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
T. A. Bisson, Foreign Policy Association, 22 East Thirty-eighth Street, New York
Cyrus H. Peake, Columbia University, New York
Kate L. Mitchell, Amerasia, 125 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Political:

Nathaniel Peffer, Columbia University, New York
John K. Fairbank, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
G. Nye Steiger, Simmons College, Boston, Mass.
Harley F. MacNair, University of Chicago
Harold M. Vinacke, University of Cincinnati, Ohio
Miriam S. Farley, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York
Dorothy Borg, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Relation of ancient China to China today:

Karl A. Wittfogel, Columbia University, New York

Owen Lattimore. (See above.)

L. Carrington Goodrich, Columbia University, New York

Herrlee G. Creel, University of Chicago

Problems of Chinese language:

George Kennedy, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Owen Lattimore. (See above.)

L. Carrington Goodrich. (See above.)

Manchuria:

W. L. Holland. (See above.)

Kurt Bloch. (See above.)

Miriam S. Farley. (See above.)

John R. Stewart, National Credit Office, 2 Park Avenue, New York

Russell G. Shiman, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York

Owen Lattimore. (See above.)

Andrew Grajdanzev, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East Fifty-second
Street, New York

Netherlands Indies:

W. L. Holland. (See above.)

Ellen van Zyll de Jong, international secretariat, IPR, 129 East Fifty-second
Street, New York

Amyr Vandenbosch, University of Kentucky, Lexington

Rupert Emerson, formerly of Harvard, now in the Territories Section, De-
partment of Interior, Washington, D. C.

All of the foregoing are American citizens except the following:

Mr. Holland is a New Zealander who has resided in the United States for
several years.Dr. Chi is Chinese, but is employed by the Sino-American Corp., set up jointly
at the instance of the Chinese and American Governments.Dr. Bloch and Dr. Wittfogel have probably taken out their first citizenship
papers.Mr. Grajdanzev is a Siberian who reads Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. He
has taken out his first citizenship papers.

Mr. MANDEL. Another item from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations is dated February 5, 1950, "FVF from LKR," presumably Frederick Vanderbilt Field, from Lawrence K. Rosinger. I read the first sentence:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent, clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further * * *.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the letter introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 123" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 123

FEBRUARY 5, 1940.

F. V. F. from L. K. R.:

I think Lattimore's article is excellent; clearly thought out and very well put. I have a few suggestions of a minor character that may improve it further:

Page 1, paragraph 3, line 3: Shouldn't "therefore" be "however", since the implication of the two previous sentences is that we are taking a strong position toward Japan?

Page 3, line 10: Since the implication here is that we should develop a correct policy before the events, instead of sadly understanding events after they have occurred, how about saying "the problem today is one of correctly understanding and shaping history in the making"?

Page 4, line 11: Wouldn't it be better to say: "It will be partly because of American stupidity"? After all, if it is foolish to say that Russian influence by itself can bring Bolshevism to China, then it is at least equally false to attribute that power to the United States.

Pages 4-5: The argument here is that social explosions result when internal forces meet outside pressures. I don't know what can be done about it, but this argument—despite a certain cogency—struck me as a little bit foolish, since it is almost equivalent to saying that (e. g.) if Tsarism had been Tsarism, then there would never have been a Bolshevik revolution. And yet the point has its validity. Perhaps it would be helpful to indicate here (as well as later) that the pressures upon China do not now constitute a fixed mathematical quantity, but that their weight can be changed radically by the counterpressure of the United States.

Page 5, last line: Considering the highly dubious origin of the New Life movement (i. e. it was essentially a political move in the civil-war period), I wonder whether it should be cited as an example of the drive toward "modern," "efficient" political ideas. I don't know much about what has happened to the movement since the outbreak of the far-eastern war, but my feeling is that New Life is pretty much in the background—perhaps almost the discard.

Page 6, line 10: Perhaps it would be desirable to qualify "every" by "almost," since I suppose that there are certain elements, particularly compradore elements in the captured cities, that—whatever their abstract desires—would be willing to deal with the Japanese—permanently. Or is Lattimore's statement "wants to grow stronger" sufficient to make "almost" unnecessary?

Page 12, paragraph 3, line 5: "led by the Communists." Since Lattimore has not stated precisely what the nature of the split in the united front might be, one would be entitled to assume that important Kuomintang elements might go along with the Communists. In this case, one could only say that the Communists would have more weight than they do now, but whether they would actually be the leaders is at least open to discussion. (This, I think, is particularly valid, since Lattimore has already said that "most" of the Chinese, in the circumstances mentioned, would go along with Russia and that only "some" of them would be of the Wang Ching-wei type.)

At this point perhaps it would buttress the argument to mention the well-known fact that Sun Yat-sen turned to Russia back in 1923-24 only after he was convinced that he could expect nothing—except possibly opposition—from other powers.

I think it might be wise in the paragraph next to the last line in the article to indicate that there might be ways, other than the embargo, of helping China—just so that the suggestions made will have as catholic a character as possible.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated October 9, 1940, "E. C. C. from W. L. H.," presumably E. C. Carter from William L. Holland, and Mr. Holland writes regarding a trip that he is proposing to make: "The principal people I want to see," and he lists among others Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 124" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 124

GIANNINI FOUNDATION,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, Calif., October 9, 1940.

E. C. C. from W. L. H.

Thank you for your letters of October 7 about the meeting on the 16th and 17th. I shall be awaiting your word about whether Tarr can come. I can easily arrange to meet you in Chicago on the morning of the 15th, and would like to leave by an afternoon train that would enable me to spend an hour or so that evening in Ann Arbor with Remer and Hayden. I could then go into Detroit and get an overnight train to New York from there. I should like to have 1 day in Washington and this might be either on the 18th or the 21st or 22d, thus leaving the week end free for a possible meeting at Lee.

I should be glad if you would make some appointments for me in the New York office. The principal people I want to see are Shepherd, Yasuo, Grajdanzey, Ellen van Zyll de Jong, Rosinger, Porter, Farley, Anstern, and Downing. In addition I should like to see Leaning, Greenberg, and Virginia Thompson, if she is well enough. At Columbia I should like 15 minutes each with Wittfogel,

Peffer, Leonard, and Roth. Perhaps some of these can be arranged at the IPR office. Leonard can be reached through Jessup's office or through Catherine Porter. I'd also like to see Harry Price and, of course, Fred Field either in New York or Washington. I shall count on seeing Lockwood either in New York or at Lee. In Washington the principal people I want to see are Rupert Emerson in the Interior Department, Henry Deimel and Sydney Smith in the State Department, Ladejinsky and Rossier in the Department of Agriculture and Johnstone, Tasca, and Merrill. I can arrange these appointments myself after I know the rest of my time table.

I'd also like to have an evening or an hour or two with Lattimore in Baltimore.

If time permits, I'd also like to have a word with Bisson, Yarnell, Jaffe, and Mitchell, but I expect these can be fitted in easily, perhaps at lunch. I'd also like a word with Shiman and Kay Greene.

Probably Matsuo had better come straight on to New York at fast as possible so that I could see him about the 23d. If possible I'd like to leave that night, but this can be kept flexible.

I take it from your letter that you have no particular business that you want me to see Wilbur or Sproul or Mrs. McLaughlin about before I leave.

W. L. H.

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter referring to France is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated August 14, 1940, E. C. C. from K. M., presumably E. C. Carter from Kate Mitchell. I read the first sentence:

With regard to Rosinger's letter of August 9 it is of course up to Bill Holland to decide whether the research fund is willing to extend the time of the grant to August 1941.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that to be introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 125" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 125

AUGUST 14, 1940.

E. C. C. from K. M.

With regard to Rosinger's letter of August 9, it is, of course, up to Bill Holland to decide whether the Research Fund is willing to extend the time of the grant to August 1941. I should say that there was no objection inasmuch as Larry doesn't ask for any more money, and considering the fact that most of our research reports are received at least 10 months later than the specified date! Why don't you tell Larry that you approve in general, but that he should take the matter up with the Research Committee. As far as his inquiry project is concerned, I suppose we will have to be satisfied with a completed manuscript in November. Are we allowed to keep our unexpended printing fund balance for use after the first of the year?

With reference to the letter from Peffer of August 6, I haven't any special comments to offer as I have not seen a copy of the manuscript, therefore cannot pass judgment either on Holland's criticisms or Peffer's refusal to accept many of them. If there is a spare copy of the manuscript floating around anywhere, might I have a look at it over this week end?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I also would like Mr. Mandel to introduce into the record or to reintroduce if it is necessary, the fact that in 1949 Lawrence Rosinger was called down to Washington by the Secretary of State to be a consultant on foreign policy to submit a memo far-eastern policy and to attend a 3-day conference in the capacity of a consultant.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have an exhibit setting that up or are you referring to testimony already taken?

Mr. MORRIS. I think Mr. Mandel has an official announcement of that fact from the State Department that he will make reference to.

Mr. MANDEL. I quote from a release dated May 20, 1950, No. 289, Department of State. It says:

The 31 who submitted memoranda were—

and included in that list are Lawrence Rosinger, New York, N. Y. Then describing further the memo says:

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the round table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 (1949), to discuss Far East policy.

On that list we find Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 126" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 126

[For the press, Department of State, May 20, 1950. No. 259—For release at 7 p. m. e. d. t., Saturday, May 20, 1950]

EXCERPT

The 31 who submitted memoranda were: Dr. Lawrence K. Rosinger, New York, N. Y. * * *

The following, including Mr. Lattimore and some others of the 31, attended the round table at the Department October 6, 7, and 8 (1949), to discuss Far East policy: Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you also introduced into the record the fact that the last publication that was supported by a grant of the Institute of Pacific Relations was edited by Lawrence K. Rosinger.

Mr. MANDEL. That is already in the record.

I have a letter here dated November 12, 1943, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. John Carter Vincent, UNRRA Conference, Hotel Claridge, Atlantic City, N. J., from T. A. Bisson.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this time, I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the original copy of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was sent to you for criticism. With your new FEA responsibilities, there is no reason to burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we are anxious to have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer, if it is conveniently possible to have it sent back.

Hoping to see you in New York soon,

Sincerely yours,

T. A. BISSON.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 127" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 127

NOVEMBER 12, 1943.

MR. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,
UNRRA Conference, Hotel Claridge,
Atlantic City, N. J.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: Knowing that you must be exceedingly busy at this time, I am sorry to bother you with a minor detail. We believe that the original copy of Mr. Lawrence Rosinger's manuscript on Wartime Politics in China was

sent to you for criticism. With your new FEA responsibilities, there is no reason to burden you with this task of reading and review. However, we are anxious to have the manuscript copy itself returned here for the printer, if it is conveniently possible to have it sent back.

Hoping to see you in New York soon,

Sincerely yours,

T. A. Bisson.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of this long introduction of documents into the record is to show extensive activity on the part of Louis Rosinger, who has been identified here as a Communist in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. Another letter dated February 21, 1944, is addressed to Dr. John Fairbank, care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank, Division of Cultural Relations, State Department, from W. L. Holland:

I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's Wartime Politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticism. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comment from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part from page 47 onward—

and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit. There are only a few more, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 128." and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 128

FEBRUARY 21, 1944.

Dr. JOHN FAIRBANK,

Care of Mrs. Wilma Fairbank,

Division of Cultural Relations, State Department,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR JOHN: I enclose a manuscript by Larry Rosinger on China's wartime politics in the hope that you can find a few minutes in which to read it and give me your criticisms. This was supposed to have been sent to you some weeks ago, but I have been waiting for some comments from people in the State Department. The comments, when they arrived, were not very enlightening, but you know how those things are. If you don't feel like reading the whole thing through, I wish you would concentrate on the last part, from page 47 onward. The manuscript is unsatisfactory in several ways mainly because Rosinger had originally intended to write about twice as much but had to change his plans because of his illness and lack of time.

I shall be down in Washington next Friday and would like to see you then for a few minutes.

Yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—I have sent the books from Lowdermilk to Wilma.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter which comes in "care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, the White House, February 28, 1944," signed "John" and typed initials, J. K. Fairbank.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You said signed "care of Lauchlin Currie." Just give us that again to clarify the record.

Mr. MANDEL. The return address is "care of Mr. Lauchlin Currie, The White House, Washington, D. C."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, this is John K. Fairbank, and he uses as his return address, "care of Lauchlin Currie, The White House, Washington, D. C."

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from the files of the Institute:

"Dear Mr. HOLLAND: I have referred to the latter part,"

and then in pencil "of Rosinger's ms on China."

"and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China sometime? The Government will not be happy about this, but it is so well done that they can hardly call it propaganda. How can we expedite bringing our friend to California?"

Sincerely,

J. K. FAIRBANK.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. So marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 129" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 129

C/O MR. LAUCHLIN CURRIE,
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 28, 1944.

Mr. W. L. HOLLAND,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: I have read over the latter part and it seems like a very good job indeed. Can't something be done to send Rosinger to China sometime? The Government will not be happy about this but it is so well done that they can hardly call it propaganda.

How can we expedite bringing our friend to California?

Sincerely,

J. K. FAIRBANK.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, you noted that this was care of Lauchlin Currie. I am hoping that the committee can subpoena Lauchlin Currie here to make an explanation of many of these matters that were going through his hands and his connection with the institute.

Mr. MORRIS. I would also like to call your attention to the fact, Mr. Chairman, that Fairbank says, "It is done so well that they can hardly call it propaganda."

Senator FERGUSON. This letter indicates that he ought to be called to make an explanation of these things.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, Senator, at the proper time in the hearings that will be accomplished.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter dated January 5, 1942, from the files of the institute, addressed to G. E. Hubbard, Esq., Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, London, England. I read part of a paragraph:

In spite of the war or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs, but have managed to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the Pacific Council staffs are stronger than ever—

and further down—

Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner here in New York.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. So marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 130" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 130

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, January 5, 1942.

G. E. HUBBARD, Esq.,

*Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office,
London, England.*

DEAR HUBBARD: It was delightful to get your letter. I am enclosing copies of two of the broadcasts in the series. Unfortunately no copies are available of the initial broadcast which Yarnell and I led off. This series has been an attempt by the American Council of the IPR to make more widely available the material which it is so carefully and laboriously assembling. I understand that the first eight broadcasts are appearing in pamphlet form in a week or two. I will see that a copy goes to you. I assume that you still see the Far Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs.

In spite of the war, or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs but have managed to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the Pacific Council staffs are stronger than ever. Lattimore is of course an asset in Chungking, though he is not technically on the IPR staff. Michael Greenberg and Mrs. Dobbs are carrying on Pacific Affairs well within the Lattimore tradition. Ch'ao-ting Chi is secretary general of the ABC stabilization fund in China and is gaining experience that will ultimately be of the greatest value if and when he is able to return to the secretariat. Friedman, who did that very able book on British relations with China, is now in the Treasury in Washington. Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner here in New York. Shiman has gone to the Tariff Commission, and Miss Ellen van Zyll de Jong, to Military Intelligence.

W. W. Lockwood has come back from Princeton and taken over the secretaryship of the American Council. For a time he had to work in Washington in the Office of Export Control, but he has managed to disentangle himself from Government service.

Lilienthal got out of Shanghai in time and is back on the American Council staff.

The Government has been after Barnett and me, but both of us have been able to persuade the United States authorities that we can render a bigger service to every department of the Government by continuing the staffs of the American and Pacific Councils intact rather than by scattering our energies through a dozen Government departments.

I wish you could write us more fully about your own work and views now that we are comrades in arms.

Sincerely yours,

, EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The final exhibit taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated December 30, 1943, on the stationery of the Foreign Policy Association, addressed to William L. Holland and signed "Larry Rosinger." I read the first paragraph:

DEAR BILL: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 131" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 131

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION,
New York, December 30, 1943.

Mr. WILLIAM L. HOLLAND,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, New York

DEAR BILL: Thanks for the comments from Stewart. I disagreed with one or two of them, but I believe they will be very useful. I am looking forward to the suggestions from Fairbank and Hiss.

I have taken care of your order for the two foreign policy reports, which I understand will be sent to you at a 20 percent discount. I think you will be interested to know that we will publish on February 1st another report of mine, tentatively titled "The Western Stake in Colonial Asia". I doubt that this will be available in print much before publication date, but if your conference is taking place before the end of the month, it may be possible to secure some copies. In any event, if you want me to, I will send you the proofs in about 2 weeks.

Yours,

LARRY ROSINGER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do any of the Senators have any questions on Mr. Rosinger?

Senator FERGUSON. I don't on Rosinger.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Canning, we had testimony recently that a man named Moses Finkelstein ran a Communist study group. Professor Wittfogel has testified that this Communist study group met in New York City. At least his contentions were that it met in New York City when he so testified. Did you know that Moses Finkelstein ran a study group in New York City?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. I knew Moses Finkelstein as both a teacher at City College in the evening session and as a graduate student at Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. He was a member of the Communist unit at Columbia University.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that of your own knowledge?

Mr. CANNING. I did, and I did attend for some time a group that did meet at Moses Finkelstein's house, a Communist study group which met there about once a week for a period of several months.

Mr. MORRIS. You didn't know all members of the group, did you, Mr. Canning?

Mr. CANNING. There weren't very many in that group at the time, and I believe I knew all of them.

Senator FERGUSON. They met as Communists?

Mr. CANNING. That is right. One or two who were not members of the party would meet as well.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the purpose of having some come in like that?

Mr. CANNING. To interest them in communism.

Senator FERGUSON. To convert them to the idea?

Mr. CANNING. To Communist ideas.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he run any other study groups there that you know of?

Mr. CANNING. Not that I know of. That is the only one that I attended.

Senator FERGUSON. The only one that you attended.

Mr. CANNING. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know that he ran any others?

Mr. CANNING. No, I don't of my own knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you heard that he ran others?

Mr. CANNING. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that a man named Daniel Thorner was a member of a study group there?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, he was one of the people who met in the study group that I referred to.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that Daniel Thorner was a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. From his own statements to me that he belonged to the Columbia University unit.

Mr. MORRIS. Do we have anything indicating that Daniel Thorner was active in IPR affairs, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. I read from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated June 2, 1942, a memo to ECC, presumably E. C. Carter, from CP presumably Catherine Porter, and I read a paragraph in which Daniel Thorner, who is in the COI, working under Brown's direction, is referred to:

Brown has an extremely high regard for Thorner, and Beecroft thinks he is one of the most promising young men in the country. He does not know Thorner's background beyond the fact that he is a New York man, that he studied at Columbia and wrote his thesis on the history of Indian railways in relation to the progress of industrialization in India. Beecroft says that Thorner probably knows more about the transport problem in India than any other person in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit. I think that already has been introduced and is exhibit No. 77, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here also as an exhibit previously introduced a list of research fellows and students of the Walter Hines Page School, 1940 to 1951, which is headed by Owen Lattimore, and among these students, research fellows, and so forth, is the name of Mr. Daniel Thorner.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that already has been introduced into the record.

Mr. Canning, do you remember when Prof. Karl August Wittfogel was invited to address a study group at the home of Mr. Finkelstein?

Mr. CANNING. No; I don't know about that.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't know that particular session?

Mr. CANNING. Not during the time that I attended the study group, I don't recall any invitation to Mr. Wittfogel.

Mr. MORRIS. But you did know that at least one study group did meet at the home of Moses Finkelstein?

Mr. CANNING. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Where was that?

Mr. CANNING. In the neighborhood of Columbia.

Mr. MORRIS. In New York City?

Mr. CANNING. I think about One Hundred Fourteenth Street, in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know what Mr. Finkelstein is doing today?

Mr. CANNING. I understand from the newspapers that he is teaching at Rutgers University, but under a different name. Finley, I believe his name is now.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his real name?

Mr. CANNING. Finkelstein; Moses Finkelstein.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what name is he going now?

Mr. CANNING. Finley, F-i-n-l-e-y.

The CHAIRMAN. He would take an Irishman's name, would he not? [Laughter.]

Senator WATKINS. How do you know that?

Mr. CANNING. I believe that was first called to my attention a year or so ago when I was questioned by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Senator WATKINS. Did you ever check to see that he was actually teaching at Rutgers?

Mr. CANNING. No; I didn't personally check. I was told that by this agent of the FBI who was questioning me.

Senator WATKINS. That is where you got your information?

Mr. CANNING. That is right, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it public knowledge that Mr. Finkelstein was a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Canning, if you know?

Mr. CANNING. I testified to it previously.

Mr. MORRIS. In 1940?

Mr. CANNING. In 1940.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he tried by the board of higher education?

Mr. CANNING. I don't believe that he came up for a trial. I think he resigned, though I would have to check to be sure.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know if the same gentleman has a grant from one of the foundations?

Senator FERGUSON. Who is that?

Mr. CANNING. Moses Finkelstein, formerly Moses Finkelstein.

Senator FERGUSON. What has he to do with this grant from the Ford Foundation?

Mr. CANNING. It is a grant apparently to improve the teaching standards of the university.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear, either publicly or privately, that he had withdrawn from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No, I have never heard that he has withdrawn from the party.

Senator FERGUSON. You do know that when you knew him back in New York he was a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. He was a Communist, and especially active in the Columbia University unit.

Senator FERGUSON. He was directly connected with IPR, but do you know any other Communist in your cells or that you knew up in these colleges that came down in the Government, the United States Government?

Mr. CANNING. There was one other who belonged to the same Columbia University unit, Theodore Geiger.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes; he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Any doubt about it?

Mr. CANNING. No doubt in my mind that he was.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did you know him?

Mr. CANNING. I knew him both at City College where he was a student, and later at Columbia University where he continued his graduate studies.

Senator FERGUSON. About when did he leave there?

Mr. CANNING. When did he leave Columbia? City College?

Senator FERGUSON. Or City College.

Mr. CANNING. I think he finished at City College, he received his bachelor's degree in 1935.

Senator FERGUSON. Where did he come in the Government?

Mr. CANNING. Into the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he is in Government now?

Mr. CANNING. No. I have been informed that he has resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. When?

Mr. CANNING. Not a very long time ago, several months ago.

Senator FERGUSON. Just months ago.

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his position in Government?

Mr. CANNING. He was, I believe, Deputy Administrator to the ECA, though I am not certain of his exact title.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the same man that you knew in Columbia as a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he active in communism?

Mr. CANNING. He was.

Senator FERGUSON. As active as you and Finkelstein?

Mr. CANNING. Not quite as active as Finkelstein, but perhaps as active as I was.

Senator FERGUSON. As you were?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anybody else who came into Government?

Mr. CANNING. One further person—

Senator FERGUSON. By the way, did you ever hear that this man had ever left the Communist rank, either publicly or privately hear that he had left?

Mr. CANNING. No, sir; I never heard that he had resigned.

Senator FERGUSON. You never heard?

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say, Senator, that some time ago the "watchdog committee" of the Committee on Appropriations made a representation to ECA as to this individual and drew the attention of ECA to his past history and asked for an investigation, following which I think there was a resignation. That is my impression.

Senator FERGUSON. I hope that Geiger will be given an opportunity to rebut this or to answer this testimony.

Is there anybody else who came down here in Government?

Mr. CANNING. During the war I was surprised to read in the New York World-Telegram in 1945 that a certain Louis Balamuth had been associated in the atomic bomb project at the University of Chicago.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

Mr. CANNING. I believe it was 1945.

Senator FERGUSON. 1945. Was he—and are you certain about it—a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir; he was a member of the same cell at City College to which I belonged.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he active as a Communist in that cell?

Mr. CANNING. His main activity in the cell was editing—he was in charge of putting out this secret publication I spoke of, the Teacher Worker.

Senator FERGUSON. He was active then in the cell as a Communist?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You learned that he went with the Atomic Energy Commission activity over in Chicago?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you ever learned that he either publicly or privately withdrew from the Communist Party?

Mr. CANNING. No; I never learned of any withdrawal from communism.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. CANNING. No, I don't know where he is now, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You gave his full name?

Mr. CANNING. Yes. Louis Balamuth.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did you know him to be a Communist in that cell to which you belonged?

Mr. CANNING. Throughout the entire period of my membership he was an active member of that unit.

The CHAIRMAN. That was for about what length of time in years?

Mr. CANNING. About 2½ years.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there anybody else who were Communists, that you knew to be Communists, who came in the Government?

Mr. CANNING. No other persons that I can recall.

Senator FERGUSON. You had no doubt and you have no doubt now that these men at the time that you are talking about and knew them were actually Communists?

Mr. CANNING. I have no doubt whatsoever, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one question in addition to the questions propounded by Senator Ferguson. You knew them to be active participants in the Communist cause in this country?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir. All those persons named during the period of my membership were actively engaged in Communist work.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask one question.

Mr. Canning, during the period that you were a member of either of those cells, did you from time to time make any memoranda about people who were making up those cells that would give us any light now on the membership?

Mr. CANNING. In the testimony which I gave some 11 years ago and in the subsequent hearings before the New York City Board of Higher Education, I gave a full account of the Communist activities at City College.

Senator SMITH. I mean did you include the names of parties who were members at that time?

Mr. CANNING. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. That is all in the record back there.

Mr. CANNING. All in the New York State Legislative Record.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that public?

Mr. CANNING. The hearings were both private and public.

Senator SMITH. Since that time have you run across any memoranda such as frequently one has, memos, diary notes, and what-not that would refresh your recollection and add any other names to that list?

Mr. CANNING. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was there any such thing as a roster of the membership of those cells that you may have had?

Mr. CANNING. The chairman of the unit no doubt kept records of that sort.

Senator SMITH. Who was the chairman?

Mr. CANNING. The chairman of this particular cell I have been speaking of was Louis Balamuth.

Senator SMITH. Who was the chairman of the other cells?

Mr. CANNING. Morris Schappes is a very important organizer of the City College unit. There was an Arthur Braunlich who was for a time the head of the entire City College unit. Some six or seven persons who were the principal leaders in the Communist cell there, the Communist unit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the last part of this testimony does not relate to the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is a subject that has interested the Senators and the evidence has come out under that form.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all I have with Mr. Canning, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Senators?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it ought to remain in this record because it is material to the question being studied by the whole committee as to Communists in government. It certainly ought to remain in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It certainly will remain in the record. That is where it belongs. That is where it was made, and there is no reason for taking it from the record.

You may proceed, Mr. Morris, with the next witness. That is all, Mr. Canning, for this time. I thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Thanks very much for coming in this morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers is the next witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chambers, do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JAY DAVID WHITTAKER CHAMBERS, WESTMINSTER, MD.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your name and address to the stenographer, Mr. Chambers.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Jay David Whittaker Chambers, Route 2, Westminster, Md.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am a writer and dairy farmer.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your last employment, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. My last employment was with Time magazine.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The year 1948.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell the committee whether or not you ever belonged to the Communist Party?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I belonged to the Communist Party from the early part of 1925 until the middle of April 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. At what period of time did you belong to the underground Communist Party, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I belonged to the underground Communist Party from about June of 1932 until the middle of April 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you describe for us the method by which you transferred from the open party to the underground party?

The CHAIRMAN. First of all, I would like to ask what is meant by the underground Communist Party as distinguished from the Communist Party proper.

Mr. CHAMBERS. The Communist Party internationally has always been organized on two planes. There is the open Communist Party with which we are all almost or are almost all familiar now, and the underground Communist Party which is organized as secretly as possible.

The underground Communist Party a great deal of the time is actually the more important part of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever have any direct dealings with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I do not believe I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever know Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I knew Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us of your experiences with Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. CHAMBERS. To do that I will have to go back of that subject a little way to describe my reasons for meeting Fred Field.

Mr. MORRIS. By all means, Mr. Chambers.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I met Fred Field in 1937. I met him in connection with Mr. Lawrence Duggan, the late Lawrence Duggan. Mr. Duggan was then in the State Department, and I think at that time in the Latin American Division. I was then in the Soviet apparatus in Washington, which was headed by Col. Boris Bykov. That apparatus worked very closely with the so-called Ware group, which had been organized in Washington by Harold Ware, who was a Communist. The group consisted of Communists and was a unit of the Communist Party and its members were all or chiefly Government employees. In that group—in fact its secretary-treasurer—was Henry Collins, who first worked, I believe, with the NRA and then in the Department of Agriculture and later in the military government in Germany. He is now head of the Russian-American Institute in New York, if my information is correct. That institute I think has been cited by the Attorney General.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean cited as Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Cited as subversive. Mr. Collins had been a college friend of Lawrence Duggan, and from my earliest days in Washington in the Communist Party, which was the spring of 1934, I heard Lawrence Duggan's name mentioned as someone very sympathetic to the Communist Party. His name was first drawn to my attention, I believe, by one Webster Clay Powell, who was then an

assistant to Harold Ware in a little Communist front called Farm Information, or some such name—Farm Research, I believe. Webster Clay Powell subsequently became an employee of the State Department and I think served in Australia in one of the legations. In any case Webster Powell first drew my attention to the name of Lawrence Duggan.

Henry Collins was equally sure that Lawrence Duggan was a man for the Communist Party to approach and particularly for the Soviet apparatus to approach. He voluntarily made at least two efforts to recruit Lawrence Duggan as a source in the State Department for the Soviet apparatus. Neither of those efforts was successful. Lawrence Duggan was approached obligingly in another way. At one point Alger Hiss, after he had entered the State Department, thought that he would be able to recruit Noel Field. Noel Field and Lawrence Duggan were very close friends and I believe lived in the same apartment house. As soon as Alger Hiss began to entertain the Fields, he also began to see the Duggans. A question arose early in that association between Hiss and Field about which Soviet apparatus Field should belong to, because Hiss discovered, much to his surprise, that there was a second Soviet apparatus operating in Washington. We now know that it was the apparatus headed here by Hede Gumperz, or Hede Massing, as she is now better known. Then Noel Field received an offer to work, if I remember correctly, in the International Labor Office in Geneva, Switzerland, for the League of Nations. He accepted that offer. Before he left—

The CHAIRMAN. Who is this?

Mr. CHAMBERS. This is Noel Field. I suppose everyone here is aware that Noel Field has disappeared into the Russian occupied territory.

Before Noel Field left for Geneva, Alger Hiss had a conversation with Field about Duggan, and he asked Field if Duggan would work for the Bykov apparatus. Field said that since he, Field, was leaving, Duggan would continue his work here for him. I heard nothing more of Duggan until the year 1937.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Chambers how did he know about the conversation between Duggan, Hiss and Field. Were you present or did one of those people tell you?

Mr. CHAMBERS. What I know of that conversation is from what Alger Hiss told me at that time.

In the year 1927 Colonel Bykov decided that the apparatus should make an attempt, which was I suppose the fourth attempt—

Senator FERGUSON. The apparatus was an espionage apparatus.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That was the Soviet espionage apparatus in Washington, the head of which so far as I know was Boris Bykov.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you trying to get information out of the State Department? Is that why you wanted these people in your apparatus?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Go ahead.

Mr. CHAMBERS. To repeat, Colonel Bykov decided to make another attempt to recruit Lawrence Duggan for his apparatus. In pursuance of that effort I talked to J. Peters. J. Peters was the head of the underground section of the American Communist Party. Peters knew that Fred Vanderbilt Field and Lawrence Duggan were friends

and told me so. I then asked Peters to introduce me to Fred Vanderbilt Field, and that Peters did in New York City close to Park Avenue and Thirty-fourth Street. I then had lunch with Fred Vanderbilt Field, but before I go into our conversation at lunch perhaps I should go a little further into what Peters told me about Fred Field in the course of a general casual conversation, in discussing Frederick Vanderbilt Field. Peters told me that Field was a member of an underground unit of the American Communist Party, which was meeting, if I remember correctly, in a house belonging to Mr. Field's mother somewhere in Central Park West, New York. In that unit were Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Joseph Barnes. Peters was considerably disturbed about the unit because some difficulty had arisen between the two men about their wives. I believe they subsequently divorced their wives and remarried each other's wives. I am not sure of the details.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony that the present Mrs. Barnes was the former wife of Frederick V. Field.

The CHAIRMAN. That was earlier testimony before this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Barnes has so testified.

Senator FERGUSON. How could that interfere with communism? [Laughter.] That you were frightened about it? What was wrong?

Mr. CHAMBERS. What was disturbing J. Peters was what would disturb any executive if he found such a situation among his personnel.

Senator FERGUSON. Just a little disturbing.

Mr. CHAMBERS. A disturbing factor.

I had, as I said, lunch with Frederick Vanderbilt Field, and I asked him to go to Washington and try to recruit for the Bykov apparatus Lawrence Duggan in the State Department. Field, as nearly as I can remember now, left either that day or the next day for Washington, and I saw him a day or two later. He told me that he had had a long conversation with Lawrence Duggan, and that Lawrence Duggan said that he could do nothing for the Bykov apparatus because he was already connected with another apparatus.

I think that is all.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the other apparatus, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That was not defined. I can't answer that except as I assume it was the Hede Massing apparatus.

The CHAIRMAN. There were two apparatuses working here in Washington at that time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. There were at least two.

The CHAIRMAN. One was by Hede Massing?

Mr. CHAMBERS. One was headed by Hede Massing.

The CHAIRMAN. The other was headed by whom?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The other was headed by myself locally and by Colonel Bykov.

Senator FERGUSON. Just so the record may be clear, were these so divided that you were each trying and getting information out of the State Department and other departments unbeknown to the other?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right. That is what is called in the Communist Party the principle of parallel apparatuses. The apparatuses are set up so that neither in theory shall have any knowledge of the personnel or the activities of the other.

Senator FERGUSON. That is valuable to get information. It is not to check the other apparatus to see whether it is remaining honest?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have reason to believe that there are still other apparatuses for that purpose.

Senator FERGUSON. Outside of that you have your counter espionage?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe so.

Senator FERGUSON. So, to get information they are set up parallel.

Mr. CHAMBERS. These two apparatuses, as I know now, were informational apparatuses. Unquestionably there are other counter-intelligence apparatuses, of which I have no direct knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. You did not know how they checked the loyalty of the Communists?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The check on loyalty would be in the first instance an inner-organizational check. Everyone in any Communist organization is always vigilant about the loyalty of all other Communists.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, they object so strenuously to their loyalty being questioned when they are in Government. As I understand it, they have a very close check in their own organization as to loyalty.

Mr. CHAMBERS. There is a kind of invisible control which is self-operating, and self-starting. There are in addition other organizational controls, but of their nature I can't speak from direct knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. But there is a loyalty check on them?

Mr. CHAMBERS. The loyalty subject preoccupies Communists a great deal for the obvious reason that the conspiracy must be tight or it will fail. In other words, I am sitting here. You can't have people like that in a conspiracy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the purpose of this testimony at this time is to show that these three people who have been named so far, namely Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Joseph Barnes, and Lawrence Duggan, were active in the Institute of Pacific Relations and during that period were active members of the Communist organization. For instance, we have shown that Joseph Barnes was the secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1931 to 1934. Mr. Frederick V. Field was the secretary from 1934 to 1940 and remained on the executive committee until 1947. Mr. Duggan, we have had testimony, was the man used by the IPR when they gave consideration to founding a Latin-American division of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to relate that as much as possible, Senator, to show that this does come within the scope of the inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations.

It may be that we are laboring this too much on Mr. Barnes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chambers is now the fourth witness who has identified Mr. Barnes as a member of some Communist unit and Communist organization, and yet I think it is necessary, Mr. Chairman, because Mr. Barnes continues to deny it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chambers, did you ever contact Harry Dexter White, who was in the Treasury Department?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; I knew Harry Dexter White rather well.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he in any apparatus?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Harry Dexter White was a source of the Soviet apparatus which I have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Was a source? Give that again.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Was a source for material. He gave both original Government documents and a weekly or fortnightly written memo summarizing information which had come to him in the course of his activities. One specimen of that memo is I believe now in the custody of the Justice Department.

Senator FERGUSON. A memo that White gave?

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is right, in his handwriting.

Senator FERGUSON. In his own handwriting. Did you ever see any notes of Harry Dexter White in relation to the Far East, the Pacific, the Chinese, economic problems?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did, and the specimen that I have referred to, the exhibit contains, as nearly as I recall, some information about Chinese finances. I am not familiar with the subject, and I have forgotten the exact matter.

Senator FERGUSON. Were those notes in your safety deposit box at one time?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I don't believe they were ever in my safety deposit box.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know where they were obtained? Were they ever obtained by the Un-American Activities Committee?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I will have to think for a moment to remember what the chain of custody was. I believe that they were first given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I am no longer quite sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Could you tell us the contents of those notes?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I am sorry, I have forgotten very largely what is in that exhibit. The exhibit exists.

Senator FERGUSON. If you can give the committee any information on where that exhibit may be now, the committee would appreciate it.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I should think counsel would know or could find very easily. For one thing, Senator Nixon, while he was Congressman, read them I believe into the Congressional Record.

Senator FERGUSON. He did?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe so. Shortly after the conviction of Alger Hiss.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, as a matter of fact, that they were in the handwriting of White, Harry Dexter White?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Without any question.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no question about that.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Moreover, the handwriting has been certified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record documents showing Harry Dexter White's extensive association and activity within the Institute of Pacific Relations. I wonder, Mr. Chambers, if you would amplify on your knowledge of Harry Dexter White's association with the Communist organization.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Harry Dexter White was not a member of the Communist Party as near as I know, and I have reason to believe that is true because he was reluctant to accept any form of discipline. I had the impression that he was a man of such character that he very much enjoyed being of the Communist Party but not in the party and not subject to its discipline. In that relationship he was willing to go to great lengths to assist them.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us about some of the lengths that he did go to assist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I think I have already stated the two chief ones. He gave original and handwriting memo of his own containing Government information.

Mr. MORRIS. And the other one?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I meant that to include two.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you know Solomon Adler?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No, I never have known and so far as I know, I never have seen Solomon Adler.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know he was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I cannot testify definitely that he was. I can, however, tell you what I do know about him, which is this: That at some point, I presume in the year 1936 or 1937, J. Peters told me that one Schloma Adler—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you spell that please?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, I probably can't spell it any better than you can. I presume it is Schloma, S-c-h-l-o-m-a, and is a Jewish diminutive of the name Solomon. In any case, J. Peters told me that one Schloma Adler was supplying a weekly memo containing information about the United States Treasury to the Communist Party. I know nothing further about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced documents into the record showing Solomon Adler's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, and we are going to have further testimony bearing on Mr. Adler's activity in the Far East and in the American Embassy in Nanking. That will come later. Mr. Chambers' testimony related to that fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you know Len De Caux?

Mr. CHAMBERS. No; I never knew Len De Caux.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he was a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; I knew Len De Caux was a Communist and I knew he was in Washington, and I believe that he was here for the Federated Press roughly from 1934 through 1938.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything at this time that we could introduce showing Len De Caux's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here, August 1, 1944, on the stationery of Columbia University, city of New York—

Senator FERGUSON. Prior to reading that, Mr. Chairman, I think he ought to state how you knew he was a Communist.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Again, my knowledge of his Communist is subject to a conversation with J. Peters, who at one point wanted me to meet Len De Caux, whom he thought might be helpful to the Soviet apparatus. For some reason which I have now forgotten it was never accomplished.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find Peters, in these tops of the Communist organization, to be wrong on who were Communists and who were not, who could be trusted in the cause and who could not?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have no recollection of any such occasion. It seems to me very unlikely that there would be.

Senator FERGUSON. So you always accept as truth that kind of statements by Peters and other tops?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I would have accepted any statement that Peters made about such a point.

The CHAIRMAN. I might state here at this point—I don't have to state to the Senators who are sitting here—that we are dealing with hearsay, but we are also dealing with a conspiracy, and the exception to the rule on the receipt of hearsay applies here.

Senator FERGUSON. After you establish the conspiracy, hearsay between the conspirators and statements are admissible even in a court of law.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do your records show Len De Caux's activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Len De Caux is shown as a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Council on page 158 of a volume called *Security in the Pacific*, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the IPR, Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945. I have here a letter dated August 1, 1944, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the stationery of Columbia University in the city of New York as addressed to Mr. Raymond Dennett, secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and signed by Philip C. Jessup. It is signed "Phil." This letter reads as follows in part:

DEAR RAY: In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation * * * the following are people whom I would include—

and among those suggested is the name of Len De Caux.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be marked and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 132" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 132

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
NAVAL SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION,
August 1, 1944.

Mr. RAYMOND DENNETT,
Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York 22, N. Y.

DEAR RAY: In regard to the delegation at the conference, I am not sure what you have in mind about a secretariat for the delegation. I do not recall that we have ever made the kind of distinction which you seem to have in mind for the American delegation. The Pacific Council provides a secretariat for the conference and some of our people have been taken by the Pacific Council for that purpose. Maybe I miss the point and if so I wish you would let me know.

The following are people whom I would include: Benjamin Kizer, Brayton Wilbur, Eric Johnston, Will Clayton, George A. Morison, Mansfield Freeman or J. A. MacKay, Lauchlin Currie, Dean Acheson, John Carter Vincent, Harry White, Rupert Emerson, Owen Lattimore, W. A. M. Burden, Abbot Low Moffat, Robert J. Watt, Len De Caux, Col. Carl Faymonville, Colonel Shoemaker, Virginus Dabney or R. E. Freeman, Walter Lippmann, Sumner Welles, Joseph Barnes, Frederick V. Field, Harold Sprout, Grayson Kirk, Ada Comstock Note-stein.

In reply to yours of the 31st, I do not know Coons, but have no objection to him. I doubt if Wilson would add much but Alger Hiss would be fine.

I definitely would exclude Hunter on the ground that we have too much of the Kizer group; I would exclude Captain Pence because he is now out of the Occupied Areas Section. If either of them were available I would suggest Commodore Vanderbilt or Commodore Stassen.

I suppose we may need to invite General McCoy for organizational purposes. I do not know anything about General Bissell. Yarnell should certainly come as a vice chairman and not as a member of the American delegation. Apropos your statement below "Military" on page II, I would get away from the idea of California naming a delegate.

Personally I would exclude Swing and would add to your press people Waymack of Des Moines.

I would be careful that we do not get too stodgy a delegation but keep a balance. I think the above list is fairly good. Another Government man who would be new to us but very helpful because of his interest in native peoples and Pacific Island government is John Collier, head of the Indian service and a fine person. Let me know what you hear from the others and we will see how things add up.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP C. JESSUP.

Frank Coe of FEA also good (penciled note).

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Mr. White in New Hampshire, Mr. Chambers?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Has your testimony covered that meeting with him?

Mr. CHAMBERS. At great length.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever meet Edmund Clubb? I think before you answer that question, Mr. Chambers, would Mr. Mandel tell us who Edmund Clubb is.

Mr. MANDEL. The Biographical Register of the Department of State dated April 1, 1950, on page 98, lists Edmund Clubb in his most recent position as follows:

Consul General at Shanghai from May 29, 1949, at Peiping September 23, 1947. Class I, April 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. What is his present position?

Mr. MANDEL. Presumably that is his present position. I have no later data.

Mr. MORRIS. No, that is not his position. Mr. Clubb is the head of the Chinese desk, I believe.

Senator FERGUSON. In the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. In the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that should be established by something more than that.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. That is why I want to know what the official record shows.

Mr. MANDEL. The New York Times of July 13, 1951, refers to Oliver Edmund Clubb as director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

Senator FERGUSON. Of the United States Department of State?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that spelled?

Mr. MANDEL. C-l-u-b-b.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that the same man you are talking about?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I believe it is.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chambers, did you ever meet Mr. Clubb?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes, I did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the circumstances of your meeting Mr. Clubb?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Probably in June, in May or June of 1932, while I was editing the New Masses.

Mr. MORRIS. That is 1932.

Mr. CHAMBERS. 1932. While I was editing the New Masses, which is a Communist-controlled magazine, there came into my office a young man who asked to see Walt Carmon.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Walt Carmon?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Walt Carmon had been in effect the managing editor of New Masses before I became editor.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he have any connection with the Communist underground?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Walt Carmon may or may not have had connection with the Communist underground. I don't know. He was a Communist.

This stranger seemed rather disturbed not to find Walt Carmon in the office where he expected him. Walt Carmon, in fact, wasn't any longer in the building, in the New Masses. The man, the stranger, told me his name was O. Edmund Clubb.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you recognize a picture of him?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I can no longer identify a picture of Clubb. If you realize that I spoke to him not more than 15 minutes in the year 1932, I think it is simply impossible to make a positive identification.

Senator FERGUSON. You cannot identify the picture.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I feel that other impressions bear on it, and I should not make an identification of him positively.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Nevertheless this man told me his name was O. Edmund Clubb, that he was a consular official of some kind at Hankow, I believe, that he was on leave of absence, and he had some kind of message which he wanted to deliver. The difficulty about my recollection of Edmund Clubb or Oliver Clubb is that I can no longer remember what that message was or even to whom it was to be delivered, but there has stayed in the back of my mind an impression which I will not testify to positively that the message was written and that it was for Grace Hutchins. Grace Hutchins is an open Communist, a member of the open Communist Party, has run on the Communist ticket in various elections, and is well known to be a Communist. But I cannot testify more positively to anything along those lines. Clubb then sat talking a little about China. Naturally I don't recall what our conversation was over that length of time, but I do remember that we talked about Hayang Arsenal. As you probably know, Hankow is one of three cities which lie close together—originally called the Wuhan cities where the Communists made their last stand when Chiang Kai-shek first swept them out. I have a further recollection, which I hesitate to make positive, that the message was from Agnes Smedley, but again I can't really testify to that positively.

Senator FERGUSON. This is your best judgment; is it?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I find it impossible, with the play of so many influences on my mind, because people are always asking me questions, bringing me information, and there are actually areas of my experience where I can no longer distinguish between what I once knew and what I have heard and learned in the course of testifying. I have given many thousands of words of testimony by now, as you know.

Mr. MORRIS. But there is no doubt about the fact that Clubb came into the New Masses office.

Mr. CHAMBERS. There is not the slightest doubt about it. He further told me that his parents lived in Minnesota and that he was going there to spend at least part of his leave with them.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you amplify any more about whether or not Clubb at that time was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have no knowledge whatsoever.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything to show that Mr. Clubb was assigned to Hankow at that particular time?

Mr. MANDEL. I read again from the State Department Register of April 1, 1950, which says that Oliver Edmund Clubb was born at South Park, Minn.; and, further, that he was vice consul at Hankow on March 12, 1931. That is obviously the date of appointment.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to defer our introducing evidence showing Clubb's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to ask you if you have that evidence.

Mr. MORRIS. There is that evidence; yes, sir. I would like to defer introducing that until the subject comes up the next time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. This question is not very necessary, Mr. Chambers, but will you identify Alger Hiss to be a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Will I identify Alger Hiss to be a Communist?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. It may not be necessary to your mind, but we are making a record here.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; Alger Hiss is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. The reason I ask that is that we have introduced into the record in the past extensive documents showing Hiss' activity with the Institute of Pacific Relations. In fact, he was a member of the board of trustees; and, as I say, other documents show extensive activity on his part within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt in your mind that Alger Hiss was a Communist?

Mr. CHAMBERS. None whatever.

Senator FERGUSON. You are positive of that?

Mr. CHAMBERS. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. I think this is all for the time being, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. What about this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. We have nothing planned for this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will rise at this time.

(Whereupon, at 2:15 p. m., the hearing recessed until 10 a. m. Wednesday, August 22, 1951.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

MONDAY, AUGUST 20, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 4:30 p. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424, Senate Office Building, Senator Willis Smith presiding.

Present: Senators Willis Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Mr. Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel.

Senator SMITH. The committee will come to order.

Will you take the oath, please? You solemnly swear that you will well and truly interpret unto the witness called to testify before this subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the oath which shall be administered to him; and that you will well and truly interpret unto said witness the questions which shall be propounded him by counsel and by members of the committee and the testimony of said witness delivered before this committee, so help you God?

Mrs. TAKESHITA. I do.

Mr. KURODA. I do.

Senator SMITH. Will you take the oath, please, Mr. Yoshikawa. Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give in this proceeding before the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA, MUSASHIHO-SHI, TOKIO.
DIRECTOR, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, INTERPRETED BY
MRS. KATSUYO TAKESHITA, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND REV.
ANDREW Y. KURODA, WASHINGTON, D. C., OF JAPANESE SECTION,
DIVISION OF ORIENTALIA, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs. TAKESHITA. Mitsusada Yoshikawa, who is presently the Director of the Special Bureau, Attorney General's Office, of the Japanese Government.

Mr. MORRIS. I will address the questions to you.

Mr. Yoshikawa, what is your present occupation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Director of the Special Investigation Bureau, Attorney General's Office.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you work for the Japanese Government officially?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your position in Japan at the trial and prosecution of Richard Sorge and his associates in the Sorge espionage ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was connected with the Tokyo Criminal Court as a procurator at the time and was connected with the Tokyo Criminal District Court Procuration Bureau.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe your functions in that case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. At the time of the Sorge case a group of procurators was formed to investigate the Sorge case, and I was one of them.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a Japanese Government official?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. They were all procurators.

Senator FERGUSON. That is a Government official position?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in over-all charge of the case?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. There was one chief procurator assigned to the case. He was the chief of a division of the criminal affairs bureau.

Mr. MORRIS. What in particular was your function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. There were two assistant procurators assigned to the case under the chief procurator, and one of them was I.

Mr. MORRIS. What did you do as opposed to what the other man did?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was appointed to carry on the investigation of the foreigners in this group.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the other man carry out the investigation of the native Japanese?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. In that capacity, did you examine Richard Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. On how many occasions?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I believe that the arrest of Sorge took place in the latter part of November 1941, and from that day on until May 1942 the investigation of Sorge was carried on every day.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you examine him every day?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. I gave special orders to the police to carry on the investigation of Sorge in the morning, while in the afternoon I personally conducted the examination of Sorge myself. However, in the first week I carried on the investigation by myself entirely.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge freely and willingly speak?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. During the first week he denied all the charges.

Mr. MORRIS. Why did he confess after 1 week?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I believe that there are four reasons for his confession. The first reason that might be given for his confession is that much material evidence was unearthed with the arrest of these persons. In the material evidence that was discovered in the Klaussen home was a wireless apparatus for sending messages and the German Statistical Yearbook, which was used as a part of the code, and had coded messages, and also the original code. The second reason for Sorge's confession could be laid to the fact that, with the arrest of these members, practically all members of the ring were apprehended at one time. The third reason that might be given is that all the

other members of the ring had given their confessions before Sorge. For instance, we had received a confession from Klaussen that he belonged to the fourth section of the Red army headquarters. Furthermore, Brando de Boukelitz was a member of the French Communists, and was in Japan as a correspondent for the Havas newspaper. It is one of the very famous news agencies in France.

Mr. MORRIS. How many reasons have you given now?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Three reasons. I spoke to Sorge about the discovery of the material in evidence and the confessions of the other persons. It is my belief that Sorge felt much relieved that he had just about completed all the work that he had set out to do since his arrival in Japan in 1933. That is the fourth reason.

I discovered this after Sorge had made his confession. About a week before Sorge's arrest, I learned that Sorge and Klaussen and de Boukelitz gathered together in Sorge's home and met together, and they spoke this: "It seems that we have lost contact with the Japanese lately. I wonder what the reason for that is. We have just about completed all the intelligence work which we had started out to do in Japan, and we have learned what Japan is to do it this critical time. Since Germany has begun her attack on Russia, let us leave Japan and go to Germany to carry on our work, and let us do intelligence work in Germany for Moscow."

This is the sort of conversation that was carried on at the time. Sorge and his group in a sense enjoyed a feeling of relief, but they felt that they had completed a very important piece of work in Japan and had completed their mission successfully.

Senator FERGUSON. Did they say what the mission was?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. They have confessed to that in detail.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the substance of their mission?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The important question at the time was whether Japan, after her long war in China, would send or direct her military activities to the north or to the south.

Senator FERGUSON. So, it was not only to obtain intelligence—that is, information—but they were to penetrate for the purpose of getting Japan to strike to the south rather than to strike Russia, which meant that they were to strike America and Britain rather than Russia; is that correct.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That was the second motive in Sorge's mission in Japan. The first was to gain objective information.

Senator FERGUSON. The second was to have this take place, though, of attacking to the south rather than attacking Russia?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. How could a German like Sorge accomplish that task? Did he have some Japanese on his side?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge was not only very intimate with the German Ambassador Ott, but he was also intimate with many of the military general staff. Furthermore, a man with whom Sorge had very close connections, Ozaki, was one of the "brain trust" group in the Konoye Cabinet, and he belonged to this group which had great influence in the policy making of the Cabinet.

Furthermore, Ozaki was a top-notch newspaperman.

Senator FERGUSON. How long after the attack at Pearl Harbor was Sorge arrested? Or was it before?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was before Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The latter part of November 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. The attack took place on the 7th of December.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was the 8th in Japan.

Senator FERGUSON. How long before that was Sorge and his group arrested?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. About 2 or 3 weeks before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge relate anything about a modus vivendi between Japan and America?

Mrs. TAKESHITA. Would you explain modus vivendi?

Senator FERGUSON. An agreement or stay of proceedings, as it were, when they were negotiating prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor. A 90-day truce, as it were, in their negotiations.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No. Sorge's sources of information were not just the Konoye Cabinet, but also from the top officers in the military clan.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever hear of a proposed modus vivendi between America and Japan prior to the 8th, as you say, of December?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No; I do not remember. Sorge considered the negotiations taking place between America and Japan as of very high importance, and he paid very, very close attention to the negotiations that were going on at the time.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Sorge did say that he was watching negotiations between America and Japan prior to the attack?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge confess to you more than you felt that he knew?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; almost all of it was so. All the information.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he confess more than you felt that he knew about?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I think you have the wrong answer. Did Sorge confess to more facts than you felt that he knew?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, most of what Sorge told me was more than I knew. May I explain. The character of the Sorge group in the beginning was a great question, and if it were connected with Moscow, how did they receive instructions. All those questions were very important at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't understand the question. Was Sorge a Communist when he died?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Of course.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he freely confess to Mr. Yoshikawa secrets that Mr. Yoshikawa could never have learned otherwise?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In part the things that I learned were entirely from Sorge's confessions and that part was a very important part.

Mr. MORRIS. If Sorge knew that another ring was operating, another spy ring was operating, does Mr. Yoshikawa think he would have confessed about that, too?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It is my private opinion, but I don't believe that he would.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your private opinion that you don't think that he would?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I don't think Sorge would.

Mr. MORRIS. Why not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. If another group had been active in Japan at the time.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any coercive methods used in obtaining the confessions?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No coercive methods were used.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any pressure put on the prosecutors on the part of the Japanese Government?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. There was.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The first man in this group who was arrested was Ozaki. Ozaki was a man held in very high esteem in the Konoye Cabinet, and it was expected that the arrest of Ozaki would have a very bad political effect on the Konoye Cabinet, but Ozaki immediately upon his arrest made the confession to me that he was an international Communist. Because of that, Konoye was not able to ignore that confession and put pressure on the procurators. Furthermore, after the arrest of Ozaki, because of other political reasons, the Konoye Cabinet resigned, and it was succeeded by the Tojo Cabinet. Therefore, we did not have any political pressure put on us in the case of Ozaki, but when Sorge was arrested some pressure was put on us.

Senator FERGUSON. Was the pressure to stop prosecution, or was it to press it and carry through the prosecution?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not a pressure that was strong.

Senator FERGUSON. But whatever pressure there was, which way was it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was just a matter of arrest at the time. The matter of prosecution had not come up yet.

Senator FERGUSON. About getting a confession, what was the pressure?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. When Sorge was arrested, Ambassador Ott and his wife became highly indignant. The Ambassador, through the Tojo Cabinet, requested that they be allowed to see Sorge and to have a report of the case immediately.

Senator FERGUSON. As I understand it, Ott was Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And Sorge had some connection with the Ambassador, with the German Embassy, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As I remember, Ott was a military attaché to the German Embassy at Nagoya at the time of the ambassadorship of Von Dirksen. From that, Sorge had become intimate with Ott from that time that he was a military attaché.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge hold any positions with the Germans?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge did not have any official position, but he was considered one of the closest friends of Ott and was regarded as one of his highest advisers. Therefore Sorge had access to all the German military and political secrets, and consulted him on many matters concerning such matters. At times when the German high officials connected with the army or the Government came to Japan, out of respect for Sorge's position they would divulge many of the confidential matters to Sorge, and he would go practically every day to the German Embassy and was connected with the newspaper in the Embassy.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he a public-relations officer?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Not in the way of liaison; no. He was just connected with a news service or a press release.

Mr. MORRIS. For the Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, for the Embassy. At one time Ott said to Sorge that he would very much like to have him attached officially to the Embassy. Although this was a very high position for Sorge, he declined. The reason for his declination was that there would be an investigation of his past and he wanted to avoid that.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the principal purpose of this ring to collect information for the Soviet Union?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they carry on another function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As I said before, Ozaki and Sorge, working together, tried as much as possible to influence Japanese military news to the south.

Mr. MORRIS. What was their second function?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. To influence——

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give us the details of this endeavor to influence the foreign policy of Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Although his position was unofficial, he enjoyed a very high standing in the Germany Embassy, and he was also a member of the Nazi Party, and as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung he had many friends among the Japanese and the foreigners in Japan. He also knew many persons in the high military command. Ozaki also had a very important position as one of the brain trust group in the Konoye Cabinet. He also had a good reputation as a topnotch newspaperman. Through consultation between themselves they initiated this political strategy. Moscow had forbidden that they take any part in political matters, to do anything that might connect them with the Japanese Communist Party. Sorge asked Moscow whether it would be permissible for him to engage in this political maneuvering. There was no answer from Moscow to that question. Sorge took it for granted that Moscow had given silent consent and, together with Ozaki, engaged in activities that would influence Japanese foreign policies as they wished. One of their methods was of course to speak to many people about what political policy Japan should take, and also to write articles on the subject. The main points in their propaganda were as follows: The first reason was that the Reds were militarily very strong and that their social set-up was also very powerful. If Japan should go to the north, it would be very unlikely that she would be the victor.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "go to the north," you mean attack the Soviet Union?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Even though Japan should send her armies into Siberia, she would find very little there that she could use, and she would probably meet with greater difficulties than she had encountered in her war with China, and historically speaking, Japan has always failed in any military missions to the north.

Moreover, should Japan send her forces to the south, she would find many resources in that area which she needs and could use.

Mr. MORRIS. When you testify that Japan should move to the south, you mean Japan should attack Great Britain, the United States and the Dutch?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. French Indochina, America, England, and the Dutch.

Mr. MORRIS. Whenever in your testimony you refer to moving to the south you mean attacking all those countries?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. I mean the dispatching of military forces to the south. By "resources" I mean great amounts of oil and rubber and other resources. For these reasons, then, it would be more advisable for Japan to go south rather than to the north.

I would like to add a few explanations as to the political position of Ozaki.

Senator FERGUSON. Ozaki is the man who was directly connected with Sorge in this espionage ring?

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Ozaki's first name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It probably is Hozumi, but in the group which investigated him he was called Hidemi. There are many readings of Japanese characters. Although Ozaki was a Communist, his position was somewhat different from the Communist Party in Japan. The aim of the Japanese Communist Party was to work within the framework of the Japanese Communist Party in Japan, and to instigate a revolution and win political power in Japan. However, Ozaki's position differed from the Communist Party in Japan. Ozaki's position was that Japan should be Communized through the cooperative efforts of Russia, China, and Japan, and that Japan should become a satellite under the leadership of Moscow. In the many conversations with Sorge we formulated the strategy which I have described.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the Institute of Pacific Relations' name ever come into the investigation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. In what way?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Ozaki had as one of the sources of information a person by the name of Saionji.

Mr. MORRIS. What is his first name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Kimikazu. The acquaintance of Ozaki and Saionji began with their attendance at a meeting at an American-Pacific conference in America.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the Institute of Pacific Relations conference, isn't it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know in what year?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not remember distinctly but I believe it was about 1937.

Senator FERGUSON. How else, if it did, did the name come into these hearings, the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Other than that which I have just told you about, I don't remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that by previous exhibits we have identified Mr. Saionji as the secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. The record will so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain to us the relationship that existed between Ozaki and Saionji?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. The intimacy between Ozaki and Saionji increased with their return to Japan, and both of these men were

members of the group closely connected with the Konoye Cabinet, and they were very good personal friends also.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Saionji arrested with the other members of the ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Saionji's arrest came very much later. I believe it was in the spring of 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give important secrets to Ozaki?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, regrettably, but Saionji did give many of the important state secrets to Ozaki.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Gunther Stein implicated in this spy ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He was an indirect member of the group.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he consciously work for the group?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; he did.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe some of his activities?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. According to Sorge's confession, Gunther Stein was a man well versed in economics and a man of great activity. Gunther Stein, knowing that Sorge was a member of the group connected with Moscow, cooperated with him freely. Sorge valued Gunther Stein's cooperation very highly, and it was Sorge's wish for Gunther Stein to become a direct member of the group. He proposed that to Moscow. By a "direct member" I mean a person who is registered in Moscow and receives money from Moscow, and furthermore is protected by the Moscow network.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that we introduced at a recent hearing records that Gunther Stein was the representative of the IPR in 1937 and we also introduced into the record extensive articles that he wrote for the Institute of Pacific Relations. I think the number is 21, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. The record will so show.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Agnes Smedley a member of this spy ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Were there any other Americans involved in this spy ring?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes. It would be a very general statement. I would not be able to give definite facts.

Senator FERGUSON. How many?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Several. When Sorge was carrying on his work in Shanghai there were more than three, including Agnes Smedley.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As I remember, it was about from January 1931 to December 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. Who were the other members in addition to Agnes Smedley who operated in the spy ring in Shanghai during that period of time?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. One was an American by the name of Jacob, a newspaper correspondent.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Jacob his true name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not believe that it was his true name.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ask Sorge for his true name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked him.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he refuse to tell you?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He smiled but did not answer me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give you a description of Jacob?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked him that also but he did not give that information to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there any other American in the spy ring in Shanghai during that period?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; there were.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was a young official connected with the American consulate in Shanghai.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get the name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked the name but Sorge did not give it to me.

Mr. MORRIS. Did he give you a description?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I asked him that also but he would not give that information to me.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he ever give the name of Agnes Smedley?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. But he wouldn't give you these other names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No; he did not.

Senator FERGUSON. Would not? Did you try to get the names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He would not give them to me, even though I asked him.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you try to get the names?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I did not try to compel him to give the names.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that because they were in Shanghai rather than Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. That was one of the reasons, yes; because we wouldn't have any jurisdiction over them in the other country.

Mr. MORRIS. Did part of the spy ring operate in Harbin, in Manchuria?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge used another group in Harbin as a mail box.

Senator FERGUSON. A mail drop?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As a message center.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this message center deal directly with the Soviet fourth division?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was an intelligence group connected with the fourth section of the Red army.

Mr. MORRIS. And they operated directly under Sorge?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. No.

Mr. MORRIS. How did it operate?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Under instructions from Moscow, this Harbin center would act as a courier, which would relay messages or wireless messages for Sorge to Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any reason to believe that there were Americans associated with that set-up?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not I who investigated this case, but it was through one of my subordinates who investigated Max Klaussen that I obtained this. The fact that this Harbin group was used as a message center is in the statement that Sorge made to me. Although Klaussen was working under Sorge in Shanghai under the instructions from Moscow, Klaussen was attached to the Harbin group for a while. According to the procurator who investigated Klaussen, I was told that there was a wireless apparatus set up in the American consulate in Harbin.

Senator FERGUSON. Who was Klaussen? Was he a German?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; he was a German.

Senator FERGUSON. Was he the man who sent the radio messages?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; he was a wireless operator.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever find the wireless in the American Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. This was information which I got from the report of the procurator who investigated Klaussen.

Senator FERGUSON. But Klaussen must have then stated to the procurator that the place where he had the wireless was in the American Embassy. Is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Klaussen stated that the wireless was in the American consulate.

Mr. MORRIS. This was a wireless of the spy ring, was it not?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was not an apparatus belonging to the American consulate. It was an apparatus belonging to the spy ring.

Mr. MORRIS. And they used the American consulate general's office as a headquarters?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes; surprisingly it was so.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Around 1931 and 1932.

Mr. MORRIS. Just approximately the same time as the American operators in Shanghai?

Senator FERGUSON. 1931 and 1932?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was this in China or Japan where the apparatus was in the Embassy?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was in Harbin, Manchuria.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Yoshikawa, we had testimony before this committee that Sorge relayed to his superiors the message that the German Army was going to attack the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941. Do you have any information that would confirm that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain it?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Before war had been declared between Russia and Germany, many members of the German high command came to Japan and visited the German Embassy. According to their reports, although I do not remember whether it was 150 divisions or 1,500,000 men, it was their report that this large number of the German military were massed on the Soviet-Russian border, and that they would be able to attack and accomplish the fall of Petrograd within 2 months. That was the plan of the German military. There were some differences of opinion among the Germans at the time. However, it was already decided that this plan would be put under way and that the attack would be launched. This information was not only related to Sorge by the German military officials, but also by Ambassador Ott. When Sorge heard this he was amazed at the plan and he took measures to confirm the information, and then to relay the information to Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. Did this spy ring ever learn that there was to be an attack on America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In a broad sense; yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Tell us what you know about it.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In July, after the outbreak of the war between the Germans and the Russians, there was a mobilization of 1,300,000 men in Japan. This was a very, very large mobilization and a highly important one. Whether this large force would be deployed to the north or to the south was a question of great military importance in Japan. Along with this, the Kwantung army in Manchuria, under the pretense of special army maneuvers, mobilized the rolling force of the South Manchurian railway. Sorge was very zealous in this investigation as to whether this army would be deployed to the north or the south, and he tried to obtain this information through Ozaki.

Senator FERGUSON. Did he obtain the information that it would be used against the American, British, French, and Dutch?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. As a result of his information activities he learned that this force would be sent to the south.

Senator FERGUSON. Which meant that it would be an attack on America, the British, the Dutch, and the French, rather than upon Russia. Is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It is a question as to whether that meant it would be actual warfare to the south, but even at that time many of the Japanese forces were being sent into French Indochina. Sorge was engaged in a detailed study of the negotiations, which were taking place between America and Japan at the time. Not only was he interested in what the government was planning, but also what the military had in mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Did Sorge tell you that he learned that Japan was going to attack America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In October or November 1941 Sorge arrived at the conclusion that Japan would send her forces south, and sent that information to Moscow.

Senator FERGUSON. How do you reconcile that testimony with what you said before the Un-American Activities Committee that was reported in the press recently?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I was shown a wireless message which was sent by Klaussen, carrying a message to that effect.

Senator FERGUSON. You were shown a message that had been sent by Klaussen, who was one of the spy ring, to Russia, advising Russia that it was the intention of the Japanese military forces to move south and not against Russia, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. This message also contained the sentence that Japan would attack.

Senator FERGUSON. Attack what?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Attack the south.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the date of that message?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not remember the date, but I saw the message and it brought back the fact that I had seen that. Sorge also confessed to the message.

Senator FERGUSON. Was America's name used in that message?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not believe that America was mentioned as America.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you interpret the message that they would attack in the south? The Japanese were already fighting in China and in Indochina.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. In the attack, other places such as Java and Singapore would be included.

Senator FERGUSON. That was Dutch. Singapore was British and Java was Dutch.

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then your language should not be interpreted either here or before the Un-American Activities Committee that the Sorge ring knew that Japan was going to attack America. Is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge stated that of necessity attacking to the south would mean going to war with America.

Senator FERGUSON. Then Sorge did tell you the name "America" in relation to the attack of Japan, is that right?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge said so.

Senator FERGUSON. Sorge said that?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge mentioned America.

Senator FERGUSON. So that as I understand it now, your testimony here under oath is that Sorge said to you that he had learned from the Japanese Government prior to the time of his arrest, which was prior to the Pearl Harbor attack on the 8th your time, the 7th our time, that he learned that an attack by the Japanese would be made upon America?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Sorge stated so.

Senator FERGUSON. The answer is yes, that he did state so, is that correct?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Sorge visit any American Communist en route to Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. He stated so; yes. But on the details of that matter, I had the police make the investigation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the result of the investigation?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. After his stay in China, Sorge went to Moscow and then he left for Japan from Moscow by way of America. At the time he made arrangements to have a Japanese Communist in America join him in his activities in Japan. I do not know definitely just whom he met and where he met them.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the American Communist? What was the American Communist's name?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I had given instructions to the procurator, the policeman Okashi, to investigate the matter, but I do not believe that Sorge disclosed the man's name.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know whether Ushiba was ever a Japanese Communist?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I do not believe that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Tsuru was ever a Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. I had never heard that he was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he active in Communist activities?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. While I was investigating this case I did not hear anything of that nature.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any instance whereby the American

Communists aided the Japanese Communists in Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain it to us, please?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. It was before the arrest of Sorge, and I believe it was in either 1937 or 1938. It was a period in which the Japanese Communist Party has been greatly weakened and was in a state of disorganization. It was a very important matter to the Japanese Communists that the party be reorganized. However, that was not possible at the time with their own strength alone, and unless they received help from Moscow they would not be able to attain that end. We had the instance that at this time the Japanese branch of the Communist Party in America gave aid to the Japanese Communists in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean those Japanese and Japanese-Americans in the American Communist Party?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Not only the Japanese. Although the group was made up of Japanese, there were also other Americans who participated in this aid. The methods which they employed were as follows: They put out a very good publication by the name of International Correspondence or Kokusai Tsubin. The contents of this publication were directed toward propaganda in Japan, taking up the current problems of that time within Japan, and gave instructions as to what steps should be taken by the Japanese Communists and it was also a very radical magazine. Another publication which was put out was the Taiheiyo Rodo-sha, which in translation means the Pacific Worker. It was a magazine put out by an organization which endeavored to bring into close relations the various radical trade unions of the various countries bordering on the Pacific. This office published this publication. This publication was published in Japanese also, and it took up practical problems such as what the Japanese Communists should do within the labor organizations in Japan. This publication was sent by mail to all the right, center, and left labor front organizations and labor organizations in Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it Mr. Yoshikawa's testimony that these publications were put out by American Communists in aid of the Japanese Communist Party because its ranks had been depleted by the Reds in Japan?

Mr. YOSHIKAWA. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. I haven't any other questions.

Senator SMITH. I want to thank you very much for your participation and testimony here.

The committee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 6:26 p. m. the committee was recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Connor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Senator Welker; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Budenz, will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about to give before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you give your name and address to the reporter, please.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.

Mr. BUDENZ. Louis Francis Budenz, Crestwood, N. Y.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, where were you born?

Mr. BUDENZ. Indianapolis, Ind.

Mr. MORRIS. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BUDENZ. Assistant professor of economics at Fordham University.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, were you ever a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I was a member of the Communist Party and of its national committee.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long were you a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. For 10 years.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what positions you held in the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I held quite a few positions, and I will give some of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, give the more notable ones, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. I was labor editor of the Daily Worker, editor of the Midwest Daily Record—that was a Communist paper in Chicago—managing editor of the Daily Worker and president of the corporation publishing that paper, a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, as I have stated, chairman of the Commission on Publications, penetrating various publications for the Communist Party, and a member of the radio commission, penetrating the radio industry. There were other assignments.

Mr. MORRIS. For how long were you a member of the national committee of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Nine years, six of them public, three of them secret.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you break with the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. October 11, 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, since that time, Mr. Budenz, have you cooperated with Government agencies in trying to eliminate Communists from positions of power?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, to the best of my ability, that is, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation upon their request, and also always on subpoena.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, could you just give us a general idea to what extent, say in hours contributed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. BUDENZ. During the last 5 years I have contributed 3,000 hours, approximately, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in questions directed to me and in the research required by those questions.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you a witness at the trial of the 11 Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was the first witness at the trial of the 11 Communists, and I might say that I was on the witness stand 10 days at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us if you were also a witness at the Santo and Peters proceedings, the deportation proceedings against Santo and J. Peters?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was a witness for the Government against Santo and J. Peters, Soviet agents, and as a matter of fact I might say I was the chief witness against J. Peters, who was one of the chief Soviet espionage agents in this country. After my testimony, both of these men agreed to go to Europe voluntarily.

Mr. MORRIS. And were you responsible for the exposure of Gerhard Eisler?

Mr. BUDENZ. In 1936, I stated publicly that Gerhard Eisler was a representative of the Communist International. That was confirmed thereafter. And I was a witness at one of his trials.

Mr. MORRIS. What trial was that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was the trial down here in Washington, in which he was convicted.

Mr. MORRIS. Convicted of what?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I am not sure.

Senator FERGUSON. Perjury, was it not, on the passport?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think that was it.

Mr. MORRIS. And then there were other contributions that you have made to various Government agencies, were there not, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I have appeared many times before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. I think it is 14 times. And before the House Labor Committee, before the Senate committee which was chaired by Senator Ferguson, and before the committee under the chairmanship of Senator Tydings. Just recently, I appeared for the New York Board of Education in the educational situation there as an expert on Marxism and Leninism, and most recently the State of New York subpoenaed me in the case of the International Workers Order, which now by court order has been declared to be dissolved.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, this committee is conducting an inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations. We are going to ask you a series of questions, all of which will be related, either directly or indirectly, to the Institute of Pacific Relations. And we are going to ask you, to the best of your ability, to answer all these questions.

At the outset, Mr. Budenz, were you in a position in the Communist Party where you would have access to more secrets, to the identity of more people, than the ordinary Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly. Indeed, more than the normal member of the national committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Why is that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. As managing editor of the Daily Worker, it was essential that I know the various delicate turns and twists of the line; not only of the line but of the emphasis of the line in the particular period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "line" in that respect, what do you mean, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I mean the Communist viewpoint at that particular moment, the Communist objective. This has nothing to do fundamentally with the Communist philosophy, except that it is an expression of it in action during a period of time. And that had to be emphasized in the Daily Worker, not merely as to what the line was but as to its various delicate nuances, if I may use that term. The Daily Worker is not a daily paper in the normal sense of the word. It is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy giving directives to the conspirators.

Mr. MORRIS. On individuals?

Mr. BUDENZ. On individuals likewise. It was a matter of political life and death to have a correct viewpoint of the various individuals who were dealt with by the Daily Worker.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it the same today as it was in your day?

Mr. BUDENZ. What is that?

Senator FERGUSON. Is the Daily Worker now a telegraph agency for the men in the conspiracy?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I can't testify of my own first-hand knowledge.

Senator FERGUSON. But as to what you see in it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. It is the telegraph agency of the conspiracy. That is its sole function. It parades under the guise of a daily paper in order to protect itself through the cry of freedom of the press, but it is not concerned primarily with how much circulation it has. The circulation sometimes has gone down to 8,000 a day. Its concern is to get out every day to the Communists throughout the country, the active ones, the instructions upon which they are to act. It is used in that way, by the way.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Budenz, from the eyes of the then editor of the Daily Worker and a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, what was your opinion of the Institute of Pacific Relations? What did you know of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. What I know is perhaps the better way to put it, because I was at Politburo meetings and in consultation with members of the Politburo constantly. As a matter of fact, day by day I was in consultation. And frequently I was at Politburo meetings because of my position. The Politburo in these discussions declared the Institute of Pacific Relations repeatedly to be a captive organization, completely under control of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the Institute of Pacific Relations was a captive organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Completely under the control of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was during the entire period of my membership in the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. That would be from 1935 to 1945?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1935 to 1945.

We have to distinguish according to the Communist parlance between captive organizations and fronts. Communist fronts are those created by the Communist Party itself. Captive organizations are those penetrated successfully and taken over. That is to say, the policies are under control of the party, although not necessarily all the personnel is.

The United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union is a very splendid example of that in the trade-union field. That was an organization that was certainly not Communist. The overwhelming majority of its members were not Communists. But it was completely controlled by the Communists. And the Institute of Pacific Relations was viewed in the same light.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Budenz, you mentioned the Politburo. Would you dwell on that somewhat, so that we may know exactly what you mean by that, for the record?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Politburo is the name used by the Communists for the political bureau of the Communist Party, whose name has now been changed to the National Board. Many of these Communist organs undergo many changes of name, either for conspiratorial reasons, to avoid legal identification later, or for some other purpose. The term "Politburo" though, was the original name. That is to say, it was modeled after the Politburo in Moscow, and on the same leadership principle.

It is the governing body insofar as there can be one, in America, of the Communist Party, although it receives its instructions from the Communist International representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it is called what, now?

Mr. BUDENZ. The National Board of the Communist Party.

Senator FERGUSON. You are talking about the American section, which is tied directly to the Moscow section; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. The Moscow directing body, that is, the political body of the Soviet Union, is called the Politburo. But

that is the Moscow Politburo. I am speaking about the American Politburo.

Senator FERGUSON. I understood.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, would you say there was a cell, a Communist cell, operating within the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Alexander Trachtenberg, in these political bureau discussions, emphasizing the importance of the work of this cell, described the Institute of Pacific Relations as "The little red schoolhouse for teaching certain people in Washington how to think with the Soviet Union in the Far East."

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us who Alexander Trachtenberg is, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Alexander Trachtenberg is one of the most important members of the Communist conspiracy in this country. He is the cultural commissar of the Communists in this country. He has published all the authorized works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and all other works authorized by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow. Through his hands these works have to go. He is technically the head of International Publishers, but he is vested with much more authority, with reference to the Daily Worker. He is in charge of the whole cultural work of the party, or at least he was when I was in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that the Communists use the Institute of Pacific Relations to influence foreign policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any doubt in your mind, Mr. Budenz, that when a man like Trachtenberg is speaking about this being an educational process, this IPR, here in Washington—and I take it that is what is meant by the "little red schoolhouse"—that that was an actual fact, that he knew what he was talking about, because of his tie-in in the whole Communist activity?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; and because he knew it through the reports which were received from the Communists within the Institute of Pacific Relations, largely through Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

Senator FERGUSON. And when he was giving this information, you being the managing editor of the Daily Worker, these were instructions to you as part of the party line here in America?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was an observation in the Politburo, a political observation, a conclusion.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was information that you might be able to operate on in the future if necessity required?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore had to be accurate?

Mr. BUDENZ. Every Communist judgment has to be carried in some form into action.

Senator FERGUSON. And it had to be accurate for you to carry on; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. Communist information among themselves is absolutely accurate. It must be. It is the foundation of their work.

Senator FERGUSON. You see, we hear a lot said about so much evidence in this conspiracy being hearsay. And I am trying to get at the point as to what weight this committee can give to hearsay of this nature. Are you able to tell the committee now that in your

opinion this is, let us say, a hearsay that deserves consideration by a committee?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is an official communication between leaders of the conspiracy.

Senator FERGUSON. Among themselves?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. An estimate of their work among themselves, borne out, however, by other corroborating facts. The fact that Mr. Frederick Vanderbilt Field was secretary of the American council, among other acts and other incidents of that sort which we cannot go into now in detail, support this judgment.

Senator FERGUSON. In other words, there is so much supporting evidence around this hearsay that you feel absolutely certain this morning when you are giving this testimony that this was a fact?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, I could not be more certain if I had heard this said within the Institute of Pacific Relations itself.

Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to get your idea on this question.

Mr. BUDENZ. It was based on reports by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an official of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. He was really the man who reported to your agency?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. So that it was coming from the Institute of Pacific Relations among the coconspirators and giving it to all of them, so that they may operate and act upon it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask: Could it be possible that Mr. Field was mistaken, that he just thought they were acting that way; that he really did not have members of the party in their sufficiently strong to influence it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I believe that he was not. In fact, I have knowledge that there were a considerable number of Communists within the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator WATKINS. Have you given the committee the names of those that you say you have no knowledge were members?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have.

Senator WATKINS. That will come out later, I suppose.

Mr. MORRIS. No; that hasn't come out yet, Senator.

Mr. Budenz, will you tell us how this cell operated in connection with the Politburo, this cell that operated within the Institute of Pacific Relations? Will you tell us structurally how it was connected to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course, this cell, as all Communist cells, changed from time to time in personnel. It was largely, though, linked up with Amerasia and was a joint cell with Amerasia, and it operated by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reporting to the Politburo on the activities of the cell within the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the results of these activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you tell us, Mr. Budenz, approximately how many times you were present at meetings of the National Committee or the Politburo of the Communist Party, at which Field, as secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, reported on the activities of the cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations, approximately?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, that would be very hard to state. The meetings were irregular. I should say four or five times a year.

Mr. MORRIS. Four or five times a year, or for a period of 10 years?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. With the exception of my being in Chicago, although even then Field did report to the Politburo in my presence when I was in from Chicago.

Mr. MORRIS. And when you say that he reported to the Politburo, did he at the same time receive instructions from the Politburo to carry on his work?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most definitely. That was the purpose of his report.

Mr. MORRIS. So there were two purposes then: to report in on the activities of the institute and at the same time receive directives from higher authorities in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Right at that point, Senator Ferguson's observation a few minutes ago dwelling on the subject of hearsay testimony brings my attention back to a remark that I heard over the radio the following morning from the date on which the chairman made reference to the fact that hearsay testimony may be received on certain conditions. The authorities are unanimous that hearsay testimony is not ordinarily to be received. One of the exceptions is in the establishment of a conspiracy. All of the authorities are unanimous that where a conspiracy is being established or has been established, then hearsay testimony under an exception to the rule may be received. The remark made over the radio was to the effect that this was testimony of a nature which would never be received in any court of justice. The gentleman who made the remark might stand corrected by reading Wigmore on Evidence or any one of the other standard works on evidence.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. I think I ought to put in the record the same idea that I have. And I do not wish to accuse any newspaper of misquoting what we said here, because I know the difficulty of giving accuracy on legal matters. As to those of us who are trained in the law, it is an easy matter for us, but sometimes we feel that there are misquotations. I felt there was a misquotation on the radio and in the press on this question of hearsay. I want it understood that I have said as a lawyer, and I say it now, that after a conspiracy has been established statements between coconspirators are always admissible in evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. As an exception to the rule.

Senator FERGUSON. As an exception to the hearsay rule. And that applies in criminal cases. As a former member of the bench, I applied the rule. It has been affirmed in Michigan decisions in conspiracy cases and in cases that I tried on the bench.

So I feel that I have made a study of it and there is no question about it. But it has to be applied, that when the conspiracy has been established then the statements among the coconspirators, as we find here in this case, are admissible in evidence even in courts of law.

That is the reason I was asking my questions on what you felt about this hearsay, how it was, and what weight you were giving it. Because we, as members of this committee, must weigh all of the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue, Mr. Morris. I am sorry to interrupt.

Senator WATKINS. May I observe that this is not a court, and nobody is actually being tried here. It is an investigation, and it is not bound by the same rules that a court of law would be bound by.

The CHAIRMAN. No; you are entirely right, Senator. But it has been the desire of the chairman to follow what he deems to be orderly procedure under what he understands to be and knows to be court procedure as nearly as we can, so as not to get off into a wild field where there is no limitation.

Senator WATKINS. I greatly appreciate the chairman's statement on that, and I have admired his conduct of this hearing and the adherence to these rules of evidence, even though we are not required in this type of an investigation to observe them. I think it is being conducted on a very high plane. I say that as a former judge who has tried conspiracy cases and is acquainted with the rule just referred to by the chairman and Senator Ferguson.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. MORRIS. May I point out, Mr. Chairman, lest anyone have the wrong impression here, that the overwhelming bulk of Mr. Budenz's testimony here today will be events that he experienced.

The CHAIRMAN. The only reason that the chairman brought it up is that I was reminded of the remark by a well-meaning commentator who evidently did not catch the real meaning of my expression.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you describe a few of those many meetings of the Politburo that you attended and heard Frederick Field report and receive directives with respect to the Politburo? Will you take a few of those meetings, some of the more notable ones, and describe exactly what happened as you recall it from your own personal experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Necessarily, many of these meetings will not be recalled with any great clarity as such. However, the first meeting, necessarily, at which I met Mr. Field, impressed itself on me. That was in 1937, when he was introduced to me by J. Peters as Comrade Frederick Spencer. This was a meeting called of certain members of the Politburo and of others interested in China work—Harry Gannes, foreign editor of the Daily Worker, J. Peters, Ferruei Marini, whose name was also Fred Brown in the Communist Party—to receive a report of Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are they important Communists, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. These are representatives of the Communist International, to whom I have referred.

Mr. MORRIS. Are they leaders of the Communist underground movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. They were at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Just develop a little bit of their importance. Most of their names this committee is not acquainted with.

Mr. BUDENZ. J. Peters should be known by now. He was the chief espionage agent for the Communist International apparatus. He was the link or liaison officer between the Communist International apparatus in this country and the Soviet secret police. That is on record in my testimony against him in his deportation proceeding. His other activities have been aired in other investigations.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Mr. Gannes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he is now dead. He was then foreign editor of the Daily Worker. Every foreign editor of the Daily Worker is knee

deep in the conspiratorial apparatus, particularly in regard to international communications. And this was true of Harry Gannes, who had been to China and had many very close connections with many underground groups and individuals in connection with China.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe who Brown was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Brown was the man who was in charge of the organization and the preparation of the party for, I should say, violent operations. He had charge of the organizational work for the Communist International of the Communist Party. There were other members of the political bureau there, but I just cannot recall them, because they changed from time to time.

Mr. MORRIS. You say Browder was present, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. He made the report that day.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what happened at that meeting as you recall it from your own personal experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. At that meeting Earl Browder declared that we had to end the business of speaking so loudly about the Chinese Communists as being champions of Soviet conditions as in Russia. Although we had begun to taper off on that, we had to emphasize their democratic character. And he described them as being represented as North Dakota nonpartisan leaguers. He likewise said that we should bring out the full democratic content of the Communist movement and particularly the fact that they represented Asia for the Asiatics against white imperialism, and were for the complete independence and democratization of Asia.

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time, how were you treating the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Up until that time largely we had treated them very extremely, as champions of a Soviet China completely. In fact, the Communist propaganda used to talk about Soviet China in those provinces under Red rule. I say during the time when the transition was taking place, however, there had been a tapering off of that, but there had not been any sharp decision upon the matter.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is as much as you can recall about that particular meeting at this time, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. There is more about the meeting if you wish me to go into it.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, I wish you would, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Because at that meeting it was decided that Owen J. Lattimore, because of his position, should more or less initiate or supervise the matter of having writers and authors and people in public opinion take up this attitude.

Mr. MORRIS. And when you said "because of his position," what did you mean by that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Because of his being in a position where he was not—For instance, Field's connections with the Communist Party were very close at that time, even, and were fairly well known in quite a circle. And then in addition to that, Lattimore was supposed to have quite an influence in the publishing world.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was Lattimore discussed as a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Instructions were given to him as a member of the Communist cell, yes, sir. That is, through Field; not in person.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say instructions were given by the Politburo to Lattimore through Field that he should do some work in connection with the change of policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain what he was supposed to do in connection with that?

Mr. BUDENZ. The details were not worked out. As a matter of fact, that is a common Communist procedure, that the details are not worked up. They are left to the initiative of the individual. They are checked on later. And his success or failure is commented upon.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question right there?

Mr. Budenz, you of course have demonstrated clearly your close association with the operations and your knowledge of the men who were taking an active and an influential part. I would like to ask you just a question or two concerning Owen Lattimore.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. The question suggests itself as to whether his name might just have been used loosely, or whether in fact, from your knowledge of everything, he was identified actively and knowingly with the Communist movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was specifically mentioned as a member of the Communist cell under instructions. There was no loose mention of his name.

Senator O'CONOR. Do you recall just what position he held at that time, if any, with either IPR or with any other movement, either as a captive organization or as a front?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't specifically. It is my impression that he was the editor of their publication. As a matter of fact, there was reference to the fact that he was—yes, he was the editor of their publication.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose publication? You say "their publication."

Mr. BUDENZ. This was Pacific Affairs, if I remember correctly. They had two.

Senator O'CONOR. I was wondering whether in their operations there was any possible code designation that might either have attached to him or in any way might have identified him if he were actually an active member.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Later on; not in connection with this meeting.

Senator O'CONOR. No, I said that because you have mentioned his name in connection with the meeting.

Mr. BUDENZ. During the course of time the Politburo issued for a number of years, from the time when I first entered the party, in 1935, or rather from the time I became a member of the national committee, in 1936, to all members of the national committee, an onion-skin report of all their proceedings in great detail. However, people in key or delicate positions were designated either by blanks, when they were easily described by the circumstances, or by initials. Now, Lattimore was described as L or XL in these onionskins.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by an onion-skin?

Mr. BUDENZ. I mean onion-skin paper, these light papers sent around. They were sent around to every member of the national committee up until 1940 and 1941. During the Hitler-Stalin pacts they were ended, through fear that the onionskins would be used against the Communist Party.

Senator O'CONOR. And was that done frequently? That is to say, was his designation indicated on frequent occasions?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, rather frequent. I can't designate the number.

Senator O'CONNOR. From it all, Mr. Budenz, would you say as to his connection with the movement whether his position in the entire movement was an important one or an unimportant one?

Mr. BUDENZ. His position from the viewpoint of the Communist Party was a very important one. It was particularly stressed in the political bureau that his great value lay in the fact that he could bring the emphasis in support of Soviet policy in language which was non-Soviet. And they consider that a very valuable asset. I could give you many quotations on that. It was discussed more than once.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Field's designation?

Mr. BUDENZ. Field was Secretary—

Senator FERGUSON. No. In this onionskin paper.

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he first was designated under the name of Spencer. Where they had false names like that, they used "Spencer." And for quite a while he went under the name of Spencer and then he went under his initial of F.

Senator FERGUSON. Just under F?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. Then when XL, who was Owen Lattimore, you say—is that right?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in high authority given the interpretation of what these initials were on these onionskins, so that when you would read them you would know who would make the statement and who was designated?

Mr. BUDENZ. Only upon inquiry. And I had to inquire, since I was editor of the paper in Chicago, the Midwest Daily Record.

Senator FERGUSON. Over what period, would you say, was Lattimore described in these onionskin sheets of paper? Over what period of time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I should say about 4 years. It ended in 1940 or 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. About 4 years?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator FERGUSON. And part of this plan was to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and its relation to the Soviet Union. Was that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct; not only on China, but on the whole Far East, to advance the Soviet objectives in the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. Was it ever discussed in these meetings that Owen Lattimore was a man who could put out propaganda and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was precisely the estimate given, that the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy, but that they were expressed in that language, which was non-Soviet in character.

Senator FERGUSON. And therefore terms that designated that it was coming out of Russia were avoided; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. But still carrying out the Communist line?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. If I might just ask a question there: Mr. Budenz, did I understand you to say that Owen Lattimore was designated for the purpose of exerting influence on the Japanese as well as the China policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was later on, to my knowledge.

But during this period we are speaking of, most of the emphasis was on China.

Senator O'CONOR. On China. I understand. I did not want to anticipate what you might come to later, but just so that we can get the connection, it did happen that subsequently he was referred to as exerting an influence on the Japanese policy as well as on China?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. And continuously over 4 years, you would say, these matters continued, in relation to which he was supposed to exercise an influence on the China policy as well?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. There may have been some gaps.

Senator O'CONOR. But it, however, started from a time and did not end until 4 years thereafter.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is in regard to that particular incident. However, there were other references.

The CHAIRMAN. You used the term "during this period," Mr. Budenz. I wonder if you would, just for the record, and for clarification, state what the period was, what years?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, that was the years 1937 or 1936, to 1940 and 1941. That is the years of the onionskin papers. We are only discussing them at the present moment, as I understand it.

Senator O'CONOR. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, we were discussing this 1937 meeting of the politburo, and Mr. Lattimore's name came up, and we had this series of questions.

Senator FERGUSON. Before you take that up, I would like, along the line of the thinking that we were carrying out, to have you read two paragraphs in a letter that is already in evidence, dated July 10, 1938. I will mark those two paragraphs.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that exhibit, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. I will try and find it.

Mr. MORRIS. It is exhibit No. 4, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you read them aloud, so that they will go in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I wanted an executive meeting before we commenced this hearing this morning, but members of the committee were not present. I would like to take about 5 or 10 minutes now in recess, if the members of the committee would come with me to the rear room for just a minute, please.

(A short recess was taken.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Budenz, getting back to that memorandum, that exhibit 4 that I gave you to read, what do you have to say about the language in that? Is that in your opinion carrying out what was expressed about Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it is a splendid example; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That he was telling the IPR in effect that the policy of the Communists in Russia was to be carried out, but it was to be carried out, how, as he says?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the whole excerpt should be read, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. And then comment on it as you go along, explaining how it does carry out the purpose for which Lattimore was to be used by the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ (reading) :

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.

For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable.

That is a typical Lattimore method which was approved by the Politburo. That is, to not appear to be a Communist, but to forward the burden, as I have said, of the Communist line, to throw the weight into Communist support.

Senator FERGUSON. To carry it out, but not let it appear that in carrying it out you, the man who is advocating it, is a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

And as a matter of fact, beyond that, to influence people who are non-Communists by appearing even to present it in non-Communist approaches and in non-Communist language :

For Japan, on the other hand, hang back as not to be inconveniently ahead of the Japanese liberals, who cannot keep up, whereas the Chinese liberals can. So the chief thing is to oppose the military wing of Japanese aggression in China, counting on a check there to take care of both the military and the civilian components of aggression in Japan.

Well, there is a lot about the British here, and the French.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would go to the Russian part.

Mr. BUDENZ (reading) :

For the U. S. S. R.—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of “subservience.”

That, again, is indicative of the method of expression to which I have referred. This was to throw the weight of support to the U. S. S. R., not to American policy, but to the U. S. S. R.

Senator FERGUSON. And to do it in such a way that the American people and the other people would not feel that it was being advocated by a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. By anyone subservient, namely, by a Communist; that is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, coming back to the question: Is that the position that you say Lattimore, Owen Lattimore, was described in this meeting as having the capacity to take, to carry out the policy of the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; in that meeting, and on a number of other occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, the witness is prepared today to testify to five episodes concerning Owen Lattimore, and we are going to come to those later.

Senator FERGUSON. That will probably cover this.

But I did at this time, when he brought up this question of Owen Lattimore's position with the party, want to ask him his opinion as in this letter written by Mr. Lattimore to Mr. Carter, exhibit 4, as to whether this did in his opinion carry out that policy.

And your answer is——

Mr. BUDENZ. That is a very fine example of the expression of Mr. Lattimore to which reference was made with approval.

Senator O'CONOR. Before you leave that, you made mention in answer to a question by Senator Ferguson that this was a typical Lattimore method, or words to that effect.

Would you say that he continued to operate in that manner? Or did he change after it?

Could you say whether or not he has until recent times continued in that line?

Mr. BUDENZ. I, of course, am confining myself to such information as I obtained officially within the Politburo, and I am stating that it was their conclusion time after time that he was very serviceable because of this peculiar facility of his in this matter.

Senator O'CONOR. Would you say that the reference to the Japanese situation would confirm your previous contention that he did have influence on the Japanese policy questions on China?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, Senator, except that later this became more pronounced.

The CHAIRMAN. Any question, Senator Smith?

Senator Watkins?

All right. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. We were discussing the meeting of the Politburo in 1937, and you had gotten as far as the mention of the name of Owen Lattimore, and then you had some questions amplifying that point.

Have you finished testifying about that 1937 meeting, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

I would like to state, in regard to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, that it was specifically mentioned there that he was to be the political representative of the cell, or was the political representative of the cell, for the party.

Further than that, likewise, at the conclusion of the discussion, J. Peters having explained to me that Frederick Spencer was actually Frederick Vanderbilt Field, that I would know that later, that I would see his pictures, and the like, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Harry Gannes, and J. Peters, at the conclusion of this political bureau meeting, in my presence discussed the matter of couriers to Washington on underground work in regard to the Far East.

The details of that work, naturally, I am unfamiliar with.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything else about that 1937 meeting that you are prepared to tell us about now, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That seems to exhaust it, so far as my memory goes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, could you think of one or two other meetings that you have testified about that you can describe to us in detail?

Mr. BUDENZ. There was the meeting in 1943.

The CHAIRMAN. This other meeting was when, this one to which you referred?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1937.

However, in regard to Frederick Vanderbilt Field, if you will permit, I would like to refer to the meetings in 1940.

There were a series of meetings of the political bureau in 1940, which, to some degree are more or less blurred in my memory, because they had to be held at second-hand. Many of the members of the political bureau were already in hiding at that time, since the party had come to the conclusion that it was about to turn the imperialist war into civil war. They expected instructions along that line during the Hitler-Stalen pact period.

The discussions, though, with the politburo by Mr. Field arose over whether he should leave the Institute of Pacific Relations as secretary of the American Council and go to the American Peace Mobilization as its head. The politburo had decided quite early that he should, because they wanted a national organization. They already had a localized organization, but they wanted a national one.

And they held a convention in Chicago, I think in that summer, at which Mr. Field was chosen.

The CHAIRMAN. What summer was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1940.

In the course of this discussion, Mr. Field declared that Dr. Philip Jessup, who was an official, in fact, one of the responsible officials of the Institute of Pacific Relations, had impressed upon Mr. Field that he thought that Mr. Field could be of more service in the I. P. R. than he could in the American Peace Mobilization.

Mr. SOURWINE. Service to whom, or to what?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was never very clear, at least so far as my memory is concerned. I thought to the cause of humanitarianism. But that would be only my interpretation.

The Politburo, however, in a number of zig-zag meetings, because some of them had to be conducted, as I say, for instance, by conference with Jack Stachel from under cover and the like, decided Mr. Field then should go to the American Peace Mobilization for two reasons:

First, that it was necessary to create a very strong reserve of the party eventually, if the party should become illegal completely, and that Mr. Field would qualify splendidly as a leader of that reserve, being a man of wealth, not having any technical difficulties, as the Communists call it, that is, not having any false passports, and having a position in society which would lead to a reluctance on the part of the Government to take action against him.

The second reason given was he need not end his relations with the IPR, but could eventually even increase them, though maybe not under the guise of being secretary.

But the first reason was the compelling one, because most of the party leaders were going under cover at that time, and they needed a structure which could serve for the party openly, and the American Peace Mobilization was, I should say, the chief one chosen for that purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, our exhibit No. 14, which we introduced into the record on July 26, duplicates the testimony given by Mr. Budenz here, and I think I would like this reread at this particular time, to show how the two tie in, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL (reading) :

EXHIBIT 14

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, HELD AT 5 P. M., THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1940

Present: Philip C. Jessup, chairman, Philo W. Parker, Francis E. Harmon, Edward C. Carter.

The second paragraph of these minutes is as follows:

The chairman read a long telegram which he had received from Mr. Frederick V. Field in Chicago on September 1, in which Mr. Field indicated that he had been called to the secretaryship of a new society which was being created to strengthen the forces of democracy during the coming critical years. He had a deep conviction that he was obligated to accept this new responsibility, because the election of officers was taking place at that time. He felt it was necessary to accept despite his obvious personal preference to postpone the decision pending consultation with Dr. Jessup and others. As he anticipated criticism and misunderstanding, his continued deep interest in the welfare of the Institute of Pacific Relations demanded, he felt, the affirmation of his immediate resignation from all I. P. R. responsibilities. Dr. Jessup explained that he had subsequently talked at length with Mr. Field, who explained in detail the reasons that had led him to accept the new position. Mr. Parker voiced the feelings of all present when he inquired whether Dr. Jessup felt that Mr. Field could not be persuaded to resume the secretaryship of the American Council. Dr. Jessup replied that he thought Mr. Field's decision was final. Under the circumstances it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during 11 years of service with the American Council. The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council.

Senator FERGUSON. This democracy that is explained in this letter was Communist, was it not?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was the organization devised to help Hitler. It picketed the White House. It assailed President Roosevelt and his "war and hunger program." And it was designed to step up the tempo of opposition to any defense efforts on the part of the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. But it was really the Communist line.

Mr. BUDENZ. It was completely controlled by the Communists from beginning to end. That was a Communist front, not a captive organization.

Senator O'CONOR. Obviously it was a Communist front and it was so known and its actions indicated that it was inherently Communist. Have you ever heard of any repudiation by Mr. Jessup of that laudatory expression concerning Field, who, of course, has been proven to be one of the greatest traitors in this country.

Mr. BUDENZ. No, I have not, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, can you tell us of another meeting you attended which Mr. Field reported for the IPR?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a meeting of 1943 which I began to anticipate and then thought of the 1940 series of meetings. At this meeting of the political bureau at which Earl Browder I know definitely was present, and I believe Robert William Weiner. His name strikes me because he was not always present at these meetings, and other members of the Politburo who were not generally there, including

Trachtenberg. At this meeting Mr. Field stated that he had received word from Mr. Lattimore. It is my impression that he had seen Mr. Lattimore personally just a day or two before, but I may be mistaken there. It was a communication either personally or in some other way. Mr. Field just returned from a trip and I get the impression that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore personally, and Mr. Lattimore stated that information coming to him from the international Communist apparatus where he was located indicated that there was to be a change of line very sharply on Chiang Kai-shek, that is to say, that the negative opposition to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a positive opposition and that more stress was to be put upon attacking Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Did the Communist Party line change at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists took action to discover the accuracy of this. They were advised that there was in the course of preparation an article by Vladimir Rogoff, the Tass correspondent, written at Moscow's request on this question which would attack the appeasers in China and Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. The Tass correspondent, you say.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain what Tass was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Tass was the official Soviet news agency in this country and so far as I know still is, but I knew it then quite definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this article subsequently communicated to the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article was communicated to the Daily Worker. The first message was received through Grace Granich who had been in charge of Intercontinent News, a Soviet agency, which had been put out of business by the Department of Justice, but who continued to maintain her relations with the Soviet Embassy, Consulate, and other sources of information, including communications to Moscow and we were advised of the coming of this article and then we received it.

Mr. MORRIS. And was the Communist line actually changed as a result of these steps that were taken?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Politburo suggested that someone, and the name of T. A. Bisson was mentioned in that connection, be enlisted to write an article in connection with the Institute of Pacific Affairs publication on this matter explaining the democratic character of the Chinese Communists and indicating that Chiang Kai-shek and his group represented antidemocracy.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz, but you mentioned the Institute of Pacific Affairs. You were referring to the Institute of Pacific Relations and its publication Pacific Affairs?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. I sort of got the two together.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record at this time the article referred to by Mr. Budenz, not as it appeared originally in War and the Working Class, but as it was reprinted in the Daily Worker. I would like to offer this into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Please lay the foundation for it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, can you testify to the authenticity of it?

Mr. MANDEL. This is an article taken from the Daily Worker of August 12, 1943, page 8, and is headed "Soviet expert warns of appeasers in China," by Vladimir Rogoff, reprinted from the Soviet Trade Union periodical the War and the Working Class.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it appear, Mr. Mandel, what date this appeared in the War and the Working Class?

Mr. MANDEL. It does not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you the article described by Mr. Mandel and ask you if you can recall the existence of such an article in the Daily Worker?

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the witness is being shown a photostatic copy of the article.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, this is the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any particular passage in the article that you think the committee should be interested in?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This article attacks the appeasers of Japan in China. You will note in so doing it attacks the whole governmental policy, that is to say, it says that 3 years have passed since Chiang Kai-shek gave certain orders in regard to reforms. Now, I will quote:

Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. The main reason for this is the diverse work of the "appeasers," the defeatist and capitulators.

There is more to this line, but this is, I should think, a key expression.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you an editor of the Daily Worker when this appeared?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What was your purpose in putting this in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was our understanding that we were to begin, under the guise of attacking the appeasers of Japan, to have an onslaught against Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. The appeasers of whom?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of Japan, that is, in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time what was your official Communist policy with respect to the situation?

Mr. BUDENZ. The official Communist policy was very critical of Chiang Kai-shek, and that will lead us to other episodes—

Mr. MORRIS. Up to that time what had been the policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. The policy had been critical of Chiang Kai-shek, but the policy now was, as we understood it, that we were to prepare for an all-out attack on Chiang Kai-shek, which was entirely different. However, if I may continue this, what the Soviet Government was trying to tell us was that this should be done under the cover of coalition government. Later on Rogoff had to explain and in fact apologize for his article, and Harriet Lucy Moore had to write an article, if I remember correctly, in Soviet Russia Today. It may have been in one of the organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations also explaining that Rogoff's article had been misinterpreted, but the purpose of this whole thing was to put the skids, if I may use that phrase, under Chiang Kai-shek under a gradual developing campaign for coalition government.

Mr. MORRIS. And that is what you meant by the sharp change in policy that you testified to earlier?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. Moscow has difficulty every once in a while in letting the Communists know the difference between how

they should emphasize things and the general presentation of the subject. We could not have such a sharp attack on Chiang Kai-shek if at the same time we were to advocate coalition government, but the purpose of the coalition government was to destroy him.

Mr. MORRIS. And is it your testimony that this conference that you testified about today took place prior to the publication of this article in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the article should go in the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I move that it be introduced into the record and made an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It shall be made a part of the record and appropriately marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 133" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 133

[From the Daily Worker, August 12, 1943, p. 8]

SOVIET EXPERT WARNS OF APPEASERS IN CHINA

(By Vladimir Rogov)

[Reprinted from the Soviet Trade Union periodical the War and the Working Class]

Moscow, August 11 (by wireless to Inter-Continent News).—During the 6 years of war the Chinese command, at the cost of considerable territorial losses, succeeded in saving the troops from defeat. Despite the numerous odds the Chinese Army preserved its capacity for resistance.

The Japanese militarists failed in their plan for a rapid conquest of China. The Japanese proved incapable of breaking the resistance of the Chinese people and bringing them to their knees. The war against China became clearly drawn out, threatening Japan with ever-growing complications.

In defensive battles on an extremely long front the Chinese Army, weakening the Japanese troops, gained the necessary time for reorganizing its troops and strengthening their fighting capacity. Soon after the fall of Wuhan (Hankow) in October 1938 Chang Kai-shek outlined a program for the reorganization of the country's armed forces, whose principal points were as follows:

Firstly, China's national policy must become the policy of a long, defensive war.

Secondly, the necessity to develop the guerrilla movement.

Thirdly, for conducting a general counteroffensive it is necessary to create a new, many-millions-strong army, trained in the use of the most up-to-date war equipment.

COVERT OPPOSITION

However, from the outset the intentions of the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army, Chiang Kai-shek, met with covert resistance. Three years have passed since then. The reforms in the army with the aim of training new cadres, reorganizing control and strengthening discipline were not completed, and the task of the creation of their own war economic base was not accomplished. The main reason for this is the diverse work of the "appeaser," the defeatists and capitulators.

The war economy resources of National China (Free China) are tremendous and afford an adequate base for the rearmament and supply of the massed army. On its territory National China has all the strategic raw materials necessary for the conduct of a prolonged war.

Nevertheless, large-scale construction has not been undertaken since the industrial and financial circles prefer to engage in profiteering rather than invest their capital in the armaments industry.

The unrestrained profiteers advance the "theories" that the people are weary of war and that it is primarily necessary to satisfy the demand of the population for goods, etc.

This situation leads to the weakening of the army's fighting capacity and greater dependence on the supply of armaments from the United States and Great Britain, which however has encountered serious difficulties since the beginning of the Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain. The elements favoring capitulation have sabotaged the measures for mobilizing the internal resources with the object of creating their own war economy base, as well as the measures for extending economic warfare against the Japanese invaders.

China has no lack of human reserves, but the Chinese Army nevertheless receives no regular reinforcements. There are insufficient trained reserves. There is not even an organized military registration of the population. To this day the law on universal military service is not fully carried out. The army receives a large percentage of men unfit for service.

The main defect of the Chinese Army is the shortage of trained commanding personnel. All foreign military observers who have visited the Chinese Army agree that the Chinese soldier is tenacious and enduring in the field and is unpretentious as far as food and uniforms are concerned; whereas the commanding personnel is extremely weak and backward in military and technical training.

The army's equipment is still at low level. The organization and control of troops are far from perfect. One of the defects of the Chinese Army is the lack of an effective united command and of coordinated operations on the separate fronts. The internal friction and suspicion among the generals could not but affect the fighting capacity of the troops and their discipline.

In Chungking, of course, there are no open advocates of surrender, but this does not mean that there is a lack of capitulators and defeatists there.

The capitulators and defeatists who occupy important positions in the Kuomintang weaken the strength of China by their harmful political intrigues and constitute a serious danger at present.

Since December 1941 the Japanese have centered their attention on the war in the Pacific. The war in China has receded to the background. This has led to the appearance among Chinese military and political leaders of a certain complacency of which the Japanese imperialists took advantage to intensify their peace offensive.

JAPANESE MACHINATIONS

The Japanese conquerors are now concentrating on deepening and sharpening the internal contradictions in China and are trying in every way to utilize these contradictions to weaken China and strengthen their positions in the struggle against China.

These Japanese plans profit from the maneuvers of the Chinese appeasers, who provoke conflicts and incidents up to armed clashes, do their utmost to undermine the military collaborations of Kuomintang circles with the Communist Party and incite the persecution and rout of the eighth and fourth armies, which as units of China's united national army have inscribed many heroic pages in the history of the resistance of the Chinese people to the Japanese invaders.

These armies consist of the most progressive, tenacious, and selfless people of China. They are led by the Chinese Communist Party which enjoys merited prestige among the broad masses of the working people as the organizer of their struggle for national freedom and independence.

Today by direct military pressure new attempts are being made to bring about the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party and the liquidation of the eighth and fourth armies. The Chinese command has transferred new divisions to the districts where these armies are stationed, with tremendous supplies of munitions and food, obviously to preparation for an attack on the eighth and fourth armies with the aim of liquidating them even at the price of unleashing civil war.

Such an attack of the Chungking generals on the eighth and fourth armies which, moreover, is completely unprovoked by these armies, would be a treacherous stabbing in the back of the Chinese people and play into the hands of the Japanese imperialists who could hope for nothing better.

A number of outstanding Kuomintang leaders oppose such treacherous activities of all sorts of appeasers, capitulators, and provocateurs. The Chinese Government, nevertheless, does not exert firmness in overcoming the activities of the capitulators designed to undermine national unity and weaken China's resistance against Japanese aggression.

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

In the last few years I have had occasion to visit more than 15 provinces of China. Both on the front and in the deep rear, in occupied Shanghai and Manchukuo, representatives of various circles of China watch with grave concern the criminal activity of the traitors, turncoats, defeatists, and saboteurs. Nevertheless they are unanimous in their confidence that all the plans to provoke civil war are doomed to failure since National China, in hard fighting, has accumulated much strength and will not permit the great national liberation cause of the Chinese people to die.

With inexhaustible strategic raw material resources and tremendous manpower reserves at its disposal, China has every possibility for victory over the enemy. The necessary conditions for this victory are the realization of radical measures for reorganizing the entire economy on a war footing, subordinating all economic life to the needs of the front and strengthening the armed forces against capitulation and defeatist moods, and most important, the genuine unity of all national forces in the struggle for freedom and national independence.

On the extent to which Chiang Kai-shek and the Chungking leading circles will understand the importance of this principal condition and succeed in averting the danger of internal struggle in China, tortured by the enemies of the Chinese people—the inevitable consequence of which would be measures directed against the eighth and fourth armies and the Communist Party—rests whether the exhausting war forced upon the Chinese people by Japanese imperialism will be brought to a successful conclusion in the interests of the whole Chinese people.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz has testified that Mr. T. A. Bisson figured in the discussions at this time. I would like to introduce into the record, after identification by Mr. Mandel and authenticity affirmed by him, excerpts from an article written by T. A. Bisson in the Far Eastern Survey which was a publication of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MANDEL. This is from an article, China's Part in a Coalition War, from the Far Eastern Survey, published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in its issue of July 1943, and I will read the following excerpts:

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

Then I go further:

DEMOCRATIC CHINA

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producers in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes, and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

And further down:

The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. Are the other paragraphs on this page, Mr. Mandel, excerpts from the article which you have been reading?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have those other excerpts inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 134" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 134

[From Far Eastern Survey, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, July 14, 1943, vol. XII, No. 14]

CHINA'S PART IN A COALITION WAR

(By T. A. Bisson)

* * * * *

However, these are only party labels. To be more descriptive, the one might be called feudal China; the other, democratic China. (6) These terms express the actualities as they exist today, the real institutional distinctions between the two Chinas.

* * * * *

DEMOCRATIC CHINA

The key to the successful mobilization of the war potential of so-called Communist China lies in the extent to which its leaders have thrown off the feudal incubus which has weighed China down for centuries. No single measure can be pointed to as the open sesame which has increasingly achieved this objective. Economic reforms have been intertwined with political reforms, the one supporting the other. Basic to the whole program has been the land reform which has freed the peasant—the primary producer in these areas, and, indeed, over most of China—from the crushing weight of rent, taxes and usurious interest charges as levied by a feudal economy.

But the ingenuity of this reform, without which it could hardly be made to work, is that the newly introduced procedures of local democracy serve as the final sanction. The landlord and entrepreneur are not excluded from this process, but neither are they permitted to dominate it. Tax assessment committees, for example, are controlled by a majority of local members and exercise a strictly local jurisdiction. Farmers know well what their neighbors own.

Over wide areas of this new China, elected councils—village, town, and district—and elected executive officials have completely supplanted the old autocratic system of feudal¹ agrarian China. These councils and officials are either unpaid or receive mere pittance which leave them no better off economically than their fellow citizens.

It is this democratic process, finally, which permits a large measure of free competition to operate over the whole of the economy. Bureaucratic price controls are not attempted. They are as unnecessary in this society as they would be in a New England town meeting. No landlord or merchant, with the watchful eyes of his neighbors upon him, can engage in hoarding or speculation. Within limits set mainly by local democratic checks, the individual landlord or entrepreneur is free, and is even encouraged, to expand his operations, and many are doing so.

By no stretch of the imagination can this be termed "communism"; it is, in fact, the essence of bourgeois democracy, applied mainly to agrarian conditions. The leaders in Yenan see in this program more than the answer to China's immediate problem of efficiently mobilizing her resources for the war against Japan. They see in it also the means of throwing off China's feudal shackles, the transition to modern nationhood.

The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you made reference to T. A. Bisson. Was the reference to Bisson to him as a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

¹ The term "feudal," as here used, is intended to define a society in which the landlord-peasant relationship is dominant and autocracy in government centers around this relationship.

Mr. MORRIS. And it was your knowledge that T. A. Bisson was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. My official knowledge. I have not met Mr. Bisson, but I have repeatedly heard him referred to officially and have been so advised he is a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you elaborate on that just a little bit when you say "officially"? Officially by whom?

Mr. BUDENZ. Officially in Politburo discussions such as this in 1943 by Earl Browder, who was general secretary of the party, and then again on several occasions subsequent to that by Jack Stachel, who was the official representative of the Politburo to the Daily Worker.

The CHAIRMAN. As to the T. A. Bisson, can you tie that in individually by an expression that you know of? Could there be other T. A. Bissons?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; this was definitely the T. A. Bisson who was the so-called far eastern expert in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. His activities were discussed, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. That particular article of T. A. Bisson was the subject of considerable controversy and I think at the expense of a few minutes we should introduce elements of that controversy on the record to see how important an article this particular one was.

Mr. Mandel, do you have anything from the institute files bearing on this subject?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 3 from the Chinese News Service marked "confidential," addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter.

It is signed by C. L. Hsia, representing the Chinese News Service. I read a paragraph from this letter:

I believe I said to you at Princeton that I could not agree with you or Mr. Tarr about the reason given for your declining to disown Mr. Bisson's article. Freedom of speech does not warrant any of us making attacks on the government of a friendly nation or making misrepresentations as to facts. To label the National Government of China as "feudal" is an open attack on my Government, and to say that certain casualty figures emanating from sources other than the Chinese Government or Chinese "official reports" is a misrepresentation. You are free to tell Mr. Tarr that I cannot accept his interpretation of the right of free speech.

Then another letter from the same gentleman is dated July 17, 1943, addressed to Mr. William Holland.

The CHAIRMAN. From whom?

Mr. MANDEL. From C. L. Hsia, director of the Chinese News Service. He says:

When I telephoned yesterday, I thought it would be polite for me to come and see you and Mr. Carter to exchange views on the article written by Mr. Bisson. Since I more or less said to you what I had to say on the subject, I don't know whether there is any point in my coming to see you on Monday. I find that I won't be able to get back to town on Monday until after half past 11, so if you and Mr. Carter still wish to have a talk with me, I think I can make it around about 12 noon.

What I said to you yesterday was purely my personal reaction and as a friend and member of the IPR I cannot speak for the China Council, nor in my official capacity. Personally I am deeply solicitous for the interests of the IPR, but the principles, objectives, and functions of the IPR may be defeated through the pursuit of this kind of activity, namely, an open, deliberate attack on one of its members, because I know how the Chinese members of the IPR feel about it, even among the most "democratic and liberal" and the most pro-IPR group. If Mr. Bisson tries to divide China into "federal and democratic," then I can't think of anybody in the Chinese IPR who can be said to be on the

"democratic" side. I imagine nothing can be done about it—I mean Mr. Bisson or the American Council or the international secretarial are not prepared to do anything in the way of retraction or amendment—so I don't see what useful service can be served by my coming to see you and Mr. Carter—

et cetera.

I have here a statement by Hollington K. Tong, who has been an official of the Chinese National Government, and whose biography can be found in the China Handbook on page 777, and here is his full comment on the whole Bisson incident, which I would like to introduce into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like two more paragraphs read in the record, Mr. Chairman. This is a point that has been disputed by Mr. Carter, and I think we should elaborate on it just a bit.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I will read:

We took a serious view of the Bisson thrust for two reasons. In the first place, the Far Eastern Survey is not a magazine of private American opinion. It is an official publication of an organization of which there is an active China branch, and Mr. Bisson is a member of the board of directors of that organization.

Therefore, an article attacking China, published in the Far Eastern Survey, would appear to have the sanction of the institute, including its China branch. In the second place, in the middle of war, such an attack seemed nothing less than a boost to the enemy's propaganda.

My first action in the matter was to notify Guenther Stein, Chungking correspondent of the IPR, that his privilege of sending his weekly messages to the IPR free of charge through Chinese Government radio facilities would be withdrawn until Bisson's article was satisfactorily explained. This caused alarm at the Press Hotel, and I was visited by a delegation from the Foreign Correspondents' Club. Did my action imply that the Government's policy in the future would be to deny transmission facilities to them if articles deemed unfavorable to China were found to have been published by their principals at home, they asked. I pointed out that I was only withdrawing free Chinese Government facilities from the IPR correspondent pending an explanation from IPR.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that whole letter introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has been identified as having been taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is that correct?

Mr. MORRIS. That is correct.

First, I would like to introduce into the record the previous letters referred to, dated August 3, 1943, and July 17, 1943, from C. L. Hsia, the letter of August 3 to Mr. Edward C. Carter as the first, and the letter of July 17, to Mr. William Holland as the second, and have them marked as the next consecutive exhibits.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be so filed.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 135" and "Exhibit No. 136," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 135

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE,
New York, N. Y., August 3, 1943.

Confidential.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Many thanks for your note of July 31, which was purely for my private information. I greatly appreciate your sending me a copy of your confidential memorandum to Miss Porter.

I believe I said to you at Princeton that I could not agree with you or Mr. Tarr about the reason given for your declining to disown Mr. Bisson's article. Freedom of speech does not warrant any of us making attacks on the government of a friendly nation or making misrepresentations as to facts. To label the National Government of China as "feudal" is an open attack on my government, and to say that certain casualty figures emanating from sources other than the Chinese Government are Chinese "official reports" is a misrepresentation. You are free to tell Mr. Tarr that I cannot accept his interpretation of the right of free speech.

I hope very much that what you wrote Miss Porter can be made public or in some other way you can make clear that Mr. Bisson's article does not reflect the viewpoint either of the American Council or of the Pacific Council.

Furthermore, I wish to advise you quite sincerely and frankly that the policy or attitude represented by your telegram to Liu Yu-wan will greatly embarrass him and his colleagues in Chungking. Knowing the situation as I do, a matter like this may make it impossible for some members of the China group to participate in the next IPR conference. I wish to make it quite clear that I am speaking as a personal friend and a member of IPR and not delivering an ultimatum, as I am not an officer and cannot speak for the China Council.

In my other capacity, I am duty bound to report to Dr. T. V. Soong what are the reactions of the Pacific Council and the American Council to my request that they publicly dissociate themselves from Mr. Bisson's article where he attacked the National Government of China. I do not know what he will do. He may think it is too small a matter to bother about and let it drop. On the other hand, he may wish to inform the China Council of his dissatisfaction. So far, the only course open to me is to report to him to the effect that neither the Pacific Council nor the American Council is willing to disown any part of the article written by Mr. Bisson.

The suggestion that Mr. Bisson write a second article does not appear to me to be any solution of the difficulties with which we are confronted. As I said to you the other day, no writer will ever admit that he was wrong. If he says he made a slight mistake, probably he will give half a dozen reasons for that slight mistake and those reasons will put him more "right" than ever. My frank advice is that he had better keep quiet for a time and let other people have a go at it.

I will try to get in touch with Miss Porter as soon as possible and I hope she will publish our comments on Mr. Bisson's article. In this connection may I repeat what I have said before, that it has been insisted that whatever comments we may make will have the same privilege of being circularized as a special release as did the summary of Mr. Bisson's article.

Sincerely yours,

C. L. HSIA, *Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 136

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE,
New York, N. Y., July 17, 1943.

MR. WILLIAM HOLLAND,
International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations.

New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. HOLLAND: When I telephoned yesterday I thought it would be polite for me to come and see you and Mr. Carter to exchange views on the article written by Mr. Bisson. Since I more or less said to you what I had to say on the subject, I don't know whether there is any point in my coming to see you on Monday. I find that I won't be able to get back to town on Monday until after half past 11, so if you and Mr. Carter still wish to have a talk with me I think I can make it around about 12 noon. (Will you please telephone my secretary, Mrs. Chen?)

What I said to you yesterday was purely my personal reaction and as a friend and member of the IPR. I cannot speak for the China Council, nor in my official capacity. Personally I am deeply solicitous for the interests of the IPR but the principles, objectives, and functions of the IPR may be defeated through the pursuit of this kind of activity, namely, an open, deliberate attack on one of its members, because I know how the Chinese members of the IPR feel about it, even among the most "democratic and liberal" and the most pro-IPR group. If Mr. Bisson tries to divide China into "feudal and democratic," then I can't

think of anybody in the Chinese IPR who can be said to be on the "democratic" side. I imagine nothing can be done about it—I mean Mr. Bisson or the American Council or the International Secretariat are not prepared to do anything in the way of retraction or amendment—so I don't see what useful purpose can be served by my coming to see you and Mr. Carter. But I thought as an old friend you would not mind my calling your attention to what I consider to be a highly regrettable incident.

Very sincerely yours,

C. L. HSIA, *Director.*

Mr. MANDEL. This is an excerpt from a book called *Dateline: China*, by Hollington K. Tong, from pages 204, 206, and 208, published in 1950 by the Rockport Press.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce the statement into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 137" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 137

EXCERPTS FROM THE BOOK, *DATELINE: CHINA*, BY HOLLINGTON K. TONG

[Pages 204, 206, and 208—Published by the Rockport Press, Inc., New York, 1950]

A note of incongruity was given to the whole attack by the fact that it was the Institute of Pacific Relations which fired the shot. The institute had been established, ostensibly, to promote good will among the peoples living in the Pacific area. Even though we knew that leftist influence had long been strong in its secretariat, it hurt us to see a blow coming from such a quarter.

In June 1943, Mr. T. A. Bisson, of the international secretariat of the institute, wrote the following in an issue of the *Far Eastern Survey*:

"The early promise held out by the war for the broadening and deepening of Chinese unity through the achievement of liberal political and economic reforms has not been fulfilled. Two Chinas have emerged, each with its own government, military forces, political and economic institutions. One is generally called Kuomintang China, and the other Communist China. But the terms 'feudal China' and 'democratic China' more accurately express the actualities as they exist today."

This seemed to us an unwarranted and unfriendly attack upon China and the Chinese Government, since Mr. Bisson's "Kuomintang" or "feudal" China was the National Government of China.

We made an issue of it.

We took a serious view of the Bisson thrust for two reasons. In the first place, the *Far Eastern Survey* is not a magazine of private American opinion. It is an official publication of an organization of which there is an active China branch, and Mr. Bisson is a member of the board of directors of that organization. Therefore, an article attacking China, published in the *Far Eastern Survey*, would appear to have the sanction of the institute, including its China branch. In the second place, in the middle of war, such an attack seemed nothing less than a boost to the enemy's propaganda.

My first action in the matter was to notify Guenther Stein, Chungking correspondent of the IPR, that his privilege of sending his weekly messages to the IPR free of charge through Chinese Government radio facilities would be withdrawn until Bisson's article was satisfactorily explained. This caused alarm at the Press Hotel, and I was visited by a delegation from the Foreign Correspondents' Club. Did my action imply that the Government's policy in the future would be to deny transmission facilities to them if articles deemed unfavorable to China were found to have been published by their principals at home, they asked. I pointed out that I was only withdrawing free Chinese Government facilities from the IPR correspondent pending an explanation from IPR. To give free Government facilities to an organization which maliciously attacked the Government seemed to me foolish in the extreme. I also pointed out the different status of the IPR as compared to other independent, non-organization papers and magazines.

Meanwhile, a spirited interchange of letters and rejoinders was taking place with the IPR. Dr. C. L. Hsia, of our New York office, presented our point of view in a letter to the institute which was published with an introductory—

editorial note stating that "Bisson's article expressed a point of view seriously held by many sincere American friends of China."

Also, in the same issue, Mr. Bisson contributed a rebuttal to Dr. Hsia's letter. Although both Mr. Bisson and Mr. Edward C. Carter, the secretary general of the IPR, who, incidentally, was also national president of the American Society for Russian Relief, stated that Mr. Bisson's article expressed ideas which were entirely his own and did not come officially from the organization as a whole, it seemed to us that the editorial note appended to Dr. Hsia's letter confirmed our feeling that the editorial board of the Far Eastern Survey was backing Bisson's point of view. They were setting a precedent which would make it possible for prejudiced writers and commentators in the United States to issue any sort of libel against China with impunity under cloak of being "sincere American friends of China."

The question of the Bisson article was further discussed a month later (August 1943) when Mr. Carter himself, accompanied by Mr. W. L. Holland, research secretary of the IPR, came out to China for a 3-week visit. Dr. Moulin Chiang, president of the National Peking University and chairman of the China branch of the IPR, discussed the matter with Mr. Carter. The members of the China branch of the IPR were as disturbed by the article as I had been, and the China branch finally lodged a formal protest. As a result, the president of the Institute of Pacific Relations issued a statement publicly dissociating the institute from the views expressed by Mr. Bisson, and we considered the matter closed. Guenther Stein's privilege to make use of our free facilities was restored to him.

During the controversy, the Institute of Pacific Relations came very close to losing its China branch altogether, which would have left it a predominantly American rather than an international organization. The China branch, whose members are by no means all Government officials, is a liberal-minded organization. But its members rebelled at the thought of being made a party to an international organization which openly attacked their Government.

During this period an article appeared in Moscow's War and the Working Class, written by V. N. Rogoff, who had been a Tass correspondent in China, and a personal friend of mine. This article was cabled by the United Press correspondent in Moscow both to England and the United States and appeared in hundreds of American and British papers. Mr. Rogoff stated that the Chinese Government was facing serious internal difficulties that could result either in civil war or a victory for Japan. He claimed that "appeasers" and "defeatists" in China were seeking to provoke trouble by urging the dissolution of the Communist units of the Chinese Army and that the alleged "intriguers" were undermining the Chinese war efforts and "have evolved the theory of an honorable peace with Japan or the futility of fighting." He insinuated that no serious attempt was being made by China to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything more about that particular meeting you would like to tell us about?

Do you have any comment on the Bisson article as it was read today?

Mr. BUDENZ. Nothing. It shows that the Politburo's views were carried out in this article and that Communist China was held forth as the democratic China.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is also an example—is it not—that the Institute of Pacific Relations was used as an instrument for carrying out that policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is a very splendid example, splendid from the Communist viewpoint.

Mr. MORRIS. Before we leave the subject of Frederick V. Field, I offer you a pamphlet which was put out in his name and ask you if you can recall that particular pamphlet.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. We were instructed by the Politburo to emphasize this pamphlet. The Daily Worker did so, and throughout the party it was emphasized and pushed, as the party does those things.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify for us that pamphlet?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is entitled "China's Greatest Crisis," by Frederick V. Field, published by New Century Publishers, Inc., of 832 Broadway, New York, in January 1945.

The New Century Publishers, may I say, are official publishers for the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very definitely. The head of it was Robert William Weiner, the head of the secret conspiratorial fund of the Communist Party and former treasurer of the Communist Party, and also former president of the International Workers Order, but it was also under control of Trachtenberg, to whom I have referred before.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that particular pamphlet?

Mr. BUDENZ. From first-hand knowledge, having been many times in the offices of this publication, conferring with Mr. Weiner, and with other officials of that Communist-created organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall that particular pamphlet, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. This pamphlet was, as I say, pushed by the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there anything significant about that pamphlet that we should know in carrying on an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

In the very introduction of the pamphlet it gives an explanation of the author. This is called "About the Author."

Frederick V. Field, the author of this pamphlet, is a member of the executive committee of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, and an authority on far-eastern problems. He is also executive vice president of the Council for Pan-American Democracy, and a member of the editorial board of New Masses.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that reference to the Institute of Pacific Relations made with any significance?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. That was in order that the name of the Institute of Pacific Relations would be an entering wedge into many civic organizations, to ministers, to professors, to others who were circularized with this pamphlet; that is, either it was sent to them, or their interest was solicited.

Mr. MORRIS. This is to show in this particular pamphlet that it was a new Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But that is a subject of common knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is not.

Mr. MORRIS. So, it is your idea with reference to this description of Mr. Field and your testimony is that it was done to confuse? Is that it?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was done specifically, to my knowledge. I was in meetings in which this was discussed, the necessity for publishing this pamphlet among wide groups of people who were not yet familiar with China from the Soviet viewpoint, in order to get their interest and attention.

In order to get their interest and attention it was printed in this fashion.

Mr. MORRIS. And the name of the Institute of Pacific Relations was so used for that purpose?

Mr. BUDENZ. Specifically used for that purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. And the material in that pamphlet is Communist propaganda?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was decisively. It was approved by the Politburo.

Senator WATKINS. I thought you referred to some fund that the Communists had in connection with this.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe he referred to an individual who had charge of the fund.

Senator WATKINS. Maybe that was it, but at any rate, I wanted a further explanation, if you could give one.

Mr. BUDENZ. I think that would take us quite far afield, to go into this fund, but I can say that Robert William Weiner, to my personal knowledge, was the head of the conspiratorial fund of the Communist International apparatus in this country which doled out thousands of dollars in cash for many purposes; that is to say, if a Communist would take a trip abroad which is illegal, he couldn't put that on the books of the Communist Party. Earl Browder, if he had taken an illegal trip to the Orient or to Moscow, he was given this expense in cash and this was quite a large business.

Robert William Weiner's assistant incidentally was Lem Harris, who springs from the Wall Street brokerage house, although he is not in that business. He merely comes from that family.

Senator WATKINS. Would you know whether any of that fund was used to finance that pamphlet just as you have described it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That I would not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, what was the date of this pamphlet?

Senator O'CONOR. 1945.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1945.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman, I do think it is pertinent at this point to observe that this is the very pamphlet about which we interrogated Mr. Field and he declined to answer on the grounds it would incriminate him.

Mr. MORRIS. It is, incidentally, introduced in the record as exhibit 10.

Senator O'CONOR. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. The secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations before Mr. Frederick V. Field was Mr. Joseph Barnes, who, according to documents, was secretary from 1931 to 1934.

Did you know that Joseph Barnes was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I did not know Mr. Barnes during this period to which you refer.

Mr. MORRIS. I am not asking you that. I am asking you if you knew Mr. Barnes was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ. I did know Mr. Barnes was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that from personal encounters, as well as from official conferences of the Communist Party leaders?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe to us any personal encounter you had with Joseph Barnes in connection with Communist Party work?

Mr. BUDENZ. I had one personal encounter.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go into that, the name "Joe Barnes" or "Joseph Barnes" is not an uncommon one. I would like some way to identify the Joe Barnes to which you have reference.

Mr. MORRIS. I think, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz, if he continues with his testimony, will bring that out, and I will make it a point to tie up the two names.

Mr. BUDENZ. The Joseph Barnes I have reference to was the foreign correspondent for some time of the New York Herald Tribune and later on, not to my personal knowledge, but in the public print, took over a part ownership of PM.

The CHAIRMAN. PM was a newspaper regularly published in New York for some time?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was a daily paper. Its name was changed to something like the New York Star.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. In the 1936 period it is my impression that the 1936 convention of the Communist Party—my very sharp impression—a few newspapermen who were Communists were admitted into the convention or into a national committee meeting. I say that on that I am not quite clear; it was either a convention or national committee meeting, and I am practically certain it was the convention of the Communist Party of 1936.

The purpose of introducing these Communist newspapermen into the convention or national committee meeting, which broke all the rules of the party up to that time since those were always executive sessions, was to have them go out and represent the party as an American institution under the new idea that was developed later by Browder so fully in saying communism is Twentieth Century Americanism, and in the hall where these people met, a small room attached to this meeting of the Communists, were several newspapermen, among whom was Joseph Barnes.

I was introduced to him by Si Gerson in the presence of J. Peters.

Mr. MORRIS. Why does the name stand out? Why does the name stand out since many years have passed and why does it stand out that you recall meeting him at this particular time?

Mr. BUDENZ. This incident which is so clear in my memory that I have reported it a long time ago to other agencies stands out in my memory because Joe Barnes was so emphasized as having been of service to the party from the very moment I came into it.

Mr. MORRIS. Prior to that time you had heard the name of Joseph Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mentioned in connection with the activity of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. On many occasions?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, a number of occasions, so much so that it became quite a personality with me without me knowing him.

Mr. MORRIS. And it is your testimony that these people you met on this occasion, which you think was 1936, were all Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it was the 1936 period. The only thing I am uncertain of, though my uncertainty is not very great, is whether it was the convention or national committee meeting.

Mr. SOURWINE. I would like to have one matter brought out clearly for the record.

Are you stating that you know Mr. Barnes to have been a Communist because he was one of these newspapermen who was admitted, or are you stating that you knew him to be a Communist and that he was in this group which was admitted? In other words, does your statement that he was a Communist rest on the fact that he was one of the group which was admitted?

Mr. BUDENZ. Partly, although it also rests on official reports in the Politburo to the effect that Barnes had been of great service to the party as a Communist; secondly, to the fact that he was introduced as Comrade Barnes to me by Si Gerson.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was on this particular occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Would the situation be this: That you knew prior to this occasion, and had known for some time prior to this occasion, that there was a Joseph Barnes who was a Communist and who had been of great service to the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And on this occasion you met a Joseph Barnes who was identified to you and in your mind as the same Joseph Barnes who was a Communist and who had been of service to the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. And that is the Joseph Barnes that you have already identified here?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. The Joseph Barnes presented to me was presented in such a vivid color as of aid to the party that he was supposed to be outstanding.

Mr. SOURWINE. And he was introduced by J. Peters?

Mr. BUDENZ. By Si Gerson.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have, or did you have, any experience subsequent to that experience which you believe took place in 1936, that could confirm your understanding that Joseph Barnes was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

I had a number of references to Barnes in the Politburo as a Communist, and also statements by Jack Stachel to me officially advising me of that fact. In about 1941 Earl Browder told me, though I don't know positively that he acted on what he said, that he was to take a certain newspaper with him to the Atlanta prison, he being privileged to only subscribe to one paper, because of the great influence of Joe Barnes in that paper and the contributions he had made.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the chairman of this committee must be on the floor very shortly. I am going to ask Senator O'Connor if you would kindly take over. I may not be able to be here this afternoon, Senator. Do you want to continue with the hearing this afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. I think we will have to get some more testimony in. We are just really getting into this testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, can you preside this afternoon?

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes, I can.

Senator O'CONNOR (presiding). The hearing will please be in order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you an article written by Joseph Barnes entitled "American Dream," which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, pages 111 to 116, in January 1937. I offer you this article and ask you when you first saw that article?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yesterday.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you first communicate to the committee your testimony about your meeting with Joseph Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. Last spring, and I communicated to other agencies before that, but I communicated to the committee specifically last spring.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you look at that article and tell us what that purports to be?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article is a review of the Communist Party convention of 1936 and also a review of the Communist tendency developing out of that convention. It presents the Communists as being Americanized.

Mr. MORRIS. And does that description of the Communist Party convention conform in every way with your understanding of the party purpose in allowing newspapermen to cover the convention?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; it may not be always expressed in Communist phraseology, but naturally the Atlantic Monthly, although I could talk about the Atlantic Monthly too, in that it wouldn't appear in that form.

However, this does express the purpose of the newspapermen being admitted, those who were.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer this into the record in its entirety and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. Has it been identified?

Mr. MORRIS. I have described it.

Mr. Mandel, did you authenticate that document?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of an article appearing in the Atlantic Monthly in January 1937, pages 111 to 116, entitled "American Dream," by Joseph Barnes.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted and marked in evidence.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 138" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 138

[From the Atlantic Monthly, January 1937, pp. 111-116]

AMERICAN DREAM

(By Joseph Barnes)

I

The Communist Party of the United States, assembled in convention in New York City last summer, nominated its candidate for President as "the new John Brown of Osawatimie." This leather-faced Kansan, with a prairie twang in his voice, conducted a campaign which was patently not planned from Moscow. Over national radio networks, on the platforms of union meeting halls, and from a cell in the Terre Haute, Ind., jail, he insisted on the legitimate and historical right of his followers to the title of sons and daughters of the American Revolution, and defenders of American liberty.

"John Brown's Body" blared from the party's bands in alternation with the "Internationale." The American flag festooned the rafters of the party's meeting places. Mr. Browder's zeal for American democracy, which led him to single out the Republican Party as the tool of big business interests, to be defeated

at all costs, made his party's campaign for the first time a factor in national political discussion.

This borrowing of American symbols was more than a political strategem, or a knavish trick of Communist expropriation. The seventh world congress of the Communist International in Moscow a year ago had bent the party line more sharply in this direction. But in its membership, its growing press, and its special language of exhortation, the Communist Party had for several years been naturalizing itself in the American scene.

Mr. Albert Jay Nock has properly rebuked, in the October issue of the *Atlantic*, the word-mongers who foist "imposter terms" upon a gullible public, twisting their meanings to serve new ends. But the true study of semantics is more than invective against philological jugglery; it is the attempt to learn the reasons for real changes in the meaning of words. The success or failure which the Communists may have in adopting the slogans of 1776 and 1861, and infusing them with new life, will show how far and why these terms have changed their meanings.

Many of them, coined or borrowed in a simpler time, when words and slogans could be held in the mouth until even their taste was fixed, have inevitably changed since they first set the pattern of American speech. Since then, the rich have compounded their riches and the poor their poverty. Mr. Browder can find ample evidence in the reports of college deans, relief administrators, or industrial-relations experts, that freedom, liberty, revolution, the American dream, are being given, in many American minds, new definitions not to be found in McGuffey's Eclectic Readers.

Every crackpot third party may appropriate for its own purposes the word "American," and the song "The Battle Hymn of the Republic." But in Mr. Browder's campaign some of the fighting words were not mere borrowings; they were already a part of the Communist vocabulary. Even in the maze of Marxist rhetoric these words may be made for many Americans to sing with something of an older throbbing rhythm. They lose the bitter, anxious note given them in so many latter-day speeches or in Mr. Hearst's editorials, the flatted pitch betraying fear that our liberties may be something less imperishable than the rocks and rills which cradled them. They can carry confidence and faith to millions of Americans for whom the old American dream has not yet curdled.

II

That dream itself was largely one of freedom. It was born in the hearts of men who wanted freedom enough to fight the wilderness for it. And for the greater number of them, from Daniel Boone who wanted room enough "to rattle b'ars in" to the Polish immigrant who wanted a loom and a less crowded ghetto and no more pogroms, the wilderness and its simple, natural freedom were forthcoming.

Sir Charles Lyell, English geologist, traveled through the eastern seaboard of the United States in 1841, as open-mouthed as any Englishman of his time could be at its geological wealth and at the freedom of its people. When he asked the keeper of his inn at Corning, N. Y., to find his coachman for him, that free-born Yankee called into the barroom: "Where is the gentleman that brought this man here?" It was, Sir Charles concluded, the young country's chief blessing.

"I am also aware that the blessing alluded to," he wrote in his diary, "and many others which they enjoy, belong to a progressive, as contrasted with a stationary, state of society; that they characterize the new colony, where there is abundance of unoccupied land, and a ready outlet to a redundant laboring class. They are not the result of a democratic, as compared with a monarchical or aristocratic, constitution, nor the fruits of an absolute equality of religious sects, still less of universal suffrage."

Karl Marx paraphrased Sir Charles on this point a few years later, but the identification of freedom with political liberty was already frozen in American thinking. Twenty years later, at the beginning of the Civil War, more than half the entire area of the United States, over a billion acres, still belonging to the Government. The opening of the West had hardly started. So long as a man could move, and stretch his arms, and "rattle" new bears, he was not far wrong in thinking himself free. And if he thanked the Constitution or his right to vote for this blessing of freedom, it was an error which history and the inviting, empty prairies overlooked.

Today the sons and grandsons of these searchers for freedom have reached a full stop in the expansive pressure of a young people into its promised land. For a few hundred farmers, crowded from the soil by the relentless growth of tenancy—which has climbed in Iowa until 60 percent of the State's 222,000 farms are tenant-operated in 1936, and 80 percent are mortgaged—there is the Matanuska Valley in Alaska. For a few hundred textile workers in New York City, whose very looms have been transported to the cheaper-labor cities of the South, there is Mr. Tugwell's Hightstown, N. J., resettlement project. Both were designed as symbols to revive the old American confidence in the invincibility of the pioneer. But both serve today to remind Americans that there is no longer an open geographical frontier offering freedom to large numbers of those who seek it.

There are still drought and grasshoppers and business depressions and tax-collecting politicians, it is true. But without unoccupied land for a redundant laboring class the older pioneer virtues of individual strength and character have been seen for nearly 7 years to falter badly against even these old adversaries. You can't "rassle," many Americans have learned, a public utility or the United States Steel Corp.

Instead, a few have learned, you can organize. It is among these few that Mr. Browder still numbers most of his 51,000 enrolled supporters. But his party's campaign to become a mass revolutionary party has been planned in larger figures. Only an embittered class of industrial workers can be won by talk of dialectics, proletarian dictatorship, and "Hands Off China." Besides them, the black-browed Marxist has slowly but carefully learned, he must win the support of millions of Americans who still feel themselves the sons of pioneers and who dream the great American dream.

For most of these, he argues, property has become an empty word, a memory, like stone walls and rail fences to an Iowa farmer. Where the title deeds and gilt-printed certificates have survived, the cold, enlacing grip of finance capital on management has wrenched both profit and the sense of ownership from the shell of property to which the middle class has clung. The old controversy of Marxist scholars as to the relative rates of growth of the so-called middle and working classes has been forgotten. It has been dwarfed by the blunt, unpleasant fact that every year, growing by geometrical progression through prosperity and depression, there are more men and women dependent for a living on a job, the surplus value of their labor taken from them, the specter of unemployment staring them in the face.

The interests of these Americans, Mr. Browder and his board of strategy have seen. He with those of the working class. Only their loyalties, the accumulated pressure of a strong tradition, keep them befuddled by a Liberty League which works for liberty only for the rich. The Communists have set out this year to change these loyalties.

They have premised their plans on the assumption that the new allegiance of these millions need not be to Moscow, but to Bunker Hill and Harper's Ferry. They have found in the American dream issues which are fresh and vital today. By a policy of "united front" with other groups which recognize these issues, and by working on social and economic problems which have replaced the geographical frontier, they propose to use the American dream in a new search for freedom.

III

The primary purpose of the Yankees moving westward across the American Continent, and of the later Americans who came as immigrants to a country already settled, was to make a living. A better living has been the first promise they have demanded of those who wished to change their homes or their ways of thinking. In recent years the depression, unemployment, and increasing fear of an accelerating spiral of boom and panic leading to some undefined disaster have prepared many Americans to listen to tales of greener pastures.

This the Communists have recognized, and their appeal for new support rests squarely on a promise of abundance. To support the promise, they can point with powerful effect to the constricting scope of human life and enterprise in the middle-class nations of the modern world. With much less effect as yet, at least for Americans, they can cite the rising standard of living and the widening world of the Soviet Union. But while they wait for these two converging lines to meet in inevitable revolution, there are other elements of the American dream which they can shape to their own purposes.

The first of these is the desire of security. The depression has been blamed perhaps too much, for the rising clamor which has enlisted even the Republican Party in support of the principles of social insurance. The true cause may have been rather the prosperity of postwar years, which sucked farmers to the cities and undermined the independence of the small merchant and producer. Merger and monopoly were the order of the day, and the economics of self-sufficiency were relegated to the textbooks, unlearned and unpracticed.

How far this change has already gone may be seen in the increasing repudiation by large numbers of citizens, not all of them on relief rolls, of the venerable American maxim that insecurity is a necessary incentive to hard work. What would make men work, we used to ask, if it were not for the wolf at the door?

How can they work, many now ask instead, if they have no access to the tools with which to work? These are no longer the ax and flintlock with which Daniel Boone made insecurity his blessing of freedom. Today they are jobs, for corporations, banks, and railroads, work to be done with hand or brain for someone else, and a wage at the end of the week. Even the farmers, caught in the spider web of mortgages and closing markets, have begun to learn that the incentive of fear, when independence has dried up with the free land, is small defense against the wolf.

Another traditional element of the American dream, according to the Communist analysis, is the revolt against injustice. To a nation familiar with abolitionists, quakers, and pacifists, this is nothing new. Even its most recent forms have only put into the conversation of increasing numbers of Americans what Ruskin knew about himself 65 years ago.

"For my own part," he wrote, "I will put up with this state of things, passively, not an hour longer. I simply cannot paint, nor read, nor look at minerals, nor do anything else that I like, and the very light of the morning sky has become hateful to me, because of the misery that I know of, and see signs of where I know it not, which no imagination can interpret too bitterly. Therefore, as I have said, I will endure it no longer quietly."

I once knew a missionary in China, a man of fine, explosive moral indignation. His ancestors had been Connecticut Yankees, whose tombstones in the cemeteries of Litchfield County, the Western Reserve, Iowa, and California marked one of the trails of American history. Its last expansive thrust sent him into China, equipped with little but his Bible and the American dream. The misery he saw around him made him rage and quiver.

A few days ago I met his son, organizing unemployed workers in New Jersey. With him one of the driving forces of American life had come full circle. The religious character of the older emotional protest had changed. But no one who has seen a Yankee agitator, like this missionary's son, forced by the misery he sees to break his silence, can doubt that his accents are those of his father, and of Emerson and of Thoreau.

Much of the same ethical basis underlies still another of the elements in modern American thinking, especially that of a younger generation, on which the Communists have based their strategy and shaped their language. This is the desire for a world of ideas that makes sense. It is the belief that the values and the esthetics of a civilized people, like its economics and its social mores, are not predestined to perpetual confusion and debasement.

It is this half-inarticulate conviction that has enlisted so many younger writers in the United States under the banner of a still-nascent proletarian literature. The treason of the intellectuals has become a series of mass desertions from the standards of a business society. The present confusion of many of these younger writers belies their avowed desire for synthesis and order. Yet large numbers of them have joined the chorus of revolt, apparently for some personal satisfaction they derive from looking at the still dim outlines of an integral world.

It may be that the attraction to them of the Marxist world is nothing more than the ageless appeal of any church to any believer. It may be simply a rock on which to rest a weary head. But there are few such syntheses left with equally compelling vitality inside the world of middle-class culture and ideas, according to the Communists; and they claim to be embarrassed by the number of their recruits who come to them for faith alone.

All these things, it may be argued, are not new, by the very token of the ease with which the Communists can find American words with which to fit them. We have sought freedom and security before, and rebelled against injustice, and looked with patience for integration in a world that moves too fast for any simple hypothesis to hold it. Those who have failed have become cynical, but have gone on living, and there has been little change.

Some young Americans have found two new and ponderable changes, which have made the whole equation new. The first is Soviet Russia. To the imagination of a Montana wheat grower or a Detroit mechanic, hard empiricists in their American dream, the scale of 5-year plans and their tough and palpable reality may make them compelling visions. Americans know of their own experience that steel and wheat and machines rank high among the things for which men live.

The second is Marxism. It is not the party line of any orthodox or schismatic group, but the tool for understanding which a few scholars, and fewer leaders, have learned to use. To the English world it is still fresh and untested; and it has the plausible ring in many ears that only those doctrines have which promise the millennium—in this case, a society without classes and without poverty, where men may be really free.

"The objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history," Engels promised, and the promise still holds good, "will then pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom."

IV

For some years it has been easy to dismiss the Communists as foreigners in the fatal sense of that term, alien to our people and to our land, speaking a language few men understood. Only out of our own soil, it was cheerfully repeated, could roots spring that would fulfill what Herbert Croly called the "promise of American life."

In one sense the Communists have admitted the validity of this claim in their adoption of Thomas Paine, Samuel Adams, and John Brown for their political iconology, and their campaign to capture the American dream. In another, they have repudiated it, in their steadfast insistence that there is no exception to the rules of capitalist decay.

The continent is no longer virgin, they insist. Its people count their ancestors in all the corners of the world. They make their living and sell their labor as in any other industrial country. The exceptional scale and speed of American life serve only to telescope the inexorable changes inherent in all industrial civilization. The specter that was haunting Europe in 1848 has appeared mysteriously lurking in the shadows of America.

This specter may not be conjured away so easily in the years to come as in the last decade. In Gary, Ind., along the Monongahela River, on the San Francisco docks, and in the rayon mills of North Carolina, it is reported, the Communists have found new men, speaking the American tongue, unhampered by doctrinaire orders from Moscow, to spread their naturalized doctrine.

William Z. Foster, the party's elder statesman and three times candidate for President, is the son of a Taunton, Mass., carriage washer, who learned his economics not from Karl Marx but from Lester F. Ward. On a platform he chews gum with the slow, deliberate rhythm of a baseball fan. Robert Minor, a Communist candidate in November for Governor of New York State, is a grandson of a first cousin to Gen. Sam Houston, first president of Texas. At the 1936 convention he nominated, as "an average American," Earl Browder, former bookkeeper and Standard Oil employee, who wears a gold wedding ring and lives in Yonkers, speaks with the slow, dry irony of a Kansas farmer, and writes in a style that suggests a little of Daniel Webster mixed with much of "Sockless Jerry" Simpson.

These men spoke at Communist meetings during the campaign to shirt-sleeved mechanics and miners, organizers from Alabama textile mills, sailors and stevedores from three American coasts. Most of their lieutenants appeared to be young. Few were women. A surprising majority had Scotch or Irish names and Yankee cheekbones. On these men, more than on Browder, or Foster, depends the success of this new experiment with the American dream.

Even more will it depend, perhaps, on the competition they encounter. It would be comforting to think that there was a reasonable body of ideas being shaped by liberals or conservatives to bring the old American dream into line with new realities in American life.

The depression has uprooted many families and with them many loyalties and ways of thinking. When they settle again, it will inevitably be in new patterns.

In the short run, most of these appear to be of two kinds. On the one hand, conservatives hold out the nostalgic hope of a return to the older agrarian virtues, confused themselves between the laissez-faire spirit of independence they preach and the controlled monopoly they practice. On the other hand there is a fumbling effort to trim and cut the American dream by endless compromise, a liberal muddling-through which promises only scarcity to the sons of men who wanted abundance and freedom.

Given time, either of these sets of ideas might bend the tradition of Daniel Boone and the American pioneer to the new and imperious demands that daily living makes on millions of confused Americans. But there may well be no time. In a world where war and fascism are bacteria in the air we breathe, the few who see the danger and prepare to struggle against it may win the title they have claimed—spiritual inheritors of the founding fathers.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, we have had testimony here previously that Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist, and in addition, we have introduced extensive records showing that she was a very active person in the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Will you tell us if you knew that Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist?

MR. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I knew Harriet Lucy Moore was a Communist.

MR. MORRIS. Did you meet her personally?

MR. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; she attended several meetings of the national committee, the enlarged national committee, and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that should be explained.

The national committee is generally composed of 60 members, though it can go up and down according to Communist exigencies, but that is not the national committee meeting to which I refer.

The national committee meeting to which I refer is the enlarged national committee which takes place about four times a year and in which from 300 to 400 Communist leaders throughout the country are invited to attend. A very strict security surveillance is kept on the meeting by the Communists and it is very secret. It generally took place up in the forties in New York in a large hall there which the Communists had rented off and on.

Now, there at that meeting, occasionally in the forties—the exact time I couldn't say just at the moment—but Harriet Lucy Moore was present. Only Communists were admitted to these meetings.

MR. MORRIS. Was Harriet Lucy Moore a member of the cell that operated in the Institute of Pacific Relations?

MR. BUDENZ. She was, both according to my knowledge gained in national meetings and in the reports of the Politburo.

MR. MORRIS. Do you know anything else about Harriet Lucy Moore's activities, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ. Well, they were called so much to my attention that I am really at a loss how to express them; that is to say, she wrote articles which were passed on by the Politburo and she was specifically praised for a review of Owen Lattimore's book which she presented, I think, to Soviet Russia Today, though it may have been another magazine. I remember the incident. It was brought up as a sample of good Communist work.

MR. MORRIS. Was she active in Russian war relief, as well?

MR. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; she was.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have previously indicated that Harriet Lucy Moore was the acting secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, as well as at one time chairman of the nominating committee of the institute.

Mr. BUDENZ, we would like some testimony from you on the subject of whether or not Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist organization. Can you relate the episodes that indicated to you that Owen Lattimore was a member of the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. These episodes which I have brought to your attention?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. You have called to our attention five or six episodes.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain these in detail, stressing at all times in your relating of them the fact of Owen Lattimore's association with the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. These episodes indicate within the conspiracy the importance of Lattimore as a sort of an advance guard for the Communist Party out in the land of the heathens, so to speak, as he was not exactly described; but as he was described, and his active and prominent part from the Communist viewpoint, such as his being assigned to prepare the ground, at least for this campaign of agrarian reformers and Asia for the Asiatic, his being conversant with changes in the line, which actually did take place, and after information we found the correct way in which to carry them out, his being likewise stated by Mr. Jack Stachel when he went with Henry Wallace to Soviet Siberia and to China—

Mr. MORRIS. Will you relate them in chronological order?

Mr. BUDENZ. You want me to go over them again? I was trying to save time.

Mr. MORRIS. You did get into some of them when we were talking about Frederick Field. I wish you would rerelease them, stressing on each occasion the role that Lattimore had on these particular episodes.

Senator O'CONNOR. I think it would be informative to us all if he would enumerate the episodes first, and then possibly go into detail in confirmation.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1937, that was the episode in regard to Browder's bringing forward the idea that the Communists should be represented as democratic, as agrarian reformers, as Asians for the Asiatics.

There Lattimore's important role is indicated by his being given an assignment by the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. And what was the assignment in general?

Mr. BUDENZ. The assignment was to be responsible for seeing that there was produced in the American publication market articles and books which would carry forward this point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Did his role in Pacific Affairs come up at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; at that time it was stressed by Earl Browder specifically as leader of the party, that Lattimore was performing a very great service for the party in Pacific Affairs by more and more bringing in Communist authors.

Browder said: "We appreciate that every writer for Pacific Affairs can't be a Communist," that, however, the number must be increased and that Lattimore had shown a willingness and readiness to do so.

Mr. MORRIS. Subsequent to that time, did you follow the publication *Pacific Affairs*?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; although, of course, today that is not all fresh in my memory.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that all of the people writing for *Pacific Affairs* were Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; it is not. I said that Mr. Browder stated that it was not understood that everyone who wrote for *Pacific Affairs* was a Communist; quite the contrary.

The very function of *Pacific Affairs* or the Institute of Pacific Relations was to have a non-Communist appearance and a non-Communist approach, but carrying the burden of the Communist viewpoint always.

Now, the fact is that some of the writers for *Pacific Affairs* undoubtedly were non-Communists. That was stated by Browder, and, I think I can say that from him in other discussions this was intended to be so.

As a matter of fact, it was even said that people of outstanding position would undoubtedly be attracted to the Institute of Pacific Relations as they had been in the past and that would be a gain to the Communists because their names would be used and very frequently they would not know anything about what was happening, they being busy people, so the emphasis on Lattimore was that he was getting more and more Communists, however, to give the proper weight to the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we will, at a subsequent time, during Mr. Budenz' testimony, put into the record the Communist writers who did contribute to *Pacific Affairs*, but at this time I would like to proceed with Mr. Budenz' narrating the episodes and indicating to him from his own experience that Lattimore was a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. 1943 was the report by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, as I say, my understanding being that he had just seen Lattimore and that Lattimore told him there was to be a change in regard to Chiang Kai-shek, that the negative criticism was to be changed to positive criticism. In other words, into an effort eventually to destroy Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the Nationalist government in China. That, of course, was borne out by the fact that we immediately received verification of that, the only difficulty being that we interpreted it somewhat incorrectly, as it happens every once in a while.

This is not only a difficulty of the Communists here; it is a difficulty that Moscow has in getting over their viewpoints, where they have a double-talking viewpoint. We had that situation on a number of other occasions to which I could refer, but I think I better not or we go far afield, but that is not a new experience in the Communist policy.

The Politburo wishes really to smash those with whom they are coalescing, but that has to be the property or knowledge of the Communists, whereas the coalition has to be the property or knowledge of the non-Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony at that time that Mr. Field had received an official Communist communication from Lattimore?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us of any other episodes?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1944, the trip of Vice President Henry Wallace. I don't know whether I can emphasize the importance of this trip to the Communists as much as it should be. It received a very great attention from the Politburo and it was constantly brought to my attention by Jack Stachel as the representative of the Politburo as a very important mission which would redound to the benefit of the Communist cause in the Far East.

In that respect a great deal of dependence was placed on Owen Lattimore, whom I was told by Mr. Stachel at that time to consider a Communist—

Mr. MORRIS. What do you mean, "consider a Communist"? Is that a technical word you are using?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a technical term we used which meant he was an authority from the Communist viewpoint. He was a Marxist authority.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that warning given to you by anyone else at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, there were many other references of similar character. I remember specifically Stachel's because my relations with him were very close and he was constantly giving me these instructions.

I do know that similar statements were made within the Politburo itself by other members in connection with Wallace's trip.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the significance of that? Was that a note of warning to you by Stachel, or was it an admonition, or what?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, I should say an underscoring of Lattimore's position, that we should be on the alert for anything that Lattimore might say or do. That was really carrying out the Communist line.

If I may explain that for just a moment, there isn't just the line to carry out, but you must know at any particular moment how the line is to be emphasized. You might talk about united fronts, but you might be emphasizing one particular element in the united fronts, or something like that, or, in the case of Italy, where we were taken by surprise, you might attack Badoglio one day and find you should be with him the next day, according to Moscow's policy.

That was within all one line of procedure with regard to Italy, but Badoglio suddenly changed in that line.

Now, in order to be advised of such things as that, we were to rely on anything Lattimore might say or do that we would be aware of.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you also to handle the name of Lattimore in any particular way?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, with consideration; yes, sir. As a matter of fact, it has been handled with great consideration.

Mr. MORRIS. And you handled it with consideration?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Could Stachel possibly be giving you misinformation under those circumstances?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is utterly impossible. The Communist Party is an army and the whole strength of its invasion of the country, which is what it is doing, is being advised correctly through the whole organization insofar as it is necessary for a person to be advised of the facts in a situation, but when someone is designated as a Communist that is utterly impossible to be false, because if that were so then the whole thing would fall into chaos.

Senator O'CONOR. Just before you leave that episode, the one in 1944, and with specific reference to the conversation with Stachel, do you place any significance on the fact that he told you to consider Lattimore as a Communist; that is to say, were those words used, "to consider him as"?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Now, you understand that some of these discussions and considerations had to be carried on under pressure. As a matter of fact many offices have arranged their walls so that you can't hear through them for various business reasons, but ours were arranged that way so that the staff of the Daily Worker couldn't hear what was being said by the leadership because many confidential and secret messages were brought there.

Now, the thing is that because of that fact, and the danger of interruption, and all that, we tried to reduce everything to what I used to call political shorthand, my own term, namely, to make everything as concise as possible, and the phrase "to consider a man as Communist" came to me that he was an authority as a Communist and that we should regard him as such.

That is a distinction from other phrases, like "treat him as a Communist," or things like that.

Mr. MORRIS. What does that mean?

Mr. BUDENZ. That he is part of the Communist conspiracy. These things had to be divided because of interruptions by staff members of conversations of this character.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you mean that when a man had been referred to by the phrase "consider him as a Communist" that he was to be regarded as speaking with authority on matters of Communist ideology; that he was an interpreter of the line with the party back of him?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. And if a person was inclined in their own mind to differ with what such a man had said that he had better take notice that there was something wrong with their thinking because he was right?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

You must understand in the case of Mr. Lattimore this was only said at that time with regard to his functioning in the Wallace mission.

Mr. MORRIS. I did not understand whether you were trying to "treat" or "consider" Mr. Lattimore as a Communist.

Mr. BUDENZ. Consider him a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. I thought you used the word "treat" in your testimony a while ago.

Mr. BUDENZ. I say that that was also a phrase used.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean that in connection with the Wallace mission the word was passed by the use of the phrase "consider him as a Communist," that with respect to that mission Mr. Lattimore might not be setting the line; he was giving the line, and he was interpreting that mission in Communist terms?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's correct. He was a representative of the party in the Wallace mission.

Senator SMITH. He was sort of a VIP in the movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. Would a man like that be allowed to make a statement, to voice a criticism of the Soviet Union, which would not be consistent with the official Communist Party line?

Mr. BUDENZ. In order to explain that, I think we have to understand the Communist position; the position of the Communist conspiracy.

Mr. MORRIS. As best you can answer the question, though, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. He would be granted an exemption if the burden of his work was such as to rebound to the line of the party in that field to which he was assigned.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know of any such exemptions that were granted to people?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you explain that?

Mr. BUDENZ. There was a noted Hollywood actor who was certainly a devoted Communist. As a matter of fact, he wept every time there was any thought that he might not be a Communist, although he couldn't publicly proclaim it. He was granted an exemption to contribute to the Finnish relief because it was said in the political bureau by V. J. Jerome that, "What are a few cents to Finland compared to the place he occupies in Hollywood for the party? There is no scandal in the party. No one knows he is a Communist."

An open Communist couldn't do that without being expelled, but a concealed Communist is permitted these exemptions.

In another case a college professor who has done very yeoman work for the party, particularly in Communist fronts—he always comes back to the Communist fronts, no matter what line is being pursued—was given an exemption to say a kind word about Trotsky. Of course, Trotsky was thoroughly dead at that time, but he was given permission to say a kind word about him in order to distinguish him from the Communists because the burden of his activities in Communist fronts, to which I say he constantly returned, was much greater from the party viewpoint from this casual reference to the fact that he wasn't known publicly as a Communist and there would be no scandal in the party. That is a phrase used.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you tell us of any other episodes that indicated to you that Lattimore was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Incidentally, in this respect, I might bring this out in another way in order that it be understood and not cause confusion, and that is that just recently when a number of Communists who were heads of trade-unions signed affidavits that they had all suddenly had a common inspiration to resign from the Communist Party, the Daily Worker ran an explanation that their function and the way they should act would be different from that of the rank and file. The rank-and-file Communist must continue because he is expected to assert openly that he is a Communist at all costs, but these leaders, because they have responsibilities to great masses, organizations, funds, and the like, may properly, while continuing their fraternal relation with the Communist Party, swear that they are not Communists.

In other words, right there is a note. I could bring in many other examples. I want to show that there is an open example there in the

pages of the *Daily Worker* that here is a leader of a trade-union who is a Communist. Ben Gold is an example, among others.

Suddenly one day he says he has resigned from the Communist Party and he can take the affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board. The Communists in the *Daily Worker* had to explain that because that did create some difficulty, and so they said that the rank-and-file Communist must continue to assert his open communism. He has no responsibility to large institutions, funds, and to the welfare of masses, but those who have responsibility, while maintaining their fraternal relations with the party, may repudiate the party openly in this way, so they went to the extent of repudiating the party in that case.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the next episode, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The next episode is a brief one, but a rather important one, and that was during the Amerasia incident, which occurred very rapidly and it is not as sharp, even though later, in my memory as some others, but nevertheless in the Amerasia case in 1945 there were many hurried meetings in the Politburo and segments of the Politburo, and in that connection Lattimore's name was mentioned several times; that is, that he should be appealed to for help, and, finally, Jack Stachel did report that Lattimore had been of considerable assistance in the Amerasia case.

The nature of the assistance I could not say.

Senator O'CONNOR. Could you state, Mr. Budenz, by whom Lattimore's name was mentioned? You said it was mentioned by several.

Mr. BUDENZ. By Jack Stachel specifically mentioning that he had been of great assistance to the defendants in the Amerasia case.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you describe for us the role of Jack Stachel and your relationship to him at this time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Jack Stachel, who is among those who were convicted in the trial on Foley Square, has been for years the most important Communist in the United States for all-around activity. He was one of the small commission of five which was in constant touch with Moscow.

Mr. BUDENZ. He also was the one who brought the line very frequently to the political bureau from this contact with Moscow representatives. When I say "in touch with Moscow," that doesn't always mean with the Soviet Embassy or Consulate; it means through intermediaries.

He was the one who was in touch with Gerhart Eisler.

In other words, he was the most important cog in the Communist machine linking up the legal party, the open party in this country, with the illegal Stalinite representatives from abroad.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you say that he monitored your work in the *Daily Worker*?

Mr. BUDENZ. In addition to that he became a representative of the political bureau of the *Daily Worker*. That was a custom, though, for years, different personnel being involved on that.

When I first went with the *Daily Worker*, Alexander Bittelman of the party was the chief even though Hathaway was supposed to be editor-in-chief. He met every day with the editorial staff of the *Daily Worker*. He could meet because he knew the line that he had received from Communist International representatives.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Jack Stachel your superior?

Mr. BUDENZ. Just a moment. Even Bittelman was succeeded by others like William Z. Foster and others and Stachel for a long time during a large part of my being managing editor was a representative of the Politburo. He therefore was my direct and immediate superior in the conspiracy.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there another episode involving Owen Lattimore that you can testify about, Mr. Budenz, connected with his Japanese activities?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. That leads us, of course, into another field and I wasn't thinking along that line at the moment.

As the war against Japan approached the climax the Communist conspiracy proceeded to emphasize the necessity of a hard peace in Japan. They had in mind a Morgenthau plan for Japan and anyone who was against that, who would treat the Japanese people in any reasonable terms, was denounced as a Fascist and an agent of the Zaibatsu. That is a Japanese term, as I understand it, meaning the industrialists of Japan.

That was the Communist position which you could find very extremely emphasized in the Daily Worker and other Communist publications of that period.

They wanted to have a hard peace for Japan, just as they emphasized the necessity of a hard peace for Germany. This was clearly told us in order to alienate these countries from the United States.

In this connection a very valuable Lattimorian contribution was made. Just in the middle of the Communist campaign Lattimore gave an interview to the United Press attacking the Zaibatsu and declaring that the democratic element should be brought forward. That's what the Communists were saying, the democratic element from the Communist viewpoint being themselves.

Now, this statement by Mr. Lattimore in that period was considered so important that extra copies of the Daily Worker were published and distributed throughout the country and the party was advised in a private directive—they get out many of these private directives—well, they advocated that Guenther Stein's books be published in that manner and Harrison Forman's books, and the like.

In one of these directives they emphasized that Lattimore's interviews, just as it appeared in the Daily Worker, should be given the widest distribution in trade-unions, youth groups, and the like; in communities, in other words.

Senator SMITH. What year was that?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1945.

Mr. SOURWINE. Doesn't Zaibatsu mean a little more than industrialist? Doesn't it mean the larger merchants? Does it not carry a connotation of blood-sucking oppression?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. It was the use by the Communists of an attack upon a group who perhaps needed criticism, but the Communists used that to identify themselves with all of the anti-Zaibatsu elements and to make themselves the sole democratic group.

In the midst of this campaign Mr. Lattimore's statement served Communist purposes well. I cannot say that that was the arrangement of the Communist Party in this instance—I don't know that—but I know that we were instructed to use it because it was so effective.

Mr. SOURWINE. You think it might have been rather timely?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was certainly considered timely by the Communists. It was right in line with their campaign.

Mr. MORRIS. You mentioned Guenther Stein and Harry Forman as having books published by the Communist Party. Were they both Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your official position with the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have here numerous exhibits bearing on the testimony of Mr. Budenz on Communist Party policy on Japan, as well as the UP release at that time, the interview at that time which Mr. Lattimore gave. I prefer to introduce those into the record immediately after lunch. The witness seems to be tired, and I suggest that we adjourn until 2 o'clock.

Senator SMITH. I have one question I would like to ask you if you can tell us now.

I thought I heard you say that the purpose of the movement for a coalition government in China was to destroy somebody or some movement.

Mr. BUDENZ. Destroy Chiang Kai-shek and establish Communist China.

As a matter of fact, Senator, if time will permit later, I can refer you to statements by the Chinese leaders to that effect right at the moment they were advocating a coalition government.

Senator SMITH. Was that before, after, or about the time that Lattimore became the confidential adviser of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was after.

Senator SMITH. Do you regard Lattimore's connection or appointment as a confidential adviser to Chiang Kai-shek a part of that plan to have a coalition government to destroy Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That I could not testify to. I have my opinion, but I cannot testify with absolute knowledge, of my own knowledge.

You see, during that period partly I was out in the Middle West, and after taking over the duties of the Daily Worker, and I couldn't say that of my own knowledge.

Senator SMITH. You did know that Lattimore turned up as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. And I know that the Communist political bureau was not ill-served by that function. That he was deliberately put there for that purpose, I cannot say.

Senator SMITH. You do not know who put him there, or how that came about?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. If there are no further questions the committee will take a recess until 2:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m., same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m. upon the expiration of the recess.)

Senator O'CONOR. The hearing will please be in order.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—

Resumed

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Budenz, just before the noon recess there were certain matters referred to concerning Owen Lattimore about which I should like to ask you a few questions. You had recounted the several episodes starting in 1937 and then up to 1943 and 1944, which, in your opinion, referred to Owen Lattimore's activities. I would like to ask you whether throughout that period you met Owen Lattimore.

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; I did not meet Mr. Lattimore at any time until at the hearing in Washington.

Senator O'CONOR. My next question is whether it is significant, and inasmuch as you say you were yourself active in the affairs of the Communist Party and you attribute to Mr. Lattimore certain interests in furtherance of Communist purposes, whether it is significant that you did not meet him or know him.

Mr. BUDENZ. It is significant. It is significant in the sense that many men of Mr. Lattimore's functioning were directed—I don't know that he was directed—but many men of Mr. Lattimore's functioning were directed specifically to avoid all contacts with official Communist organs that would commit them in any way in the public eye. As a matter of fact, there is quite a difference of responsibility among members of the Communist Party, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know whether you want me to pursue that or not.

Senator O'CONOR. I think it would be of very great interest to have you do so at this time.

Mr. BUDENZ. We have what I call the Communist spectrum. The spectrum of Communist allegiance; that is a term I used while I was still a Communist and to some extent was adopted by other people who discussed this in the Politburo. That is to say, we will take the spy.

Anyone engaged in espionage like Judith Coplon, and there are a number of those people trained for espionage alone, must not give any indication of any association with Communists. As a matter of fact, they are not even permitted to approach Communist branch meetings; they are ordered not to do so. They cannot have any contact with known Communists.

That of course is quite obvious why that would be. The infiltrator of government is somewhat in a similar position and is not supposed to have any vestige of Communist membership on him and to avoid any public relationship with Communists. Beyond that he is also permitted of course within limitations to make such statements critical of the Communist Party as will assure his non-Communist standing so that he may put the burden—I use that word "burden" of his activity in the Communist cause because that was the way it was used—the weight of his activities in the Communist cause.

Then there is the infiltrator of other organizations. They likewise have the same responsibilities, though they are not so much protected as anyone in the Government. I mean protected by the Communist Party. They likewise can misrepresent.

You take, for example, during the one month that I was supposedly a non-Communist, though a Communist, in August 1935, I was specifically directed by Stachel again to criticize the party to non-Communists but to do it lightly and to put the burden of my arguments in

favor of cooperation with the Communists, although I was a fully admitted Communist Party member working as a non-Communist until they could decide what my function should be.

We have also the case of even Ben Gold, the open Communist, and this was worked out while I was still in the party, though it didn't come to fruition until the next CIO convention, who as an open Communist signed a report denouncing Communist infiltration in the CIO. That was in order to ameliorate the feelings of Philip Murray.

These special exemptions are granted by the district leader functioning as a non-Communist in infiltrating into other organizations in order that his infiltration may be effective.

Next in the category are the members of the Communist fronts who have still another set of responsibilities, to follow out the fronts, to respond when called upon, but who again deny they are Communists, and of course in denying it have to express occasionally why they are not Communists. You just can't say, "I am not a Communist," you have to explain why. They are permitted to do that, although 95 percent of the Communist fronts, according to my knowledge, are members of the Communist Party.

When I say members of the Communist Party I do not mean necessarily card-carrying Communists because most Communists do not carry cards but are subject to Communist allegiance.

Then there are the open party members, the expendables as they have been called, the rank-and-file Communists, the picket-line Communists who are supposed to be open, and they are not permitted to deviate from the line of the party because they represent the reputation of the party.

Likewise with the bureaucrat or functionary. The word "bureaucrat" is not used in the party. Although Lenin said our party is bureaucratic, they don't like to use that. They are functionaries. They, of course, have a deep responsibility and they cannot deviate from the party at all. Anyone who is a section organizer or district organizer of the party or the like in his person is the party because the leadership principle is very strong.

Among the bureaucrats, though, there are variations again. There are those illegal agents sent in here by Stalin who direct the party, who are largely underground; there are the open party representatives like William Z. Foster, today, and Browder when I was there, and the like; and then there are, of course, certain functionaries who for one reason or another, from time to time, become concealed.

Now each one of these, at the time that they perform these different functions, have different responsibilities in regard to how much they will assert their Communist integrity. The great question that was always put in the Politburo and at State committee meetings, and I have attended a number of State committee meetings where this question came up for lesser people in the party, those people who were concerned, the question always was how far they could go in order that they could carry on their deceit of others, what scandal it will create in the party.

According to the answer to that question were they granted a certain immunity from being quite regular from the party line or party regulations.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Budenz, therefore did you consider it exceptional or extraordinary or unusual that Owen Lattimore was not known to you or seen by you during this period?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; that could be said of a number of other people, some of whom later on were divulged to be Communists. That would be true of Dr. Norman Bethune, a noted Canadian surgeon who also was very active in the Communist Party in the United States and for various reasons was not known to me. I never saw him. He was supposed always to be a non-Communist. He asserted strenuously, he was not a Communist, but after he died in China, helping the Chinese Reds, Earl Browder announced at a public meeting that the wish of Bethune when he went to China was that he be publicly acknowledged to be a member of the Communist Party for many years.

Now Dr. Bethune was not known to me. I just mention him because his case was rather outstanding.

Senator O'CONOR. All right, Mr. Morris, will you proceed then?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we had gotten as far as Mr. Budenz' testimony on a certain press interview given by Mr. Owen Lattimore. I would like to introduce that into the record at this time.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify this photostat you have just given me?

Mr. MANDEL. I have had this photostat made of the Daily Worker of September 5, 1945, page 8, of an article by Gwen Morgan entitled, "Allies Must Break Japanese Monopolists' Grip," says Lattimore."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you recognize that article?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you editor of the Daily Worker when that was published?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was indeed; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that part of the Communist program to impose a hard peace on Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. You will find that this is accompanied in the Daily Worker by demands of a similar character though expressed sometimes in different language. Just at this time the campaign of the Communists was for a hard peace in Japan, and this hard peace was to be directed against the Zaibatsu.

That is in accordance with Communists calling other people Fascists or saying they are against monopoly and saying they are the only democratic elements. This campaign was to be carried on in that manner.

As a matter of fact, I believe we shall see an interesting development of this in the effort to destroy anyone connected with the Government who opposed a hard peace for Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean people in our State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. That was the Communist program, but that would have to be developed further.

Mr. MORRIS. Now is there any particular thing in that article that you would like to comment further on, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think not. The article more or less speaks for itself and it accompanies the campaign of the Daily Worker, which upon investigation would have been found to be along the same line. The emphasis of both the Daily Worker and of Mr. Lattimore was that the democratic elements in Japan should be brought forward, but when you examine who the democratic elements in Japan were, Mr. Lattimore doesn't examine them except very superficially, and the

Daily Worker did, we will find them to be those represented by the Communists.

The importance of this article so far as I am concerned and so far as my knowledge is concerned is this: (1) That it was quite in line with the headline reading, "Allies must break Japanese monopolists' grip which was what the Communists were driving for at that time; (2) that it was used so widely by the Communist Party to my own knowledge—that is, among non-Communist groups.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, this photostat of the Daily Worker article, the Daily Worker of Wednesday, September 5, 1945, page 8, with the headline reading, "Allies must break Japanese monopolists' grip," says Lattimore, "I would like to have this introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted and will be given the next consecutive number.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 139" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 139

[From the Daily Worker, New York, September 5, 1945]

"ALLIES MUST BREAK JAPANESE MONOPOLISTS' GRIP" SAYS LATTIMORE

(By Gwen Morgan)

BALTIMORE, September 4 (UP).—Owen Lattimore, former adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, said today that the Allies must free Japan of the "Zaibatsu's" grip before democracy can develop there. He declared that the Zaibatsu—or industrialists—merged completely with the militarists in controlling Japan for aggression and that the primary control always was civilian.

"Together," he said, "they are like a small octopus with huge tentacles which holds everything in its power. Their tool and front was the Emperor, owner of vast shares and estates, and he still is—although now they are loudly disclaiming the militarists."

Lattimore said in an interview at Johns Hopkins University, where he is director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, that preserving the Emperor and the Zaibatsu means preserving the "entire machinery that made Japan an aggressive country."

The biggest misconception about Japan, he said, is that the interests of the industrialists, the militarists and the Emperor differ.

"The only difference is that the civilians or industrialists are the go-slow crowd about aggression," he said. "The militarists are the go-fast. The Emperor belongs to both of them."

The Emperor's holdings alone, he said, amount to thousands of shares in banking, railroad, sugar, utilities, paper, and shipping companies, as well as hundreds of thousands of acres of land.

Lattimore said breaking the stranglehold of the Zaibatsu would make possible the development of a "genuine spontaneous and thoroughly Japanese movement which would substitute for the Emperor a real republic."

He declared that if this were permitted, supported, and encouraged by American policy it would take the form of middle-of-the-road democracy, and there would be no "danger" of communism.

"The only danger of communism would arise if American policy were to choke off the development of democracy, leaving communism as the only alternative to reactionary Japanese forces supported by the victorious powers," he said.

Lattimore said a democratic potential does exist in Japan, composed of thousands of small, independent businessmen who were not brought completely under the Zaibatsu until the war period and now would like to regain their independence; laborers who have been shorn of rights and poorly paid, and peasants whose cooperatives have been subject to monopoly control and who have been dominated by landlords, the most powerful of whom are related to the Zaibatsu and military families.

MONOPOLISTS' PROGRAM

Lattimore said the Zaibatsu were better prepared for defeat than the United States for victory.

"They already have put their collaborationist team on the field to capitalize on the United States belief that the Emperor controls them while, in fact, they control him," he said.

He predicted this would be their line of action:

1. To stimulate disorder and conflict in China.

2. To work up antagonism between Russia and the other Allies.

3. To be awfully good boys with the Americans and carry out their wishes. If any uprisings occur in the name of democracy, the Japanese authorities would run to the Allies and report it as subversive activity.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with a publication called the United Nations World, whose editor is Louis Dolivet?

Senator O'CONNOR. I note that it is dated Baltimore, September 4. What is the year?

Mr. MORRIS. 1945.

Senator O'CONNOR. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with the United Nations World, the editor of which in 1950 was Louis Dolivet?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What do you know of Louis Dolivet?

Mr. BUDENZ. Louis Dolivet was officially stated to me by Earl Browder to be a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with an article appearing in the United Nations—

Mr. BUDENZ. May I explain how that arose?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. It may take your time.

Mr. MORRIS. That is all right.

Mr. BUDENZ. There was a predecessor to this paper which was independent, we didn't have the United Nations. It was Free World or something like that.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. As chairman of the publications commission of the party I organized for the penetration of the Free World and even had arranged for a secretary to be in Louis Dolivet's office, which was a very common method of Communist penetration to get information. I first consulted because this was partially an international matter, I consulted Mr. Browder. He told me not to do this, that Mr. Dolivet was with us, that he had technically resigned in order to come to the United States, but that he was a Communist in good standing so far as the party was concerned.

Mr. MORRIS. That is the same Louis Dolivet who became editor of United Nations World?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the same man.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I have a copy of the United Nations World dated March 1950, the masthead of which shows that Louis Dolivet was the editor. On page 22 there is an article, Asia Reconquers Asia, by Owen Lattimore. I ask you if you have read that article, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you comment on it for us, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. This article carries out very skillfully the Asia for the Asiatics campaign of the Communists. Of course, this is after

my being in the party, but it carries forward exactly what the idea was.

Mr. MORRIS. You learned what the Communist policy was from your experience in the Communist movement?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. It begins with this statement:

It is clear that the change of power in China cannot properly be described as primarily a victory of Communist armies or of Communist ideas. The chief phenomenon has been the moral and political bankruptcy of the National Government of China, whose "ability" to collapse greatly exceeded the ability of the Communists to push it over.

Well, we could go forward, but there is another paragraph here that might be of some pertinence.

The shift of power which took place in spite of a formidable American intervention and in the absence of any ponderable Russian intervention means that China for the first time for a hundred years is beyond the control of the most powerful of the western nations. There are a number of reasons for believing that the power of control by intervention which has fallen from the hands of the west has not passed into the hands of Soviet Russia. It may well be that Russia also will not be able to "move in on" China and take over control within China.

Well, Mr. Lattimore must certainly have been advised when he wrote that article of the many official declarations of the Chinese Communists not only of adherence to Stalin but of adoration of him. I have scores of such statements in my own library. To state that there was no Russian intervention in China and to picture the whole thing as just a revolt against the west is typically in line with the Communist position to those who were not Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us the date of that article, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The date is March 1950.

Senator O'CONNOR. Will the hearing please be in order? Mr. Morris, will you kindly resume?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Maxwell S. Stewart a Communist to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever meet Maxwell S. Stewart under circumstances that would conclusively show to you that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe those circumstances to the committee, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was in the early forties. The exact year I cannot remember as yet. The incident I remember very definitely.

There was a confidential matter connected with the party that I had to consult Mr. Stewart about. I had an appointment at the Nation with him. I went to Mr. Browder to consult with him, as the leader of the party, as to whether I could talk to Maxwell S. Stewart, and in what capacity.

Mr. Browder said, "You may speak to him as a Communist." So in the resultant conference, I disclosed to Mr. Stewart that I knew that he was under the same allegiance that I was.

Mr. MORRIS. You did meet with Mr. Stewart?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, in the office of the Nation.

Mr. MORRIS. What was Mr. Stewart's position in the Nation at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was one of the editors, I believe.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any other reason to believe that Maxwell S. Stewart was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Many reasons.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you describe them, please, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Maxwell S. Stewart has been one of the most active members of the Communist fronts that exist in the United States. I cannot keep track of all of these Communist fronts.

In connection with these Communist fronts, over and over again Maxwell Stewart was discussed by the leaders of the party with me as either an initiator or sponsor or one who could be relied upon to see that others joined these Communist fronts.

In that connection, I learned repeatedly over the years from the early forties until I left the party in 1945, that Maxwell Stewart continued to be one of the reliables of the party—a phrase which was used in his regard by Mr. Browder.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, would you put something officially into the record to show that Mr. Stewart was the editor of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series?

Mr. MANDEL. In the report entitled, "Windows on the Pacific, Biennial Report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations," 1944-46, page 11, we find this notation:

In Miriam Farley's absence, Maxwell S. Stewart, editor of the well-known Public Affairs Pamphlets, assumed the editorship of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that excerpt read by Mr. Mandel to appear in the record and that exhibit be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 140" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 140

[From Windows on the Pacific, Biennial Report of American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1944-46 (p. 11)]

MAXWELL S. STEWART

In Miriam Farley's absence, Maxwell S. Stewart, editor of the well-known Public Affairs Pamphlets, assumed the editorship of the IPR Popular Pamphlet series.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you take a sample pamphlet completely written by Mr. Stewart and call it to the attention of the committee, please?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a pamphlet entitled, "Wartime China."

Mr. MORRIS. Will you listen to what is read here, Mr. Budenz? We may ask for a characterization.

Mr. MANDEL. (reading):

By Maxwell S. Stewart. IPR Pamphlets No. 10. American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Published in 1944.

I read from an excerpt on page 45.

As China is not like any other country, so Chinese communism has no parallel elsewhere. You can find in it resemblances to Communist movements in other

countries and you can also find resemblances to the "grass-roots" Populist movements that have figured in American history. Because there is no other effective opposition party in China, the Communists have attracted the support of many progressive and patriotic Chinese who know little of the doctrines of Karl Marx or Stalin and care less. Raymond Gram Swing described Chinese Communists as "agrarian radicals trying to establish democratic practices."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that whole excerpt appear in our record and that pamphlet be introduced by reference as part of the record.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be so introduced and marked.

(The pamphlet referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 141" and filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you any comment to make on that excerpt from Mr. Stewart's article?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This appeared while I was very active in the Communist Party. This is good illustration of the carrying out of the North Dakota Non-Partisan League formula.

This describes the Chinese Communists as the Populists. That is similar to the American Populist. It is a complete deceit on the American people because, at the same time, if I may be privileged to say so, Mr. Stewart and the Institute of Pacific Relations had at their disposal official statements by the Chinese Communists, such as they made in the opening of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935, that they were pledged to Soviet power throughout the world and to mounting the barricades in that pursuit.

In other words, the Chinese Communists by their official declarations had thoroughly established in the Communist world their own character as adherents of Moscow and completely devoted to Marxism Leninism.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, that was a pamphlet written by Mr. Stewart. Do you have an example of one edited by Maxwell Stewart?

Mr. MANDEL. We have a pamphlet entitled "Land of the Soviets," by Marguerite Ann Stewart, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart.

Mr. MORRIS. Is Marguerite Ann Stewart the wife of Maxwell S. Stewart?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. This is published as a cooperative project between American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Webster Publishing Co., St. Louis, Dallas, and Los Angeles.

I have selected some excerpts from that pamphlet to give the tone of the pamphlet. I now read a few of these excerpts.

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government.

But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who devotes himself conscientiously to the common good. An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice in running the factories.

Mr. MORRIS. Just one more, Mr. Mandel.

Mr. MANDEL. In reference to the Soviet purges:

The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It regarded such acts as violations against Socialist property and punished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again; in a few instances they were shot.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on that?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, if the Communist Party circulated that, it could not be better done as a Communist apologia. It is precisely what the Communists were saying. It is thoroughly a Communist point of view.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have such of the excerpts as extracted by Mr. Mandel from the pamphlet, *Land of the Soviets*, written by Marguerite Ann Stewart and edited by Maxwell S. Stewart introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 142

LAND OF THE SOVIETS

(By Marguerite Ann Stewart, edited by Maxwell S. Stewart, cover by LaVerne Riess)

(A cooperative project between American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations and Webster Publishing Co., St. Louis, Dallas, Los Angeles)

* * * * *

Because these Soviets were the organ which represented the people most widely at that time, they grew rapidly in influence and respect during the troubled months of 1917 until, on November 7, they became the government (p. 3).

* * * As we know, under the capitalist system, property of all kinds may be owned by private individuals or commercial organizations, and all business is conducted primarily for the profit of the owner. * * * But, under a Socialist system, the factories and other types of business are socially owned, that is, they belong to the population as a whole and are operated by the government, not for the profit of any one person or group of individuals, but for the benefit of all the people. * * * And all industry—every single factory, office, bank, grocery, and department store, every theater, movie, bakery, and newspaper—is the property of the people as a whole and is operated by their government or by their organizations (p. 6).

* * * Ivan Petrovich Petrov might be considered a rather typical Russian city worker. Blonde, rosy-checked, and of medium height, he has a keen sense of humor; loves to dance, sing, and talk until late at night and to enjoy himself with his friends; admires things on a big scale and adores mechanical devices and machinery. * * * Ivan, a very responsible worker, was a member of the factory committee, elected by the workers to advise the director of the plant. Each day he and Anna took Sasha to the attractive nursery school maintained by the factory for the children of its employees (p. 17).

* * * Curious as it may seem to us, the person at the top of the social scale is the worker (p. 21).

* * * But while the Russians are quick to condemn those who display ambition for personal power, they have no praise too high for the person who devotes himself conscientiously to the common good. * * * An additional motive peculiar to the Russian system is the pride of ownership of the Soviet workers. They have a voice in running the factories. * * * (P. 26.)

Why did the Russians resort to revolution in 1917? Was such a complete overthrow necessary? And, why, after the revolution, did they set up a system so different from that of other governments? Why were they not satisfied with a republic, for example, like that of the United States? (P. 27.)

* * * On November 7 (October 25 by the old Russian calendar), the Red Guards were sent by the Soviets to surround the Winter Palace and all the Government buildings in the name of the Socialist revolution. All the provisional ministers were arrested except Kerensky, who had managed to escape. * * * Thus, at one stroke, the peasants attained the right to more than 500 million additional acres which had heretofore belonged to the Crown, the nobility, and

the church. Industry likewise was taken over as the property of the people (p. 37).

Probably the greatest surprise of Hitler's life lay in the fact that the Russian peasants, particularly in the Ukraine, did not hail his approach in 1941 as a signal to revolt against the Soviet Government. * * * (P. 53.)

* * * The Soviet answer to those who thus broke the peace was swift and severe. It regarded such acts as violations against Socialist property and punished them accordingly. The culprits were forcibly removed from their villages. In some cases they were imprisoned, but more frequently their property was confiscated and they were sent to another part of the country to begin life again; in a few instances they were shot. * * * (P. 60).

* * * Communists are expected to be an example to others (p. 66).

* * * Each of these has its own village soviet, chosen at a village meeting not unlike our New England town meeting. * * * City soviets are also elected directly by the people (p. 68).

* * * The 1936 constitution also introduced into the Soviet Union many of the elements of democracy as we know them in this country. It introduced the secret ballot (p. 69).

Mr. BUDENZ. Incidentally, I did not say that rashly. These phrases can be found almost in the same order in official Communist documents.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know that Ben Kizer is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe how you know that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know this through official information given me by Jack Stachel, and also by the district leader of the party in Washington, Henry Huff.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, at that point, if you do not mind, I think, for the same reason that the chairman commented today, it might be well at this juncture to identify Ben Kizer.

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. I would be glad to do it. He is a rather well known and, as a matter of fact, distinguished lawyer in the State of Washington and has quite a wide circle of acquaintances.

He has been rather active on the Pacific coast advancing the Soviet idea of the Far East, that is, those Soviet ideas which could be put forth under a non-Communist cover.

Mr. Kizer has been mentioned to me—I cannot give you exactly the occasions, but on a number of occasions—and in reports to the national committee on one or two occasions was praised by the district leader of the Communist Party in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name, Mr. Budenz, of the leader of the Communist Party in Washington?

Mr. BUDENZ. Henry Huff.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have something to show that Mr. Kizer is presently on the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letterhead, a 1951 letterhead of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, showing Benjamin H. Kizer as a member of the board of trustees.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this letterhead identified by Mr. Mandel introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be introduced and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 143" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 143

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

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 Sumner Welles
 Brayton Wilbur
 Herbert J. Wood
 Louise L. Wright

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any information on the activities on the part of Mr. Kizer?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify them and read them into the record, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Miller Freeman, from Charles W. Eliot, Director of the Executive Office of the President, National Resources Planning Board, Washington, D. C. It is dated May 1, 1943.

We have delayed replying to your letter of March 30 inquiring about Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer's, The Northern Pacific International Planning Project, as reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this statement as mimeographed in a confidential edition by the institute was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. Those two agencies have completed examination of the document and related maps and have given their approval to general publication of the material with some modification.

The confidential mimeographed edition was not reproduced by this agency and we assume that it was kept confidential, because it was realized by the institute that some of the statements might be objected to by military authorities and it was for this reason that the document was submitted to the censor and to the Army for clearance.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT, *Director.*

This comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then we have here a letter to Benjamin Kizer from Owen Lattimore, dated January 27, 1939, which is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

I read parts of the letter.

I have just been reading with great appreciation an advance copy of your article to come out in Amerasia. This article will do a lot of good, I think. It is one of the best statesmanlike discussions of the whole subject that I have seen.

Mr. MORRIS. Is this Mr. Lattimore writing?

Mr. MANDEL. This is Mr. Lattimore writing.

Is it in time, however? Aren't we all of us too late? One of the most shocking things about the present atmosphere of crisis is that at the very time when the Gallup poll has tabulated the fact which most of us know already—that the majority of people in this country are in favor of Loyalist Spain and disgusted with the Spanish embargo—nothing has been done about it, and Barcelona has been allowed to fall.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment on that, Mr. Budenz, to the extent that you heard it read?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, except that it followed the Communist position at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have these two letters introduced into the record and marked as consecutive exhibits.

Senator O'CONNOR. The Chair has brought up the question because of our possible doubt as to the propriety of introducing a letter dated May 1 from one Charles W. Eliot to Mr. Miller Freeman.

Mr. MORRIS, would you indicate why you think it is relevant?

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of introducing that letter was to show that Benjamin H. Kizer's book, *The Northern Pacific International Planning Project*, was reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that it was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. It is being introduced simply for those two facts, without any implication whatsoever with respect to the addressee or the sender.

Senator O'CONNOR. Yes. With regard to those two matters, it also is not indicated whether it was reproduced with or without the authorization—I do think if it is introduced for that limited purpose, without there being any inference upon the sender or the addressee, it would be permissible.

Mr. MORRIS. That is right. When Senator McCarran had the chair, he issued a caveat at one time that these letters being introduced carry no implication broader than the mere fact of the letters themselves. There is no implication by the mere association of either the addressee or the people mentioned in the body, or the senders of the letters.

Senator SMITH. Was this found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel testified that it was extracted from the files.

Senator O'CONNOR. Senator Smith, I had no difficulty about it being applicable to the IPR. I did think it might have some unfortunate connotations in regard to the sender or the addressee. But with the stipulation that has been made—

Senator SMITH. The question occurred to me whether or not it was reproduced by or with the consent and the approval of any of these men. I do not know.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, on that point, the letter says it was reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, and that letter was in the files of the institute. It was for that purpose that we are showing Mr. Kizer's association with the institute.

Senator SMITH. That is the only purpose of it?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONNOR. With that limited purpose, it will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit Nos. 144 and 145" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 144

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD,
Washington, D. C., May 1, 1943.

Mr. MILLER FREEMAN,
71 Columbia Street, Seattle, Wash.

DEAR MR. FREEMAN: We have delayed replying to your letter of March 30 inquiring about Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer's The Northern Pacific International Planning Project, as reproduced by the Institute of Pacific Relations, because this statement as mimeographed in a confidential edition by the institute was being cleared by the Office of Censorship in Washington and by the United States Army. Those two agencies have completed examination of the document and related maps and have given their approval to general publication of the material with some modification.

The confidential mimeographed edition was not reproduced by this agency and we assume that it was kept confidential, because it was realized by the institute that some of the statements might be objected to by military authorities and it was for this reason that the document was submitted to the censor and to the Army for clearance.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT, *Director.*

EXHIBIT No. 145

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,
Baltimore, Md., January 27, 1939.

Mr. BENJAMIN H. KIZER,
Old National Bank Building,
Spokane, Wash.

DEAR MR. KIZER: I have just been reading with great appreciation an advance copy of your article to come out in Amerasia. This article will do a lot of good, I think. It is one of the most statesmanlike discussions of the whole subject that I have seen.

Is it in time, however? Aren't we all of us too late? One of the most shocking things about the present atmosphere of crisis is that at the very time when the Gallup poll has tabulated the fact which most of us knew already—that the majority of people in this country are in favor of Loyalist Spain and disgusted with the Spanish embargo—nothing has been done about it, and Barcelona has been allowed to fall. Is this purely inertia? Is it just a lag between the forming of the popular will and the expression of that will through political action by the Government? Not just that, I am afraid. The effect of the natural inertia or lag has been very much aggravated by the lobbying and string-pulling of those who "view with alarm" just that very thing—the expression of the popular will.

Are we going to be as far behind the run of the play in Asia as we have in Europe? Maybe we have a slight edge, because, as you have pointed out, the key to the whole situation is the fact that Japan is the angle of the Fascist triangle. The Japanese don't need to be defeated outright. If they are just properly stalled, it will nullify the gain in Europe made by Italy and Germany.

We have just met here your friends, the Hazelton Spensers, and are enjoying them very much. I had dinner there the other night with Archibald MacLeish. He has been giving a series of lectures here on modern poetry. Very brilliant, and some penetrating analyses. I think he is dead right in saying that in our times, the atmosphere of our generation, the genuinely poetic mood is bound to be political.

With warm regards from both my wife and myself.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a list of positions held in the IPR by Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer, as taken from the official publication of the IPR, which I wish to place in the record.

The positions include vice chairman, American Council, IPR; member of the international secretariat, and other positions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record Mr. Mandel's compilation of the positions held by Mr. Benjamin H. Kizer in its entirety in the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Budenz, there is no doubt that this is the individual to whom you refer? It gives his address as "Attorney, Spokane, Wash."

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 146" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 146

BENJAMIN H. KIZER

Benjamin H. Kizer (1933, 1936), member of the law firm of Graves, Kizer & Graves; Chairman, Region No. 9, National Resources Planning Board; associate member of the War Labor Board; vice chairman, American Council, IPR (p. 160).

Source: War and Peace in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations on wartime and postwar cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4-14, 1942; international secretariat, IPR; copyright, 1943.

Benjamin H. Kizer (1933, 1936, 1942), lawyer (Graves, Kizer & Graves), Spokane, Wash.; trustee, American IPR; associate public member, National War Labor Board, 1943-45; Director, China Office, UNRRA, 1945-46 (p. 120).

Source: Problems of Economic Reconstruction in the Far East, tenth conference of the IPR, Stratford-on-Avon, England, September 5-20, 1947; international secretariat, IPR; copyright, 1949.

B. H. Kizer, attorney, Spokane, Wash. (p. 456).

Source: Problems of the Pacific, 1933, economic conflict and control proceedings of the fifth conference of the IPR, Banff, Alberta, Canada, August 14-26, 1933; edited by Bruno Lasker and W. L. Holland, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.; published June 1934.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter on the letterhead of Benjamin H. Kizer, dated August 23, 1937, and addressed to Frederick V. Field of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to read the letter. [Reading:]

Now that dramatic and bloody events in the Far East are so rapidly making history of the sort that we have come to regard as inevitable, no matter how evil the consequences, I have taken occasion to reread, in the quiet of Sunday afternoon, your article "The Far East and American Foreign Policy," reprinted from *The Annals*.

Even more than in my first reading, I am deeply impressed with the insight into those tangled relations that it discloses. It calls to my mind a characteristic sentence of Judge Holmes: "The final gift is, I think, insight." Your article has that "final gift" in its best form.

You take up the question of American foreign policy in the Far East where the rest of us who recently contributed in Amerasia left off and give us a relatively complete picture, not merely of that policy but of its probable consequences. It is the world's tragedy that, although such insight as yours exists, the world is incapable of making use of it while nations stumble along blindfolded by their want of insight, with consequences that play havoc with human happiness and human destiny.

More than ever your article makes me eager to hear you on the neutrality topic at Victoria next month.

Yours faithfully,

B. H. KIZER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, this letter was written on August 23, 1937. At that time did you know that Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I had not yet met him, but I knew from official statements that he was a member.

Mr. MORRIS. Your earlier testimony was that you attended a meeting with him in 1937.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. That was approximately in October.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. This was in October. Do you think it is possible that Mr. Field could have assumed such an important position in the Communist Party in the ensuing 2 months?

Mr. BUDENZ. No. He had come to my attention before as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. So, at the time Mr. Kizer wrote this letter praising Mr. Field's writing on the Far East, you know that Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right. I had not met him, however, until approximately October, as far as I recall. I may have met him earlier.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be introduced and marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 147" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 147

SPOKANE, WASH., August 23, 1937.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,

American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,

129 East Fifty-second Street, New York City.

MY DEAR FRED: Now that dramatic and bloody events in the Far East are so rapidly making history of the sort that we have come to regard as inevitable, no matter how evil the consequences, I have taken occasion to re-read, in the quiet of Sunday afternoon, your article "The Far East and American Foreign Policy," reprinted from *The Annals*.

Even more than in my first reading, I am deeply impressed with the insight into those tangled relations that it discloses. It calls to my mind a characteristic sentence of Judge Holmes: "The final gift is, I think, insight." Your article has that "final gift" in its best form.

You take up the question of American foreign policy in the Far East where the rest of us who recently contributed to *Amerasia* left off and give us a relatively complete picture, not merely of that policy but of its probable consequences. It is the world's tragedy that, although such insight as yours exists, the world is incapable of making use of it while nations stumble along blindfolded by their want of insight, with consequences that play havoc with human happiness and human destiny.

More than ever your article makes me eager to hear you on the neutrality topic at Victoria next month.

Yours faithfully,

B. H. KIZER.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter on the letterhead of the National Resources Planning Board, field office, Portland, Ore. It is dated December 1, 1942. It is addressed to Mr. W. W. Lockwood, and it is signed by George Sundborg, senior planning technician, region X.

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: We have just received from the Military Intelligence Service of the Army a request that it be furnished with four copies of your American Council Paper No. 2, which as I understand it is Mr. Kizer's paper

on the North Pacific planning project, prepared for presentation at Mont Tremblant. The copies are needed for distribution within the Army.

Can you take care of this request? The address is:

North American Group,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Lt. J. S. Culbertson.
Sincerely yours,

GEORGE SUNDBORG,
Senior Planning Technician, Region X.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose for introducing this letter into the record is to show that Mr. Kizer's papers were being distributed and taken up by the Army Intelligence on December 1, 1941. With that limited purpose, I introduce this letter into the record and ask that it be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. Are we to understand that it was found in the records of IPR?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel did so testify.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be then introduced at this time for that limited purpose.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 148" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 148

NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD,
FIELD OFFICE,
Portland, Oreg., December 1, 1942.

Mr. W. W. LOCKWOOD,
*Secretary, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. LOCKWOOD: We have just received from the Military Intelligence Service of the Army a request that it be furnished with four copies of your American Council Paper No. 2, which as I understand it is Mr. Kizer's paper on the North Pacific planning project, prepared for presentation at Mont Tremblant. The copies are needed for distribution within the Army.

Can you take care of this request? The address is:

North American Group,
Military Intelligence Service,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Lt. J. S. Culbertson.
Sincerely yours,

GEORGE SUNDBORG,
Senior Planning Technician, Region X.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a footnote dated November 5, 1948, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

"C. L. from E. C. C." "C. L." may be Corliss Lamont, and "E. C. C." may be E. C. Carter.

The letter reads as follows:

I don't know whether you ever met Ben Kizer who for years has been one of our staunchest board members from anywhere in the country. He believes profoundly in the institute and has the broadest kind of international outlook. It will pay you to keep very closely in touch with him and whenever you do decide to go to the Northwest, you should spend at least a full day with him in Spokane and let him arrange for a visit at least to nearby Pullman. The above is occasioned by this letter which I wish you would return.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be so introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 149" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 149

[Handwritten note:]

R. D. C.: Please note for me.

E. C. C.: Thanks, and double congratulations for footnote in both [unintelligible]—L.

NOVEMBER 5, 1948.

C. L. from E. C. C.

I don't know whether you ever met Ben Kizer who for years has been one of our staunchest board members from anywhere in the country. He believes profoundly in the institute and has the broadest kind of international outlook. It will pay you to keep very closely in touch with him and whenever you do decide to go to the Northwest you should spend at least a full day with him in Spokane and let him arrange for a visit at least to nearby Pullman. The above is occasioned by this letter which I wish you would return.

[Handwritten] R. D. C.: Has E. C. C. asked Mayer for his India letters? P. E. L. might find them a useful suggestion for FES articles.—K. R. C. P.

[Handwritten] I'd also like to see them.—W. L. H.

Mr. MORRIS. One reason for mentioning this is to show that Ben Kizer was for many years associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations as a board member. It is also introduced for the other comments contained therein.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated November 2, 1948. It is from Benjamin H. Kizer to Mr. Edward C. Carter. It was taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR NED: Responsive to your good letter of the 29th instant, I have concluded, for this year only, to add \$100 to my contribution, and make it \$150. This, in spite of the fact that the drains on me for this year are exceptionally heavy. I do this solely because I do want to support you as fully as I can in this year. I have a deep loyalty, admiration, and affection for you, and for the generous, self-abnegating way in which you have so richly spent your life in the cause of international relations, now of primary importance to us all.

I will send the remittance within a month. Just now, I am accumulating pennies for the final installment of income tax, which I want to have behind me before remitting.

With friendliest greetings, as always,

Yours faithfully,

BENJAMIN H. KIZER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 150" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 150

SPOKANE, November 2, 1948.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR NED: Responsive to your good letter of the 29th instant, I have concluded, for this year only, to add \$100 to my contribution, and make it \$150. This, in spite of the fact that the drains on me for this year are exceptionally heavy. I do this solely because I do want to support you as fully as I can in this year. I have a deep loyalty, admiration, and affection for you, and for the generous, self-abnegating way in which you have so richly spent your life in the cause of international relations, now of primary importance to us all.

I will send the remittance within a month. Just now, I am accumulating pennies for the final installment of income tax, which I want to have behind me before remitting.

With friendliest greetings, as always,

Yours faithfully,

BENJAMIN H. KIZER.

P. S.—I have a letter from Arthur Mayer that indicates that he has returned from his trip to India. His office has sent out mimeographed letters to a circle of friends, covering his India experiences. Do ask him for a set of them. You will find them richly rewarding.

B. H. K.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a small note dated August 16, 1942, which is headed "W. W. L. from R. W. B."

We presume "W. W. L." to be William William Lockwood, and "R. W. B." to be Robert W. Barnett.

The letter reads as follows. This is also taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

W. W. L. from R. W. B.

Your letter of July 23 to Kizer is most interesting and very sound. I don't see Julean Arnold maneuvering public opinion and congressional pressure groups with the finesse required. He is essentially sentimental about China. Lattimore has pointed out what damage sentiment might do. Would it be desirable for Schwellenbach, now, to take the lead in initial soundings and have Arnold and Walsh et al. attach themselves to him? I would like to talk to you about this.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. For whom did you say the initials "R. W. B." stood?

Mr. MANDEL. Robert Warren Barnett. The initials "W. W. L." stood for William W. Lockwood.

Senator SMITH. What is the basis for your assumption?

Mr. MANDEL. We have numerous correspondence with those initials and those names.

Senator SMITH. The reason I ask this, Mr. Chairman, I do know this gentleman Barnett. I know he went to school in my State, our State university. About 40 or 45 years ago, I knew his father. I was interested when you called out his name.

Mr. MANDEL. He is the secretary of the Washington IPR and there is a great deal of correspondence from him with his name written out.

Senator SMITH. There is no question about his identity?

Mr. MANDEL. No.

Senator SMITH. If there was any question, I wanted to raise the propriety of introducing something that carried an assumption.

Mr. SOURWINE. The situation is this, Mr. Senator. These particular initials are found with great frequency in the files.

The gentleman concerning whom Mr. Mandel said the initials presumably referred to is the only person with those initials who we know is closely connected with the institute. He was connected, as Mr. Mandel testified.

Senator SMITH. I did not know.

Senator O'CONOR. I might ask Mr. Mandel if he can give us assurance that as of this time, August 16, 1942, or at or about that time, those parties were so connected.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. This morning, was there not another name mentioned—Robert Somebody? Who was that mentioned this morning?

Mr. MANDEL. Nobody else.

Senator SMITH. There was something said about a Robert Somebody this morning. I do not recall now. I just wanted to be sure.

Mr. MORRIS. May I make an observation, Mr. Chairman, on that?

Senator O'CONOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice from my perusal of the files in the Institute of Pacific Relations, the people did not make any reference by initials only to staff members; that is, by their own staff members, and in their own offices. Robert Barnett is the only staff member or officer who does have those initials.

Senator SMITH. I did not know whether he was a member or not.

I was just trying to be guarded lest we might attach some implication to some initials here that is not warranted. What you say puts a different light on the subject.

Mr. MORRIS. I, myself, understand that Mr. Robert W. Barnett was the secretary of the Washington, D. C., chapter of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. That is something I had not heard of before.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record.

Mr. MANDEL. The next exhibit is that of a photostat of a round-table proceedings of August 26, 1936; obviously connected with the Yosemite IPR Conference which occurred at that time.

This give the comments of the various participants. I want to read only the comments of Kizer, who is listed here as representing the United States:

We may begin with the illuminating point of Mr. Dafoe that between 1922 and the present time the emergence of the powers Russia and China has made a fundamental alteration in the balance in the Pacific.

We have discovered that the United States and other powers are now more or less powerless so that the Washington Treaty is correspondingly out of date. There has been a tendency in the discussions to emphasize political questions at the expense of economic ones. The emergence of Russia as a Pacific power has been due to her emphasis on internal economic development and the same is true of China with her emphasis on the reconstruction policy. Nations emphasizing their internal economic policy are thereby making a contribution to the settlement of problems around the Pacific.

We should study the possibility of adjustments of strains by each nation trying to adjust its own internal problems so that it does not need to export goods or labor and so disturb other economies.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Morris, before going into that, if we can go back for just a brief moment to the previous exhibit, which is a note from W. W. L. to R. W. B.

A reference is made to one Julean Arnold. Is there any further information that bears on that individual that might indicate or identify him?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce that excerpt from the Department of State?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the Register of the Department of State. It is dated April 1, 1950.

Julean Arnold, Jr., is listed here. I will just read his last position in the Department of State. "P-4, May 3, 1946, as a country specialist." This is his full biographical record.

Senator O'CONOR. This register, I note, is as of April 1, 1950.

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Reference to him is purely incidental. There is no implication in any way.

Senator O'CONOR. I wanted to be certain that he was identified so that it would not reflect on anyone else.

All right. That will be introduced.

(The first document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 151" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 151

AUGUST 16, 1942.

W. W. L. from R. W. B.

Your letter of July 23 to Kizer is most interesting; and very sound. I don't see Julean Arnold maneuvering public opinion and congressional pressure groups with the finesse required. He is essentially sentimental about China. Latimore has pointed out what damage sentiment might do. Would it be desirable for Schwellenbach, now, to take the lead in initial soundings and have Arnold and Walsh et al attach themselves to him? I would like to talk to you about this.

Arnold, Julean, Jr.—b. Hankow, China, of Am. parents Oct. 8, 1914; Shanghai Am. Sch. grad.; Pomona Coll., B. A. 1936; Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, A. M. 1938; cml. agt., Bu. of For. and Dom. Com., 1939-41; U. S. Army 1941-46, lt. col.; app. country specialist, P-4, in the Dept. of State May 3, 1946; P-5 Feb. 9, 1947; GS-12 Oct. 30, 1949; married. (Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1950, p. 18.)

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that the last exhibit read by Mr. Mandel be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be so marked.

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 152" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 152

ROUND TABLE C. AUGUST 26, 1936

(Recorder, C. B. Fahs)

(Chairman (Motylev) opened discussion on the first three questions of subtopic A in the agenda.)

KIZER (United States). We may begin with the illuminating point of Mr. Daffoe that between 1922 and the present time the emergence of the powers Russia and China has made a fundamental alteration in the balance in the Pacific. We have discovered that the United States and other powers are now more or less powerless so that the Washington Treaty is correspondingly out of date. There has been a tendency in the discussions to emphasize political questions at the expense of economic ones. The emergence of Russia as a Pacific power has been due to her emphasis on internal economic development and the same is true of China with her emphasis on the reconstruction policy. Nations emphasizing their internal economic policy are thereby making a contribution to the settlement of problems around the Pacific. We should study the possibility of adjustments of strains by each nation trying to adjust its own internal problems so that it does not need to export goods or labor and so disturb other economies.

SCHILLINGLAW (United States). To what extent does Mr. Kizer imply isolation?

KIZER. Not in least. The policy of voluntary association will develop better when the nations adjust their internal stresses so that the question of cooperation with other nations is really a voluntary one.

MOTYLEV. We should pay attention to military as well as political questions. For example, the problem of navies and the denunciation of the Washington Treaty. Also changes in the economic strength of various nations and their political effects.

BELSHAW (New Zealand). It seems that the emphasis of question (3) is on maladjustment but behind that problem is the actual increase in economic power, e.g., of Japan and the U.S.S.R. Japan's increase in armaments is both motivated by and made possible by her increasing economic strength. On the other hand the preoccupation of the United States and Great Britain with domestic problems has made more difficult the maintenance of a positive interest in the Far East and so removed an obstacle to Japanese expansion. The question

involves the possibilities of agreement between the great powers as to what policy should be in the east. I have an idea that agreement between two parties is easier when they are approximately equal in strength. When there is a wide disparity in strength the possibility of agreement is less. In the east it is now virtually impossible for the United States or Great Britain to take effective action and therefore it is much more difficult to agree on policy. Changes in relative power are also influenced by the political situation in Europe. In Australia and New Zealand there is a growing feeling that we can no longer rely on defense by the British Navy. Therefore there is an emphasis on internal defense, e.g., by development of air force. The fear is not of occupation but of the changing balance. I should like to see a discussion of the increase in productive capacity and the resulting maladjustment.

TAKAHASHI (translated by Nagakura). The greatest factor in the change of economic conditions is that the principle of freedom of trade has been wiped out. This is the fundamental reason for various disputes of a political nature.

HAMANO. Re Takahashi's statement I should like to add that recent changes must be traced back to the World War which caused a great price rise and a reduction of exports from England. As a result far eastern countries became more or less self-sufficient. India which before the war imported three-fourths of its cotton piece goods now only imports one tenth or one fifth. This tendency was accentuated by the depression of 1929—also a result of the war—which decreased the price and market for the agricultural products of the east (and so reduced the exchange resources available for imports). We must consider the internal production changes in each country. Takahashi says free trade was forbidden but why? The cause is the self-sufficient tendency growing out of the high prices of the World War.

HOPPER. (United States). Question 1 implies a shift of power in the east, the decline of western states and the increase of the U. S. S. R. and Japan. Could we not list the changes meant in order to avoid confusion?

LATTIMORE (United States). If we are to discuss changes in the distribution of power we must get common idea of the nature of power. The present period may be considered the period of breakdown of Washington treaties. The treaties were surely the expression of a sigh of relief of the countries dominant after the war who thought they could establish a stable state of affairs in the Pacific. The great omission of the Washington treaties was the Soviet Union. No one foresaw the rapid rise of the Soviet Union and the vindication of its principles. I said sometime ago that the shift in balance of power in the Far East was from a maritime to a land basis. Soviet critics challenged me, prophesying that Japan would demand a larger rather than a smaller navy in connection with its land expansion. They were right and I wrong. It is not simply a geographical question of distribution of land and sea power. The rise of the Soviet Union has vindicated the efficiency in practice of an economic system quite different from that of the other powers. We must be very careful when speaking of nations and national policies. Motive powers are frequently interests not nations themselves. The question implies a change in the nature of power and a challenge to the western system of a new system challenging it in efficiency. The tendency of China in the past was to gravitate to the stronger power and to adopt capitalism. The rise of the U. S. S. R. not only changed the balance but raised the question of relative efficiency and China now shows a conflict of tendencies—half to the west, half to the U. S. S. R. This influence of the Soviet Union must not be confused with propaganda.

KIZER. Has not Lattimore too easily given up his point that the center of gravity was bound to shift from sea to land? Was not the denunciation of the Washington treaty by Japan part of its program to establish power on the continent?

LATTIMORE. I still think the theory is sound as far as it goes but it does not go far enough. Must also consider balance of efficiencies between social and economic systems.

MOTYLEV. The discussion has brought us to the question of navies. What is the economic and political significance of the denunciation of the Wahs. [sic] naval treaty? What are the prospects of a naval race?

ROSE (Great Britain). Suggest invite Admiral Taylor who is a naval expert.

MOTYLEV. All right but question not only a military one. Has economic and political significance as well.

VAN MOOK. The question especially concerns countries in the tropical sphere of the Pacific. As China, Japan, and the U. S. S. R. have developed economic stability they have developed a certain amount of self-sufficiency which has

decreased foreign trade. As Motylev has pointed out the 5-year plan was intended to supply the home market. Japan has also sought to develop markets and sources of material within her control. Nevertheless there have been increased Japanese exports to the Dutch East Indies. If this were not balanced by Dutch East Indies trade to the United States we would have the contradiction of Asiatic countries forcing exports to be limiting exports from the Dutch East Indies.

Another consideration is that if the United States should withdraw from the Pacific the Philippine Islands would enter this unhappy family of nations and conditions would be worse than now. The policy of self-sufficiency can be followed by countries of great area and economic resources but is difficult for small countries with limited resources. As long as economic nationalism predominates it tends to dislocate trade in the less favored countries.

MOTYLEV. Called on Admiral Taylor for a statement on the naval issue and on the influence of the development of air forces.

TAYLOR (Great Britain). Air power may have important effects in certain limited regions but not on the general question of sea power in the Pacific because of the great distances concerned. Aircraft are an important auxiliary to naval forces but their influence by themselves on sea power is slight. They cannot carry stores or troops in large quantities. If these are carried by ships they must be defended by ships except perhaps at the terminals.

In regard to sea power. In our estimate the settlement at Washington of naval ration plus status quo agreements gave everyone a fair degree of security. It gave Japan a greater degree of security than the British Empire can ever possess.

HOPPER. Asked Taylor whether view should not be directed to broad Pacific area. Wasn't it shown in the Mediterranean that the air force dictated settlement? Could this not be applied to the China coast?

TAYLOR. I was in the Mediterranean and did not think air power a deciding factor. Of course there are certain areas where air power will have to very great effect but in the Pacific the distances are too great. Hongkong to Japan is 1,500 miles. It is possible but not a "military operation." It would be possible for purposes of frightfulness but that is ineffective policy.

HOPPER. The distances in the north are less. Vladivostok to Tokyo is only 700 miles.

TAYLOR. The distance is still very great.

SCHILLINGLAW. What will be the effect of denunciation of the treaties on policies and strengths in the next few years.

TAYLOR. General answer impossible. Depends on circumstances in Pacific and elsewhere. We all hope that although Japan has not signed she will not depart from the 1936 agreements to such an extent as to cause any other power to have to increase armaments beyond the present ratios and that there will be no need for change re agreement armaments status quo in the Pacific.

WRIGHT (Great Britain). Do the Japanese agree that the Washington treaties give Japan a greater measure of security.

TAMURA (Japan). The reason for denunciation was the desire on the Japanese Government to recover autonomy of national defense. The 5-5-3 ratio was accepted reluctantly by the Japanese people and led to many tragedies, such as the assassination of the Premier. We do not intend to have the same strength as Great Britain and the United States, but psychologically want equality of status. It is a question of national pride. Japan is satisfied with the release from the restrictions of the treaty and has no intention to increase naval power and engage in a naval race with United States or Great Britain.

WRIGHT. Does this mean that Japan would be opposed to a collective system or to all-around disarmament?

TAMURA. That is another question. For 15 years Japan was a loyal member of the League of Nations. Difficulty was that Japan's two great neighbors, the United States and U. S. S. R., were not members. For example, in the case of the North Manchuria Railway dispute of 1929 between the U. S. S. R. and China, when hostilities broke out, Japan cooperated with the United States in refusing to interfere along with other League powers. Another difficulty in collective agreements is that the rise of Russia has changed the conditions under which the so-called Nine-Power Treaty was signed. The U. S. S. R. is not a party. The treaty guarantees the integrity of China, but Outer Mongolia would seem not to be a territory of China.

China's territorial integrity has been violated by a nonsigner of the Nine-Power Treaty. A great power nonparty to the treaty has penetrated Outer

Mongolia and Outer Mongolia has been alienated from China. This is a serious problem to us, because we are direct neighbors. The United States and Great Britain are far off, interested only in trade and not concerned, but for Japan it becomes a question of self-defense.

MOTYLEV. Is the Nine-Power Treaty still recognized or not?

TAMURA. Of course.

DAFOE. The unofficial opinion in the United States seems to be that it has lapsed.

SCHILLINGLAW. The statements of Secretary Stimson and Hull indicate that it is still effective.

VAN MOOK. Would the accession of the U. S. S. R. to the Nine-Power Treaty change the view of Japan?

TAMURA. I cannot answer. Would the U. S. S. R. join the treaty?

MOTYLEV. That is a conditional question, and I need not answer. Can we turn to the question of the influence of reconstruction in China on the changing balance of power?

LEE (China). A full answer is impossible. Reconstruction in China exercises a stabilizing influence on peace in the Far East, provided that it does not induce aggression on part of other powers. Reconstruction efforts have centered on the development of unity—for example, through road building, a nation-wide radio network, and so forth—and this unity should be a stabilizing influence.

HAMANO. Recently American air companies have extended lines in the interior of China. Are these paying lines or not?

LEE. Are Japanese airlines paying? Most airlines are not. In any case the control of these lines is solely in Chinese hands.

HOPPER. The United States has taken no action in regard to the Nine-Power Treaty, but I believe it is the opinion of the State Department that the three Washington agreements fall together.

DAFOE. It is a nice question of international law.

MOTYLEV. The problem of the balance of power requires attention to tendencies of development. From this viewpoint, it is much more complicated. It is necessary to pay attention to the real economic strength and the strength of the social order, to the influence of real economic possibilities on future development, to possible American naval and air expansion, and to the significance to the Pacific of the European balance of power. We cannot hope to answer the whole question, because the round-table is more or less limited to questions of economies and access to raw materials. But clarification requires understanding not only of facts but also of tendencies.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment on that exhibit, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The date is important. Yes; I do. This follows exactly the line laid down by Eisler: that the Pacific Ocean was to become a Soviet lake.

It is well known through the Communist Party. It is in line with the agreement with the Communist Parties of China, the Philippines, the United States, and Japan—under the guidance of Moscow—to get American “imperialism” out of the Pacific, because they declared that America is powerless in the Pacific and should turn to its own internal development.

Mr. MORRIS. That is your interpretation of the article to the extent that you heard it?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. Insofar as you would express it in non-Communist expressions.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. Chairman, the next name we have on the list here is a person who is now dead. Again, as the chairman has counseled at the outset, we do not introduce this name to introduce evidence about that particular person.

Our interest is his associations in the past with people now living. It is for that purpose that we introduce the following evidence on Evans F. Carlson.

Mr. Budenz, do you know that he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. General Carlson was a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you meet him, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I met him on one occasion in the middle forties.

Mr. MORRIS. Were his Communist activities extensive?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. He has been a Communist for a long time according to the official reports made in the Politbureau and to me. I met him at Fred Field's house. He was not a general then. I think at that time he was for the moment retired. But he returned to the Army again.

I saw him for only a moment because I had to go back to the Daily Worker. I met him along with Marian Bachrach.

Mr. MORRIS. Along with official party circumstances?

Mr. BUDENZ. It would have been a party meeting. Then, again, General Carlson was very widely discussed just before I left the party as the man who would lead the movement for a Red China in the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he—I am sorry.

Mr. BUDENZ. That developed later in the organization, I understand. This was being discussed very definitely. His consent had already been received according to statements in the Politbureau when I left the party.

Mr. MORRIS. What organization did that become?

Mr. BUDENZ. I just cannot recall its name. If you can recall it to my—

Mr. MORRIS. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. While you were in the party, you heard that organization being formed?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And you heard that Evans Carlson was to be the head of that organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read from the—

Senator O'CONNOR. Can you amplify, or give us any further information as to its objective or purpose other than that which you have given in such a general way?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This organization was to be a new organization which would declare that the United States would completely withdraw any interest in China and should allow the Chinese Communists to develop their activities there.

Of course, it had many ramifications; but that was the general idea: Within the United States to drive for the United States' abandoning Nationalist China completely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you know if you have a listing that that organization is listed as a subversive organization by the Attorney General?

Mr. MANDEL. It was cited as a subversive organization by the Attorney General—Attorney General Tom Clark on April 27, 1949.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you say the name was?

Mr. MANDEL. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt that Carlson was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir. That was brought to my official attention on many occasions and over a number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce or read the exhibits showing Evans Carlson's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I wish to introduce a list of books and articles officially published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations and written by Evans Fordyce Carlson.

Quoting from his book, if I may, an authorized biography of Evans F. Carlson, entitled "The Big Yankee." I read from page 257, a letter from Carlson to United States Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in answer to the latter's question as to the nature of the Chinese Communists:

Their political doctrines are representative democracy; their economic doctrines are the cooperative theory, and only in their social application are they Communists, for they place a great deal of emphasis on social equality. * * * They want democracy in China, free speech, free press, and the rest.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, would you recognize that as Communist propaganda?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. I also would recognize the author of General Carlson's biography as a Communist—Michael Blankfort. He is well known to myself as a Communist. He had many consultations with me as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, were you going to read the list of books written by Evans Carlson and put out by the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. Author of *The Chinese Army*. Author of *Strategy of the Sino-Japanese War*, Far Eastern Survey, May 19, 1941, page 99. Author of *The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyan*, Pacific Affairs, 1939, pages 279-284, and the writer of *Letters Regarding the Guerrilla War in China*, in Pacific Affairs, June 1939, pages 183-184.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that excerpt made by Mr. Mandel introduced into the record in its entirety and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be so introduced and marked by the reporter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 153" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 153

EVANS FORDYCE CARLSON

Author of *The Chinese Army—Its Origin and Military Efficiency*, published by the international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations; publications office, 129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, 1940.

Author of *Strategy of the Sino-Japanese War*, far-eastern survey, May 19, 1941, page 99.

Author of *The Chinese Mongol Front in Suiyan*, Pacific Affairs, 1939, pages 278-284.

Quoting from *The Big Yankee*, an authorized biography of Evans F. Carlson, written by Michael Blankfort (Little, Brown & Co., 1947), page 257, a letter from Carlson to United States Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson in answer to the latter's question as to the nature of the Chinese Communists: "Their political doctrines are representative democracy; their economic doctrines are the cooperative theory, and only in their social application are they Communists, for they place a great deal of emphasis on social equality. * * * They want democracy in China, free speech, free press, and the rest."

Writer of *Letters Regarding the Guerrilla War in China*, in Pacific Affairs, June 1939, pages 183-184.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any letters showing Carlson's activities within the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. We have here several letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One is dated March 27, 1939, which is a letter addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, from Owen Lattimore. I will read the letter:

Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak out, he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east, I have no recent impressions by which to gage his possible usefulness as a "friend of China."

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write you again.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that "Friend of China," in quotes, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. I was just wondering why the words "Friend of China" were in quotes. Would that mean anything?

Mr. BUDENZ. Where?

Senator FERGUSON. Right at the bottom of the letter there.

Mr. BUDENZ. It in itself does not mean anything. No, I would not put any particular interpretation on it, except, of course, for one who had Mr. Lattimore's allegiance as a "Friend of China" and—

Mr. MORRIS. Was that the same allegiance that Evans Carlson had?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any other comments to make on that incident, Mr. Budenz? Did you hear about that within the Communist Party—the resignation of Carlson?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell what you recall about it?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, in reference to his resignation, I know it was partly due to the fact that he had such a strong feeling for the Chinese Communists, that he felt he could serve better by being outside the Army, where he could express his opinion.

He had come into contact with them, and had formed a very strong alliance with them, or, at least, a friendship with them, and wished to speak out on the subject.

Senator FERGUSON. Does that letter indicate to you that Mr. Lattimore thought it would be better for him as a "Friend of China" to remain in the services and act in the services rather than quit and go out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, most decidedly. That was the way the advice was given to Carlson. I was not there. I was not present. That was the advice the party gave to General Carlson, and he used the first opportunity to take advantage of it when the war came along.

Senator FERGUSON. What was his rank; do you know?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was a colonel most of the time. My understanding is they made him a general. I do not know the exact specifications.

We referred to him as colonel Carlson, but he has been referred to in recent years as general.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the same man?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. It is the same man.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record this document and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be so introduced and admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 154" and filed for the record.)

EXHIBIT No. 154

BALTIMORE, Md., March 27, 1939.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

Institute of Pacific Relations, New York City.

DEAR CARTER: Thanks for sending me the copy of the letter from Carlson. If I had known about this before, I should have risked impertinence by writing to urge him not to resign. As an officer in the Marine Corps, known to have a favorable view of China's prospects in the war, and known to be restrained from giving full expression to his views by Navy Department policy, Carlson had quite a potent effect. As an officer who has resigned his commission in order to speak out he will have a momentary sensational effect, but is in danger of soon being disparaged as more sentimental than realistic. I hope very much that he has the ability to earn his way by writing and speaking, but there is no evidence to go on. As I did not see him on his brief trip east I have no recent impressions by which to gauge his possible usefulness as a "Friend of China."

I expect I shall be hearing from him direct before long and if so I shall write you again.

Yours very sincerely,

OWEN LATTIMORE.

Mr. MANDEL. The next letter from the files of the institute is dated June 6, 1940. It is addressed to Mr. John H. Oakie. The sender is Mr. Frederick V. Field. I shall read the letter:

DEAR JACK: I wonder if you know that Maj. Evans Carlson is going to be in Berkeley for a few weeks in connection with the Mills summer institute, and that he will then proceed to China? You doubtless do have this information but I want to urge you to try and arrange a meeting at which Carlson can speak perhaps more frankly and openly than he could at Mills for he has direct contacts with our administration people from the top down and has a pretty good first-hand picture of the way things are moving. One interesting point, for instance, is that our whole naval strategy is in process of rapid transition which if it goes through will withdraw approximately half of the fleet from the Pacific for operations in Latin American waters. This, as you can obviously see, has broad implications with regard to the possibility of our taking any action—even short of military action—in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know that on June 6, 1940, Frederick V. Field was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. He certainly was. He not only was a member of the Communist Party, but he was openly an enemy of President Roosevelt as the head of the Nation and of the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment to make on that letter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it speaks for itself.

Senator SMITH. I would like to ask a question.

Senator O'CONOR. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. I notice the word "Administration" is capitalized. Whom do you think they were referring to—the national administration or the administration of some other activity?

Mr. BUDENZ. No. He means the national administration.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into evidence and marked the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 155" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 155

NEW YORK CITY, *June 6, 1940.*

Mr. JOHN H. OAKIE,
San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR JACK: I wonder if you know that Maj. Evans Carlson is going to be in Berkeley for a few weeks in connection with the Mills Summer Institute, and that he will then proceed to China? You doubtless do have this information but I want to urge you to try and arrange a meeting at which Carlson can speak perhaps more frankly and openly than he could at Mills for he has direct contacts with our Administration people from the top down and has a pretty good first-hand picture of the way things are moving. One interesting point, for instance, is that our whole naval strategy is in process of rapid transition which if it goes through will withdraw approximately half of the fleet from the Pacific for operations in Latin-American waters. This, as you can obviously see, has broad implications with regard to the possibility of our taking any action—even short of military action—in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Senator FERGUSON. I do not know that I know who John H. Oakie is.

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not either.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not offhand.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, he was an officer of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator FERGUSON. I know.

Mr. MORRIS. We are not going to introduce any evidence about it at this time.

Senator FERGUSON. It would seem from this letter, as I read it, then, that Field thought that Carlson had some information in relation to our Navy that could be given to Oakie and other men.

Mr. MORRIS. He was a Marine officer.

Senator FERGUSON. Carlson was?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. This Mills Summer Institute; what was that?

Mr. MANDEL. Mills College. It is a women's college on the west coast.

Next is a letter dated June 15, 1943, addressed to Lauchlin Currie, and it is from Edward C. Carter. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

DEAR CURRIE: Sweet, of UCR, has compiled the enclosed list of foreign personnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and return this copy to me in due course.

"Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new and characteristically valuable experiences behind him. He leaves tonight

for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next 2 days in case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONOR. It will be admitted, and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 156" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 156

NEW YORK 22, N. Y., June 15, 1943.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE, Esq.,

Executive Office of the President,

The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CURRIE: Sweet, of UCR, has compiled the enclosed list of foreign personnel that might be of use in relief and rehabilitation positions in China. If there is anything of use to you in it will you make a copy for your files and return this copy to me in due course.

Col. Evans Carlson, as you doubtless know, is back from the Pacific with new and characteristic valuable experience behind him. He leaves tonight for Washington and will be at the Army and Navy Club for the next 2 days in case you want to see him. I assume he will be seeing the President.

Sincerely yours.

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. That letter, Mr. Chairman, seems to imply that Mr. Carlson had access to the President.

Senator O'CONOR. It is noted.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know Lauchlin Currie, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. By official reports; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. When he was in the White House?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Executive Administrator, or whatever his position was; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What did you know about him?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Ferguson, we have an episode concerning Lauchlin Currie that we are going to develop tomorrow in better sequence.

I think it would be more appropriate to wait until tomorrow, if you do not mind.

Senator FERGUSON. I will withhold my question.

Mr. MORRIS. If that is satisfactory with you, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The reason I think it should be brought up—two reasons; one, Currie's connection with the institute, and Currie's present position.

As I understand it, while it could not be classified as officially with the United States Government, it is in connection with money that is loaned by the United States Government or financed by the United States Government.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the episode that I relate to, and suggest that we take up at another time, involves many exhibits, and we are not quite ready for it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will withdraw it.

Mr. MORRIS. It should be interesting to find out.

Senator FERGUSON. I think he ought to be given an opportunity to come in here and explain some of these associations and things that happened here in the file.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated August 26, 1939. This is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter. It is from Evans F. Carlson.

I will read excerpts from the letter.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of the 15th, in which you enclosed the comment from Colonel Faymonville. I agree with Colonel Faymonville that " * * * the politics, economics, and military power of the Soviet Union constitute an important background for any event which happens in Asia * * *." I did not consider that an extended discussion of the relations of the Soviet Union to China formed a part of the subject under discussion. If you consider it desirable I can prepare four or five hundred words on that angle.

The nature of the concessions which China has had to make to gain Russian assistance is debatable. It is certain that such assistance has been used to induce the generalissimo to make certain concessions regarding the mobilization of the people and the ethical indoctrination of the army. I know from my conversations with Russian military men that these two doctrines are regarded as important potential military weapons.

I plan to depart for New York on Monday, the 28th. My plan is to move toward China by way of Europe. I would like to go via the Soviet Union if I can negotiate the necessary credentials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that letter in its entirety into the record and ask it be marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be admitted and so marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 157" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 157

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., August 26, 1939.

MR. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Secretary General, Institute of Pacific Relations,

New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of the 15th, in which you enclosed the comment from Colonel Faymonville.

I agree with Colonel Faymonville that "* * * the politics, economics, and military power of the Soviet Union constitute an important background for any event which happens in Asia * * *." I did not consider that an extended discussion of the relations of the Soviet Union to China formed a part of the subject under discussion. If you consider it desirable I can prepare four or five hundred words on that angle.

The Relation of Russia to the Sino-Japanese conflict can be argued from various points of view. If approached from the point of view of international politics, i. e., based on the self-interest of nations, it must be obvious that Russia's interest in China's independence is predominant. I have felt since this conflict began that Russia could not permit China to succumb to Japan. She has been providing assistance in an unofficial manner since September 1937. If China should reach the point where she could not carry on, even with the subrosa assistance, I believe that Russia would engage Japan openly and officially in order to assure China's independence.

The nature of the concessions which China has had to make to gain Russian assistance is debatable. It is certain that such assistance has been used to induce the generalissimo to make certain concessions regarding the mobilization of the people and the ethical indoctrination of the army. I know from my conversations with Russian military men that these two doctrines are regarded as important potential military weapons.

I plan to depart for New York on Monday, the 28th. My plan is to move toward China by way of Europe. I would like to go via the Soviet Union if I can negotiate the necessary credentials.

I hope to see you in New York. If possible, I would like to make the modifications in the manuscript which may be indicated.

With kind personal regards, I am,

Sincerely,

EVANS F. CARLSON.

Ian Pruitt is en route east.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally, there is a reference to exhibit No. 20. This is from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is dated August 30, 1939.

The note is marked "F. V. F. from E. C. C." Presumably "F. V. F." is Frederick Field, and "E. C. C." is Edward C. Carter. The note reads as follows:

You will be interested in this letter from Major Carlson. I will endeavor to furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials.

Senator SMITH. This is from whom?

Mr. MANDEL. From Carter to Field.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator O'CONNOR. It will be introduced.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 158" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 158

F. V. F. from E. C. C.

AUGUST 30, 1939.

You will be interested in this letter from Major Carlson. I will endeavor to furnish Carlson with the necessary Soviet credentials.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose for introducing that correspondence and that testimony about Mr. Carlson was relevant to present associations with people now living.

Mr. BUDENZ, do you know Talitha Gerlach?

Mr. BUDENZ. She is an active Communist-front member, and engaged in educational activities. She has been known to me personally. She was at several committee meetings in the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt that she was, when you knew her, a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes.

Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have no doubt at all. Not only from those occasions, but from repeated references to her in the State committee of New York and in many other official—

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, you spoke of her as an active Communist-front member. Does that characterization have a particular meaning in Communist parlance, or did you merely mean to generalize that she was a member of perhaps many and various Communist fronts?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, they do not use the expression "Communist fronts." They distinguish them between captive organizations and those which the Communists create. Those which the Communists create are Communist fronts. This woman has been a member of many Communist fronts.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your characterization of her as an active Communist-front member was interesting. I believe it was the first time you referred to anyone that way. I was wondering specifically why she came to your mind that way, since you have almost in the same breath testified that she was an active Communist—that is, a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. BUDENZ. I was endeavoring to identify her to some extent. Her name appears on a number of Communist-front lists.

Mr. SOURWINE. You mean she is a person more active than the usual Communist in connection with Communist-front matters?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. In other words, there were some Communists who were full-fledged Communists, you might say and who were also members of groups that were referred to as Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. As I have said, to my knowledge 95 percent of the members of the Communist-front organizations are actually Communists, and the other 10 percent are thrown in there to give that appearance or that uncertainty of connection with the Communist movement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Mr. Budenz. You have 105 percent. Will you settle for 90 and 10?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would say it was 5 and 95 percent.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have anything to show Miss Gerlach's relations with the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. I have two letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One letter is addressed to Miss Gerlach and sent to Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: As you know, I recently heard that Miss Cholmeley would like an invitation from the IPR to come to the United States for a short-time appointment. I cabled her an invitation some time ago. Today I received from Kweilin the following cable:

"Temporarily delayed owing Stevens State Department requesting assistance here.

"ELSIE CHOLMELEY."

Doubtless, I will have in due season further particulars by mail, but I thought you would want to know that she is not likely to turn up in the near future.

I am glad that she has a temporary appointment with a State Department official, because that should simplify her problem of getting the necessary visas to come here when she wants.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

The other is a letter dated February 6, 1943, and marked "Private and confidential."

DEAR MISS GERLACH: Interestingly enough Miss Cholmeley, who, as you know, is a 200 percent Indusco fan, is working for Mackenzie Stevens, of Maryland University, who was sent out by the State Department for 3 months to aid in reorganizing CIC. Unless Stevens is a miracle man, I doubt if Indusco has much to fear from Stevens, now that he is apparently in Miss Cholmeley's hands.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce that into evidence for the simple reason of showing the influence on the part of Miss Cholmeley without any comment whatever with respect to Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Mandel, will you identify Miss Cholmeley for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL. Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley is the wife of Israel Epstein, whose record we have previously testified about.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, as I recall, Senator Ferguson the other day asked for the immigration record on Israel Epstein.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you read that record, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D. C., dated July 20, 1951:

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 28, 1951, concerning Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein, also known as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Your communication under reference advised that it was your understanding that both these aliens were subjects of investigation by this Service, and requested that you be informed regarding the disposition of these cases. In response thereto, I wish to inform you that Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein were under investigation by this Service to determine whether or not they were deportable from the United States. However, prior to the completion of investigations, both aliens departed from the United States.

The records of this Service disclose that Mary Epstein departed on the steamship *Liberte* on November 11, 1950, destined for Plymouth, England. Israel Epstein departed on the steamship *Batory* on March 3, 1951. It may be of interest to you to know that prior to his departure from the United States, Mr. Epstein executed a document for the Service wherein he abandoned his domicile in the United States.

Upon the departure of these two aliens from the United States, this Service issued lookout notices throughout the United States in order to prevent the possible reentry of these aliens into this country at some future time.

Sincerely yours,

B. JOHN HABBERTON, *Commissioner*.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, does that answer your question?

Senator FERGUSON. That covers the matter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew that he was a Communist by official information, and from J. Peters, that he was engaged in Communist underground activities of an espionage character.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know his wife?

Mr. BUDENZ. I just heard her name. I did not hear any reports—that is, that I can remember.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call your attention to a document we introduced into the record the other day. It is from Edward C. Carter to Miss Anne Ford, publicity director, Little, Brown & Co.

It is dated June 12, 1947, wherein Mr. Carter endorsed the book by Epstein, *The Unfinished Revolution in China*.

I would like to make reference to it again at this time.

Senator O'CONOR. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce into the record the correspondence on Miss Talitha Gerlach, as well as the letter from the Immigration and Naturalization Service on Israel Epstein and his wife, Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Senator O'CONOR. That will be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 159 and 160," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 159

NEW YORK, N. Y., February 6, 1943.

Private and confidential.

MISS TALITHA GERLACH,

Foreign Division, YWCA,

New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: Interestingly enough Miss Cholmeley who, as you know, is a 200-percent Indusco fan, is working for Mackenzie Stevens of Maryland

University who was sent out by the State Department for 3 months to aid in reorganizing CIC. Unless Stevens is a miracle man, I doubt if Induseo has much to fear from Stevens now that he is apparently in Miss Cholmeley's hands.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

NEW YORK, N. Y., February 4, 1943.

MISS TALITHA GERLACH,
Foreign Division, YWCA,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS GERLACH: As you know, I recently heard that Miss Cholmeley would like an invitation from the IPR to come to the United States for a short-time appointment. I cabled her an invitation some time ago. Today I received from Kweilin the following cable:

"Temporarily delayed owing Stevens, State Department, requesting assistance here.

"ELSIE CHOLMELEY."

Doubtless I will have in due season further particulars by mail, but I thought you would want to know that she is not likely to turn up in the near future.

I am glad that she has a temporary appointment with a State Department official, because that should simplify her problem of getting the necessary visas to come here when she wants.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

EXHIBIT No. 160

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington 25, D. C., July 20, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 28, 1951, concerning Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein, also known as Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.

Your communication under reference advised that it was your understanding that both these aliens were subjects of investigation by this Service, and requested that you be informed regarding the disposition of these cases. In response thereto, I wish to inform you that Israel Epstein and his wife Mary Epstein were under investigation by this Service to determine whether or not they were deportable from the United States. However, prior to the completion of investigations, both aliens departed from the United States.

The records of this Service disclose that Mary Epstein departed on the Steamship *Liberte* on November 11, 1950, destined for Plymouth, England. Israel Epstein departed on the Steamship *Batory* on March 3, 1951. It may be of interest to you to know that prior to his departure from the United States, Mr. Epstein executed a document for the Service wherein he abandoned his domicile in the United States.

Upon the departure of these two aliens from the United States, this Service issued lookout notices throughout the United States in order to prevent the possible reentry of these aliens into this country at some future time.

Sincerely yours,

BENJ. G. HABBERTON,
Acting Commissioner.

Senator O'Connor. It had been agreed that we would suspend at this time because of certain commitments. So at this time the committee will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 10 a. m.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10 a. m.)

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424 Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarran, O'Connor, Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.

Also present: Representative Kersten; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Morris, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.— Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz at the termination of yesterday's session was identifying people associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations who were Communists. I would like to interrupt that process today and ask Mr. Budenz to discuss at some length the extent to which the Communists were able to influence our foreign policy, and we will commence our hearing today with that aspect.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, you may proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, during the time that you were editor of the Daily Worker and a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, did you Communists endeavor to influence the Far East policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; that was one of our main assignments from the international Communist organization.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you succeed in influencing the policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Successes were reported on a number of occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, would you tell us how you were able to influence the foreign policy of the United States?

Mr. BUDENZ. Through personal contacts here in Washington which had been laid over a series of years, through organizations like the Institute of Pacific Relations, which Browder had designated as an umbrella for Communist operations in this respect, and through other channels.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could give us some specific details.

Mr. BUDENZ. There is an incident in 1942 which stands out.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you describe what happened at that incident, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. In the fall of 1942—it was sometime ahead of October 2, and I will tell you why I recall that date later—but sometime ahead of October 2 Earl Browder called me to his office and asked me to look over a rough draft of an attack upon the State Department.

This was an attack upon the anti-Soviet clique in the State Department, more specifically. I looked it over and made a few changes, which were not supposed to be changes in content but in editing, and returned it to him. Thereupon very shortly thereafter he gave me this document for setting up, for printing, in the Sunday Worker.

He was to deliver this message at a meeting, if I recall correctly, of the Young Communist League on October 2, 1942. In that message or speech or document he attacked very sharply the reactionary clique in the State Department which was favoring Chiang Kai-shek and injuring the Chinese Communists.

I do not mean by that to give the inference that there was aid given in a military fashion; I don't mean by troops, but otherwise.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean Mr. Browder came to you with this article which had been prepared already, and the substance of the article was that it was an attack on the people in the State Department who favored Chiang Kai-shek and were against the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was directed to those who were opposed to the Soviet policy in the Far East. He stated incidentally that this document had been worked out by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify on that a little bit, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can only quote his precise words. He didn't say how an arrangement had been made. He said that this had been prepared by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie in order to smoke out the anti-Soviet elements in the State Department. The reason that he mentioned that was to emphasize to me the importance of the document, even asking me to read the material both before it went into the paper—that is, into type—and also after it was in type.

That is why he gave it to me sometime in advance.

Mr. MORRIS. I offer you a photostatic copy of the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942, and I ask you if that is the article to which you have testified?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; that is the article.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify this article for us, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Worker of October 4, 1942, pages 1 and 5, prepared at my direction.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say this is the article that you saw in advance of its being printed in the Daily Worker?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that article had been worked out by Mr. Browder and, according to Mr. Browder, had been worked out in conjunction with Mr. Currie?

Mr. BUDENZ. That the article had been prepared through arrangements with Lauchlin Currie to smoke out the people who were opposed to Soviet policy in the Far East in the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us dwell on that for just a moment. You say the article had been arranged by Mr. Browder through arrangements with Lauchlin Currie; is that right?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what Mr. Browder told you?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. He was emphasizing its importance and that I should be careful to see that there were no words that would give a distortion to the article.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened after that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, later on I saw Mr. Browder either in connection with the publication of a further statement on this matter or shortly afterward, but it was a discussion of the statement which appeared after Mr. Browder made a trip to Washington to see Mr. Sumner Welles.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, sometime after that is it your testimony, Mr. Budenz, that Browder then did go down to the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he went down to the State Department with Robert Minor.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us what happened at that meeting?

The CHAIRMAN. He went down to the State Department with Robert Minor?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you identify Robert Minor?

Mr. BUDENZ. Robert Minor then, I think, was assistant secretary of the party. At least he was technically second in command to Browder. I say "technically" because Jack Stachel was an important person, and we have to always remember that.

Mr. MORRIS. Was this visit to the State Department connected with the original statement which you have already testified about?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. There was much discussion of this matter. I just can't recall all of the discussion, but at any rate it was definitely in connection with this first article.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, inasmuch as you have a number of articles before you, Mr. Morris, I suggest that the first one to which you have referred and which was identified by the witness here be identified and inserted in the record or otherwise identified.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record the photostatic copy of the article in the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942, which was authenticated by Mr. Mandel.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 161" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 161

[From the Worker, New York, October 4, 1942]

BROWDER ACCUSES STATE DEPARTMENT CLIQUE—IT HAMPERS OUR WAR IN PACIFIC, EUROPE

(By Earl Browder)

Almost 10 months after the United States is fully committed to the war against the Axis we are being told that "the United States is losing the war, period."

Loss of this war means destruction of our Nation and slavery for our people. Yet we are told that we are losing this war. That would seem to be a matter to get excited about, something to call for action.

We are losing this war before we have well begun to fight.

Would it not be more accurate to say that we are losing this war because we have not yet begun to fight?

What is the matter? Whence comes this seeming paralysis which keeps our tremendous military potential idle at the moment our fate and the fate of the world is being decided?

Roy Howard, Hearst, and the Patterson-McCormicks, the chief newspaper spokesmen for the modern Copperheads, give the double-barreled answer that the people are not behind this war and that the President is bungling it. But they are liars, any they spread the lies that please Hitler. The people are behind this war to the end; they are ready for every necessary sacrifice; they are impatient to go ahead. The President is doing the best he can with advisers who keep jogging his elbow and holding back his arm; he can only be criticized for hesitating to sweep these mischief makers out of his councils, and for failing to crack down on the defeatist newspapers.

Let us frankly face the facts, however, that the defeatist poison penetrates and tends to paralyze the war policies of our Government in Washington. We must learn how to locate the seats of this poison, in order to eliminate them.

Look first of all at the Pacific front. Our Armed Forces in the Pacific have already demonstrated that they have a fighting spirit fit for any task given them. But what about the policies which direct that fighting spirit? They are not yet serious fighting war policies.

I charge that powerful appeasement forces in the State Department in Washington are deliberately withholding 1,000,000 of the most effective soldiers in Asia, keeping them out of the fight against the Japanese, and thereby releasing that many Japanese soldiers for action against our boys in the South Pacific.

I charge that it is on the advice of reactionary officials in the State Department that Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies out of the war. The army under General Hu Chung-han, with 440,000 troops, is engaged not in fighting the Japanese but in blockading the Chinese Eighth Route Army in the north and northwest, and hampering that army in its fight against the Japanese; the army under General Tang En-po, with 500,000 troops, is engaged not in fighting the Japanese but in blocking the Chinese New Fourth Army in central and eastern China, and hampering that army in its fight against the Japanese.

These two Chinese armies, the best equipped and trained in all China, totaling almost a million men, are being confined to blockading the Chinese Communist armies and territories, because the State Department in Washington has informed Chungking's representatives that our Government would be displeased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists. These officials continue the old policy of "war against the Communists" in China; they tell Chungking it must continue to fight the Communists if it wishes United States friendship, and they thereby accept responsibility for withdrawing a million Chinese troops from the war against Japan, and keep China back from full unity in this war.

What suicidal nonsense is this, by which persons who speak for our own Government keep the best Chinese fighters out of the war and create a gap which must be filled by a million American boys?

This is not a way to fight a war of survival, this is a sure way to continue to lose the war.

Our attitude toward Europe is equally ambiguous. Our State Department continues to do business with Mannerheim Finland, Franco Spain, and Vichy France, three puppet regimes of Hitler, to feast the representatives of these Nazi agencies in the highest Washington society, to send vital materials to them, and to appease them in every way while they conduct active war against the United Nations.

This two-faced attitude of the State Department toward Europe finds its highest expression in the campaign being waged through the defeatist press against the opening of the second front in Western Europe. Of course it is impossible to carry on a policy of appeasement of Mannerheim, Franco, and Laval, and at the same time energetically prepare the immediate second front in Europe. Find those figures in our Government who push through this appeasement policy, and there you will find the high opponents of the second front. They are the men who keep our men, guns, planes, and tanks in idleness while our fate is being decided at Stalingrad where men, women, and children hold off the full might of a Nazi-occupied Europe without counting the cost to themselves.

The only way to stop losing this war is to begin seriously to fight it. And to fight it we must overcome the influence of Munichism, of appeasement, of defeatism, in the United States itself. This Munich influence is not among the

people, and it does not proceed from our Commander in Chief; it is entrenched in some high officials of the State Department, some members of the Cabinet, in a disorganized Congress, dominated by a clique of Vanderbergs, Wheelers, Brookses, and Dieses, several powerful industrialists, and above all in the newspapers of Patterson-McCormick, Hearst, and Roy Howard, which poison the mind of the country with defeatism day after day. The people must be roused and organize in support of the President against this cabal of the Munichmen.

These days we are being shown the most astonishing depths of depravity to which the defeatist newspapers will descend in their fight against the second front. I wish to impose upon you for a few moments to turn the microscope upon an example of this moral and intellectual rottenness. I pick up Roy Howard's newspaper for September 29, where this defeatist speaks through his hired scribbler, William Philip Simms. At the moment of crisis of the battle of Stalingrad, the miserable voice finds it possible to whine that we "would appreciate a little more cooperation from the Russians." In that phrase we can see the spirit of a Laval or Doriot, the spirit that rotted out the heart of the French Republic and delivered that nation over to Hitlerite bondage.

"A little more cooperation from the Russians," cries Roy Howard through the pen of Mr. Simms. At such a sound, every decent American should vomit, in revulsion at the monstrous thought that this could be America's answer to Stalingrad. "A little more cooperation from the Russians," while certain gentlemen from high places in the United States and Britain carefully calculate the last and final buttons on the uniforms of our boys which will make it safe to throw them into the battle.

Nothing could be further from the spirit of America's youth, in and out of the Armed Forces, than the rotten defeatism, appeasement, and cowardice expressed in this slogan of Roy Howard.

The spirit of our boys in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, is expressed in opposite slogans:

"Let's give some fighting cooperation to our heroic Russian allies."

"When do we begin to fight?"

"Open up the second front in Europe now."

Let us not drop Roy Howard's man Simms, however, without looking deeper into the cesspool of his mind. What kind of cooperation does he want from the Russians that he is not getting in the most magnificent battle for freedom in all history? "Perhaps this may require explanation," remarks Mr. Simms. Indeed it does. And what is Mr. Simm's explanation? He explains that he wants the Russians to teach the Americans and British how to fight. "The one place really to learn war is in war," says Mr. Simm's and "Moscow still refuses" to permit Americans to learn how to make war in that "one place." That, says Mr. Simms, is why we have no second front. Our officers and soldiers don't know how to fight and the Russians refuse to teach them. Therefore there is nothing to do but wait until Timoshenko gets time and leisure to open up a school for us.

I wonder what American Army officers think of this kind of arguments? I think I know. I think the vast majority will "give the works" to anybody who tells them they cannot open up a second front because they do not know how to fight. They have already learned the great lesson the Russians have taught the world, that the way to fight is to fight, to push aside all the hesitators and appeasers and if necessary to shoot them, to go to battle and put everything you have into it, to engage the enemy, to kill him, to get into the battle without delay, to fight, fight, and fight again until the Hitler Axis is crushed.

Yes, it is true, the one place really to learn war is in war. But who is holding us back from learning war by making war? It is the Roy Howards, the Hearsts, the Patterson-McCormicks, and their fellow appeasers and one-time friends of Hitler, who now join together in their obscene outeries against the second front. The second front is the practical school in which British and American soldiers will learn how to smash Hitlerism. We are all learning and will learn from the mighty achievements of the Red army and the Soviet people, but we will not allow the worthy idea of learning from them to be used for the purpose of delaying our joint action with them in a two-front war.

Young people of America have no part or parcel of the appeasement conspiracies. Defeatism is the property of old and corrupt reactionaries and their hired men. No young person could possibly live in their stifling atmosphere. Young people are particularly immune to the counsels of cowardice and capitulation. A thousand times they prefer to risk their lives in combat with Hitler's hordes than to risk the living death of a Vichified America, the slavery of a

Hitlerite world. Our young people are demanding the chance to fight. They are the front lines of the movement for a second front now. They will not permit their future and the future of the world to be gambled away by the Munichmen of appeasement and defeatism. They want to know: When do we begin to fight?

The Young Communist League, dedicating tonight its service flag, has as high a percentage of its members in the Armed Forces as any group of Americans. And this is not the first time the Young Communists have given their best members to the armed struggle against the Axis. Not less than one-third of the Lincoln Battalion composed of Americans who gave their lives to stop the Axis in Spain in 1936 to 1938 were from the Young Communist League. This first American expeditionary force against the Axis, defending the Spanish Republic from the Hitler assassins, gave their lives in order to prevent the present war; if their warnings and their example had been heeded and followed, the Axis would have been broken before it could challenge the entire world. But their blood was not spilled in vain. They left an imperishable and glorious tradition, fully in the spirit of the Stalingrad of today. They helped to hold the Axis hordes outside the gates of Madrid for 32 months. They were fully representative of the youth of America today, a youth which is ready and eager to strike Hitler's gangs now in Western Europe, and guarantee that they will not have to stop them on American soil later on.

There is no room for any issue in our country today except the issue of how most quickly and effectively to crush the Hitlerite Axis. There is no room for partisanship or special interests. There must be national unity of all men and women regardless of race, creed, or class, who are ready to subordinate all else to victory. There must be international unity among all the United Nations, who, win or lose, stand or fall together. And at this moment all this is summed up in one issue, whether our country can meet the crisis of war with honor, whether we win through to freedom or go down into slavery, whether we have the quality of victors or whether we shall be shamefully defeated without even having fought—all this is summed up in the one issue of the immediate opening of the second front in Europe.

We ask our Commander in Chief: When are we going to fight?

(The above article is based on an address delivered by Earl Browder before a second front rally of the Young Communist League in New York on October 2.)

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us the upshot of the meeting in Washington? Who attended the meeting in Washington, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Browder stated to me, and so he published in the Daily Worker if my memory is correct, that the meeting was attended by Mr. Browder, Mr. Minor, Lauchlin Currie, and Mr. Welles.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened at that meeting?

Mr. BUDENZ. At that meeting an agreement was reached which was embodied in this statement.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this statement," will you identify that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. This is the statement printed in the Daily Worker of October 16, 1942, headed, "Welles states United States policy on China. After interview with Under Secretary of State, Browder retracts charges against State Department officials." That is the article.

The CHAIRMAN. That has not been identified?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you should lay the foundation.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Daily Worker of October 16, 1942, pages 1 and 2, the photostat being prepared under my direction.

The CHAIRMAN. It ought to be identified by a number so that we can go along and keep these separate.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced as the second exhibit introduced this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be identified by the proper number and inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 162" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 162

[From the Daily Worker, New York, October 16, 1942]

WELLES STATES UNITED STATES POLICY ON CHINA—AFTER INTERVIEW WITH UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, BROWDER RETRACTS CHARGES AGAINST STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

Earl Browder, general secretary of the Communist Party, at his office at 35 East Twelfth Street, New York City, made the following statement to the press yesterday:

"In the Worker of October 4, I made charges that persons whom I designated as 'reactionary officials in the State Department' were encouraging the maintenance of a situation in China harmful to the war effort of our country and its allies. I spoke of strained relations between Kuomintang and Communists, resulting in the immobilization of large numbers of the best troops of that country.

"Upon the invitation of Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, I visited him in his office on October 12, in company with Mr. Robert Minor, and heard from him, and from Mr. Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President, a detailed refutation of my charges in this respect. The information received from Mr. Welles and Mr. Currie convinced me that my charges had been made on the basis of incomplete information. I believe it is established that no responsible official of the State Department is contributing to disunity in China, and that the policy of the United States Government is being exerted in the opposite direction.

"I am therefore more than happy to retract those charges without reservation.

"What I had thought of as a heavy door that needed pushing open proved to be but a curtain of lack of information. Since many persons in the United States and in China also are without that information which I lacked before visiting Mr. Welles, I believe our war effort will be benefited if I make public that portion of Mr. Welles' remarks which was given to me in written form."

Mr. Welles' memorandum follows:

"With regard to the specific charge that it is on the advice of reactionary officials in the State Department that Chiang Kai-shek is keeping his best armies out of the war, the simple fact is that the nearest approach to 'advice' given by any officials in the Department of State in this context has been an expression of an opinion that civil strife in China, at all times unfortunate, would be especially unfortunate at a time when China is engaged in a desperate struggle of self-defense against an armed invader. The implication of the expression of opinion was that the Chinese Government should try to maintain peace by processes of conciliation between and among all groups and factions in China. And, the course which Chiang Kai-shek has been pursuing is not 'keeping his best armies out of the war'. Both the armies of the National Government and the 'Communist' armies are fighting the Japanese. No Chinese armies are actively engaged in large-scale offensive operations against the Japanese—for the reason, principally, that there is lacking to all Chinese armies types and amounts of equipment which are essential to such operations; but this situation is one which both the Chinese Government and the American Government are endeavoring to remedy as equipment becomes available.

"With regard to the specific charge that 'the State Department in Washington has informed Chungking's representatives that our Government would be displeased if complete unity was established in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists,' what this statement alleges is the exact opposite of the fact. The State Department in Washington has at all times taken the position, both in diplomatic contexts and publicly, that the United States favors 'complete unity' among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof.

"With regard to the specific charge that 'these officials continue the old policy of "war against the Communists" in China, this Government has had no such policy, either 'old' or new. This Government has in fact viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the 'serious menace' of 'Communism' in China. We have, for instance, as is publicly and well known, declined to be moved by Japanese contentions that presence and maintenance of Japanese armed forces in China were and would be desirable for the purpose of 'combatting communism.'

"With regard to the specific charge that officials of this Government 'tell Chungking it must continue to fight the Communists if it wishes United States

friendship,' the simple fact is that no officials of this Government ever have told Chungking either that it must fight or that it must continue to fight the 'Communists'; this Government holds no such belief; this Government desires Chinese unity and deprecates civil strife in China; this Government treats the Government of China as an equal; it does not dictate to the Government of China; it does not make United States friendship contingent; it regards unity within China, unity within the United States, unity within each of the countries of the United Nations group, and unity among the United Nations as utterly desirable toward effectively carrying on war against the Axis Powers and toward creation and maintenance of conditions of just peace when the United Nations shall have gained the victory which is to be theirs."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you take some of the highlights and discuss them with us inasmuch as you were the editor of the Daily Worker at that time, the significance of that statement? I do not think it is clear to the committee as to the purpose of that statement.

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, this statement says that upon invitation of Mr. Sumner Welles, the Under Secretary of State, "I visited him in his office on October 12 in company with Mr. Robert Minor and heard from him and from Mr. Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President, a detailed refutation of my charges in this respect."

In other words, in regard to China. The charges that he made were:

In the Worker of October 4 I made charges that persons whom I designated as "reactionary officials in the State Department" were encouraging the maintenance of a situation in China harmful to the war effort of our country and its allies.

Browder had spoken of strained relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists resulting in the immobilization of large numbers of the best troops of that country. The assurance given by Mr. Welles, to make this brief, was that the policy of the State Department was not against the Communists in China and that there was to be no distinction made between the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek.

That was the understanding which led Browder on his part to make what he called a retraction.

Senator O'CONNOR. Could I interrupt you to ask whether or not any use was made of that by the Communists on that point?

Mr. BUDENZ. You can see in the first place how it is played up, and the Daily Worker gives directives to the Communists. It was used throughout the country as an indication that American policy was seeing eye to eye with Soviet policy in the Far East.

As a matter of fact, in a subsequent meeting of the Politburo which I attended, Browder said it was as important as an agreement between nations and that we should emphasize it throughout the country as something very fundamental, representing what he considered to be a great gain for the Communist cause.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz, as I understand the gist of what you have just said, plus what you said yesterday, that the Daily Worker took its line from the Politburo and then passed that on, and the Daily Worker was in effect the instruction sheet to Communist organizations all over America?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is exclusively what it is. It is, as I say, the telegraph agency of the conspiracy.

Senator SMITH. So that when the Communists read something in the Daily Worker indicating what line is being taken by the Daily

Worker, that is the same as definite instructions to them to follow through on that line?

Mr. BUDENZ. Every time the Daily Worker arrives in the district office of the Communist Party it is read immediately by the district leader. He calls together his staff, and he assigns to them their tasks as a result of the Daily Worker articles and editorials.

Of course, that is supplemented by other things, mail sent out through mail drops and the like, but this is the constant source of directives.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether the conference that is referred to in that article of the 16th of October was simply the successful fruition of a plan which started with the blast that was carried in the issue of the 4th or whether blast and conference, cause and effect, were all part of a single prearranged plan?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I can only cite Mr. Browder's words. I wouldn't want to put my own interpretation into that, but very strongly the impression was given that this was all arranged, that this was the complete picture; that Mr. Browder when he went to Washington understood that he was going to gain.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say, Mr. Budenz, that this statement, after it was promulgated by Mr. Welles, was used extensively by the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most extensively; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say his statement, after it was promulgated by Mr. Welles. What statement do you refer to and what exhibit?

Mr. MORRIS. This is the statement in exhibit No. 162 that we have introduced this morning, "Welles States United States Policy on China."

Prior to that time, had there been any such statement on the part of the United States Government, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, you are not offering that exhibit as evidence that Mr. Welles made such a statement but only as evidence that the Daily Worker carried that story, that Mr. Browder attributed that story, statement, to Mr. Welles, are you not?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Watkins?

Senator WATKINS. I was going to ask if we have available the statement issued by Mr. Welles, the actual statement. I came in late, so I do not know what has preceded this, but it seems to me in view of what Mr. Sourwine has said that there ought to be some follow-up as to the statement actually issued by Mr. Welles.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a statement issued by Mr. Welles? The Senator is asking for it.

Senator WATKINS. The confirmation.

Mr. MORRIS. We have that, Senator, and we will bring it out in just a minute.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz, do you know whether or not copies of the Daily Worker were circulated among employees of the State Department that were likely to be brought to the attention of Mr. Welles?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I wouldn't have knowledge of that. The Daily Worker though is pretty well examined by governmental officials, and that is a matter of public knowledge.

Senator SMITH. Did you receive any protest from Mr. Welles about the publication of these statements?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, no, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, was this statement, as it appears in the Daily Worker there, used as a basis for a campaign by the Communists to eliminate people who were anti-Communist from places of influence in the Government?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I intended to complete Senator O'Connor's question there along that line and had my thought interrupted, that is to say, the campaign began actually then against those who were considered to be against Soviet policy in the Far East. It began with an attack on Mr. Adolf Berle, who by the way was under fire from the Communists at that particular moment, very definitely and strenuously. It proceeded through the years until in 1944 or 1945 it broke out into an organized campaign.

I don't want to give an exact quote, but this is the essence of it, as the Communists express it, "To clean the State Department of all anti-Soviet elements."

Mr. MORRIS. You say that was a sustained Communist campaign all during the war period?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Of course, it had highlights, but it was sustained.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I offer you a photostat of an article that appeared in the Daily Worker of October 4, 1942. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate this, please?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Worker of October 4, 1942, page 5, the photostat being prepared at my direction.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated. You are getting your exhibits a little confused, Mr. Morris, because your exhibits have been running along in a series from the beginning of the hearings, and now you are starting with a series of this date. I think it might be well to have it follow in sequence following your exhibits of former days.

Mr. MORRIS. That is true, Mr. Chairman. I just want to designate that as the third this morning so we will be able to distinguish.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 163" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 163

[From the Worker, New York, October 4, 1942, p. 5]

THE SINISTER A. A. BERLE—CHAMPION OF MUNICH, ANTI-SOVIET INTRIGUER IN OUR STATE DEPARTMENT

(By Adam Lapin)

WASHINGTON, October 3.—A few days ago Adolph Augustus Berle, Jr., was discussing the Spanish situation with an intimate group. The slight, sallow-faced Assistant Secretary of State expressed gratification that Franco, the puppet of Hitler and Mussolini, had crushed the Spanish Republic.

He said that the world situation would have been infinitely worse if "communism" had triumphed in Spain and then spread over Europe.

This incident is typical of the thinking of Adolph Berle, whom many informed observers here consider the nearest thing to an American counterpart to George Bonnet, the corrupt French politician, who was one of the principal architects of Munich.

As the last few months have passed without the opening of a second front, the voices of the Munichmen in Washington have grown louder.

Not only in Congress, but in the State Department, the War Department, and the War Production Board the men of faint heart have begun to speak up, to intrigue against the Soviet Union, to spread anti-Soviet rumors. Even speculation about a negotiated peace is no longer a rarity.

Try to trace down the anti-second front and the anti-Soviet talk in Washington, and you will find that an exceptionally high percentage emanates from room 200½, off the dank second floor corridors of the musty State Department Building, from the office of Assistant Secretary Berle.

Berle is no longer the boy wonder who graduated Harvard at 18 and was an adviser on Russian affairs to President Wilson at Versailles when he was 23.

He is now a cynical, power-hungry man of 47. He is a brilliant and fluent phrase-maker, but beneath the flowery verbiage is the hard inner core of his dominant passion: A bitter, last-ditch hostility to the Soviet Union.

During the Munich crisis Berle wrote in a memorandum to the President that the United States should not be swung off base either by diplomacy or emotion.

The memorandum was quoted by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, the Washington newspapermen, in the book which they wrote from a desk in Berle's office.

They saw Berle every day for several weeks, and they must know whereof they speak when they say that Berle pleaded "for the most hard-headed—even cold-hearted—approach to the Czechoslovak question."

Berle was an advocate of Munichism then. There is every reason to think that he still is.

He was one of the men who helped to strangle the Spanish Republic and today helps perpetuate the continued appeasement of Franco.

He was one of the most influential State Department officials to favor the shipment of war materials to Japan over several costly and long-to-be-regretted years.

He is an ardent advocate of appeasing Vichy France.

Around Berle gathered the more dangerous anti-Soviet element among the European emigres now in the United States.

The Assistant Secretary of State confers frequently with Alexander Kerensky, who has never forgiven the Russian people for turning on his Government in favor of the Communists.

Tibor Eckhardt, the Hungarian Facist who claims that he is opposed to Hitler but is active in sponsoring anti-Soviet propaganda in this country, also sees Berle frequently.

Berle was active in trying to spike the conversations between former Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.

The newspapermen who saw Berle in those days would almost invariably leave his office with a juicy anti-Soviet story.

The Assistant Secretary of State is frequently present at Mrs. Evalyn Walsh McLean's parties. Last New Year's Eve he was photographed there chatting with Finnish Minister Hjalmar Procope, Senator Robert Taft, the notorious Ohio defeatist, and Ambassador Espil, of Argentina.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you identify this, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, we published this in the *Daily Worker* and the character of the article is indicated by the headline, "The Sinister A. A. Berle, champion of Munich, anti-Soviet intriguer in our State Department."

Mr. MORRIS. That is a sample of the campaign which was being sustained by the Communists at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is the campaign that was carried into every part of the United States, not only among the Communists but the organizations which they were infiltrating.

Mr. MORRIS. Did this campaign extend to other officials in the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us who the other officials were?

Mr. BUDENZ. Joseph B. Grew, Under Secretary of State; Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, not technically with the State Department but connected at least diplomatically with State Department relations; Eugene C. Dooman, who was head of the Far Eastern Division, if I remember correctly, at least he was in control of the details of the far eastern policy; and Gen. Patrick Hurley, Ambassador to China, who particularly was under attack from the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I think, Mr. Chairman, if we take these items one at a time it will be a lot clearer.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. In point of time, Mr. Budenz, which is the first one of these that we should discuss?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I think Under Secretary of State Grew is the first because as early as at least 1944 the Politburo laid plans against Mr. Grew, asking him questions, criticizing his policy, and the like.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us the first episode that you can recall in point of time, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, there were episodes before this, but the ones that I can recall occurred in 1945 and are the most vivid. Mr. Grew was attacked on two grounds, one that he didn't have the right policy in China, and secondly, as we approached the question of what to do with Japan, that he favored a soft peace with Japan.

The Communists wanted a tough peace just as there was to be the Morgenthau plan in Germany. They didn't hesitate in their own discussions to show that this would tend to drive the Japanese into the hands of the Soviet Union.

Mr. MORRIS. How did you know they wanted a tough peace?

Mr. BUDENZ. They discussed it and planned it and discussed it in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, in aid of the testimony this morning I have here a folder full of exhibits which are extracts from the Daily Worker. By way of refreshing the recollection of the witness I would like to make those available to him while he is testifying to episodes that occurred in this campaign.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do so if he identifies them as articles published in the Daily Worker under his editorial supervision.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to present them in chronological order.

The CHAIRMAN. If he can identify them as publications in the Daily Worker under his supervision.

Mr. MORRIS. As each one is pulled out we can identify them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think that as the witness identifies it there should be an identifying mark on the exhibit to show what exhibit he is holding in his hand at the time. The clerk will see to that, please.

Mr. BUDENZ. The first exhibit is from the Daily Worker of June 4, 1945, page 4.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Mandel, was this photostat prepared under your direction?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. This is a reprint of the statement made by the national board of the Communist Political Association, that being the temporary name, as you recall, of the Communist Party during a cer-

tain period. This statement was made on the eve of changing back to the Communist Party.

In the course of their general program they outline a far-eastern policy which, to make it brief, includes:

One, rout and defeat the advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese imperialists and war lords. Guarantee a free democratic Asia with the right of national independence for all colonial and dependent peoples. Curb those who seek American imperialist control in the Far East.

Three, press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Communists and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victory.

There are other items, but those are the outstanding ones.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so designated and entered into the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 164" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 164

[From the Daily Worker, New York, June 4, 1945, p. 4]

THE PRESENT SITUATION AND NEXT TASKS—RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL BOARD, CPA, ADOPTED ON JUNE 2, 1945

This resolution is submitted as a draft for discussion and action by the national committee and the entire membership of the Communist Political Association.

The vote on the resolution in the national board was as follows:

For: Morris Childs, Benjamin Davis, Jr., Eugene Dennis, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, James Ford, Wm. Z. Foster, Gilbert Green, Robert Minor, Robert Thompson, John Williamson.

Against: Earl Browder.

Abstained: Roy Hudson.

Absent: William Schneiderman.

PART 1

The military defeat of Nazi Germany is a great historic victory for world democracy, for all mankind. This epochal triumph was brought about by the concerted action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition—by the decisive blows of the Red Army, by the American-British offensives, and by the heroic struggle of the resistance movements. This victory opens the way for the complete destruction of fascism in Europe and weakens the forces of reaction and fascism everywhere. It has already brought forth a new antifascist unity of the peoples in Europe marked by the formation in a number of countries of democratic governments representative of the will of the people. It has also created the prerequisites for bringing about the speedy defeat of Japanese imperialism. Thus great possibilities have been opened up for realizing a durable peace.

2

However, a sharp and sustained struggle must still be conducted to secure the complete destruction of fascism in Europe and throughout the world and to guarantee that the possibilities which now exist for creating an enduring peace shall be realized. This is so because the economic and social roots of fascism in Europe have not yet been fully destroyed. This is so because the extremely powerful reactionary forces in the United States and England, which are centered in the trusts and cartels, are striving to reconstruct liberated Europe on a reactionary basis. Moreover, this is so because the most aggressive circles of American imperialism are endeavoring to secure for themselves political and economic domination in the world.

With the ending of the war against Nazi Germany, important groupings of American capital, which were opposed to German imperialist world domination, are joining hands with the most reactionary and profascist circles of monopoly capital—with the profascist du Pont clique in the leadership of the NAM. Now

that Nazi Germany has been crushed, these big business circles which heretofore supported, though inconsistently, the war against Hitler, in order to eliminate their German imperialist rival are today frightened by the democratic consequences of that victory.

Like their British counterparts, they are alarmed at the strengthened positions of world labor, at the democratic advances in Europe and at the upsurge of the national liberation movements in the colonial and dependent countries. Therefore they seek to halt the march of democracy; to curb the strength of labor and the people. They want to save the remnants of fascism in Germany and in the rest of Europe. They are trying to organize a new cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union which bore the main brunt of the war against the Nazis, and which is the staunchest champion of national freedom, democracy, and world peace.

This regrouping in the ranks of American capital, reacting to the defeat of Germany, has been reflected in many recent actions of the State Department. It is evidenced by the fact that the majority of the American delegation at San Francisco yielded on certain issues to the extreme reactionaries. In so doing they departed from Roosevelt's foreign policy of Big Three unity as worked out at Tehran and Yalta.

This regrouping in the ranks of capital explains why, on most basic questions, Stettinius and Connally were influenced to join hands with Vandenberg—the spokesman for Hoover and the most predatory sections of American finance capital. This explains the seating of Fascist Argentina and the British-American reluctance to live up to the Yalta accord on Poland and Germany. This is the reason why the American delegation at San Francisco refused to join with the Soviet Union to pledge the right of national independence for mandated territories and colonies, and refused to give official recognition to the representatives of the World Labor Conference who spoke for 60,000,000 organized workers.

This shift in the position of certain big business circles explains the reactionary intervention at Trieste and the threat of armed force against our Yugoslav ally. This development also explains why Washington and London are pursuing the dangerous policy of preventing a strong, united, and democratic China, and why they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime which is obstructing an all-out war against Japan. It accounts, too, for the new campaign of anti-Soviet slander and incitement calculated to undermine American-Soviet friendship and cooperation which was the cornerstone for victory over Hitler Germany and is the indispensable key to attain postwar peace and world security.

On the home front the camp of reaction is blocking the development of a satisfactory program to meet the human needs of reconversion with its accompanying economic dislocations and severe unemployment. Reactionary forces—especially the NAM and their representatives in Congress—are planning a new open-shop drive to weaken or smash the trade-unions. They are trying to prevent the adoption of governmental measures which must be enacted at once if our country is to avoid the most acute consequences of future economic crisis. Likewise they are vigorously preparing to win the crucial 1946 elections.

If these reactionary policies and forces are not checked and defeated, America and the world will be confronted with new aggressions and wars and the growth of reaction and fascism in the United States.

3

However, the conditions and forces exist to defeat this reactionary threat, and to enable our country to play a progressive role in world affairs in accord with the true national interests of the American people. For one thing, the military defeat of Nazi Germany has changed the relationship of world forces in favor of democracy. It has enhanced the role and influence of the land of socialism. It has strengthened those forces in our country and elsewhere which seek to maintain and consolidate the friendship and cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union—a unity which must now be extended and reinforced. This is evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the American people, and in the first place labor, are opposed to reaction and fascism, support the foreign and domestic policies of President Roosevelt as embodied in the decisions of Tehran and Crimea, and in the second bill of rights.

This majority must now speak out and assert its collective strength and will. The united power of labor and of all democratic forces must express itself in a decisive fashion so as to influence the course of the Nation in a consistently progressive direction.

It is imperative that the American people resolutely support every effort of the Truman administration to carry forward Roosevelt's program for victory, peace, democracy, and 60,000,000 jobs. It is equally necessary that the people sharply criticize all hesitations to apply this policy, and vigorously oppose any concessions to the reactionaries. The camp of reaction must not be appeased—it must be isolated and routed.

Toward this end it is necessary, as never before, to decisively strengthen the democratic unity of the Nation. It is essential to weld together and consolidate the broadest national coalition of all anti-Fascist and democratic forces, including all supporters of Roosevelt's anti-Axis policies. To forge this democratic coalition most effectively and to enable it to exercise decisive influence upon the affairs of the Nation, it is essential that the working class—especially the progressive labor movement and the Communists—strengthen its independent role and activities and display far greater political and organizing initiative. It is imperative to develop the maximum unity of action between the CIO, the AFL, and the Railroad Brotherhoods and to achieve their full participation in the new World Federation of Trade Unions.

While cooperating with the patriotic and democratic forces from all walks of life, labor must, in the first place, strengthen its ties with the veterans, the toiling farmers, the Negro people, the youth, the women, professionals and small-business men, and with their democratic organizations.

4

To achieve the widest democratic coalition and the most effective anti-Fascist unity of the Nation, it is vital that labor vigorously champion a program of action that will promote the complete destruction of fascism, speed victory over Japanese imperialism, curb the powers of the trusts and monopolies—advance the economic welfare of the people and protect and extend American democracy.

In the opinion of the Communist Political Association, such a program should be based on the following slogans of action:

I. Hasten the defeat of Fascist-militarist Japan!

Rout and defeat the advocates of a compromise peace with the Japanese imperialists and warlords.

Guarantee a free, democratic Asia with the right of national independence for all colonial and dependent peoples. Curb those who seek American imperialist control in the Far East.

Press for a united and free China based upon the unity of the Communists and all other democratic and anti-Japanese forces so as to speed victory. Full military aid to the Chinese guerrillas led by the heroic Eighth and Fourth Armies.

Continue uninterrupted war production and uphold labor's no-strike pledge for the duration. Stop employer provocations.

II. Complete the destruction of fascism and build a durable peace.

Cement American-Soviet friendship and unity to guarantee the fulfillment of Tehran and Yalta accords for an enduring peace and a world free of fascism.

Carry out in full the decisions made by the Big Three at Crimea.

Punish the war guilty without further delay. Death to all Fascist war criminals. Make Germany pay full reparations in labor and in kind for the reconstruction of Europe.

Strengthen the World Labor Congress as the backbone of the unity of the peoples and the free nations.

Support the establishment of an effective international security organization based upon the Dumbarton Oaks plan and the Yalta agreement.

Guarantee to all peoples the right to determine freely their own destiny and to establish their own democratic form of government. Put an end to Anglo-American intervention against the peoples, such as in Greece, Belgium, and Italy. Grant immediate national independence to Puerto Rico.

Break diplomatic relations with Franco Spain and Fascist Argentina.

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials. Help feed and reconstruct starving and war-torn Europe. Reject the Hoover program based on reactionary financial mortgages and political interference.

Pass the Bretton Woods proposals and other democratic measures designed to promote international economic cooperation and expanding world trade. Grant extensive long-term loans and credits, at low interest rates, for purposes of reconstruction and industrialization.

III. Meet the human needs of reconversion—Push the fight for 60 million jobs.

Make the right to work and the Roosevelt second Bill of Rights the law of the land.

Increase purchasing-power to promote maximum employment. No reduction in weekly take-home pay when overtime is eliminated.

For an immediate 20 percent wage increase to meet the rise in the cost of living. Establish an adequate minimum hourly wage on a national scale.

Establish the principle of the guaranteed annual wage.

For a shorter workweek without wage reductions, except where this would hamper war production.

Support Truman's proposals for emergency Federal legislation to extend and supplement present unemployment insurance benefits. Start unemployment insurance payments promptly upon loss of job and continue until new employment is found. Provide adequate severance pay for laid-off workers. Insure the retraining, education and reemployment of the young workers.

Prevent growing unemployment during the reconversion and post war period by starting large-scale Federal, State and municipal public works programs—slum clearance, low rental housing developments, rural electrification, the building of new schools, hospitals, roads, etc.

No scrapping of Government owned industrial plants. If private industry cannot operate these at full capacity for peacetime purposes the Government must.

Maintain and rigidly enforce rent and price control and rationing. Strengthen the law enforcement powers of the OPA. Smash the black market.

Utilize the Labor-Management Charter to press for the organization of the unorganized, to strengthen collective bargaining, to defend the trade-unions from all attacks by the open-shoppers, to raise living standards, and to promote the fight for 60 million jobs.

Prosecute the war profiteers. No reduction in corporate, excess profit and income taxes for the millionaires.

Pass the Wagner-Murray-Dingell social security bill.

Maintain equitable farm prices and assure adequate Federal and State aid to all needy farmers.

IV. Repay our debt to the men who fought for victory.

Guarantee jobs and security for all returning veterans regardless of race, creed or color.

Extend the scope and benefits of the GI bill of rights and eliminate all red tape from the Veterans' Administration. Guarantee adequate medical care to every veteran.

Press for the speedy enactment of legislation providing for substantial demobilization pay, based on length and character of service, and financed by taxes on higher personal and corporate incomes.

Insure full benefits of all veterans legislation to Negro veterans.

V. Safeguard and extend democracy.

Enforce equal rights for every American citizen regardless of race, color, creed, political affiliation or national origin.

End Jim Crow. Outlaw anti-Semitism. Eliminate all anti-Communist legislation. Pass a national FEPC. Abolish the poll tax and the white primary. End every form of discrimination in the Armed Forces.

Protect labor's rights, especially the right to organize and bargain collectively.

Outlaw and prohibit all fascist organizations and activities.

Curb the powers and policies of the monopolies and trusts which jeopardize the national welfare and world peace. Prosecute all violations of the antitrust laws, and all moves and acts to restore or continue the Anglo-German-American cartel system and practices. Protect and extend Federal aid to small business.

This program represents the most urgent interests of the American people and the Nation. It is not a program for socialism which alone can completely abolish insecurity, exploitation, oppression, and war. This is an immediate program of action around which all progressive Americans can unite today. It is a program of action which will advance the destruction of fascism, help realize a more stable peace.

(Continued on Page 5) etc.

CPA NATIONAL BOARD DECIDES UPON DISCUSSIONS ON RESOLUTION

The national board of the CPA, at its meeting of June 2, also adopted the following additional motions:

1. The national committee shall be convened within 2 weeks.

2. The discussion by the membership of the association on the resolution of the national board shall start immediately in the clubs and in other meetings

of the association to be determined by each State committee. The discussion shall continue up to a date to be decided by the national committee, CPA.

3. For the period of the discussion, arrangements shall be made with the Daily Worker to publish a semiweekly discussion bulletin as a supplement to the paper. This bulletin shall be open to all members of the association.

4. State organizations may publish special discussion bulletins if they so desire.

5. During the entire period of the discussion, the policy and practical mass work of the association shall be governed by the resolution of the national board.

Mr. MORRIS. I might say that that exhibit is the fourth one we have introduced today.

Mr. BUDENZ. I am going by chronology rather than a rounded-out picture, but the picture will be given, Mr. Chairman.

The next one as far as I can see is dated June 26, 1945, page 9, headed, "One of Six Arrested Hits Clique in State Department."

The CHAIRMAN. That is of the issue of the Daily Worker of what date?

Mr. BUDENZ. June 26, 1945, page 9.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BUDENZ. This refers to Andrew Roth, one of those arrested in the Amerasia case and the Daily Worker predicts:

Roth's forthcoming book, *Dilemma in Japan*, "dissects" the State Department's "past mistakes and current fallacies," in the author's words. It exposes Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co. announced that the book would come out in September.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done and it will be received in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 165" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 165

[From the Daily Worker, New York, June 26, 1945, p. 9]

ONE OF SIX ARRESTED HITS CLIQUE IN STATE DEPARTMENT

Andrew Roth, on inactive status as senior lieutenant in the United States Naval Reserve since his arrest June 6, declared yesterday that charges against him "reflect the hopes of a powerful conservative clique in the State Department."

In a copyrighted article in the New York Post Roth warned that, should this clique have its way, "the end result will almost certainly be a China wracked by civil war, a Japan in which the roots of aggression have been left intact, and a sharp clash of American and Soviet interests in the Far East."

Roth expressed confidence that he would be cleared of the accusation against himself and five others, of having been party to a conspiracy to transmit confidential information to unauthorized persons.

Roth's forthcoming book, *Dilemma in Japan*, "dissects" the State Department's "past mistakes and current fallacies," in the author's words. It exposes Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Roth's arrest came after Little, Brown & Co. announced that the book would come out in September.

Mr. SOURWINE. To save time, could Mr. Mandel be asked whether these photostats which have been handed to the witness are all photostats of the Daily Worker, photostats prepared under his direction?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUDENZ. The next is an editorial in the Daily Worker of August 6, 1945, page 6, and reads:

It is for Under Secretary Grew to answer: Why are American guns being used to pursue civil war in China? What measures are being taken to halt such crimes and guarantee against their repetition?

This is an attack on Mr. Grew under the title, "Question to Mr. Grew."

Mr. MORRIS. I offer that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 166" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 166

[From the Daily Worker, August 6, 1945, p. 6]

QUESTION TO MR. GREW

Far up in northern China, Chinese are fighting Chinese at this very moment—yet how is it possible that hardly a mention of this gets to the American people?

The Yenan radio has charged that American lend-lease guns are being used against the Chinese Communist guerillas by the armies of Gen. Hu Tsung-nan—yet the War Department and the State Department say nary a word.

We think this warfare in northern China is scandalous. And equally scandalous is the absence of any recognition by the State Department of American responsibility in this deadly serious affair.

For who gains when a Kuomintang soldier is ordered to attack a Chinese Communist guerilla? Only Japan, the common enemy.

And who profits by this silence from the United States? Only the Kuomintang dictatorship, which interprets silence as giving consent to its evil plans for the disunion of the Chinese nation.

The Yenan radio has twice appealed to Chiang Kai-shek, urging him to call off the attack of Kuomintang's Fifty-ninth Division. It is an appeal directed to Americans as well.

For the plain fact remains that American lives are being jeopardized if the Chungking regime is permitted to continue such policies.

And if such things can happen while the Kuomintang is supposedly liberalizing its dictatorship, while the Soong-Stalin discussions are about to be resumed—the American people can have no confidence whatsoever in the Chungking leaders and all their promises and plans.

It is for Under Secretary Grew to answer: Why are American guns being used to pursue civil war in China? What measures are being taken to halt such crimes and guarantee against their repetition?

Mr. BUDENZ. The next that I can find is the Daily Worker of August 13, 1945, page 5, headed "The Allied Reply and the Role of the Emperor," in which they state:

Our public knows, from a correct understanding of Japanese history, that the Emperor is the focus of the militarist-feudal-industrialist set-up in Japan responsible for the war and the oppression of Asia.

And they feel correctly that powerful capitalist forces, represented by such men as Under Secretary Joseph Grew and Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, want to preserve this particular Emperor's powers and the royal institution as such. They want to preserve as much of Japanese fascism as they can.

That is an editorial.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert that as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 167" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 167

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 13, 1945, p. 5]

THE ALLIED REPLY AND THE ROLE OF THE EMPEROR—AN EDITORIAL

Reprinted from late edition of Sunday Worker

The four great powers have given their answer to Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam surrender declaration, in which the Japanese rulers asked for clarification on the Emperor's role. The world awaits the next developments while the war itself is being pressed forward on all fronts.

Faced with the overwhelming power of the United Nations, the vast American air and naval power, the atom bomb, the Soviet Union's rapid advances in Manchuria and Korea, the Japanese rulers were forced to accept the Potsdam terms.

The great powers have elaborated these terms to the extent that the Emperor will have to subordinate himself entirely to the Allied Supreme Command. He will have to carry out the Supreme Command's orders in compelling the Japanese troops to lay down their arms. The institution of the monarchy itself will ultimately be decided by the Japanese people.

If we remember that the Potsdam declaration provided a good basis for eradicating Japanese fascism, eliminating the possibility of renewed aggression and opening the path for democratic development in Japan, it is clear that the United Nations stand on the eve of an immense victory. The tremendous fact is that fascism in Asia as well as in Europe has at last been forced to its knees.

We do not know, and cannot know, all the factors which entered into the Big Four's reply. Certainly, one of them is the necessity of intimate unity among the great powers. For without such unity a common program for ending the war, occupying the strategic areas of eastern Asia, and beginning the destruction of fascist-militarism would be endangered.

This should be remembered, even though on the role of the Emperor himself the American people are understandably disappointed. He is continuing on the throne, even though he is a war criminal, and the people rightly want to treat him as such. Our public knows, from a correct understanding of Japanese history, that the Emperor is the focus of the militarist-fendal-industrialist set-up in Japan responsible for the war and the oppression of Asia.

And they feel correctly that powerful capitalist forces represented by such men as Under Secretary Joseph Grew and Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, want to preserve this particular Emperor's powers and the royal institution as such. They want to preserve as much of Japanese fascism as they can. The Vandenberg and the Tafts unquestionably will attempt to use the royal house for desperate efforts to sabotage the impending United Nations victory.

That is why the American people must continue their vigilance—even though the war will undoubtedly end before the Japanese people have decided the ultimate fate of the royal house.

A great victory of epic dimensions is unfolding before the democratic world.

It is a victory well earned. It is a victory for which heavy sacrifices have been made. It is a victory which must lead to the complete eradication of fascism, and for this task—the precondition of a long and real peace—the unity of the great powers is decisive.

The advance of democracy in China, the full independence of the colonial peoples is equally decisive. It is on all these issues that continued vigilance and struggle will be required.

Mr. BUDENZ. This is August 15, 1945, an editorial in the Daily Worker, page 2, which means it was given particular prominence.

The CHAIRMAN. As regards this last one that you just identified, you said it was an editorial in the Daily Worker. Were you the editorial writer at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I was the managing editor of the Daily Worker. The writing of the editorials was assigned at each editorial board meeting to various editors on the board. This was very likely written by Joseph Starobin, although that wasn't always the case. It was written under the supervision of the editorial board.

This is entitled "Prevent Civil War in China," and at the conclusion states:

The State Department should be bombarded with messages demanding the recall of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, and the immediate cleansing of the people in the Department responsible for this suicidal policy.

That is, the policy which they were condemning.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that as the next consecutive exhibit in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be given its proper number and will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 168" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 168

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 15, 1945, p. 2]

PREVENT CIVIL WAR IN CHINA—AN EDITORIAL

With Japan's surrender just around the corner, the danger of civil war in China assumes immediate and alarming proportions. During the last few days Chiang Kai-shek has clearly revealed his intention of launching the civil war immediately, using Central Government troops which have been held ready for this moment, as well as puppet troops which collaborated with the Japanese.

And especially disturbing to the American people, in the midst of their jubilation over the approaching end of the war, are the reports from Chungking that American airplanes, troops, and munitions may be placed at the disposal of the Fascist-feudal clique in Chungking.

The calamity of civil war in China must be prevented. For should it take place the peace for which we have fought a long and hard war would be seriously endangered. The American people, as well as our allies, must not be cheated of the fruits of the global victory. Much less can we permit the continuation of government policies which give aid to a reactionary, Fascist clique, a clique which has stood aloof from the war against Japan since 1938, which has connived with the collaborationist regime at Nanking against all the democratic forces of China and which now rushes to make open war against them.

CONFIRMATION IN UNITED STATES PRESS

The charges made by the Yen-an radio against Chiang, accusing him of collusion with the puppet troops and of setting up a united front with the Nanking collaborationists for the immediate launching of the civil war, are fully confirmed by A. T. Steele's report to the New York Herald Tribune yesterday.

"It is no secret," writes Mr. Steele, "that many puppet officials and army officers are in league with Chungking and plan to declare allegiance to the Central Government when the time is ripe."

According to the same correspondent, Chiang "is counting on assistance from Chinese puppet troops in enemy-held areas." This was openly admitted by the Generalissimo when he forbade the Communist-led armies and guerrillas to disarm the enemy, and called upon the puppet armies to "maintain order."

In the tense and dangerous situation it is absolutely impermissible for Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer to place American material and men at Chiang's disposal.

According to reports from Chungking, the two top American representatives have been conferring with Chiang for the purpose of planning the rapid occupation by Kuomintang troops of key ports and areas which have already been largely liberated by the Yen-an armies. It is reported that American planes are ready to transport Chiang's troops into sectors already occupied or soon to be taken by the Communist-led and guerrilla forces.

WORLD PEACE ENDANGERED

For Chiang to attempt to possess these areas would mean to oust the liberation armies and declare war upon the people. We cannot be a party to such nefarious and dastardly plans. They would endanger the prospects of peace in the Pacific and in the world.

For Hurley and Wedemeyer to participate in this scheme is to place our Government policy entirely at the disposal of the most reactionary and imperialist forces in our country who want to prevent a united and democratic China, and will stop at nothing to achieve their end.

The American people, especially the labor movement, should intervene directly, and at this very moment when the end of the war is at hand.

We do not want the continuation of the war in another form, in the shape of a civil war in China.

We want peace in the Pacific and in the world, and that means a democratic and united China. It means that the Chinese collaborationists, the Nanking puppets, and their Kuomintang traitors should be held strictly to account and made to suffer for their treachery.

Not a single American gun, soldier, plane or other war equipment must be placed at the disposal of the Fascist clique in Chungking.

The Chinese liberation armies, including the eighth and fourth route armies which did the major land fighting against the enemy, should be fully represented in working out the allied occupation of Japan and liberated areas.

As with the other main problems of the peace, American-Soviet cooperation must be maintained and extended in the process of preventing civil war in China.

The State Department should be bombarded with messages demanding the recall of Ambassador Hurley and General Wedemeyer, and the immediate cleansing of the people in the Department responsible for this suicidal policy. We want a durable and democratic peace.

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I have stepped out of the chronology, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, but I will introduce this anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. BUDENZ. This is the Daily Worker of July 24, 1945, an editorial, the chief editorial, "Mr. Grew Must Explain," in which they accuse the State Department under Mr. Grew's direction of playing up to the Japanese imperialists and appealing to them to surrender in time to save themselves.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that for the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 169" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 169

[From the Daily Worker, July 24, 1945]

MR. GREW MUST EXPLAIN

There is something very strange, very rotten, and very alarming in the way American policy toward Japan is developing. It is time the entire Nation realized what is going on, and what is at stake.

Early last week, the Herald Tribune's Washington correspondent reported that plans were being made to modify the unconditional-surrender policy. Japan was going to be told that her Imperial Government might remain if only she would subordinate herself to the United States and submit to a peace which would not necessarily destroy her feudal-militarist structure. The Navy and State Department were reported favorable to such a plan. But it was all a matter for the future, to be decided by President Truman himself.

Now it is disclosed that a direct Navy Department representative, Capt. E. M. Zacharias, has been broadcasting to Japan for the OWI. On Friday night he openly appealed to the Japanese industrialists to surrender in time. He said that American patience was running short, that unless the Japanese leaders surrender now, the peace may be complicated by the pressure of China, Australia, and perhaps also by the Soviet Union. Japan, unlike Germany, would be well treated under the terms of the Atlantic Charter. In other words, an open appeal to negotiate a peace.

Under Secretary Joseph Grew last week did not deny the Herald Tribune reports; he merely said that no official peace offers had been received, which could be an invitation for them. And Elmer Davis now discloses that Captain

Zacharias has already made 12 such broadcasts. Evidently, what was going to be a modification of policy in the future is already a fact—to this officer—and has been the basis of repeated broadcasts.

This is a scandalous situation. Both the Herald Tribune and the New York Times have in recent days devoted sharp editorials to it, which shows that while there is serious resistance to modification of the unconditional-surrender policy in the very highest circles, there is also plenty of fire to cause such smoke.

Both newspapers point out that this kind of thing is only prolonging the war. It is encouraging the Japanese to resist even more fiercely. Instead of shortening the war, this is literally costing American lives. The Tribune cites a commentator of the Japanese Broadcasting Co., Kuso Oya, who gleefully predicts an impending about-face by the United States, urging the Japanese to fight on until that happens. Of course, it is not only the fact that the war is being prolonged by such tactics. The very basis of a democratic Asia would be undermined if the State Department conception wins out.

Explanations to the American people are in order. The Navy Department should explain the case of Captain Zacharias. Mr. Grew should openly and frankly inform the American people whether and why the policy of unconditional surrender is being modified.

Mr. BUDENZ. The next two are from the Daily Worker of August 18, 1945, the first of them being on page 2 and being a news dispatch from Art Shields, the Daily Worker correspondent at that time in Washington. In the course of this article, which is headed "See danger of United States intervention for Chiang," it says:

Unfortunately America's declared policy, as laid down by Ambassador Patrick Hurley, is to help the Kuomintang and to isolate the popular resistance forces operating from Yenan. There is no evidence yet to show that Grew's designation means that the United States intends to follow the united policy urged by General Stilwell, before he was taken out of China at the request of Chiang.

That "designation" is a typographical error, it means "resignation" because they have just mentioned that Grew has resigned.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that into the record as the next consecutive exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 170" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 170

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 18, 1945, p. 2]

SEE DANGER OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION FOR CHIANG

(By Art Shields)

WASHINGTON, August 17.—The resignation of Joseph C. Grew, long a foe of Chinese unity, from his strategic post as Under Secretary of State, might be seen as an encouraging token of American policy toward China if taken by itself. Unfortunately it cannot be taken by itself. And there is too little time to speculate hopefully on inconclusive data, while the danger of further American intervention in the civil war, which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is preparing, remains so obvious.

This intervention in the next few days may take a more active form than it has in recent months when the United States was merely equipping the Kuomintang armies, which were giving more attention to the blockade against the popular anti-Japanese resistance forces, led by the Communist General Chu Teh, than to fighting the enemy.

The best informed authorities on China in Washington, in talks with the Daily Worker, yesterday foresaw certain types of American military and naval intervention to help the reactionary dictatorship, as distinct possibilities for the very near future.

Military intervention could come if General Wedemeyer, commander of American forces in China, carried out his reported promise to Chiang to carry airborne

Kuomintang troops to areas where the Japanese are surrendering. In most of those areas the Japanese and puppet troops would otherwise be forced to surrender to Chu Teh's armies, which are engaging more enemy forces than Chiang's armies are engaging.

Such action, if it takes place, would constitute American military intervention on behalf of the Chinese reactionaries, who are plotting civil war. It would involve the loss of American lives and a breach of faith with the Chinese people. It would jeopardize postwar peace in Asia and the world.

Chiang has already appealed to the Japanese not to surrender to the democratic forces, in other words to continue resisting them until he can take over with American help, thus encouraging the Japanese to continue the war in violation of the Allied orders for immediate and unconditional surrender. He also has told the puppet troops under Japanese command that he will hold them "responsible for maintaining local peace and order."

This means that Chiang is seeking an alliance with foreign enemies and Chinese traitors against the people. And it means, says a statement from the people's government at Yen-an, that Chiang is seeking to get possession of enemy arms for the purpose of launching large-scale civil war against the heroic anti-Japanese guerilla fighters and the Eighth and Fourth Route Armies led by the Communists.

NAVAL INTERVENTION

The danger of naval as well as military intervention may come in port cities like Shanghai. The democratic, anti-Japanese armies, not Chiang's are advancing on Shanghai and most of the other large cities. The people, not the Kuomintang, will take these cities unless America intervenes.

Unfortunately America's declared policy, as laid down by Ambassador Patrick Hurley, is to help the Kuomintang and to isolate the popular resistance forces operating from Yen-an. There is no evidence yet to show that Grew's designation means that the United States intends to follow the unity policy urged by General Stilwell before he was taken out of China at the request of Chiang.

Authoritative observers of the Chinese scene here also point out that Americans should not develop hasty illusions from Chiang's recent request to Mao Tse-tung, Communist political leader in Yen-an, to confer with him in Chungking.

Conferences that are intended as more than gestures are not called in such vague fashion, they declare. There must first be preliminary meetings of representatives of the two groups to prepare the ground before the principals sit down together. There must be understandings regarding the specific issues to be discussed. Chiang's florid but brief invitation to Mao does not provide such understandings.

And, most important, the invitation must be accompanied by such measures of good faith as the cessation of civil war by the Kuomintang, the lifting of the blockade against the border region, the release of political prisoners, and the establishment of democratic civil liberties.

TERRORISTIC ATMOSPHERE

Chungking's present terroristic atmosphere is not conducive to the conference Chiang proposes.

America's first concern, however, is to tell our Government that there must be no intervention against the anti-Japanese fighters in China. No intervention on the side of a civil war plotter like Chiang, who, Yen-an spokesmen have revealed, has set up a special Chinese brand of fascism—the brand called Compradore fascism, which is a reactionary dictatorship under the wings of foreign imperialism.

Mr. MORRIS. May I make it clear that we are reading these articles and editorials from the Daily Worker to show that the Communist Party, during this period, was carrying on an extensive campaign against the then Under Secretary of State Grew, because he was advocating a so-called soft peace for Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the case?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the Communist policy for Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. It was that of a tough peace for Japan.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Grew was not carrying out that policy and therefore they were opposing him?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

We have here an editorial, *Stop the Monkey Business*, appearing on the same date, August 18, 1945, on the regular editorial page of the *Daily Worker*, page 6. This is the leading editorial, which concludes as follows:

Americans today are in no mood to take any wooden nickels. The dilly-dallying with the Emperor in Japan must stop, and, incidentally, Joseph Grew must really be retired from public life and in no case appointed to any post dealing with far-eastern affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. Now was this campaign being carried on against anyone else in the Japanese Division of the State Department, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; it was carried on at the same time extensively by the party, much more than these articles in the *Daily Worker* indicate. They corroborate the campaign, but through communications of the Politburo it was also against Eugene C. Dooman, who I understand was then connected with the Far Eastern Division of the State Department.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any reference to Mr. Dooman in those articles?

Mr. BUDENZ. There are references which I don't see in these articles, but there were many. There is an announcement here that the State Department "retires soft-peace advocate," but this is a United Press dispatch played up in the *Daily Worker*. This is dated September 6, 1945, page 2. It indicates that the campaign against Mr. Dooman was meeting with success.

Mr. MORRIS. The campaign against Mr. Dooman was meeting with success?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have these introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be so received and so designated.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 171 and 172," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 171

[From the *Daily Worker*, August 18, 1945, p. 6]

STOP THE MONKEY BUSINESS

The American people are watching the spectacle of Japan's delayed surrender with very suspicious eyes. And when you take into account the treacherous policies of Chiang Kai-shek, and the rip-roaring appeal to the reactionaries of the entire world by Winston Churchill—you get a very strange picture indeed. The American people are in no mood for monkey business. And that's what they fear is afoot.

For example, there is today's report of a Japanese airplane attack upon our bombers, who were peacefully photographing Tokyo. The Kwantung army is still fighting.

The behavior of the Japanese Emperor is very strange, and all his rescripts read as though Japan still thinks she can make war again at some future time. At least three war criminals, members of the old Cabinet, have been reappointed to the new one; and one of these ministers even has the portfolio for "Greater East Asia," as though to say that Japan still expects to exercise imperialist control over the peoples of Indochina, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Burma, and Thailand.

The Japanese Government explains to its people that the war was won "spiritually"; the Tokyo radio breathes insidious suggestions of revenge; there is no mention of the war guilt of the former Japanese Cabinet whatsoever.

And the Emperor's emphasis on the atom bomb makes it appear that Japan lost the war because of some scientific freak and not because she was forced to her knees. This is exactly the kind of propaganda to prepare for sabotaging the Potsdam declaration. We cannot share President Truman's complacency about it.

SURRENDER DELAYED

But the main thing is that the cease-fire order is being delayed. Russians and Mongolians—our allies—are still dying. And our own soldiers face treachery at every point. No wonder the American people are suspicious. It is as though the American supreme command is just as worried about a social and political crack-up inside of Japan as the Emperor himself. It is as though our State Department is trying to help the Japanese feudalists and industrialists to weather their internal crisis. That is none of our business. Any leniency to the Japanese along those lines contains the prospect of rupturing the Allies and laying the basis for future wars.

And then there is the crisis in China. The facts are brutally plain. Chiang Kai-shek is trying to keep the Japanese armies intact and fully armed until his own troops can get to Shanghai and Nanking. In other words, Chiang Kai-shek is afraid of the Chinese people who have suffered so long under the Japanese heel; he prefers to keep them under that heel rather than allow them to liberate themselves.

What does it mean, after all, when the Japanese puppet at Nanking publicly offers to hold the city with quisling troops until Chiang Kai-shek gets there? This is simple treachery. If it had happened in Europe, the country would be crying "sellout" from the housetops.

But how can Chiang Kai-shek dare to fly his troops into Shanghai and Nanking? Only because the American general, Albert Wedemeyer offers to help him with the services of American planes. In blunt language, this is intervention in the affairs of the Chinese people. It is encouraging Chiang to make civil war on all Chinese democrats. It is a dastardly game, and neither our soldiers nor our people want any part of it.

And finally, there is the Herbert Hoover of Great Britain—Winston Churchill. His speech in Parliament was much more than a challenge to the British Labor Government, although it was that, too, and we hope the British people and their leaders will know how to answer it. The speech was also a call to American reactionaries, urging them to treat Japan and to handle China in such a way as to prevent the victory of the democratic forces.

His reference to communism in Eastern and Central Europe, and his defense of the poor Germans in eastern Prussia is dangerous in itself, but most important, it bears immediately on the issues in Asia.

Americans today are in no mood to take any wooden nickels. The dilly-dallying with the emperor in Japan must stop, and incidentally Joseph Grew must really be retired from public life and in no case appointed to any post dealing with far-eastern affairs.

The United States must disavow Chiang Kai-shek's plans for civil war in China and give no support whatsoever to such a project. Vigilance of the Nation is required today, a responsibility which falls particularly upon the labor movement.

EXHIBIT No. 172

[From the Daily Worker, New York, Thursday, September 6, 1945, p. 2]

STATE DEPARTMENT RETIRES "SOFT PEACE" ADVOCATE

WASHINGTON, September 5 (UP).—Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, shaping a stiff occupation policy toward Japan, today was replacing old-line Japanese policy-making officials in the State Department with experts on China.

Eugene Dooman, special assistant to the director of the Department's Far Eastern Division, retired on August 31, it was revealed today, after 33 years of diplomatic service in the Japanese department. He was born in Japan and has been criticized by liberal publications for a "soft" attitude toward Japan.

He had held a key spot in formulating occupation procedure for Japan as chairman of a joint State, Army, and Navy Department committee responsible for occupation policy.

John Carter Vincent, chief of the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs, was recalled hurriedly from his vacation to fill Dooman's place on the committee. Vincent also retained his China post.

OTHERS MAY GO

Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew's recent resignation, and Dooman's retirement intensified speculation that Byrnes would replace other old liners in the Japanese section. Mentioned prominently were Ballantine and Erle R. Dickover, Chief of the Japanese Section.

Observers regarded it significant that Vincent was the second China specialist to be appointed to a vital Japanese policy-making post within the last few days.

Byrnes yesterday appointed United States Minister to Thailand George Atcheson to be acting political adviser to Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Both Vincent and Atcheson have spent years in China and have seen the effects of Japanese aggression. Atcheson was aboard the U. S. S. *Panay* when the Japanese bombed it on December 12, 1937.

At his press conference Byrnes made it clear that United States policy toward Japan was more stringent than had yet been disclosed.

Asked if he had seen reports that the Japanese did not believe they had lost the war, he said the terms of the occupation would soon be presented to the Japanese and if they didn't bring defeat home to them he didn't know what would.

Mr. BUDENZ. May I state, Mr. Chairman, that I have one more exhibit, which while I have taken it out of order is slightly different, it indicates the continuation of the campaign against Mr. Grew in order to drive him completely out of public life, as the editorial of August 18 stated, and this is a very large display article playing up with a great deal of praise John Stewart Service for having been vindicated after he had allegedly taken State Department documents and given them to Philip Jaffe.

After his vindication and reinstatement in the State Department this says—

"So sorry," says Grew; State Department reinstates man he called spy.

There is a very prominent picture of John Service, and it says—

Mr. Grew, late but unlamented Undersecretary of the State Department, popped off, too.

Then they go on to indicate that Grew was compelled personally to apologize to one of the victims of the witch hunt, John S. Service, who was reinstated to his State Department job.

So there was nothing that poor Mr. Grew could do but echo the American equivalent of the Japanese "so sorry" which he learned after a long sojourn in Tokyo.

This is written up by a special writer for the Daily Worker and plays up Mr. Service, and of course belittles Mr. Grew.

Senator O'CONNOR. I would like to ask a question.

THE CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Senator O'CONNOR. In view of your reference just made I am going to ask the question whether you considered Amerasia a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. Amerasia was organized, according to official information given to me, under complete Communist auspices. As a matter of fact, the first copy of Amerasia when it first appeared was presented to me before it ever appeared to get my opinion. This

was done, however, within the Communist apparatus and not by the Amerasia people.

After I passed on it it went back to the Politburo. They said it had been submitted to me first before publication.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean issue No. 1 of volume No. 1 was submitted to you for approval?

Mr. BUDENZ. For my comments as to whether it was going to perform its task.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce the previous photostat we were discussing into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 173" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 173

[From the Daily Worker, New York, August 24, 1943, p. 4]

"SO SORRY," SAYS GREW; STATE DEPARTMENT REINSTATES MAN HE CALLED SPY

(By John Meldon)

Yes, sir; it was all quite a mistake—but you won't find acknowledgment in those newspapers which screamed "Spy ring" a short time back.

You recall the case: Five men and a woman were arrested and the Scripps-Howard press and Dirty Willie's Journal-American and Mirror, as well as the staid Times, ran the story in banner headlines. The six were accused—by the press and not the authorities—of constituting a "spy ring" with "connections" with those awful Communists.

For several days the newspapers raved and ranted, and Mr. Grew, late but unlamented Under Secretary of the State Department, popped off, too. He hinted darkly that the six accused—three employees of the State Department and several editors and writers for the magazine Amerasia—had done everything but back a Mack truck up to the State Department and expropriate all sorts of "confidential" documents relating to the China situation.

Payoff came yesterday when Mr. Grew personally apologized to one of the victims of the witchhunt—John S. Service—who was reinstated to his State Department job by Secretary Byrnes. In putting Service back on the job, Mr. Byrnes praised Service to the skies for his excellent 12-year record with the Department. So there was nothing that poor Mr. Grew could do but echo the American equivalent of the Japanese "so sorry" which he learned after a long sojourn in Tokyo.

But do you think the newspapers which went to town on the "spy ring" phony had anything to say yesterday? Of course not. For that matter when, on last August 10 only three of the original group accused were indicted—not as spies, mind you, but on the far less serious charge of removing documents without permission—the newspapers buried the fact in little one-column stories somewhere back among the want ads.

However, don't get the idea Mr. Howard or Mr. Dirty Willie are sorry. They accomplished what they set out to do. They planted a terrific lie and some of it stuck. You see, the whole thing behind the story is that the accused group were fed up with Mr. Grew's policies toward our Chinese allies. So Mr. Grew and the big-circulation press nailed them.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had testimony previously that the first issue of Amerasia appeared in 1937.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. While the campaign against Mr. Grew and Mr. Dooman was proceeding with respect to policy for Japan, was there a policy in the Communist Party councils also being carried out with respect to certain officials concerning our China policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; definitely. As we have indicated here it was against Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, against Ambassador and Gen. Patrick Hurley.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow the same procedure with respect to this folder. Mr. Mandel, will you testify as to the contents of that folder?

Mr. MANDEL. All copies from the Daily Worker appearing in this folder have been prepared at my direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Photostatic copies?

Mr. MANDEL. Some are photostated and a couple are typed.

Mr. MORRIS. I am forwarding this list to the witness, Mr. Chairman, so that it will refresh his recollection in testifying to the coming incidents.

Mr. BUDENZ. This first photostatic copy of the Daily Worker is linked up with the campaign on Grew to some extent in addition to the campaign on Hurley. It was engineered, to my knowledge, by the Communist Party—that is, by official reports that I have received. This was the statement by 21 prominent Americans urging President Truman to avert the serious danger of civil war in China.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt at this point to show that these 21 people who signed the statement, which according to the testimony of Mr. Budenz was signed to influence our foreign policy, that a great number of them were connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations. I would like to go through that list with this in mind. Mr. Budenz, have you a copy of the list?

Mr. BUDENZ. It appears here in the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if we could linger here for a minute and I would like to ask you to read out the names.

Mr. BUDENZ. All of them?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. Dr. Phyllis Ackerman; T. A. Bisson, writer——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we have had testimony concerning Mr. Bisson's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Mrs. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Is she the wife of Edward C. Carter, the secretary general of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my understanding.

Mr. MORRIS. Continue, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. Maurice P. Davidson, lawyer; Israel Epstein, correspondent.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that we have had testimony that Israel Epstein was connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that speaks for itself, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BUDENZ. Melvin J. Fox; Talitha Gerlach, Young Women's Christian Association——

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that Talitha Gerlach, according to previous testimony, has been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. BUDENZ. Freda Kirchwey, editor, the Nation; Lewis Merrill, president, United Office and Professional Workers of America;

Frederick N. Myers, vice president, National Maritime Union; Rev. Richard Morton, executive secretary, United Church Council for Democracy; Arthur Upham Pope, director, Iranian Institute; Martin Popper, executive secretary, National Lawyers Guild; Lawrence E. Salisbury, editor, Far Eastern Survey.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that the Far Eastern Survey is the official publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Budenz, do you know Mr. Martin Popper?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have talked to him on the phone and my impression is that I have met him.

Senator SMITH. Do you know about his alleged trip to Russia in the spring of 1946?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't recall that.

Senator SMITH. Did you know about that?

Mr. BUDENZ. I couldn't recall it offhand. His relations with the Daily Worker were of the closest.

Senator SMITH. I saw him in Europe myself, and it was alleged that he went from Nuremberg to Russia and I wondered if you knew about it.

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. I think that will be enough, Mr. Budenz.

The purpose of that, Mr. Chairman, was to show the high incidence of the members of the Institute of Pacific Relations which participated in that which Mr. Budenz described as a Communist maneuver.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a list on some document addressed to the President?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was it arranged by the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that?

Mr. BUDENZ. August 17, 1945.

Senator O'CONOR. I do understand, Mr. Budenz, that you either are prepared to say or have said it that the telegram was signed by the individuals in their individual capacity? You did make reference to certain organizations such as the Young Women's Christian Association.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator O'CONOR. I do not think you wanted to give any impression that they were speaking for the organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. No; but this is a typical Communist procedure, putting the organization down and giving the impression that they are linked up in some way. I might say that they call themselves the Friends of Chinese Democracy. It was a committee called that, so it was under the cover of that committee.

Senator SMITH. The same might be said with respect to the National Lawyers Guild, Mr. Martin Popper of the National Lawyers Guild?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I would prefer not to discuss the National Lawyers Guild today because I have to indict it and that would take quite a bit of time.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that all there is to this particular one?

Mr. BUDENZ. There is another name, Ilona Ralf Sues, writer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and given the proper designation.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 174" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 174

[From the Daily Worker, New York, Friday, August 17, 1945, p. 2]

AMERICANS IN PLEA TO TRUMAN ON CHINA

Twenty-one prominent Americans yesterday urged President Truman to avert the serious danger of civil war in China. They demanded immediate steps to prevent American planes and other military equipment from being turned over to the Chungking government.

Pointing out that Chiang Kai-shek has made a direct appeal to the Japanese troops "to retain their arms and equipment for the maintenance of public order," the telegram to Truman stated that "the only American policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender of Japanese troops to patriotic Chinese groups on the spot.

The message to President Truman noted that the Communist-led Eighth Route and new Fourth Armies which Chiang Kai-shek is preparing to attack "have borne the brunt of the Allied fight in North Central China.

SIGNERS

The telegram was signed by the following in their individual capacities (organizations listed for purpose of identification only):

Dr. Phyllis Ackerman; T. A. Bisson, writer; Mrs. Edward C. Carter; Maurice P. Davidson, lawyer; Israel Epstein, correspondent; Frederick V. Field, member, executive committee, Institute of Pacific Relations; Melvin J. Fox; Talitha Gerlach, Young Women's Christian Association; Freda Kirchwey, editor, the Nation; Lewis Merrill, president, United Office and Professional Workers of America; Frederick N. Myers, vice president, National Maritime Union.

Rev. Richard Morton, executive secretary, United Church Council for Democracy; Arthur Upham Pope, director, Iranian Institute; Martin Popper, executive secretary, National Lawyers Guild; Lawrence E. Salisbury, editor, Far Eastern Survey; Vincent Sheean, writer, Mrs. Edgar Snow, writer; Ilona Ralf Sues, writer; Richard Watts, writer; Dr. Max Yergan, director, Council on African Affairs, and Reid Robinson, president, Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, CIO.

A committee called The Friends of Chinese Democracy, is being formed, the purpose of which will be to press for an American foreign policy designed to support all efforts of the Chinese people for unity and democratic government, it was announced yesterday.

The full text of the message to President Truman follows:

"We are alarmed at the news that the Chungking government is planning to use American planes and other military equipment made available to them by General Wedemeyer and Ambassador Hurley to combat the perfectly legitimate efforts of patriotic Chinese forces in north and central China engaged in disarming enemy troops and liberating areas in which they alone have fought throughout the war.

"If these plans are carried out it can only mean civil war in China instead of Chinese democratic unity on which the security of the Far East depends.

"We are particularly disturbed by Chiang Kai-shek's recent order to Chinese puppet troops who have been serving the Japanese enemy and who now apparently are to be used by the Chungking and American Governments against patriotic forces.

"The latter, despite never having received any assistance from the United States or Chungking, have borne the brunt of the Allied fight in north and central China, cooperated with American military personnel and rescued almost 100 American airmen forced down in the vicinity of Peiping, Taiyuan, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong.

ENCOURAGES FOE

"Generalissimo Chiang, moreover, encourages continued resistance of the enemy by inviting them to police the areas which they hold at present, and by stating that they will be held "strictly accountable" for arms which they or their puppets "might surrender to any organization or party other than officers or men duly authorized by the Chinese (Central) Government."

If carried out, such a policy would violate the purposes of this war. It would seriously jeopardize the peace that has been won. Americans would not support a policy toward China similar to that of the British in Greece.

Under circumstances existing in China today we believe that the only American policy which will avoid civil war is not to interfere with the surrender to patriotic Chinese troops on the spot and simultaneously to encourage all Chinese efforts to a democratic government.

"Such action must be based on full agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

"In appealing to you, Mr. President, we reflect the views of thousands of Americans, including many of those serving in the Armed Forces in China."

MR. MORRIS. Are there any other articles, Mr. Budenz, establishing the point that the Communists were then carrying on a policy such as you testified to?

MR. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Having disposed of Grew and Dooman, the campaign was laid before I left the party, and it was already under way, as you can see from these editorials to which I have referred, for attack on Ambassador Hurley, which was more prolonged than we have indicated here. I say, before I left the party because these copies of the Daily Worker are after I am out of the party.

MR. MORRIS. I see.

MR. BUDENZ. However, I recognize them as copies of the Daily Worker which I have read.

MR. MORRIS. Will you continue your testimony on that point?

THE CHAIRMAN. Just on that point, do you intend to follow up, Mr. Morris, as regards the attack on General Wedemeyer? If not I would like to ask a question or two. If you have it in the course of your presentation, all right.

MR. MORRIS. Are you prepared to testify about the campaign against General Wedemeyer, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ. Not in great detail. I just know that this campaign in the Daily Worker was carried out to the various sections of the Communist Party and was made the order of business for the Communists in other organizations.

THE CHAIRMAN. I am interested in that phase of the campaign which seems to have been pointed toward General Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer was at that time, or at some time either prior to or subsequently sent under the auspices of the State Department to China, as I recall?

MR. BUDENZ. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN. And was the representative of the State Department in China. Was it during that time that he was attacked by the Communists?

MR. BUDENZ. That is my impression. As a matter of fact, the Communists viewed General Wedemeyer as the enemy of the Soviet interests in the Far East.

THE CHAIRMAN. General Wedemeyer's report was a controversial thing here for a long time and was refused to congressional committees even under subpoena when we issued subpoenas for the presentation of General Wedemeyer's report on China and the Far East.

I am just wondering why the attack was directed against Wedemeyer, if you know.

Mr. BUDENZ. The attack was directed against Wedemeyer from the Communist viewpoint because they consider him to be an enemy of Soviet policy in the Far East. The policy of the Communists was to work out a coalition government in which they could strangle those who coalesced with them. That was the phrase used in the discussion so that I am not straining the question.

General Wedemeyer's tendencies—I can't go into them in detail, were in opposition to that course—that is, at least to the extent that the Communists viewed him as one who would not go along fully with their program.

Senator WATKINS. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator WATKINS. With respect to General Wedemeyer, the public press reported him to have told about a time when he was appointed Ambassador to China and then his appointment was canceled because some intereststs in China objected. Do you know anything about that campaign about getting his appointment canceled?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not specifically. I know there was a general campaign against General Wedemeyer as one of those in our diplomatic service who was inimical to Soviet interests.

Senator WATKINS. Do you recall his testimony where he said he bought his clothing for that particular assignment?

Mr. BUDENZ. I read in the public press and that is the only knowledge I have.

Senator WATKINS. Were you connected with the party at that time? That goes back a number of years.

Mr. BUDENZ. That I am not sure of. I don't know the date of it, and I would want to be precise.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. When General Wedemeyer's report was held up, do you know, Mr. Budenz, enough about the influence of the Communists on anybody in State Department that tended to cause that report to be held up; and, if so, how was that worked out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of my own knowledge I wouldn't know that. I wouldn't know everything about Communist activity. But I do know that the Communists relied very strongly on Service and John Carter Vincent in the campaign against Ambassador Hurley, for example.

Senator SMITH. Was a part of the campaign against General Wedemeyer to have his report suppressed, as it was indeed suppressed for several years?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator Smith, it may be that Mr. Budenz' experience in the Communist Party terminated in 1945. Was not General Wedemeyer's report issued subsequent to that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my impression.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you have been testifying up to this point with regard to the people that the Communists planned to eliminate from the State Department because they interfered with Communist policy. What people were you relying on to put over your policy?

The CHAIRMAN. The policy of elimination?

Mr. MORRIS. The policy of elimination. Let's take the Japanese situation first. Did the Communist Party make use of Owen Lattimore or Owen Lattimore's writings with respect to Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, we see that with respect to Japan policy and others.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you elaborate on that?

Mr. BUDENZ. His book, *Solution in Asia*, was it not?—was used by the Communists and other writings of his.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you not testify about a certain press release yesterday?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is what I referred to just now.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you amplify that, please?

Mr. BUDENZ. This press release we can see runs in line with the Communist charges here against everybody; that they are for the retention of vested interest in Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. To what press release do you refer when you say "this press release"?

Mr. BUDENZ. This was a press release which was introduced in evidence the other day issued in 1945. I don't say that I have any knowledge that Mr. Lattimore conferred with the Communists before making the statement. I do say that this statement was used extensively by the Communists to my knowledge, it was made a special order of business for the Communist Party to press it.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that supplemented the Communist campaign to eliminate Grew from the State Department?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. And also in imposing a hard peace on Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Were any writings of Andrew Roth used for this purpose?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Dilemma in Japan was not only advanced by the Communists but it was submitted to the Politburo before publication.

Mr. MORRIS. Was Andrew Roth a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, from many official reports he was a Communist. These came up particularly in the Amerasia case and definitely Mr. Roth was described as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that Andrew Roth's book was used to supplement this Communist campaign?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports that I have received, he was.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that he went to China with Henry Wallace and Owen Lattimore?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you hear at that time in official Communist Party circles that John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore were members of the Communist Party traveling with Henry Wallace?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would elaborate on that.

Mr. BUDENZ. As I have stated, the trip by Wallace to China was followed by the Communists with a great deal of interest in discussions in the Politburo. In those discussions it was pointed out that Mr. Wallace was more or less under good influences from the Communist viewpoint, that is to say, that he had on one hand Mr. Lattimore and on the other John Carter Vincent, both of whom were

described as being in line with the Communist viewpoint, seeing eye to eye with it, and that they would guide Mr. Wallace largely along those paths.

The CHAIRMAN. To what are you referring, are you referring to publications or statements made in party conclave, or statements made by high officials of the Communist Party or to what are you referring when you say that it was stated that Mr. Wallace was under good influence?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was stated by Communist officials in the Politburo at that time, by Mr. Browder and Mr. Jack Stachel. This is also confirmed to some degree, not the Wallace business but the dependence on John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent, that is confirmed by the Daily Worker's subsequent statement that they were responsible to a great degree for getting Mr. Hurley out of the State Department.

Senator O'CONNOR. Mr. Budenz, at that point could I ask you if you knew what position John Carter Vincent held at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. I could not. I know as yet he wasn't head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and that he was subsequently placed in that Division.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that it was an official Communist Party secret shared by a few people that at that time John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Was one of the objectives of the Communists to put Mr. Vincent in the position he afterward acquired?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Communists were eager that Mr. Vincent advance and that he obtain a place in the State Department where he could get rid of Hurley and in addition to that could also influence policy.

Senator SMITH. Was that purpose achieved by his being put in the position that he was placed in?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, Mr. Dooman was got out and he was put in his place.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you read extracts from Henry Wallace's book at that time which elaborates on Mr. Budenz' testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. What was the name of the book and when was it published?

Mr. MANDEL. I read from the book entitled "Soviet Asia Mission," by Henry A. Wallace, published by Reynal & Hitchcock, the following two paragraphs on page 172.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you the date of the publication?

Mr. MANDEL. It was 1944 or 1945.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. This is Henry Wallace's writing.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

We spent the night of July 4 at Chita. In the evening I had a long talk with Sergei Goglidze. He was curious about the Chinese situation. I replied in the spirit of the Chungking joint statement. Like other Russian officials Goglidze was concerned about the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in China. He was anxious that China remain united in the war against Japan and was conscious of the vital role the United States has in China's future. His feelings were revealed in telling incidents during our entire journey.

One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast: "To the modernization of China." Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification: "May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese militarism,

China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there anything in the previous paragraph that identifies who Goglidze was?

Mr. MANDEL. Goglidze, according to the same book, was a Georgian, an intimate friend of Marshal Stalin, president of the executive committee of Khabarovsk Territory, under which this far northern area is governed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit, this excerpt from Mr. Wallace's book. But I would like to ask Mr. Budenz a question on that last toast Mr. Goglidze proposed.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted in the record and properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 175" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 175

SOVIET ASIA MISSION

(By Henry A. Wallace—Regnal and Hitchcock)

I was assisted by expert interpreters who accompanied me. They were, in addition to Mr. Lattimore: Mr. John Hazard, Chief Liaison Officer, Division for Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration of Chinese Affairs, State Department (p. 21).

* * * * *

We spent the night of July 4 at Chita. In the evening I had a long talk with Sergei Goglidze. He was curious about the Chinese situation. I replied in the spirit of the Chungking joint statement. Like other Russian officials Goglidze was concerned about the strength of the anti-Soviet elements in China. He was anxious that China remain united in the war against Japan and was conscious of the vital role the United States has in China's future. His feelings were revealed in telling incidents during our entire journey.

One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast: "To the modernization of China." Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification: "May China remain in the war." Without victory over Japanese militarism, China could hardly have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, after our return from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future" (p. 172).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you hear the toast that Goglidze proposed, "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future"? As an expert on the Communist movement, bearing in mind the fact that Mr. Goglidze was an intimate of Marshal Stalin and that he made that toast, would it have any significance to you?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it speaks for itself. I think it speaks for itself that the Russians always make these toasts for political purposes. Of course, everybody they toast is not a Communist, but I think that they were definitely trying to establish the place of Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent in Mr. Wallace's mind for Mr. Wallace and also placing upon them the responsibility.

Mr. MORRIS. When Mr. Goglidze speaks of China's future he does it with what in view?

Mr. BUDENZ. Definitely he does it with the view of a Red China, that is no secret, that was told us long ago and was the whole program.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters there showing John Carter Vincent's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. John Carter Vincent——

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Mr. MANDEL. I am reading from a list of attendance at the discussion conference held in Washington, D. C., of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations held December 9 to 10, 1938, and Mr. John Carter Vincent attended that conference. He was also a conference member of the Hot Springs IPR conference held January 6 to 17, 1945, according to a volume called Security in the Pacific, a preliminary report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, on page 159.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, is there anything showing when Mr. Vincent was a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. No, I do not have that.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you make that a part of the record later today?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

DECEMBER 27, 1944.

MR. JOHN CARTER VINCENT,

Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR MR. VINCENT: This is just a last minute reminder to you about the conference. According to our records, you are expected during the following dates: January 9 through 17.

I would urge you to carefully observe the following suggestions:

1. There are no additional copies of data papers available. This means that you should bring your data papers with you or have them sent to you care of room 250, which is the headquarters of the American delegation. Any papers so sent should get out as soon as possible in order for them to arrive by January 5.

2. Additional data papers, not previously distributed, are being mailed direct to Hot Springs and will be distributed to you upon arrival.

3. Prior to January 4, please notify us of any change in your schedule by telegram to this office. After January 4, please notify us of any such change by wiring us at room 250, The Homestead, Hot Springs, Va.

The following is a listing we have for you in the conference who's who. If you have any changes, will you please let me know immediately:

"Chief, China Section, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Member, Board of Trustees, American Council, IPR."

I need not impress upon you again the importance of this meeting nor urge that you keep us informed of your plans.

Looking forward to seeing you at our sessions in Hot Springs, I am,

Very cordially yours,

RAYMOND DENNETT, *Secretary.*

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any letters, Mr. Mandel, that we can introduce at this time?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated February 4, 1944. It is really a memorandum headed "W. L. H.," presumably William L. Holland, "from M. S. F.," presumably Miriam S. Farley. It says: "Copy to H. M." That might be Harriet Moore.

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence), with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting.

Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

That is an excerpt from the memorandum which is offered as an exhibit.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record as the next consecutive exhibit and then I would like to ask Mr. Budenz a question.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly marked.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 176" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 176

FEBRUARY 4, 1944.

W. L. H. from M. S. F.
(Copy to H. M.)

As you know, we have considered very carefully the possible effect of Max Stewart's pamphlet on IPR relations with China.

The Ms. has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said (in confidence), and with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

I am now editing the Ms. in the light of suggestions from Fairbank, Vincent and others. I have also to consider the author, who is not in favor of toning it down any more. Nevertheless I am making some changes along lines recommended by Fairbank, though not, likely, enough to satisfy him completely. My position is that I am willing, in fact, anxious, to go to any lengths to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, provided this does not destroy the pamphlet's value for American readers. Our purpose in issuing it is to provide information for Americans, not to influence Chinese national policy. It would be useless for this purpose if it were written so subtly that ordinary Americans would not get anything out of it.

Personally I doubt that the China Council will leave the IPR because of this or anything else in similar vein. They have more to lose than the IPR by such action, though naturally they will use threats for what they are worth. I am inclined to agree with Max that they respect us more if we don't knuckle under to them.

The American Council is of course prepared to take full responsibility for this pamphlet and will quite understand if the Secretariat wishes to disown it. Nevertheless we should welcome your views. Perhaps I have assumed too much from the meagerness of your comments on the original Ms.; if so, please let me know. I shall be glad to show you the revised Ms. if you care to see it.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, have you previously testified that Maxwell Stewart is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I have met him as such.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that John Fairbank is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; not by personally meeting him but by official reports, particularly in 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. You have already testified that John Carter Vincent was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Now I call your attention to the second paragraph in that letter, Mr. Budenz. Will you read that second paragraph? Mr. Budenz, the "Ms." stands for manuscript, I believe.

Mr. BUDENZ. "I am now editing the manuscript"—

Mr. MORRIS. The second paragraph.

Mr. BUDENZ. I beg your pardon.

The manuscript has been read by John Fairbank and John Carter Vincent among others. Vincent said, in confidence, with a certain emphasis, that he thought it good and well worth publishing. Fairbank thought these things should be said but in a more subtle manner, and recommended rather extensive rewriting. Without this he thought the pamphlet might impel the Chinese to leave the IPR. Both Fairbank and Vincent also made a number of helpful suggestions on points of detail.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator O'Conor.

Senator O'CONOR. Mr. Budenz, I particularly note the parenthesis that John Vincent said in confidence and with a certain emphasis. Can you give any reason why any such statement should be made in confidence or just what significance that had?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. It certainly was part of the Communist plan to protect, as I have said, those who were in key and delicate positions and therefore what he would give would be in confidence so that his name could not be used extensively but for immediate purposes involved among those in whom he had confidence.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, from your own experience was it a practice before a manuscript was issued that it be looked over by members of the Communist Party for perfection?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you elaborate on that a bit for us?

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course, that doesn't prove this was looked over by Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. I understand.

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a practice; that is to say, frequently a pamphlet was referred to the Politburo or to someone immediately in charge of that particular work involved. He would then assign it to two or three people to look it over. I have looked over pamphlets and then people outside the immediate Communist apparatus would look over it for determination as to whether it stood up for the Marxist viewpoint, and to see whether it met the peculiar exigencies of the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. You do know with respect to this particular document, the author of which was Maxwell Stewart, read by John Carter Vincent and John Fairbank, that they were members of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a brief slip taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations that is undated, which is headed "E. C. C." and the name of Mortimer Graves is attached at the end. It reads as follows:

I have been asked by the Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call together a few people in Washington for discussion of a Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R.. I can't spend any time on the matter myself but am quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with Russian War Relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, of course, I won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent, just back from Chungking.

Mr. MORRIS. That is signed "Mortimer Graves"?

Mr. MANDEL. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce this into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be so inserted and identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 177" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 177

E. C. C.:

I have been asked by Council of American-Soviet Friendship to call together a few people in Washington for discussion of a Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R.. I can't spend any time on the matter myself but am quite willing to get a group together for lunch. Does this conflict in any way with Russian War Relief plans or anything of that sort? If so, I won't participate. Hope to write something on the other matter tomorrow. Currie is waiting to see John Carter Vincent, just back from Chungking.

MORTIMER GRAVES.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on that particular memorandum?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't think so. I don't think so unless you want to ask me some question about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the Council of American-Soviet Friendship a Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was a Communist front. That was a duplicate, if I may use the word duplicate here, because of many other organizations involved, founded by the Russian apparatus all over the world. They were first known as Friends of Soviet Russia and then became the Council of American-Soviet Friendship, completely controlled by the Communists, as it was created by them.

Mr. MORRIS. Was the staff of the Russian War Relief made up of Communists, Mr. Budenz, to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; at least to my knowledge. I don't know that I can detail them at the moment.

Mr. MORRIS. Generally would you describe it?

Mr. BUDENZ. The Russian War Relief was organized by the Communists. It was organized under orders of the Soviet Embassy, at least from the statements made in the Politburo that they had received instruction to see that Russia War Relief was not only organized but made efficient and this matter was discussed on many occasions.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you continue with your going through those exhibits there with the view toward supplementing your testimony on the point that Communists were influencing our foreign policy with respect to China?

Mr. BUDENZ. These are Daily Workers published after I left the Communist Party, but I recognize them as copies of the Daily Worker I have read, as I continue to read the Daily Worker up to the present day. This one is dated November 28, 1945, page 3, Hurley Out as Envoy to China, Backs War Policy in Far East.

The paragraph to which I wish to direct your attention here, the one at least in my opinion that should be given attention, reads:

It is well known that liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department have opposed Hurley's reappointment. The former Ambassador continually sought to bypass them in his one-man rule of the Embassy in China.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists—

By the way, the Communists made particular point of attacking Hurley's mentality, representing him as a crude fellow. I could, if I had time, give you many examples, but they wouldn't be profitable.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists, and his main fire was centered on "the considerable section of our State Department which is endeavoring to support communism generally as well as specifically in China."

This article is significant beyond being an article in the *Daily Worker* because it is a specially written article by Joseph Starobin, foreign editor of the *Daily Worker*.

MR. MORRIS. Were you managing editor of the *Daily Worker* at that time?

MR. BUDENZ. I was not.

MR. MORRIS. Can you describe the significance of the language there, "liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department"?

MR. BUDENZ. That is generally used, liberal and progressive, for those who are Communist or pro-Communist. It doesn't necessarily mean that, however, but I think these speak for themselves.

MR. MORRIS. What did you know about John Stewart Service, Mr. Budenz?

MR. BUDENZ. I might add that those who are allies of the Communists, and some may be unconsciously, are designated as liberals. Progressives are always identified as Communists, so when the Communists speak of liberals they mean those that go along with Communist policy either because of their own self-interest or because of being in line with the Communist views.

MR. MORRIS. Now, in this case I notice they use the term "liberal" in connection with John Carter Vincent.

MR. BUDENZ. That is correct.

MR. MORRIS. Yet at the same time you knew that Vincent was a member of the Communist Party?

MR. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; the stressing of Vincent and Service as "liberal" by Starobin the moment Hurley is thrown out is significant. They are being recommended as people who stand for the things that the *Daily Worker* stands for.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

MR. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, before you introduce that, did you want this one introduced?

MR. MORRIS. That is the one I referred to.

THE CHAIRMAN. That has been identified by the witness.

MR. SOURWINE. That is the one the witness referred to?

MR. MORRIS. Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted in the record and properly designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 178" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 178

[From the *Daily Worker*, New York, November 28, 1945, p. 3]

HURLEY OUT AS ENVOY TO CHINA, BACKS WAR POLICY IN FAR EAST

(By Joseph Starobin)

Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley resigned yesterday from the post of Ambassador to Chungking with a statement indicating an all-out drive of the Hoover Republicans and American imperialists to encourage the Truman administration's headlong intervention in China.

Hurley's inflammatory 1,500-word statement was essentially the voice of those American imperialists who are openly anti-Soviet and call everything democratic in Europe and Asia a manifestation of "Communist imperialism."

At the same time, it was a criticism of American support for British imperialism in Asia in the sense that Hurley feels American capital should be getting more out of support for Britain than it is now getting.

The decision not to return as Ambassador in China came after weeks of a varied criticism of Hurley's policies from liberal experts on China, from the labor movement, from six progressive west coast Congressmen and even from the Republican independent paper, the New York Herald Tribune.

BLATANT POLICY SEEN

The White House immediately announced the appointment of Gen. George C. Marshall, who resigned last week as Chief of Staff.

This choice of a conservative military man gave no indication that American policy is today concerned with conciliation or peace in China.

Hurley, while criticizing the professional diplomats in the State Department—that is, the civilian pro-Roosevelt elements who have been increasingly worried by where our policy is going—nevertheless associated himself completely with President Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.

Major political interest was focused yesterday on the Hurley resignation, since it indicates the various personal, factional, and political conflicts within the administration. These in turn reflect the great popular alarm with the administration's course.

The way to take advantage of these conflicts, of course, is not to bank on their stopping the Truman-Byrnes policy, but to redouble pressure on all elements in the administration.

HOOVER LANGUAGE

Hurley used the characteristic language of the Hoover-Vandenberg crowd. He claimed to be favoring "democracy and free enterprise" against "imperialism and communism."

He was full of praise for the Atlantic Charter and was bitter at the "professional Foreign Service men," who, he said, were sympathetic to the "Communist armed party in China."

It is well known that liberal elements like John Carter Vincent and John S. Service in the State Department have opposed Hurley's reappointment. The former Ambassador continually sought to bypass them in his one-man rule of the Embassy in China.

It is a significant reflection of his mentality that all his critics are called Communists, and his main fire was centered on "the considerable section of our State Department which is endeavoring to support communism generally as well as specifically in China."

STEP UP "QUIT CHINA" FIGHT IN CONGRESS

(By Art Shields)

Washington, Nov. 27.—Ambassador Patrick Hurley's resignation, and his replacement by General Marshall, will not stop the congressional campaign to end America's intervention in China.

"Regardless of who is the ambassador to Chungking, we will press for the passage of our anti-intervention resolution until the Marines and GIs and transports are taken out of China," declared Representative Hugh DeLacy (Democrat, Washington), the leader of the group.

The step-the-intervention drive will be pushed at two meetings on Capitol Hill tomorrow.

At 4:30 p. m., a number of congressmen are expected to meet in the Indian Affairs Room to press for action by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

DeLacy, Charles Savage, (Democrat, Washington), John M. Coffee (Democrat, Washington) and Ellis E. Paterson, Ned R. Healy and Helen Gahagan Douglas, California Democrats who sponsored the resolution, will be joined by others.

At 2 p. m. DeLacy is calling a meeting of representatives of the CIO, the AFL, Americans United, the Young Men's Christian Association and other groups.

Representative Savage told this reporter yesterday:

"Trade unions, farm organizations and many individuals are writing me daily against the intervention. We are getting more letters on the China issue than on anything else except army demobilization."

"We expect early action by the Foreign Affairs Committee. The pressure for such action will continue."

Hurley's leave taking must be followed by an exodus of Hurley's policies, said DeLacy today.

"The resignation of Ambassador Hurley," he said, "presents the Secretary of State with a great opportunity."

Mr. BUDENZ. We have here November 22, page 9, an article in the Daily Worker written by Helen Simon, who to my knowledge was a very important member of the staff of the Daily Worker and also engaged in Soviet underground international work through Mexico and other places.

The CHAIRMAN. November 22 of what year?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1945, excuse me, Senator, page 9.

This article deals with "Social Workers Get the Truth About China." It is carrying forward clearly the Communist campaign on this question.

Mr. MORRIS. May I see that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that in this article the following people were mentioned and these people have been identified by this committee as Communists and as associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Paragraph 2 reads:

Guenther Stein, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in China and author of Challenge of Red China, making his first public appearance in New York since his return, painted a picture of the feudalism that has been China's centuries-old curse.

Do you know that Gunther Stein was a member of the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, and also that he was engaged in Soviet undercover work.

Mr. MORRIS. And I think, Mr. Chairman, we have put into the record his associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. At a later paragraph in the same article, Mr. Budenz, we find the following:

Israel Epstein, who represented the New York Times on the American correspondents' trip to Yen'an last summer, contrasted the genuine cooperatives in Yen'an areas to the so-called credit cooperatives in Kuomintang areas which serve to line the landlords' pockets, and "cooperative hostels" where ragged workers are not allowed.

Did you know that Israel Epstein was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Israel Epstein was emphasized as one of the most important Communists in regard to Far East affairs. There was great solicitude in getting him into this country, and J. Peters said he was also engaged in Soviet undercover work.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced evidence of his association with the Institute of Pacific Relations. Later in the article, Mr. Budenz, it reads:

Chu Tong, an editor of the New York China Daily News, rounded out the picture.

Then it goes on to say:

The feudal evil is allied with foreign imperialism, he explained, outlining the 100-year history of Anglo-American intervention which "has always been on the wrong side."

Did you know that the New York China Daily News was a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 179" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 179

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 22, 1945, p. 9]

SOCIAL WORKERS GET THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA

By Helen Simon

The CIO social service workers who attended Local 19 forum on the crisis in China Monday night were outraged and angry. The speakers, outstanding experts in the field, presented the facts and the union members felt that now they were better armed to fight America's undemocratic intervention and to get their men folk home.

Gunther Stein, Christian Science Monitor correspondent in China and author of *Challenge of Red China*, making his first public appearance in New York since his return, painted a picture of the feudalism that has been China's centuries-old curse.

FEUDALISM CITED

The Chungking government is based on the identical feudal landlords, money lenders, parasites who had to be ousted from power in 18th and 19th century Europe to make way for industrialization, Stein said. The oriental village, with its thankless primitive toil, its exorbitant rents and innumerable taxes, is the key to China's problem.

Chiang Kai-shek's central government is "corrupt and inefficient;" its control is limited to the Chungking area and based elsewhere on compromise with local chieftains. It is incapable of developing industry—which would be to the interest of American investors—because it does not consider raising mass purchasing power. It is interested in using American loans for a new war industry, for a dumping-export industry—but not for consumption.

This is the feudal set-up which Washington supports, Stein charged. And this is the set-up which the Communists undertake to replace.

Stein spoke of rent and tax reduction in Yen-an areas; of the first successful program anywhere in the Orient of village self-government; of doubling farm production and creating ingenious factories despite the blockade.

"The Chungking feudal regime can never win," Stein concluded.

Israel Epstein, who represented the New York Times on the American correspondents' trip to Yen-an last summer, contrasted the genuine cooperatives in Yen-an areas to the so-called credit cooperatives in Kuomintang areas which serve to line the landlords' pockets, and "cooperative hostels" where ragged workers are not allowed.

He compared "trade unions" in Kuomintang China—many of which have no right to strike or bargain collectively—to Yen-an unions which have full rights, even sharing in the planning of government-owned industries and fully responsible for spending the three percent social-security fund paid out by employers.

CONTRAST IN WAGES

As to wages, even official Kuomintang figures admit that real wages dropped 60 percent during the war. In Yen-an two equally beneficial wage systems apply: either the worker receives free rent, three suits a year, food, soap and other goods for himself and an additional one and one-half persons plus a money wage or else his wage is computed by the market price of a fixed measure of millet, the staple food.

There is no free medical care in Kuomintang China while all medical care is free in the north, Epstein reported.

Chu Tong, an editor of the New York China Daily News, rounded out the picture.

The feudal evil is allied with foreign imperialism, he explained, outlining the 100-year history of Anglo-American intervention which "has always been on the wrong side."

The Chinese-American editor demolished arguments currently used to justify the transposition of Kuomintang troops to Communist-liberated areas and their armed support by American marines.

It's just to disarm Japanese? But the Japanese are not disarmed and are working alongside Kuomintang, puppet and American troops against Communist-led forces.

We must back the legal government? Was this so of Spain's Republican government? Should Lafayette have helped George III rather than Washington?

WARNS OF UNITED STATES ROLE

We must protect the lives of Americans? But we are risking them by becoming involved in China's civil war. And this traditional excuse for intervention was used by the Japanese, too.

Remember that United States General Wedemeyer said that we must make North China a military base to prevent Russian expansion, Chu Tong warned. Remember that some United States monopolists may be interested in China as an economic colony.

The room teemed with questions when the speakers stopped. What is Russia's role? Russia is not intervening, is withdrawing as promised from Manchuria.

Why was General Stilwell replaced? Because he opposed corruption and inefficiency in the Kuomintang armies and sought cooperation with the Communist-led armies.

RAP INTERVENTION

How do Chinese groups other than Kuomintang and Communists stand? All demand withdrawal of United States troops.

The meeting unanimously passed a resolution condemning United States intervention (see box) and determined to circulate a petition. One girl, to strong applause, urged mass action—meetings, parades, demonstrations.

The wife of a marine now stationed in Tientsin added a note of desperate urgency:

"Our boys don't understand what's happening to them. They are being wined, dined, corrupted by the Kuomintang mayor of Tientsin. We've got to get to them somehow and explain how terribly wrong it is to fight against the democratic peoples of China."

Mr. MORRIS. You say this was part of the Communist campaign to influence foreign policy?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can say that definitely because this campaign was organized ahead of time, not with Gunther Stein, but ahead of time for a great number of organizations which were not necessarily Communist organizations but were infiltrated with Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue?

Mr. BUDENZ. This is another article, November 29, 1945, which I have here, page 2, written by Joseph Starobin and, therefore, of very high standing in Communist directives and information, and it says:

State Department career men like Raymond T. Ludden had visited Yen-an and brought back favorable impressions; there was an American mission in Yen-an, headed by Col. David Barrett, whose reports were also favorable. Newspapermen like Brooks Atkinson, Harrison Forman, and Israel Epstein, who knew China better than Hurley, were telling the truth about both the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Then they go on. This is an attack upon General Hurley, it is quite evident, to belittle Hurley as a man who liked Cadillac cars.

This accounts for his spleen against the "career men," whom he considers "college fellers" and pro-Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. I am sorry, proceed.

Mr. BUDENZ. "College fellers," by the way, is in quotations to indicate that Hurley is not coherent.

Mr. MORRIS. To what extent do you know the Communist affiliation of those people?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Israel Epstein. I know the close association of Harrison Forman with the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, he was intimately connected with the Communist Party; is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. How about Raymond Ludden?

Mr. BUDENZ. Raymond Ludden I only know in this way: That the group around Stilwell were constantly referred to as those relied upon to help advance the Communist cause in China. I wouldn't want to indict one individual of that group, although Mr. Ludden is one of them, but the discussions did not refer to individuals.

Mr. MORRIS. It is your testimony that, when you were talking about people that the Communists could rely on, the reliance was on the whole group around General Stilwell and not to any one individual?

Mr. BUDENZ. The group around Stilwell, in persuading him to antagonism toward Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. That completes this.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have that introduced into the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 180" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 180

[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 29, 1945, p. 2]

HURLEY'S COLORFUL CAREER PAINTED IN OIL

(By Joseph Starobin)

Sympathetic newspapers always use the word "colorful" to describe men like Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley. It is part of big business mythology about democracy and free enterprise that such oil speculators (preferably with plenty of gold braid on their shoulders) should run the foreign policy of the United States.

Yet Hurley has colorfully succeeded in master-minding the present warfare in China. The result is that American boys are dying—3 months after VJ day—to bolster a dictatorial regime which the Chinese people themselves don't want.

Who is Hurley, and what do his resignation statements mean?

It does not say enough to call him an imperialist, for so are Byrnes and Truman. For that matter, Roosevelt who appointed and tolerated Hurley, also wanted to advance the specific American interest in Asia.

Hurley is first of all a big-business man, with the typical concern for direct money interests, with the special streak of a frontier background in the old Choctaw Indian territory of Oklahoma, where he was born 62 years ago. He served as attorney for the Choctaw Indians and saw action in the First World War, becoming a colonel by the end of it.

BIG OILMAN

Hurley assisted in organizing the United States Chamber of Commerce in 1912, and was chairman of the Oklahoma Republican State convention in 1926. He did big business in oil development, and was instrumental in forcing Mexico to indemnify the oil interests when their imperialist properties were seized.

And he became, as a reward for services rendered, the Secretary of War in Herbert Hoover's administration, serving from 1929 to 1933. He was in office when Gen. Douglas MacArthur shot down the bonus marchers in 1932. He is, incidentally, a great friend of John L. Lewis.

Hurley's prewar mentality can best be seen from a speech on November 11, 1939, to the Overseas Masonic Lodge at Providence, R. I.

Hurley proposed that western civilization should be saved by an alliance between Germany and Great Britain, impossible as that might seem, he added.

Otherwise, the gates will be opened to an avalanche of orientalism, namely Soviet Russia, he said, from which it would take western civilization a century to recover.

This fear of orientalism sounds funny, doesn't it, in view of Hurley's supposed love for China. What he meant, however, was clear.

He was bitterly afraid of the Soviet Union, afraid that the war might develop in such a way as to let the Soviet Union share in the victory. And he sought some way to reconcile the Anglo-German struggle.

But he was an America Firster enough to stress that we should not intervene in Europe and should develop a cash-and-carry trade with France and Britain.

The reason why the Republicans and all the former isolationists now rush to embrace Hurley is that they recognize the former Republican isolationist in him.

GLOBE-TROTTER

He favored victory over the Axis, not because he opposed fascism as such but because he wanted the United States to cash in on that victory by pursuing an anti-Soviet course simultaneously with a policy of forcing Britain to shell out to the USA. Only if you see this in Hurley can you understand his opposition to Communist and colonial imperialism.

During the war he was sent to all corners of the globe as Ambassador to New Zealand, as special emissary in the Near East, as observer in Moscow during the critical days of 1942. And finally, he bobbed up with Donald Nelson's economic mission in China in the late summer of 1944.

In China, Hurley's flamboyant self-advertising methods were notorious; he was strongly attracted to Chiang Kai-shek for he recognized the man who might build a reactionary China subservient to a strong imperialist America—at the expense of the Soviet Union and Great Britain as well.

Hurley's first bit of "colorfulness" was to maneuver Gen. Joseph Stilwell and the former Ambassador, Clarence E. Gauss, out of China. Stilwell had been critical of the way Chiang was saving American lend-lease weapons for the ultimate civil war; Gauss knew more about Kuomintang corruption than anyone else.

When Chiang demanded Stilwell's scalp, Hurley said to "Vinegar Joe": "I have only two stars to your four, but I'm going to tell Washington one of us has to leave."

From November 1944 until April 1945 Hurley put on a big show of trying to bring about Kuomintang-Communist unity. He even thought a personal visit to Moscow last April would solve all problems in China. Hurley, who knew nothing about China, acted very much the prima donna. He tried to trick the Chinese Communists into an abject surrender to the Kuomintang. When that finally failed, he became openly pro-Chiang and bitterly anti-Communist.

IRKED BY CRITICS

What irked him just as much as his failure to force a Chinese settlement was the fact that well-informed American opinion among experts and journalists was very critical of the Kuomintang and of Hurley's methods.

State Department career men like Raymond T. Ludden had visited Yenan and brought back favorable impressions; there was an American mission in Yenan, headed by Col. David Barrett, whose reports were also favorable. Newspapermen like Brooks Atkinson, Harrison Forman and Israel Epstein (who knew China better than Hurley) were telling the truth about both the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Hurley was the kind of man who could arrange for a specially designed Cadillac to be flown in from India to Chungking. He insisted on wearing his uniform in performing civilian duties, although he was not entitled to do so. Roosevelt had to tell him point blank to cut it out. This kind of man had no use for the pro-China experts, and succeeded in forcing them out of the Chungking Embassy one by one.

This accounts for his spleen against the "career men," whom he considers "college fellers" and pro-Communists. Actually they are only the last of the pro-Roosevelt Mohicans in a Department which is increasingly dominated by the Byrnes type of political ignoramus.

Now Hurley resigns with a big bang, which is completely in keeping with his bang, bang career.

The moral of the tale is this: when Truman and Byrnes broke with the Roosevelt policy and backed Chiang Kai-shek's civil war plans, they naturally had to rely on Hurley more and more—for he expressed the logic of their position and, moreover, carried it out in practice.

So it is in every phase of foreign affairs. Wherever American-Soviet understanding is abandoned and an attempt is made by Democratic politicians to embark on world domination, the Hurley Republicans will make the most of it. They will go the Truman-Byrnes type one better. They will rapidly drive this country to an internal coup d'état and external aggression in other people's affairs.

Mr. BUDENZ. This was written while I was still in the Communist Party, and I recall it. It is a special dispatch by Virginia Gardner and Art Shields, Communist correspondents here in Washington, Daily Worker correspondents in Washington. It is headed Washington Notes, and says:

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened.

That is found on page 2 of that issue.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 181" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 181

[From the Worker, October 7, 1945, p. 2]

WASHINGTON NOTES

(By Virginia Gardner and Art Shields)

WAR DEPARTMENT DIVISION ON JAPANESE POLICY; UNITED STATES CHAMBER ADVISES OPTIMISM WITH HUMOR

The recent rebuke to Gen. Douglas MacArthur's policies given by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the culmination not only of a split in the State Department but in the War Department itself.

With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened. They were able to push through certain directives which had been held up in committee theretofore, so that the set of directives for treatment of Japan which the White House recently released were even better than the original directives which had been flown over to MacArthur and apparently lay ignored somewhere on his desk or thereabouts.

But in the War Department itself there developed what amounted to virtually a revolution. Among those most alarmed and exercised by the MacArthur policies and the complete lack of carrying out of directives from the State Department was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. In fact, McCloy is said to be determined that the new directives shall be carried out even if he has to go over to Japan and take a look-see himself.

Yet Senator H. Styles Bridges (Republican of New Hampshire) continues to attribute to Washington officials who represent "the leftist thinking of the Nation" the wave of criticism against MacArthur.

You don't hear much these days in Washington about what a good administrator President Truman is, since MacArthur has flouted the directives sent him and the Ways and Means Committee declared a lockout on all unemployment-compensation legislation. In all the years during which the late President Roosevelt took such a beating as a poor administrator, there never was quite such contempt shown for legislation he recommended or directives sent to any part of the Government by a constituted authority.

The United States Chamber of Commerce determined to be sunny, even if it hurts. So in a piece which underlines with a note of grimness its advice to business to exude confidence the Chamber of Commerce Business Action for September 24 says: "If we read the signs aright, the great mass of the population is ready to welcome an active, aggressive leadership by business * * *. But labor is afraid of unemployment, just as business fears it * * *. Some believe the answer is to be found in the Murray (full employment) bill. The sharp, forceful movement behind that measure is a manifestation of fear * * *. The formulas have got to be achieved on the local or industry level, or more specifically on the individual level."

Then, in italics: "This is the time for businessmen to think, talk, plan and act in forceful tones of optimism, with the confidence which they are fully justified in feeling—and with a sense of humor."

What amounts to an actual conspiracy to build up an anti-Communist labor movement in Germany under official United States auspices is under way. Spark plug in it from Washington is Irving Brown, who along with many of his former associates in the Labor Section of the War Production Board had a Social-Democratic orientation.

For 3 months he did little else but busily recruit candidates on the basis of such refined qualifications as their devotion to the cause of Red-baiting. Among others he has picked are Joseph D. Keenan of the AFL, Vice Chairman for labor production of WPB. Paul Porter, Wisconsin Socialist, who has been kicking around the Government for years now trying to retrieve his standing with labor after the fiasco he pulled at the airframe wage hearing he conducted early in the war, and David Saposs of the WPB Labor Section, who is a natural for the assignment. In Germany as a result they are dealing only with non-Communist elements in the labor movement, and actively encouraging anti-Communists in the unions being established or revived.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that terminates the phase of Mr. Budenz' testimony concerning the Communist effort to infiltrate and influence American foreign policy. I would like to get back to Mr. Budenz' identification of people who were associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations and their Communist affiliation.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know James S. Allen?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; Mr. Allen was well known to me. He was foreign editor of the Daily Worker for a considerable period of time while I was managing editor, and then he had a sort of special assignment as foreign adviser to the Daily Worker.

Prior to that he was Communist International representative in the Philippines with all the powers of a Communist International representative in the islands.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record Mr. Allen's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations on a previous occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Abraham Chapman?

Senator SMITH. Is this Mr. Allen the man who wrote a review of some books or the review of an attack on some of the Southern States and was part of a group to incite the Negroes down there?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. That is not involved here now, however.

Senator SMITH. He was a Communist at that time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. He held a high place in the Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. He was a very much trusted man, and this is shown by the fact that he was the Communist representative in the Philippines, sent on a special mission there and directing the Philippine Communist Party.

In addition to that, he was the leading authority on foreign affairs for the Daily Worker, and even when he resigned as foreign editor to do special writing he continued to be foreign affairs adviser and was closely in touch with many International agents. I can say that from his own statements and from my knowledge of what a foreign editor of the Daily Worker does.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Hilda Austern was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. From official reports.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record evidence of Miss Austern's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Hilda Austern was also known as Mrs. Bretholz.

The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading from?

Mr. MANDEL. Her associations with the Institute of Pacific Relations are taken from War and Peace in the Pacific, a Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR on Wartime and Postwar Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East, page 162 being the proceedings of the Mont Tremblant, Quebec, conference of December 4 to 14, 1942.

In that volume she is listed as a member of the international secretariat and as having participated in the 1936 and 1939 conferences as assistant treasurer.

Mr. MORRIS. Assistant treasurer of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Next I read from Handbook for the Sixth Conference of the IPR at Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15 to 29, 1936, page 62, where Hilda Austern is listed as a member of the international secretariat and conference staff and also a member of the finance committee.

I read from Security in the Pacific, a Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Hot Springs, Va., January 6 to 17, 1945, page 160, where Hilda Austern is listed as a member of the international secretariat. She is again so listed in the proceedings of the Virginia conference, Virginia Beach conference, held November 18 to December 2, 1939, and she is also there listed as assistant treasurer.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those references made by Mr. Mandel incorporated into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be so incorporated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 182" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 182

MISS HILDA AUSTERN

International secretariat (also known as Mrs. Bretholz): Miss Hilda Austern (1936, 1939). Assistant treasurer. (Source: War and Peace in the Pacific (A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR on Wartime and Postwar Cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific and the Far East), Mont Tremblant, Quebec, December 4-14, 1942, p. 162.)

International secretariat and conference staff, finance committee: Minute secretary, Hilda Austern. (Source: Handbook for the Sixth Conference of the IPR, Yosemite National Park, Calif., August 15-29, 1936, p. 62.)

International secretariat: Hilda Austern (1936, 1939, 1942). Assistant treasurer, IPR. (Source: Security in the Pacific (A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations), Hot Springs, Va., January 6-17, 1945, p. 160.)

International secretariat: Hilda Austern, assistant treasurer (1936). (Source: Problems of the Pacific (Proceedings of the Study Meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Virginia Beach, Va., November 18-December 2, 1939, p. 274.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have here an item from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated September 1, 1941, being a letter marked "Strictly Confidential," addressed to Miss Hilda Austern from Edward C. Carter. I will read excerpts from this letter as follows:

DEAR HILDA: Would you like to tackle the following research job for the War Department? You would be on the international secretariat payroll, and I do not propose to charge the Army anything for this service.

The project has to be done if possible in a fortnight, and the aim is to discover what the possibilities would be of finding suitable space for landing fields, preferably 4,000 feet long, but with an absolute minimum of 3,500 feet, on the following islands.

Then there is a list of islands in the Pacific which is given.

Supplementary information which would be required would be:

Then there is a list given such as prevailing winds, possibilities for landing supplies, and so forth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that letter introduced into evidence and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom is that signed?

Mr. MANDEL. Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Addressed to Hilda Austern, about whom we were talking.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record and properly identified.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 183" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 183

LEE, MASS., *September 1, 1941.*

Strictly Confidential.

Miss HILDA AUSTERN,

Office.

DEAR HILDA: Would you like to tackle the following rush research job for the War Department? You would be on the international secretariat payroll and I do not propose to charge the Army anything for this service.

The project has to be done if possible in a fortnight, and the aim is to discover what the possibilities would be of finding suitable space for landing fields, preferably 4,000 feet long, but with an absolute minimum of 3,500 feet, on the following islands:

Palmyra	Baker
Enderbury	Christmas
Samoa (British and United States)	Fiji group
New Hebrides	New Caledonia
Howland	Jarvis
Johnson	Canton
Loyalty	

Supplementary information which would be required would be:

- (a) Prevailing winds, storms, monsoons, etc.
- (b) Possibilities for landing supplies by steamer.

(c) Natural defenses, i. e., would the fields be far enough inland or, if near the sea, protected by higher ground from, say, the gunnery range of submarines that might emerge from the sea nearby.

(d) Health conditions, i. e., mosquitoes, malaria, or other diseases.

(e) Local food supply.

(f) Local labor supply.

(g) Local government and its political orientation.

(h) Local police or military organization, if any.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that that last letter was introduced for the purpose of showing that Miss Austern was on the payroll of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the general nature of some of the work that she performed for that organization.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know Abraham Chapman?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he is a veteran Communist, also known as John Arnold.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "John Arnold" is that his party name?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, he wrote under these different names and was sometimes known in the party as John Arnold. It was a party name. He was on the editorial board in connection with Freiheit, which is the Communist daily paper in New York, published in the same building as the Daily Worker. Therefore I conferred with Mr. Chapman many times and know him as a Communist. He has a very high position so far as the regard of the Communist Party leaders in the Communist movement.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you introduce into the record the associations of Mr. Chapman with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a memorandum found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated May 9, 1947, headed, "Research and publication program of the American Institute of Pacific Relations," and listing books and research projects and studies under way for 1946-47. It lists Philippine Nationalism Today, by Abraham Chapman.

Then I have here a list of articles written for the Far Eastern Survey by Abraham Chapman. There are four articles. It is to be noted also, however, that Abraham Chapman is coauthor with Earl Browder of a pamphlet entitled "The Meaning of the Palestine Partition," published in 1937.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. No, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. But the first four articles were?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like Mr. Mandel's notation showing Abraham Chapman's relations with the Institute of Pacific Relations in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. These are notations, Mr. Mandel, as I understand it, from instruments that you found in the records, these notations were made by you or notations that you found?

Mr. MANDEL. They are notations in the first case from the memorandum of the Institute of Pacific Relations and in the second case from the actual volumes of the Far Eastern Survey, the official organ of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Who made the notation?

Mr. MANDEL. I did.

Mr. SOURWINE. You examined the volumes yourself?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 184" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 184

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION PROGRAM OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS—BOOKS AND RESEARCH PROJECTS

Studies under way 1946-47: Philippine Nationalism Today, by Abraham Chapman.

Abraham Chapman, author of American Policy in the Philippines (Far Eastern Survey, June 5, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Hawaii Seeks Statehood (Far Eastern Survey, June 17, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Pacification in Central Luzon (Far Eastern Survey, August 17, 1946).

Abraham Chapman, author of Notes on the Philippine Election (Pacific Affairs, June, 1943, p. 193).

Abraham Chapman, coauthor with Earl Browder, of pamphlet, The Meaning of the Palestine Partition (1937).

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Kathleen Barnes?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew of her, I did not meet her personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know she was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I will not say that I knew it through the whole 10 years I was in the Communist Party, but I heard it mentioned at various times.

Mr. MORRIS. So you do know that at one time she was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would say a couple of times. She did not receive the constant reference that some of the other names that you have mentioned received.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you tell us of Mrs. Barnes' association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. This is taken from the files of Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern Survey, both organs of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and is a long list of articles by Kathleen Barnes which is here submitted for the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you indicate the number of articles in each publication, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. For Pacific Affairs, 8, and for Far Eastern Survey, 23.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that compilation introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that compilation made by, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. By actual consultation of the volumes of both publications.

The CHAIRMAN. By yourself?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had the volumes in your possession?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 185" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 185

KATHLEEN BARNES

Member of board of directors of the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, Inc., 56 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.

The following articles by Kathleen Barnes appear in *Pacific Affairs*:

Eastward Migration Within the Soviet Union, December 1934 (pp. 395-405).
Review of Project for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U. S. S. R., December 1934 (pp. 470-471).

Review of Birobidzhantsy na Amure (The Birobidjans on the Amur) by M. Goldstein, September 1935 (pp. 507-508).

Review of Soviet Journey by Louis Fischer, June 1935 (pp. 254-256).

Comment and Opinion of Another Perspective, September 1935 (pp. 477-481).

Review of Soviet Communism: A New Civilization by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, June 1936 (pp. 294-296).

Review of The Soviets by Albert Rhys Williams, December 1937 (pp. 490-492).

Review of Over the North Pole, by George Baidukov, June 1938 (pp. 274-275).

Review of Great Soviet World Atlas, volume 1; edited by A. F. Gorkin, et al., September 1940 (pp. 354-355).

The following articles by Kathleen Barnes appear in the *Far Eastern Survey*:

Industrialization of the Soviet Far East, April 10, 1935.

Japanese Soviet Friction, September 25, 1935.

The Soviet Economic Stake in the Orient, January 29, 1936 (p. 19).

Siberia—From Mongolia to the Arctic, May 6, 1936 (p. 93).

The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific, November 18, 1936 (p. 243).

The Agricultural Foundation of Siberia's Economy, February 17, 1937 (p. 37).

Tanna Tuva Showing Signs of Industrial Activity, March 17, 1937.

Siberian Gold Production Tops Previous Figures, May 12, 1937.

New Bed of Radio Active Ores Found in Central Asia, June 23, 1937.

Overcoming Obstacles to Rubber Control, August 4, 1937 (p. 177).

Alaska Salmon in World Politics, March 2, 1938.

Japanese Government Given Blank Check, April 6, 1938 (p. 79).

Asiatic Russia, Storehouse of Mineral Wealth, July 13, 1938 (p. 157).

Soviet-Japanese Relations Still Hanging Fire, January 5, 1939 (p. 1).

Konismolsk—Pioneer City on the Amur, February 15, 1939.

Japan Seeking Larger Contribution From Her Mandate, March 15, 1939.

Outer Mongolia on the World Stage, August 30, 1939, (p. 207).

Soviets Promoting Migration to Siberia, October 25, 1939.

Soviets Hope for Rubber Self Sufficiency by 1942, November 8, 1939.

Soviet Union Improving Railway Network, December 20, 1939.

Pacific Islands Double Phosphate Output, May 22, 1940.

Soviets Stress Program for Far Eastern Section, July 17, 1940.

Fisheries, Mainstay of Soviet-Japanese Friction, March 27, 1940 (p. 75).

MR. MORRIS. Are there any letters from the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mrs. Barnes?

MR. MANDEL. I have here two letters taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letterhead of the Council of the U. S. S. R., Institute of Pacific Relations, one dated April 16, 1938, addressed to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes from E. V. Harondar, who has been previously designated as an official of the U. S. S. R. Council of the IPR.

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Could you kindly obtain and send us on an exchange basis the following publications which we urgently need for our work here: (1) Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, (2) Official Handbook of the Panama Canal, and (3) Panama Canal Record. We would like to get all these data for the last 3 years. Thanking you in advance for this favor.

Sincerely yours,

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that written from?

MR. MANDEL. From Moscow, 20 Razin Street, April 16, 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. Who signed that first letter?

Mr. MANDEL. E. V. Harondar.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is he?

Mr. MANDEL. He is an official of the U. S. S. R. Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Then we have another letter dated August 29, 1939, to Mrs. Kathleen Barnes on the same type of letterhead from the same individual, E. V. Harondar, as follows:

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Referring to your letter of June 14 and July 6, I take pleasure in informing you that all books mentioned therein have been received. We note that there will be some delay in obtaining some of them. However, The United States in World Affairs, 1938, has already been received. We have recently sent you an English edition of the papers published in connection with the Eighteenth party congress under the title, The Land of Socialism, and an English edition of the History of the Communist Party. Today under separate cover I am sending you a book of statistical information on Soviet agriculture. Our librarian is collecting a new set of books on the Soviet Union which will be forwarded to you shortly. We would appreciate it if you could include in the next shipment of books the following publication: Panama Canal and its Ports, United States War Department, United States Army Corps of Engineers, revised 1938.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this introduced into the record. The purpose of introducing this exhibit, these two exhibits, would be to show the functions being carried on by the Institute of Pacific Relations, particularly by Kathleen Barnes, who has been identified by Mr. Budenz as a member of the Communist Party.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 186" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 186

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
Moscow, August 29, 1939.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES,
*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.*

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Referring to your letter of June 14, and July 6, I take pleasure in informing you that all books mentioned therein have been received. We note that there will be some delay in obtaining some of them. However, the United States in World Affairs, 1938, has been already received. We have recently sent you an English edition of the papers published in connection with the XVIII Party Congress under the title The Land of Socialism and an English edition of the History of the Communist Party. Today under separate cover I am sending you a book of statistical information on Soviet Agriculture. Our librarian is collecting a new set of books on the Soviet Union which will be forwarded to you shortly. We would appreciate it if you could include in the next shipment of books the following publication: Panama Canal and Its Ports. U. S. War Department, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Revised 1938.

Sincerely yours,

E. V. HARONDAR.

COUNCIL OF THE U. S. S. R.,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS,
Moscow, April 16, 1938.

Mrs. KATHLEEN BARNES,
*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City, N. Y., U. S. A.*

DEAR MRS. BARNES: Could you kindly obtain and send us on an exchange basis the following publications which we urgently need for our work here: (1)

Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, (2) Official Handbook of the Panama Canal, and (3) Panama Canal Record. We would like to get all these data for the last 3 years. Thanking you in advance for this favor.

Sincerely yours,

E. V. HARONDAR.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comments on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I would like to call attention to the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I don't know what the date of this letter is.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the date of that letter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. 1939. If I am correct, this is an advance copy before the American Communists got it. We must understand the significance of this book, that it is the foundation stone today of Communist doctrine.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say "this book"?

Mr. BUDENZ. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Bolsheviks, to which he refers, which is now fully credited to Josef Stalin. It is required reading by every Communist and is used as a basis of their thought and action. This was not got out in the United States until after this was sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a modern edition of Marxism?

Mr. BUDENZ. It is Stalin's rendition of Marxism-Leninism under the guise of history. It shows the necessity for violent revolution, the overthrow of the bourgeois government, and the importance of a Communist Party devoted to revolution, a party of a new type, in order to bring about this overthrow of these governments.

Senator SMITH. Is that available here now?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is available in the English translation, gotten out by the Communist Party through the International Publishers, headed by Alexander Trachtenberg.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. I refer to a previous exhibit already introduced, exhibit 58, and I read one paragraph of that exhibit, being a memorandum on Personnel in Connection With Soviet Studies. It is marked "confidential, not for distribution outside the office."

This is dated August 10, 1934, and the last paragraph reads as follows:

The fourth group—

That is, the people engaged in these studies—

consists of the few people who are already familiar with the institute's record in the Soviet Union, or who could be made so. Harriet Moore and Kathleen Barnes are about the only ones already familiar, and they both have the advantage of being good students who have not got the academic jitters about bolshevism. With Harriet, a further period of language study, which she may at present be contemplating, would probably be essential. This could be arranged, however, or you could decide to start from the beginning and send some young person of promise to Moscow to train him for the job.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Harriet Moore—

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. By whom was that signed?

Mr. MANDEL. This has no signature.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently it is addressed to somebody?

Mr. MANDEL. It is evidently an interoffice memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Harriet Moore identified in that document is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think I identified her yesterday as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have had evidence that Kathleen Barnes was the first wife of the Joseph Barnes who has been identified before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. MANDEL. I have another letter here from the S. S. *Chitral* dated January 24, 1935. The document comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is addressed to Frederick Field from E. C. Carter, and I read:

DEAR FRED: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow gave me, indicating precisely what American Fisheries Publications they already have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect of the fish business.

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by way of confirmation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is signed by whom?

Mr. MANDEL. As I understand, by E. C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that is addressed to Frederick Field. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record again as an example of the type of work being carried on by Kathleen Barnes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is already an exhibit, is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 187" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 187

STEAMSHIP "CHITRAL,"
January 24, 1935.

F. FIELD,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York City, U. S. A.

DEAR FRED: Here is the list which the Institute of Oceanography in Moscow gave me, indicating precisely what American fisheries publications they already have. As I have already written you, I told them that you or Mrs. Barnes would undertake to get sent to them any glaring omissions, and that, in addition, you would see what could be secured from commercial firms engaged in any aspect of the fish business.

I am sending this letter by air mail with a typed copy of the list which our friends in Moscow gave me. I am sending the original list by ordinary mail, by way of confirmation.

Sincerely yours,

E. C. CARTER.

Send all stuff to Oceanography people via Kantarovich.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here some quotations from Mrs. Barnes' actual writings in the magazine of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in *Pacific Affairs*. The first is reviewing a book called *The Soviets*, by Albert Rhys Williams.

The *Soviets*, by Albert Rhys Williams, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes: "The Soviets is absorbing reading and bears impressive witness to the achievements of the country under consideration."

From *Pacific Affairs*, December 1937, page 492.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Albert Rhys Williams is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Albert Rhys Williams personally, and he is a Communist.

Mr. MANDEL. Then next is a review of Soviet Journey by Louis Fischer.

Soviet Journey, by Louis Fischer, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 255: "Agitation in foreign countries is not likely to be productive of revolutionary results until such time as the workers of these countries can see that life under bolshevism is better in every way than under capitalism. Is that time coming? What will result from this burgeoning activity in the U. S. S. R.? This question is implied in the short last chapter of Soviet Journey."

From Pacific Affairs, March 1935, page 255.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have any comment to make on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I didn't catch it fully. I was distracted by the spelling of Albert Rhys Williams' name.

Mr. MANDEL (reading):

Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 294 ff: "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the consideration of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' is replaced by the 'service of man.' Such is the Webbs' appraisal of Soviet communism."

From Pacific Affairs, June 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those excerpts made by Mr. Mandel incorporated into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be inserted in the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 188" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 188

KATHLEEN BARNES

The Soviets, by Albert Rhys Williams, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes: "The Soviets is absorbing reading and bears impressive witness to the achievements of the country under consideration" (Pacific Affairs, December 1937, p. 492).

Soviet Journey, by Louis Fischer, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 255: "Agitation in foreign countries is not likely to be productive of revolutionary results until such time as the workers of these countries can see that life under bolshevism is better in every way than under capitalism. Is that time coming? What will result from this burgeoning activity in the U. S. S. R.? This question is implied in the short last chapter of Soviet Journey" (Pacific Affairs, March 1935, p. 255).

Soviet Communism, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, reviewed by Kathleen Barnes, page 294ff: "Slowly and with care the study proceeds to the consideration of the 'good life' at which the Soviets are aiming. 'The worship of God' is replaced by the 'service of man.' Such is the Webbs' appraisal of Soviet communism" (Pacific Affairs, June 1936).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Angus Cameron to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; from official reports.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you have any dealings with Angus Cameron?

Mr. BUDENZ. None at all.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the nature of the official reports, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The official reports had to do with the conduct of the Communist Party in Massachusetts, with which I was very closely in touch; that is to say, I was in Massachusetts a great deal as a member of the national committee of the Communist Party, perhaps more than in any other State. It repeatedly was called to my attention

at State committee meetings the important part that Angus Cameron was playing in the Communist Party.

Secondly, and more important than that, he was called to the attention of the Politburo by Alexander Trachtenberg as having committed himself to the Communist cause and also with the statement by Alexander Trachtenberg that Little, Brown & Co. was being made into the international publishers of the Communist front.

I said the other day that Communist leaders didn't use the words "Communist front"; that was one time that Trachtenberg in a sort of jesting way used the term. The work of Angus Cameron in getting published the works of those who were pro-Communist but not necessarily known publicly as such was commended by the Politburo and his plans particularly for doing that in the future.

Mr. MORRIS. What firm was he associated with, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Little, Brown & Co. in Boston.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of that testimony was to show the nature of this publishing firm which did put out quite a few books of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I understand that there has been a reorganization of the firm recently.

Senator SMITH. Little, Brown & Co.?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

Senator SMITH. That is one of the oldest firms in America, a publishing firm; is it not?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; Mr. Budenz just testified to that.

Do you have any comments to make, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Little, Brown & Co. had a high and distinguished record as publishers and maintains it by some of the works they publish and some of the authors they bring forth. That was, of course, of great value to the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. You did know of many Communist publications which were gotten out by Little, Brown & Co.?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know that was the plan, and I know that many people in Communist fronts have had their books published by them. I can't say that I know specifically that it was all arranged, because I wasn't present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, you previously testified that John K. Fairbank was a member of the Communist Party to your knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do you have any letter at this time that we can introduce showing Mr. Fairbank's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. John K. Fairbank is listed as a member of the board of trustees of the American council of the publication IPR News, in a letter dated March 1950. We have had previously testimony that he was chairman of one of the subcommittees of the Mont Tremblant conference.

Mr. MORRIS. He is presently a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations; is he not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir. I have here a letter from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated April 29, 1944, and I read a section of this letter as follows:

If Wellington Liu visits India, perhaps he can help in forwarding the manuscripts to New York, but it would be best to have them brought back by some American or sent in a diplomatic bag, perhaps to Mr. Fairbank.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 189" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 189

APRIL 29, 1944.

Message for Prof. Chien Tuan-sheng,

Southwest Associated University, Kunming, or care of

Lt. Robert W. Barnett, Headquarters, Fourteenth Air Force,
Kunming Airfield.

DEAR MR. CHIEN: I was extremely disappointed to receive your cable stating that you were discontinuing work on the study of Chinese government and politics. As you will know from my cabled reply of April 10, I had already sent you a message about the project in care of Professor Staley, asking him to leave it with Robert Barnett in Kunming. I do hope it has now reached you; but, in case it has not, here is what I said:

"Holland approves outline of project on Chinese government as described in Chien's letter of December 6. Holland is cabling approval on February 17, 1944. In addition to the \$300 already turned over to Professor Chou, Holland will arrange a further payment of \$600. Part of this might be paid with the help of Barnett if he agrees and informs his wife or Holland accordingly. Holland is also consulting Wong Shih-chieh about facilitating part of the payment. Holland hopes that a substantial part of the manuscript may be completed and in his hands by the end of September, so that portions of it might, if necessary, be used as a document for the IPR conference in January 1945. Holland also hopes that Chien or his colleague can make available part of the chapter on recent trends of the Kuomintang, which might be used as an article in the September issue of Pacific Affairs. This should reach New York by June 30 at the latest. If this topic is not convenient, an article on some problems of postwar political readjustment in China might be substituted. For safety's sake, Holland thinks that there ought to be at least three copies of the manuscript, but Chien can decide whether these shall be rough copies or clean copies. It might be wise to send Holland a copy of each chapter as it is completed. If Wellington Liu visits India, perhaps he can help in forwarding the manuscripts to New York, but it would be best to have them brought back by some American or sent in a diplomatic bag, perhaps to Mr. Fairbank.

It has not been as easy as I expected to send the money to you in the form requested, but I trust that by this time you will have already received an installment of \$200 from Barnett and more will be coming shortly.

I realize that with prices rising so fast the original fee I proposed may now be inadequate and it was for that reason that I suggested in my cable that we could increase the amount from \$800 to \$1,100. I most earnestly hope that you will not have to drop the project, as we have been counting on it very much. Even if it is not possible to complete the study on the original scale, I would urge you or Mr. Wang to prepare a short monograph and send it to me by October or November at the latest.

If there is anything else we can do to assist you in completing the study, please let me know. I realize that conditions for doing this kind of research work must be terribly difficult now, and I am anxious to do everything possible to facilitate matters for you. I am sure that Wellington Liu will be just as disappointed as we are if you do not produce a manuscript. As you know, your study has been included in the list of research projects announced by the China Council of the IPR.

With all good wishes and looking forward to hearing from you,

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

P. S.—Would you kindly tell Dr. Chiang Mon-lin when you see him that I have received his letter of April 11 with some errata for his book. We have tried two publishers so far but have not yet succeeded in getting the book accepted. It is now being considered by the Oxford University Press, and I hope to get a decision soon. One of the difficulties is the paper rationing.

Mr. MANDEL. We have previously introduced a letter signed by I. Epstein to W. H. Holland, from which I read a paragraph. This was exhibit 112.

I suppose you know that Fairbank came in from Kweilin (come to think of it, I told you Saturday) and have received something, through him, from H. and Elsie.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, that has already been introduced into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated March 10, 1944, addressed to John Fairbank care of Lauchlin Currie of the White House, Washington, D. C. I read:

Here is a letter to Liu Yu-wan which I should like to have sent by hand or via the A. P. O. in Chungking. Would you be kind enough to inquire whether John Davies can take it with him if he is likely to be going through to Chungking in the near future or alternatively whether it could be sent via A. P. O. to Mac Fischer or Jack Service or someone else whom you know to be in Chungking and willing to deliver the note? If for any reason you prefer not to do this, don't hesitate to tell me. I shall be down in Washington next Wednesday and probably Thursday also.

That is signed, "W. L. Holland."

The CHAIRMAN. Addressed to whom?

Mr. MANDEL. Addressed to John Fairbank, care of Lauchlin Currie, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Senator FERGUSON. What was Fairbank doing at that time? What was his job? Why did he get his mail at the White House?

Mr. MANDEL. I believe he was connected with the Office of War Information.

Senator FERGUSON. Why did he not get at the Office of War Information? Have you any records to show?

Mr. MORRIS. We do not have any records to show why. We will have to ask Mr. Fairbank that.

Mr. MANDEL. This is exhibit 106, previously used.

Senator FERGUSON. We notice quite a bit of this mail going through courier.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I have to go to the floor. I am in charge of a bill that is coming up. Senator Smith, would take over?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Max Granich was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know Max Granich very well, know him to be a member of the Communist Party and engaged in underground work. He is the husband of Grace Granich to whom I previously referred and a brother of Mike Gold, the Communist columnist of the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. You know he is a trusted member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very trusted, part of the very protected apparatus, or protective apparatus, the security apparatus.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have a letter that will show the connection between Mr. Granich and the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. An exhibit that was previously used.

Senator FERGUSON. Might we get the time when he was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. All through the period of my membership, 1935 to 1945.

Mr. MANDEL. This letter is dated December 13, 1939, and is exhibit 54, addressed to Mr. Max Granich at China Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, will you listen particularly to this, please?

Mr. MANDEL. It is addressed to him at 168 West Twenty-third Street, New York City, and as I understand by Owen Lattimore. I read from the letter as follows:

I am afraid that my position as editor of Pacific Affairs makes it impossible for me to join the editorial board of China Today. I am a member of the international secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. This means that one of my employers is the Japanese council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. There has already been a considerable kick about my being on the board of Amerasia. It is probably better for me not to invite extra kicks by going on the board of China Today, which is more partisan, and more obviously partisan, than Amerasia.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you have any comments to make on that particular publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. China Today was the Communist publication run by Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Philip Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Did they run it under their own names?

Mr. BUDENZ. No, sir; they ran it under the names of Frederick Spencer and J. W. Phillips or some such name. I think that is correct, J. W. Phillips.

Senator FERGUSON. Was Amerasia a Communist publication?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; Communist-created, but in order to have a certain different function than China Today. China Today was clearly Communist from its inception.

Senator FERGUSON. Would that account for the language that is used there about having a different slant?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes. This letter, it seems to me, is very revealing. You will note Mr. Lattimore did not reject the policy of China Today, he just thinks it wouldn't permit him to function as well if he were connected with it. China Today was clearly a Chinese publication devised by the Communists in secrecy, to a degree, but with Communist policies very clearly defined for the purpose of influencing other agencies and organizations, penetrating them, and in that way working out the Communist program in the United States for China.

Senator FERGUSON. And it was more openly for the Communist cause than Amerasia?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; that is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Reading that letter, Mr. Budenz, would you not say that Owen Lattimore knew the nature of those organizations when he used the term "one is more partisan than the other"?

Mr. BUDENZ. I can't see as an expert of the Far East how he could avoid knowing it because these were prominent publications in New York activity.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you say the words "more partisan" meant more communistic?

Mr. BUDENZ. Decidedly.

Senator FERGUSON. As far as China was concerned and the Far East?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. If you are Communist in regard to China, you are Communist everywhere.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know that Philip Jaffee was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; both by official information and by personally being acquainted with Mr. Jaffe in his not too frequent but nevertheless several visits to the Politburo.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no doubt in your mind that Philip Jaffe was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it definitely.

Senator FERGUSON. During the whole period that you were one?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. Of course, during the whole period I didn't always see him personally, but from official reports. Not only may I say that he was a Communist, but he was a Soviet espionage agent from advice given to me by J. Peters, immediately following conversations of Peters with Jaffe.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I have here a photostat of the Daily Worker of December 3, 1945. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate that document for us?

Mr. MANDEL. This photostat was made at my direction. It is a photostat of the Daily Worker of December 3, 1945, page 11.

Mr. MORRIS. I call your attention to the review of Joseph Starobin there of Jaffe's book on the Far East. I ask you if you will make comments on it, Mr. Budenz. You will note some part of it is underscored.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. Well, of course, Mr. Starobin—this by the way, was published after I was out of the Communist Party, but it is an issue I have read. Mr. Starobin begins by attacking Patrick J. Hurley all over again and says:

Militarists like Patrick J. Hurley are riled by the virtual unanimity of American intellectual opinion on the broad issues of the future of Asia. The writers, experts, journalists—and even career diplomats in the State Department—are almost unanimous in their judgment of the reactionary character of the Kuomintang leaders, in their sympathy for the Chinese Communist program, and their emphasis on the need for an independent, democratic India.

Then he goes on to say:

This has given rise to virtual renaissance of American writing and thinking on the Far East.

The renaissance in this case is evidence by Philip Jaffe.

Philip Jaffe's book is the latest contribution to this judgment of the experts. It follows a remarkable outpouring of progressive literature about Asia in the last 2 years. There was Owen Lattimore's *Solution in Asia*; Kate Mitchell's study of India, and Kumar Goshal's work on the same subject. We have also had Lawrence K. Rosinger's *China's Crisis* and Andrew Roth's *Dilemma in Japan*—excellent statements from the younger men in the far eastern field. And then there were the two eyewitness reports on the Chinese Communists by Harrison Forman and Guenther Stein.

It goes on then with quite an acclaim of Jaffe's contribution.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Kate Mitchell was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I met her as such at enlarged meetings of the Communist Party.

Senator SMITH. Is this Harrison Forman a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I am glad you asked me that question, Senator. Yesterday in the double question raised by Mr. Morris on Harrison Forman and Mr. Stein I said "Yes," they were Communists. Technically and legally I cannot say that Harrison Forman is a Communist. This is the situation: Harrison Forman was working with the Communists, knew he was working with them.

According to all official information I have he consented to have the Communists get out a special campaign for his book. He consented to have Joe North look over his book, and in addition to that was

referred to as one of "our people," but I have never heard him referred to as Communist specifically and I like to be meticulous about that.

I would like to make that sharp distinction. He was as close to the Communists as one could be without having been called such.

Mr. MORRIS. And he consciously worked with them?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, he consciously worked with them and arranged that the Communists should send out a secret memorandum which plugged his book and Gunther Stein's at the same time as required reading for all Communists and also as those books which should be pushed forward in non-Communist organizations.

Senator SMITH. Is he any relation to Dr. Clark Forman?

Mr. BUDENZ. He is no relation so far as I know. Dr. Clark Forman is another man.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Clark Forman to be a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; I did.

Mr. MORRIS. You read there that Kumar Goshal wrote a book. Did you know that Kumar Goshal was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have heard him referred to as such though not very emphatically.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and given the next consecutive number.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 190" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 190

[From the Daily Worker, New York, December 3, 1945, p. 11]

JAFFE'S BOOK ON FAR EAST STRESSES NEED FOR DEMOCRACY, INDUSTRIALIZATION

(New Frontiers in Asia, by Philip Jaffe. Alfred A. Knopf, \$3. Reviewed by Joseph Starobin)

Militarists like Patrick J. Hurley are riled by the virtual unanimity of American intellectual opinion on the broad issues of the future of Asia. The writers, experts, journalists—and even career diplomats in the State Department—are almost unanimous in their judgment of the reactionary character of the Kuomintang leaders, in their sympathy for the Chinese Communist program, and their emphasis on the need for an independent, democratic India. There is probably no other phase of American policy on which there is such a broad agreement among well-informed people. This has given rise to a virtual renaissance of American writing and thinking on the Far East.

Philip Jaffe's book is the latest contribution to this judgment of the experts. It follows a remarkable outpouring of progressive literature about Asia in the last 2 years. There was Owen Lattimore's *Solution in Asia*; Kate Mitchell's study of India; and Kumar Goshal's work on the same subject. We have also had Lawrence K. Rosinger's *China's Crisis*, and Andrew Roth's *Dilemma in Japan*—excellent statements from the younger men in the far eastern field. And then there were the two eyewitness reports on the Chinese Communists—by Harrison Forman and Guenther Stein.

PROGRAM FOR ASIA

Jaffe's contribution is in the same tradition of scholarship; but in addition to presenting the facts as they are, Jaffe has attempted, like Lattimore, to couch his scholarship in the framework of a general proposition. This proposition is that the needs of American capitalism demand a large-scale program of industrializing China and India on the basis of democratic and progressive governments in those countries. Not only do the needs of America require such a pro-

gram but also the necessity of minimizing rivalry with Great Britain, securing a peaceful Asia and establishing a real basis for cooperation with Soviet Russia.

In reality, there are two separate aspects to the book: One is a detailed exposition of recent history in India and China, an excellent and rich library of information in itself. The other aspects, linked with the first but quite separate, is an essay on how the United States can solve the problems created by its enormous wartime productivity. The first aspect of the book is easier to appraise than the second.

SKILLFUL ANALYSIS

The discussion of India and China offer an excellent picture of what's what in both countries. The strategy of British imperialism in the Cripps proposal is exposed with great skill, and Jaffe makes full use of his detailed knowledge of the All India National Congress both before and after the August 1942 events.

He also uses the letters of William Phillips to the late President Roosevelt to good advantage, and what gives the passage on India particular depth is his treatment of her economic problems, the various proposals which have come from India itself for postwar economic development.

The discussion of China is probably the most elaborate single aspect of the book. It adds up to a damning indictment of the Kuomintang regime and a very firm statement on behalf of Communist China's achievements—or more exactly—"new China's" achievements.

These passages are jam-packed with material of the greatest topical value to the layman and yet of equal academic value to the student of China. The full story of Kuomintang deception over the draft constitution is here; likewise, the hitherto unpublished summary of what really happened in Sinkiang, the details of General Hurley's antics and the meaning of the Stilwell-Gauss ousters a year ago. All this offers as fresh a background for today's headlines as one could hope for.

BRITAIN'S DILEMMA

I would have liked an equally thorough treatment of the Indonesian, Indo-Chinese and Philippine independence movements, and a greater differentiation in analyzing French as compared with British imperial policy.

On the other hand, one comes across rare material that is so little understood in this country—such as the story of Anglo-American rivalry in Siam. In general, one of Jaffe's strong points is his delineation of the British imperialist dilemma and the use which he makes of sidelights and comments from British sources. This enriches the entire discussion.

QUESTIONS ON ASIA

The second aspect of this book—the proposal for large-scale development of Asia—raises many more questions, and I can only indicate them here.

Jaffe does not say that American capitalists will accept his proposals; he does not regard them as inevitable in any sense, and in fact exhibits many doubts as to whether the United States will take the course he advises.

He is also quite well aware that the alternative to a program of democratic cooperation with the progressive forces of Asia is a policy of imperialist expansion and cut-throat rivalry with Great Britain.

Yet it is also true that his appeal has a certain one-sidedness. It does not analyze very sharply the actual possibilities of realizing his program. And of course, this discussion is entirely within the framework of the continuation of capitalism as such.

AMERICAN POLICY

I think that American Communists can certainly agree with the concept of American assistance in the industrialization of an Asia in which an independent India and a progressive, anti-feudal China would be the recipients of this aid.

But the immediate problem, as recent events show, is that American policy is blocking the independence movements of Asia and shows no inclination to accept or work with the anti-feudal, democratic program of the Chinese Communists.

It is this aspect of American policy which determines our approach to everything else about United States relations with the Far East. And this refusal to accept a democratic Asia is not sufficiently foreseen in Jaffe's discussion and even in his premises.

This was perhaps understandable since the bulk of the book was written in the summer of 1944. But when read today, it gives rise to illusions about the nature of American policy.

In all fairness, I see these faults only as an aspect of the book, and not necessarily the decisive aspect. For its factual material and its elaboration of the true issues inside of India, China, and Japan it ranks second to none in the growing library of progressive thought on the Far East.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice that this writing kind of lumped all these books together. Would you say that was a proper classification?

Mr. BUDENZ. These are some exhibits of those books which carried forward the idea of Communists represented by Mr. Browder in 1937; that the Chinese Communists should be represented as the democratic elements for the salvation of China.

Senator FERGUSON. But if you were to class the writings of this writer that we have been talking about would you class them the same as he did?

Mr. BUDENZ. Absolutely.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, we were discussing Philip Jaffe. I offer you there an article from the New Masses and ask you if that recalls anything to you.

Mr. BUDENZ. This article from the New Masses is its issue of October 12, 1937, with the chief article, the one to which you refer by Philip Jaffe, China's Communists Told Me, a Specialist in Far Eastern Affairs Interviews the Leading Men of Red China in Their Home Territory. This expedition, if you wish to call it that, under Jaffe's supervision to Yen-an was a Communist project so far as discussions in the Politburo showed.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew it was a Communist project from your position in the Daily Worker, is that correct?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. Not only in the Daily Worker, it was discussed with the editors of New Masses before the Politburo and was considered to be a very important mission to stimulate activity among intellectuals everywhere about Red China to bring out that which Joseph Stalin later pointed out that the intellectuals have been won to sympathy for Red China.

Mr. MORRIS. So you knew this was a Red project?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other excerpts that you care to comment on, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. We shouldn't take too much time on it. I think the significant part is the concluding part.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you read that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. The part I shall quote is this:

Our visit to Yen-an was climaxed by a huge mass meeting, addressed by Chu Teh, Bisson, Lattimore, and myself and attended by the 1,500 cadet students of the People's Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and about 500 from other schools.

Mr. MORRIS. Who is Chu Teh?

Mr. BUDENZ. Chu Teh is one of the great leaders of the Chinese Communists. Bisson, he is identified as T. A. Bisson in other parts of the article. Lattimore is identified as Owen Lattimore, editor of Pacific Affairs, in another part of the article.

Here are some questions asked of me. "What is the position of woman in the United States of America? How do American workers live and how developed is their movement? What are the results of Roosevelt's NRA campaign? What is

the present situation in the left literary movement in America? What do the American people think of our long march west?" And innumerable questions concerning America's attitude in the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict, the American attitude toward the war in Spain, and what Americans think of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.

Then omitting one paragraph he concludes with Agnes Smedley's estimate of their trip—that is, of the trip of Bisson, Jaffe, Lattimore, to the Red Chinese areas. In this letter Miss Smedley says, or rather Jaffe says, that Miss Smedley indicates "better than I am able," how much hope and enthusiasm the visit of Americans evoked in the former Soviet regions.

This is Agnes Smedley now being quoted :

In my imagination I follow your journey from here, and my friends and I speculate as to your exact location day by day, and your exact occupation. I want to tell you that you left behind remarkable friends. I did not realize the effect of that meeting until 2 or 3 days had passed. Then it began to roll in. I have no reason to tell you tales. But the meeting, and your speech in particular, has had a colossal effect upon all people.

Then she goes on with other similar praises for the contribution made.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that article of October 12, 1937, in the New Masses magazine, incorporated by reference.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 191" and was filed for the record.)

Mr. MORRIS. And I would like to have such extracts as read by Mr. Budenz completely incorporated into the record.

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you know Anthony Jenkinson?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew him personally, sir; Anthony Jenkinson.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he, according to his own statement to me, was sent here under instructions from Moscow to penetrate the conservative labor press with the Allied Labor News. I had a number of conferences in his office in mid-Manhattan on this question.

These conferences—may I explain?

Mr. MORRIS. By all means.

Mr. BUDENZ. These conferences arose from the fact that the Daily Worker was having difficulty in getting full coverage from Moscow, and we wanted to get the help of the Allied Labor News and Anthony Jenkinson declared in a series of conferences I had with him that this was contrary to the instructions which he had received in England; that the instructions he had received from Moscow were to confine the Allied Labor News to the conservative labor press and to try to penetrate the American Federation of Labor newspapers under the guise of being merely a labor service on the international basis.

Later on, after further discussions and because in part the Allied Labor News didn't get into the A. F. of L. newspapers as they wanted—the A. F. of L. labor leaders have a remarkable ability to smell out Communist institutions—they did then relent in regard to the Daily Worker first by permitting the Daily Worker to quote the Allied Labor News, and then finally by allowing us, if I remember correctly—at least we were on the eve of that—to use its name, its byline.

State of New York,
County of _____

ss: _____

On this 12 day of May

before me personally appeared

William B. Spivey and Louis F. Spivey

both known and known to me to be the individuals

described in and who executed the foregoing

instrument, and they acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

W. B. Spivey
Notary Public
State of New York
My Comm. Exp. March 31, 1941

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Mr. MORRIS. You have no doubt, then, that they were completely controlled?

Mr. BUDENZ. Completely controlled by the Communists. Not only do I know that from the Politburo but Jenkinson told me definitely he had been sent from England for that purpose. You must understand that a great many of the translations, for popular purposes, of Moscow publications at that time took place in London. They had over there at that time for that purpose a division of Communist International and he had received his instructions from the Soviet capital for that purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. Was he an English citizen?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is my understanding. He was even supposed to be titled.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, in connection with your statement that it was created by the Communist Party, I would like Mr. Mandel to introduce a certificate of incorporation of the Allied Labor News.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a photostat of the certificate of incorporation of the Allied Labor News, dated May 12, 1942, in which Anthony B. Jenkinson and Robert Terrall, T-e-r-r-a-l-l, are listed as the incorporators.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Robert Terrall?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't recall him now.

Mr. MORRIS. But you do know that Anthony B. Jenkinson is a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Definitely.

Mr. MORRIS. I notice he uses the address of 16 West Twelfth Street, New York City.

Do you know what address that is?

Mr. BUDENZ. I don't know.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that the home residence of Frederick Vanderbilt Field?

Mr. BUDENZ. It's near it; it's opposite the Daily Worker.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate where that came from?

Mr. MANDEL. That photostat was made at my direction from the records of the county clerk.

Mr. MORRIS. Also the records of the secretary of state of New York?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. That will be received as an exhibit.

Mr. MANDEL. To indicate the nature of the Allied Labor News.

Mr. MORRIS. Not on that, his association with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 192" and is herewith inserted.)

Mr. MANDEL. I have the following letters from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one is dated February 2, 1942, addressed to Philip E. Lilienthal, from W. L. Holland, referring to Sir Anthony Jenkinson. I read the following excerpt:

The Shepherd book and the second volume of the handbook should be out this week and Bradley next week. We have added a new chapter on strategy to the Formosa book and that should be out in about two more weeks. Elizabeth is greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Department for our pamphlets, the latest being for 20,000 copies of a very brief, elementary affair, called Know Your Enemy, Japan, by Tony Jenkinson. We are expecting them to order 15,000 copies of your pamphlet.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this is to show that Anthony Jenkinson's book was the subject of interest of the Institute of Pacific Relations and also that the War Department had ordered 20,000 copies of his pamphlet.

May that be introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 193" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 193

NEW YORK CITY, February 2, 1942.

Mr. PHILIP E. LILIENTHAL,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR PHIL: Many thanks for your notes of Friday and Saturday and the earlier note about Condliffe's approval of the Mitchell proofs.

I am not surprised that the Washington proposal smelled bad to you, but I thought I ought to let you know about it in case you had caught the prevailing yearning to be in the Nation's Capital. Personally, I should much prefer you here. Thus far Luce apparently has not been able to persuade the Government to give Bob Barnett passage to China on a bomber, so the whole business is still in suspense. Please don't feel bound to leave exactly on the 14th. I only suggested it because it was the end of the week. If you want to stay a week longer, please do so.

I wrote last week to Albany for a certificate of ownership for my car and hope the GMAC will send it to me soon. I am sorry to be giving you so much trouble over the car. I enclose a check for \$40 to cover part of the expenses you have been incurring, e. g., for Doreen's excess baggage and license plates. I am awfully grateful for all you did to help Doreen and hope the cleaning-up job has not been too awful. The laundry box arrived safely. We seem to have brought a few of Miss Stewart's things and have apparently left our electric kitchen clock behind, but I will write Miss Stewart about this when I return her things.

The first part of the Broek manuscript looks pretty good, and Hilda thinks the printer will be able to read the manuscript quite well. Farquhar was on a considerable bender in New York. Whether it was because of this or not I don't know, but Hilda was finally able to make a pretty remunerative deal with him on the Burma book which is now being reprinted by Haddon. We are actually going to get 10-percent royalties on it. I hope Sammy won't repudiate the agreement when he sobers up.

The Shepherd book and the second volume of the handbook should be out this week and Bradley next week. We have added a new chapter on strategy to the Formosa book and that should be out in about two more weeks. Elisabeth is greatly excited at the colossal orders we continue to get from the War Department for our pamphlets, the latest being for 20,000 copies of a very brief elementary affair called "Know Your Enemy Japan," by Tony Jenkinson. We are expecting them to order 50,000 copies of your pamphlet.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. HOLLAND.

Mr. MANDEL. This is the next letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated July 24, 1940, addressed to Chen Han-seng, care of the American Express Co., Hong Kong. He is addressed as "Dear Geoffrey," and I read a section of the letter, as follows:

In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an invaluable friend.

That is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. By that he means the international secretariat of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 194" and is as follows:)

NEW YORK, N. Y., July 24, 1940.

CHEN HAN-SENG, Esq.,

Care of American Express Co., Hong Kong.

DEAR GEOFFREY: Yesterday was certainly a red-letter day in the office, for I received two letters from you both dated the 8th of July. It is very exciting to be in direct communication with you again, for we have all missed you greatly and no one has missed you more than I.

What you have said about Pacific affairs is most timely. I have sent copies of your Pacific Affairs letter to Owen, Lockwood, Field, Porter, Holland, and others. I know that they will all enjoy it as much as I have.

I wish you would write me frankly your private estimate of the Far Eastern Survey. I assume that you get it regularly. Do you have time to read it? Is it of use (a) to you, (b) to any Chinese of your acquaintance in China or Hong Kong, (c) to any foreigners of your acquaintance in China or Hong Kong?

What is your reaction to Amerasia as at present operating? Does it fill the need of a monthly, or do you still feel that Pacific Affairs should become a monthly in competition with Amerasia?

I am glad that you have sent Bill Holland direct a copy of your other letter of July 8 reporting on your program of work. I am sure he will be glad to have this letter and will doubtless be writing you as to several questions in due course. I know he will be as excited as I am to be in direct communication with you again.

The next month is likely to be fateful for both Hong Kong and England. We hope that no damage will come to you and Susie or to Elsie or to Wellington and all of the members of his family.

We feel important here in the midst of the enormous, but undirected, latent power of the United States. The administration is preparing to be strong in a military way in 2 or 3 years, but is doing little to use its moral and material strength now when it is needed.

In a little while I hope to be able to send Tony Jenkinson to China for a few months on behalf of the international secretariat. You will find him an invaluable friend.

Linebarger has written most enthusiastically of the help you gave him when he was in Hong Kong.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated January 18, 1937, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Dr. James T. Shotwell. It comes from Frederick V. Field. I read:

DEAR DR. SHOTWELL: One of the secretaries of the British group at the Yosemite Conference was Sir Anthony Jenkinson, who has just been in my office and asked if I would be so good as to put him in touch with you. He is a young Englishman who, like a good many others, at first gives a good many people the impression of being superficial but who on longer acquaintance turns out to be exceedingly thoughtful, talented, and indeed quite brilliant. Three or four years ago he wrote a book called *America Came My Way*, which I am told had phenomenal sales in England.

Since the Yosemite Conference, Jenkinson has been traveling in Canada, gathering information for a book on that country. He has heard about the large study of the Canadian-American relations which you have organized, and is very anxious to know more about it. It is for this reason that he would welcome an opportunity to have a talk with you. I therefore told him that I would write you this note so that you would know who he was if he called for an appointment.

I hope you will forgive my taking this liberty on your time, but I think you will find that Jenkinson is well worth while.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to have Mr. Field's letter of January 18, 1937, introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 195" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 195

JANUARY 18, 1937.

Dr. JAMES T. SHOTWELL,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. SHOTWELL: One of the secretaries of the British group at the Yosemite Conference was Sir Anthony Jenkinson, who has just been in my office and asked if I would be so good as to put him in touch with you. He is a young Englishman who, like a good many others, at first gives a good many people the impression of being superficial but who on longer acquaintance turns out to be exceedingly thoughtful, talented, and indeed quite brilliant. Three or four years ago he wrote a book called *America Came My Way*, which I am told had phenomenal sales in England.

Since the Yosemite Conference Jenkinson has been traveling in Canada gathering information for a book on that country. He has heard about the large study of Canadian-American relations which you have organized, and is very anxious to know more about it. It is for this reason that he would welcome an opportunity to have a talk with you. I therefore told him that I would write you this note so that you would know who he was if he called for an appointment.

I hope you will forgive my taking this liberty on your time, but I think you will find that Jenkinson is well worth while.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK V. FIELD.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a list of writings, articles, by Israel Epstein, writing for the *Allied Labor News* and appearing in the *Daily Worker*.

I would like to incorporate that list into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be incorporated in the record?

Senator SMITH. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 196" and is as follows:)

ISRAEL EPSTEIN—ARTICLES FOR ALLIED LABOR NEWS

Daily Worker, July 29, 1946.

Daily Worker, January 30, 1948.

Daily Worker, August 26, 1948, page 8.

Daily Worker, August 27, 1948, page 8.

Daily Worker, December 1, 1948.

Daily Worker, August 18, 1949, page 6.

Daily Worker, August 19, 1949, page 6.

Daily Worker, September 5, 1949, page 6.

Daily Worker, August 16, 1950, page 6.

Daily Worker, September 11, 1950, page 6.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Mr. William Mandel, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know him to be a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, I have met him both at the headquarters of the Communist Party and also up at the offices of Soviet Russia Today, or, yes, Soviet Russia Today.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know him to be a Communist of long standing, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he is a well-versed Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you have anything to show Mr. Mandel's connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. William Mandel, listed as a research associate of the American Russian Institute, IPR—no relative of mine—was the author of a paper on the Soviet Far East and Central Asia which was presented at the eighth conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Mount Tremblant, Canada, in December 1942.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, when you said "member of the American Council," do you mean the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes. He is listed as a research associate of the American Russian Institute which is one of the organizations listed by the Attorney General and in the foreword to his study, had the following note:

This study, constituting part 2 of a larger work on the Soviets in the Far East, is to be published later by the IPR and is submitted by the international secretariat—

Mr. MORRIS. Of the IPR?

Mr. MANDEL. Of the IPR.

as a document of the eighth conference of the IPR to be held in December 1942. The author alone is responsible for statements of fact or opinion in his study that later appeared as a book entitled, "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia," which is listed as follows: "By William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute, IPR, inquiry series, issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, the Dial Press, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1944.

Now, I have made some excerpts from the book which are worthy of note, and I read from the foreword:

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dafoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern carried the major share of this responsibility.

Now, I have an excerpt from the book—

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel's book?

Mr. MANDEL. William Mandel's book. The author's preface might be worthy of note and I read:

The Soviet Union has stated its desire for continued neutrality vis-à-vis Japan. It feels that this neutrality is necessary in order finally to defeat Hitler and thus deprive Japan of the partner without which it cannot hope for victory. Its single-handed aid to China from the beginning of the Japanese attack in 1937, helped to prevent Japan from winning the Pacific war during China's 4 years of otherwise lonely struggle before Pearl Harbor. That neutrality means not only that Soviet forces in the Far East need not be replenished and supplied in active campaign, but that American lend-lease aid can continue to reach the Soviet Union without loss by submarine attack or aerial bombardment.

* * * For the most complete prewar data available, the reader is referred to Land of the Soviets, by Nicholas Mikhailov, a Soviet work available in English, and Soviet Asia, by R. A. Davies and Andrew Steiger.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce those excerpts into the record.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 197" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 197

THE SOVIET FAR EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

(By William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute IPR inquiry series issued under the auspices of the international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. The Dial Press, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1944)

FOREWORD

This study forms part of the documentation of an inquiry organized by the Institute of Pacific Relations into the problems arising from the conflict in the Far East.

* * * * *

It has been prepared by Mr. William Mandel, research associate, American Russian Institute.

* * * * *

During 1938 the inquiry was carried on under the general direction of Dr. J. W. Dufoe as chairman of the Pacific Council and since 1939 under his successors, Dr. Philip C. Jessup and Mr. Edgar J. Tarr. Every member of the international secretariat has contributed to the research and editorial work in connection with the inquiry, but special mention should be made of Mr. W. L. Holland, Miss Kate Mitchell, and Miss Hilda Austern, who have carried the major share of this responsibility.

* * * * *

The purpose of this inquiry is to relate unofficial scholarship to the problems arising from the present situation in the Far East. Its purpose is to provide members of the institute in all countries and the members of IPR conferences with an impartial and constructive analysis of the situation in the Far East with a view to indicating the major issues, which must be considered in any future adjustment of international relations in that area.

* * * * *

(Pp. vii, viii, ix)

EDWARD C. CARTER,
Secretary-General.

NEW YORK, May 15, 1943.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

* * * * *

The Soviet Union has stated its desire for continued neutrality vis-à-vis Japan. It feels that this neutrality is necessary in order finally to defeat Hitler and thus deprive Japan of the partner without which it cannot hope for victory. Its single-handed aid to China from the beginning of the Japanese attack in 1937, helped to prevent Japan from winning the Pacific war during China's 4 years of otherwise lonely struggle before Pearl Harbor. That neutrality means not only that Soviet forces in the Far East need not be replenished and supplied in active campaign, but that American lend-lease aid can continue to reach the Soviet Union without loss by submarine attack or aerial bombardment.

* * * For the most complete prewar data available, the reader is referred to *Land of the Soviets*, by Nicholas Mikhailov, a Soviet work available in English, and *Soviet Asia*, by R. A. Davies and Andrew Steiger.

* * * Industrial enterprises have been evacuated to, and erected in central Asia in such numbers during the course of the war as to have completely changed the basis of its economy. Refugees have been resettled en masse. They include not only Slavs, but large numbers of Jews, as well as persons from the Baltic states. As a result of the Soviet policy of safeguarding not only cultural institutions, but the creative individuals who are the bearers of culture, these evacuees include a large proportion of scientists, artists, writers, the personnel of the motion-picture industry, and the like.

* * * * *

(Pp. xii, xiv, xv)

WILLIAM MANDEL.

NEW YORK, September 1943.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, two previous witnesses have identified Michael Greenberg as a member of the Communist Party. Did you know that Michael Greenberg is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew him from official communications to be a member of the Communist Party, yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have already shown Mr. Greenberg is connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations, but I think we have one inquiry by Senator Ferguson which has not been answered.

Mr. MANDEL. Senator Ferguson asked about the naturalization of Michael Greenberg. Our files show that Michael Greenberg was naturalized in the United States District Court of Washington, D. C., June 6, 1944, certificate No. 6370908.

Senator SMITH. Where was he from?

Mr. MANDEL. England.

Mr. MORRIS. May the record so show?

Mr. Budenz, do you know Andrew Roth to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir, from official communications. My impression is that I met Andrew Roth but I am not sure. He was very active, particularly during the Amerasia difficulties in sending suggestions to the Communist leaders.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know his book, Dilemma in Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This book, Dilemma in Japan, was submitted to the Politburo for reading before it was published.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own knowledge?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; I saw at least what purported to be a copy of it. It was to be given to several people and I didn't read it.

Mr. MORRIS. Who published Dilemma in Japan?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it is Little, Brown & Co.

Mr. MORRIS. It so states in that article?

Mr. BUDENZ. That was my remembrance.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you comment any further on Dilemma in Japan as used by the Communist Party, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, this particular photostat that has been given me, which is the Daily Worker of September 12, 1945—the date is obscure, but it's 1945—page 8, Seeds of New Pearl Harbor still in Japan, Writer Warns, by Samuel Sillen, was a leading article in order to focus attention on Japan, which the Communist leaders were on orders to advance everywhere they could. In this book, Lieutenant Roth attacks very sharply Under Secretary of State Grew, or rather former Under Secretary of State Grew, because Grew had resigned while this book was in the course of being prepared or published rather.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like this photostat, if it is authenticated by Mr. Mandel, to be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostat of the Daily Worker of September 12, 1945, page 8, which was reproduced at my direction.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 198" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 198

[From the Daily Worker, New York, September 12, 1945, p. 8]

SEEDS OF NEW PEARL HARBOR STILL IN JAPAN, WRITER WARNS

(By Samuel Sillen)

A new Pearl Harbor will threaten America unless sweeping changes are quickly effected in Japan's political and economic structure. The imperialist rulers of Japan have a carefully planned come-back strategy which calls for retention of their power within the country and for creating disunity among the victor nations. If United States policy is not directed toward smashing this strategy at the outset, the blood of American boys will again redden the Pacific. This urgent warning is the theme of *Dilemma in Japan*, a book completed after VJ-day and published this morning by Little, Brown & Co.

Andrew Roth, the author, is one of the group of the Far East experts, who earned the displeasure of former Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, leading advocate of friendship with the Emperor both before and after Pearl Harbor. He is at present under indictment for allegedly making use of State Department documents marked "Confidential."

But there is nothing confidential in this book. The public record of tragically wrong-headed policy speaks for itself. And a review of that record—which prominently includes Mr. Grew's published diary, *Ten Years in Japan*—casts a disturbing light on the events of the past few days in Southern Korea, China, and Japan itself.

Mr. Roth rips away the unreal distinction between the moderates and extremists among Japan's rulers. The moderate elements—Emperor, navy, businessmen—on whom the State Department experts relied for peace, joined hands enthusiastically with the most rabid militarists in the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

And today again, Roth warns, the group in Japan that will try most eagerly to please us will be our greatest danger.

"These self-proclaimed angels of peace," he writes, "will be the front men for the Zaibatsu, which is Japanese for plutocracy or moneyed groups."

In view of General MacArthur's announcement that he does not intend to interfere with Japan's internal economy, Roth's analysis of Japan's Big Four financial combines—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda—assumes vital significance. Emphasizing that they boast a concentration of financial power unparalleled anywhere else in the world, Roth notes that "the relative position of the Mitsui or Mitsubishi concerns in the life of Japan is so important that beside them the role played by organizations like du Pont and Standard Oil seems small."

"During most of the modern period," he writes, "Japan's giant trusts have been important and willing partners of the militarists in the acquisition of new territories for exploitation, with quarrels restricted to the question of methods, division of spoils, and supreme power over the domestic economy."

A surrender that would leave these elements in power would fall far short of victory.

Like these imperialists, the Emperor should be tried as a war criminal, Roth believes. Hirohito, a wealthy landowner, is also a substantial member of the Zaibatsu, an integral part of the economic oligarchy. The occupying forces should encourage literature critical of the Emperor institution. The opponents of the throne, who favor popular sovereignty against imperial sovereignty, should be strengthened, he declares.

These antiimperialist elements in Japan are described historically in one of the most important sections of Roth's valuable book. Japanese censorship has kept the world in virtual ignorance of popular resistance movements within the country, so that the average American thinks of Japan as one undifferentiated mass.

But the severity of Japanese reaction reflects, as in Germany, the imperialists' need to stamp out or siphon off the discontent of the people organized in trade-unions and democratic political movements.

Roth recalls that in the Diet elections of 1928, for example, the laborites won 8 seats with 438,000 votes, and the Communist-influenced Workers and Peasants Party won 2 seats with 188,000 votes.

STRUGGLE AGAINST WAR

The Japanese Communists have consistently fought against Japan's imperialist war even under the most savage repression.

"On July 8, 1937, the day after the beginning of the China Incident, the Communists issued a statement denouncing Japan's attack as an 'unjust robbers' war which every Japanese should oppose."

Roth cites dramatic evidence of labor resistance, under Communist leadership, even after Pearl Harbor.

The problem, says Roth, is to convert Japan's democratic minority into a majority. Working with the labor movement which has persisted, even if in rudimentary form, during the war is indispensable for achieving a peaceful and democratic Japan.

But Roth understands clearly that American monopolists, who certainly don't like to encourage labor at home, will be most reluctant to promote labor organization in Japan.

Under the slogan of working with the forces of "order" and "stability," American reactionaries will resist essential modification of the class structure in Japan. That way lies another Pearl Harbor for America.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I notice that we are introducing quite a few people, mentioning quite a few people, as Communists connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Was there ever any comment made in official Communist Party circles that you know of that indicated the degree of concentration by Communist writers and Communist members?

MR. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; there were a number of discussions within the Politburo that while they were pleased with the success that IPR was making in its contacts and in the infiltration and its influence in governmental agencies and in agencies of public opinion, they constantly criticized the Institute of Pacific Relations comrades for not spreading out more—that is, they felt that the institute was too much a concentration point for Communists; that control could be maintained without such a galaxy of Communists in it. These problems were presented to the Communist Party from time to time. This discussion, therefore, went on for several years, to my knowledge, and the constant criticism by the Communist leaders was that those within the Institute of Pacific Relations were too much concentrated in regard to Communist personnel.

MR. MORRIS. Then they had too many Communists for their purpose?

MR. BUDENZ. That is right, they didn't need so many.

MR. MORRIS. Do you have anything else that would associate Andrew Roth with the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Mandel?

MR. MANDEL. This is taken from the official publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations. We find a list of books and articles by Andrew Roth, for example, *French Interest and Policies in the Far East*, coauthored by Andrew Roth. IPR Inquiry Series, 1941. I have here four articles, three articles by Roth and one a review of his book, *Dilemma in Japan*, taken from *Pacific Affairs*. Then there are three articles by Roth or about his book in the *Far Eastern Survey*.

I offer that for the record.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that compilation be introduced into the record and made a part of it with the next consecutive number?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 199" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 199

ANDREW ROTH

IPR BOOKS

French Interests and Policies in the Far East by Roger Levy, Guy Lacam, Andrew Roth. IPR Inquiry Series, 1941. (IPR Books, New and Forthcoming Publications on the Far East and Pacific Area—IPR (p. 11)).

ARTICLES IN PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Japan Strikes South, 371-372 (Review 1941, volume XIV.

Review of Blood on the Rising Sun by Douglas G. Haring, 235-236, 1944, volume XVII.

Review of Our Japanese Foe, by Ian Morrison; My Life With the Enemy, by Phyllis Argall; Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan, by Willis Lamott, 351-352, 1944, volume XVII.

Dilemma in Japan (review) 114, volume XIX, 1946.

ARTICLES IN FAR EASTERN SURVEY

War Leads to Sharp Rise in Soviet-United States Trade, October 1940.

Cotton for the Soviets, January 2, 1941.

Dilemma in Japan, Little Brown. Reviewed by Richard Watts, October 10, 1945.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, a press release from the Federated Press, Eastern Bureau, 30 Irving Place, New York City, sheet 2, February 19, 1941. The article is by Andrew Roth and at the top it says:

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was the author?

Mr. MANDEL. Andrew Roth.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, could you tell us what the Federated Press was?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. As chairman of publications, Dick Sellers reported to me. He was in charge and afterward so was Mark Stone or Finestone, the brother of I. N. Stone, who reported to me. He was its business manager or manager and the Federated Press was completely controlled by the Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you any comments to make on the fact that Andrew Roth's book was released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by the Federated Press?

Mr. BUDENZ. Well, I must say that if someone who was a non-Communist in the American Council was responsible for that, he was very naive. Undoubtedly, it was due to Communist influence.

Mr. MORRIS. That was an article, not a book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. The article was released in that fashion because the Federated Press by that time had a well-established reputation.

Mr. MORRIS. It was openly Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. It wasn't openly Communist but everybody in New York knew.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 200" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 200

LOOKING ABROAD

Written for (insert name of paper) and released by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations and by Federated Press. Opinions are the author's.

(By Andrew Roth, author of numerous articles on India and Indochina)

Indochina has emerged from the obscurity of small items buried in the back pages of the American press into the full glare of front-page headlines.

Friction between the unofficial Anglo-American alliance and Japan has reached a new intensity. The fate of Indochina is a key to future developments in the area.

Indochina's importance is largely strategic. From northern Indochina, where Japan obtained bases last September, Japanese planes have taken off to bombard the Burma road and southwest China. In addition, Japan has taken steps to obtain Camrahh Bay, Indochina's partly developed naval base on the southeast coast, and Saigon, a smaller but completed base further south.

Possession of these bases would not only help Japan to outflank the defenses of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, but also bring Japan within 750 miles of Singapore—the British Gibraltar of the East.

It was largely because Indochinese officials refused to give up these bases that Japan encouraged Thailand to attack Indochina, paving the way for Japan to step in as mediator. The peace conference between Thailand and Indochina is now going on in Tokyo and Japan is expected to emerge as the winner, with the possibility of obtaining bases in Thailand—as well as Indochina—as payment for its mediation.

Most discussions of Indochina have ignored the fact that the nation's 23,000,000 inhabitants have aspirations of their own. As in China and India, the great mass of the Indochinese people are peasants, impoverished by a tremendous burden of high taxes and low returns. In Indochina the economy was largely owned by the Bank of Indochina, whose political representative in France was Paul Baudoin, foreign minister in the Reynaud cabinet and also in the early days of the Petain regime.

The development of the nationalist movement in China in the twenties and the effect of the depression of 1929 promoted agrarian discontent in Indochina. This culminated in an uprising of Indochinese troops at Yenbay in 1930, with sporadic fighting continuing into 1931. The rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed, but the basic cause—peasant poverty—was not removed.

That unrest still exists in Indochina was demonstrated by a series of riots and demonstrations which occurred throughout the state in November and December of 1940. In the Saigon area alone more than 1,000 rebels were arrested, 200 of them being lined up and shot at the Saigon airport. The desire on the part of the Indochinese to be free from the bondage of either the Japanese or the French may yet play an important part in southeast Asia, the Balkans of the Far East.

Mr. BUDENZ. The American Federation of Labor had publicly labeled it as Communist. I don't know the exact year, but it was on several occasions.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated September 26, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Owen Lattimore from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR OWEN: Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important monograph for the IPR inquiry is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese postwar history, and also on Indian history.

He will be delighted to contribute to Pacific Affairs if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for Pacific Affairs

during the next 2 years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Pepper.

Mr. MORRIS. Who signed that?

Mr. MANDEL. It is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have that introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 201" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 201

SUNSET FARM,
LEE, MASS., September 26, 1940.

OWEN LATTIMORE, Esq.,
300 Gilman Hall, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

DEAR OWEN: Andrew Roth, who has been doing a small but important monograph for the IPR inquiry, is going on with his Far Eastern studies. He has completed his third year in the Chinese language, has started Russian, and has done a good deal on Chinese labor and nationalism, on Chinese postwar history and also on Indian history.

He will be delighted to contribute to Pacific Affairs if you wish to appeal to him for help. You have already seen some evidences of his writing and will know better than I whether he will fit into your plan for Pacific Affairs during the next 2 years. I think you know that he is rated very highly by Jessup and Pepper.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. That is a recommendation of Andrew Roth showing other members of the IPR, and Jessup is Philip Jessup.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated May 23, 1940, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. Holland from Mr. Carter, and reads:

Andrew Roth called to see me today as a result of your letter to him of May 10.

Then the last paragraph says:

Roth knows Barnett and Rosinger and is working under Pepper and Peake at Columbia. He hopes to stay in the Far East field.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 202" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 202

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,
May 23, 1940.

W. L. HOLLAND, Esq.,
Giannini Foundation, University of California,
Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR BILL: Andrew Roth called to see me today as a result of your letter to him of May 10. He is prepared to undertake to add the chapter that you have proposed; namely, to bring the history of French political and economic relations with China and Japan up to the present time, since Levy's report does not go beyond 1938. I have assumed that you want Roth to cover anything he can in 1939 and thus far in 1940.

I have told Roth that I hope he can finish his work by July 1 or July 15 at the latest.

As he is headed for a scholastic career, he is wondering what he can get out of this task professionally; that is, what sort of a byline he could get. I said I supposed there were three possibilities: First, that he might be mentioned in

the foreword as having contributed a chapter; second, that he might be mentioned on the title page as having contributed a chapter; and, third, that the book might be published as being written by Levy and Roth. I, myself, think that the latter would probably not be possible, but I told him that this was a matter that you would have to decide, and that I could not commit myself at all. Will you let me know what your reaction is?

Roth knows Barnett and Rosinger and is working under Peffer and Peake at Columbia. He hopes to stay in the Far East field.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter from the Department of the Navy, dated July 19, 1951, addressed to Hon. Pat McCarran, and reads:

In reply to your letter of 27 June 1951, the following data concerning Andrew Roth are submitted for your information.

Roth was enrolled in the United States Navy Japanese-language course at Harvard University as a contract employee on 28 August 1941. This contract was canceled on 5 December 1941 when Roth enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve. On 8 September 1942, he was commissioned as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve and was ordered to duty with the Department of the Navy.

On 6 June 1945, Roth was arrested by Federal authorities in Washington, D. C. The complaint charged Roth with conspiracy to violate subsections C and D of section 31 title 50, United States Code (revised under act of 25 June 1948, 80th Cong., as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 793), and the violation of section 88, title 18, United States Code (revised as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 371). On that date he was presented with an order signed by the Secretary of the Navy which relieved him immediately from active duty in the Navy.

At the August 1945 criminal term of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Roth was indicted with others for removing United States Government records from the files of various Government agencies and converting them to their own use. The charges against Roth were subsequently nol-prossed by the United States attorney.

Roth's resignation from the United States Naval Reserve was accepted on 3 April 1947. Since that time, he has had no connection with the United States Navy.

That is signed by Dan A. Kimball, Under Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter from Under Secretary of the Navy be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 203" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 203

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, July 19, 1951.

HON. PAT MCCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARRAN: In reply to your letter of 27 June 1951, the following data concerning Andrew Roth are submitted for your information.

Roth was enrolled in the United States Navy Japanese-language course at Harvard University as a contract employee on 28 August 1941. This contract was cancelled on 5 December 1941 when Roth enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve. On 8 September 1942 he was commissioned as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve and was ordered to duty with the Department of the Navy.

On 6 June 1945 Roth was arrested by Federal authorities in Washington, D. C. The complaint charged Roth with conspiracy to violate subsections C and D of section 31, title 50, United States Code (revised under act of 25 June 1948, 80th Cong., as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 793), and the violation of section 88, title 18, United States Code (revised as title 18, U. S. Code, sec. 371). On that date he was presented with an order signed by the Secretary of the Navy which relieved him immediately from active duty in the Navy.

At the August 1945 criminal term of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Roth was indicted with others for removing United States Government records from the files of various Government agencies and converting them to their own use. The charges against Roth were subsequently not pressed by the United States attorney.

Roth's resignation from the United States Naval Reserve was accepted on 3 April 1947. Since that time, he has had no connection with the United States Navy.

Sincerely yours,

DAN A. KIMBALL,
Under Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, United States Navy, dated August 4, 1942, from Edward C. Carter, coming from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I read as follows:

DEAR SIR: I have known Andrew Roth for several years and have found him to be exceedingly intelligent and of pleasing personality and good judgment. I have the highest regard for his scholarship and knowledge of the problems of southeast Asia. He completed the research assignment made to him by the Institute of Pacific Relations promptly and in an entirely satisfactory manner. He is a tireless worker.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

This letter of August 4 is a response to a request from Andrew Roth dated July 28, 1942, addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter, and found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

DEAR MR. CARTER: It was very good seeing you, if only for a moment. Knowing how busy you are, I thought that my contact with you would be restricted to hearing you over the radio as I have several times, including the Shostakovich premiere.

I am nearing the end of the course, and I am increasingly happy that I chose to follow your advice. I feel that I can perform a useful function not only now but in the postwar world, should I be around to observe it.

As you may have guessed, this letter has an ulterior purpose. I am about to be elevated from the lowly rank of yeoman, second class, to lieutenant, junior grade, and I require letters of recommendation. I am sorry that the effectiveness of your past recommendations compels me to ask you for another.

Therefore, I should heartily appreciate it if you were to find time to write another. It should be addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, but be sent to me and bear no reference to the particular division to which I expect to be assigned. Unfortunately for your secretary, the rules require the letter to be in triplicate. I should appreciate receiving a letter as soon as possible, because our applications are being held up until our letters of recommendation are in.

I put the whole letter into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. Two letters?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like those two letters authenticated by Mr. Mandel as having come from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. First is the letter signed by Andrew Roth to Mr. Carter, and the second letter does not appear to be signed.

Mr. MORRIS. You did not introduce that into the record; did you?

Mr. MANDEL. No.

Senator SMITH. You are not introducing this last one?

Mr. MORRIS. Since this is part of the file, we will introduce it exactly for what it was, as a letter attached to the rest of the file.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Mr. MORRIS. We will just introduce it as being an appendage to the other letter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 204" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 204

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,

August 4, 1942.

CHIEF OF BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,

United States Navy.

DEAR SIR: I have known Andrew Roth for several years and have found him to be exceedingly intelligent and of pleasing personality and good judgment. I have the highest regard for his scholarship and knowledge of the problems of southeast Asia. He completed the research assignment made to him by the Institute of Pacific Relations promptly and in an entirely satisfactory manner. He is a tireless worker.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

36 GRAY STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,

July 28, 1942.

DEAR MR. CARTER: It was very good seeing you, if only for a moment. Knowing how busy you are, I thought that my contact with you would be restricted to hearing you over the radio as I have several times, including the Shostakovitch premier.

I am nearing the end of the course, and I am increasingly happy that I chose to follow your advice. I feel that I can perform a useful function not only now but in the postwar world, should I be around to observe it.

As you may have guessed, this letter has an ulterior purpose. I am about to be elevated from the lowly rank of yeoman, second class, to lieutenant, junior grade, and I require letters of recommendation. I am sorry that the effectiveness of your past recommendations compels me to ask you for another.

Therefore, I should heartily appreciate it if you were to find time to write another. It should be addressed to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, but be sent to me and bear no reference to the particular division to which I expect to be assigned. Unfortunately for your secretary, the rules require the letter be in triplicate. I should appreciate receiving the letters as soon as possible, because our applications are being held up until our letters of recommendation are in.

In the little spare time at my disposal, I have been doing some thinking and reading on postwar Japan, and have come near formulating a study on that subject. However, since I do not know whether my next tour of duty will admit of any research or writing, I cannot plan very definitively at this time. Perhaps I can discuss this with you on my next leave.

Sincerely yours,

ANDREW ROTH.

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET, NEW YORK CITY,

August 4, 1942.

Mr. ANDREW ROTH,

36 Gray Street, Cambridge, Mass.

DEAR ANDY: Thank you for your letter of July 28. I was glad to hear of your impending promotion.

Enclosed is the letter of recommendation in triplicate with an extra copy for your own files.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, did you ever see Corliss Lamont at Communist meetings?

Mr. BUDENZ. Not at Communist meetings, but I have met him as a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. You have?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes; and I have discussed with him on several occasions Communist affairs, with him as a Communist. You must understand that while Mr. Lamont, to my knowledge, was a Communist—that is, to my personal knowledge and in meeting with him as such and conferring with him, that he sometimes had little difficulties with the Communist viewpoint with some criticism, and on several occasions and specifically on one that I can remember, I was called upon by the Communist leaders to give him information that would straighten him out. This was with regard to James Burnham, now of New York, who had evidently made quite an impression on Lamont and whom I assured him was a Trotzkyite. Lamont was sending reports to Comrade Hathaway of his activities in the organization which he then represented, formerly known as Friends of Russia.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Len DeCaux was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very well, and personally. I have met him on many occasions at secret Communist meetings and specifically in July 1940, though I could recall many more, but July 1940 at the national convention of the CIO in St. Louis. I recall that because just at that time I had become president of the corporation controlling the Daily Worker, and we commented on that. He attended secret meetings with Roy Hudson and other representatives of the Communist Party in regard to the role he was to play in the national office of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Mr. MORRIS. So it is your knowledge that he is a highly placed Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew him as a Communist before he was in the CIO.

By the way, he was released from the CIO because he could not agree with Mr. Murray. I think that should be clear.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have already introduced into the record the fact that Len DeCaux was a member of the board of trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations as well as the man who was in charge of public relations for the Triennial Conference at Mont Tremblant in 1942.

Mr. Chairman, we have, I would estimate, about another half hour's work.

Senator SMITH. We will recess now until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 2:30 of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SMITH. The hearing will come to order. We will proceed, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce into the record a book review of William Mandel's book, IPR Inquiry Series, New York, the Dial Press, 1944. This appeared in the Saturday Review of Literature, March 11, 1944, page 18. Mr. Mandel, will you authenticate the authenticity of that?

Mr. MANDEL. This is a photostatic copy of a review appearing in the Saturday Evening Review of Literature for March 11, 1944, page 18.

Here we have a book review appearing in the New York Times of February 28, 1944, on page 16, also an opinion of the Library of Congress in a letter to Senator Pat McCarran, August 23, 1941, signed by Ernest S. Griffith, Director, Legislative Reference Service.

Mr. MORRIS. I would like to introduce those into the record and have them marked the next consecutive exhibits.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 205 and 206," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 205

[From the Saturday Review of Literature, March 11, 1944, p. 18]

THE RUMP OF THE BEAR

(The Soviet Far East and Central Asia. By William Mandel. IPR Inquiry Series. New York: The Dial Press. 1944. 151 pp. \$2.50—reviewed by Emil Lengyel)

The Soviet Far East is a huge land bordering on Japanese-held territory and the Pacific. William Mandel compares it to Canada and Alaska from Lake Superior to the Pacific Ocean, insofar as its size is concerned. The Yakut Republic itself—part of this territory—is as large as all of European Russia.

Most important region of the Soviet Far East is the Maritime Territory with the city Vladivostok on its southern tip. On the map this region looks like a finger thrust into the intestines of the Japanese Empire. It was bases there that attracted the envious attention of the world-traveling United States Senators, some of whom told the country that the Soviets should place those bases at our disposal.

This is a rich country and would be much richer if more manpower could be had. Oil is one of its most important raw materials in this mechanized world, and large quantities of it are found in the northern part of Sakhalin Island. The author points out that the Soviet Far East produces more than its quota of coal, pig iron, and cement. It exports large quantities of lumber, fish, and fur to the western Soviet Union. The known natural riches of the Far East sound like a list of chemical elements. In agricultural products it became self-sufficient a couple of years ago, and is now expected to provide an exportable surplus.

This vast territory is sparsely settled, most of its white inhabitants living along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and great river banks. The January average temperature of the city of Khabarovsk is 6 below zero Fahrenheit, while that of Verkhoyansk, in Yakutia, it is 58° Fahrenheit.

The Soviet Far East is the land of one railway, the author shows. That railway is the Trans-Siberian. The much talked about and little known Baikal-Amur Railway has not yet been completed, in the author's view. Rivers afford water transportation when open to navigation, which may not be more than an average of 6 months a year.

Obviously, Mr. Mandel made an effort to assemble most of the material available about the natural resources, economic and cultural development, population and land settlement, transportation and administrative divisions of the Soviet Far East. The available material is not rich, which may be judged by the fact that all of it is presented on not more than 85 pages, several of which are reprints of Soviet daily press articles, containing so few points of interest that they could have easily been presented in condensed form. Just the same, the material provided by Mr. Mandel will prove useful to Far East specialists.

Readers may be interested in Mr. Mandel's treatment of the importance of this region for the outcome of the war with Japan. The Soviets are at peace with the Mikado's empire, since, as the author points out, first they had to stave off Hitler's aggression. The Far East was turned into an arsenal for the forces fighting in the west.

In his interpretation of the Soviet policy in the Far East, Mr. Mandel does not seem to be consistent. He writes in his preface that the Far East's economic expansion was "determined by Soviet estimates of potentialities inherent in the position of the U. S. S. R. as members of opposition coalitions." On the other hand, he writes in a later chapter: "Any attempt to read into the regionalization of the economy of the Far East now proceeding, any special design arising out of the proximity of Japanese forces would not be borne out by the facts." Not only is this statement not consistent with the previous one, but it is hard to accept it in view of the constant state of preparedness characterizing life in Far East border districts.

Some 30 pages of this small book are devoted to a discussion of the vast Soviet Central Asiatic Republics. The author himself warns the reader that these chapters contain no rounded treatment. The title page of his book reads: "The Soviet Far East and Central Asia," while the other titles, on the jacket and elsewhere, simply call it: "The Soviet Far East." Had more material been available about the more eastern region, it would have been preferable for the author not to roam so far afield.

EXHIBIT No. 206

[From the New York Times, February 28, 1944, p. 16 of Book Review Section]

THE NEW SIBERIA

(The Soviet Far East, by William Mandel, 158 pp. New York: The Dial Press. \$2.50—by William Henry Chamberlin)

The Soviet Far East, the vast, bleak, sparsely settled territory between Lake Baikal and the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, is one of the least known regions of the world, so far as the developments of the last 10 or 15 years are concerned. Ever since the Japanese seizure of Manchuria the Soviet Government has regarded this area as an advanced military zone and has not extended facilities for detailed study to any foreign observer.

In the event that the Soviet Union should enter the war against Japan this region would assume great importance in American eyes. So it is useful to have a compilation of the information that is available from Soviet sources about economic development and settlement and population policies. This is what Mr. Mandel has prepared in this little book, which is one of the inquiry series prepared by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

While the author concentrates his attention on the Soviet Far East, he includes some material bearing on Soviet Central Asia. Here, as he shows, population has increased and cultural life has been enriched because of the mass evacuation of refugees from the Ukraine and other sections when the Germans invaded European Russia in 1941 and 1942.

Climatically and physically the Soviet Far East, as the author suggests, is similar in some respects to western and northwestern Canada. There are rich fisheries and timber and mining regions in the southern part of the area; but the greater part is an unbroken Arctic waste. Of the 4½ million people who lived east and north of Lake Baikal in 1939 nearly 4 million lived along the line of the Trans-Siberian Railway or in the valley, 50 to 100 miles wide, between the Amur River and the mountains. In Canada one finds this same ribbonlike distribution of population—though Canada, of course, has developed a much thicker network of railways and an infinitely higher standard of living than eastern Siberia.

The Soviet Government has tried to push the development of the Far East, both for military and for economic reasons. Discharged Red army soldiers have been settled in military farm colonies along the Manchurian border. Ardent young Communists have helped to establish a pioneer town, Komsomolsk, on the lower reaches of the Amur River and have helped to develop oil resources in the northern, Russian half of the island of Sakhalin.

While the reader will find interesting information on a little-known part of the world in this book, two limitations must be noted. The first (for which the author is, of course, not responsible) is the absence of first-hand foreign information. The second is Mr. Mandel's extremely uncritical attitude toward the Soviet regime. The czarist practice of sending political prisoners to Siberia is frequently mentioned; but there are no references to the much larger employment of forced labor under the Soviets. And it is highly questionable, to put it mildly, whether Soviet Uzbekistan is, in Mr. Mandel's words, "a State comparable to Sweden in economy, culture, and national statehood."

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, D. C., August 23, 1951.

HON. PAT McCARRAN,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR McCARRAN: We have examined the book, *The Soviet Far East and Central Asia*, by William Mandel (New York, international secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944). The book mentions the czarist practice of

sending exiles to the Far East but does not contain any references to Soviet slave-labor camps. It cites several cases of increases in the population of various localities due to new arrivals which are described in such terms as "the influx of settlers," "mass settlement of refugees," "influx of evacuees," etc.

The two reviews of Mr. Mandel's book which accompany this letter comment upon its merit. The underlined portions contain the more critical remarks.

The map which we are sending contains the best information that we have on the location of forced-labor camps in the Soviet Union. We have roughly sketched in on this map those regions comprising the Soviet Far East and Central Asia as delineated in the book by Mr. Mandel.

Sincerely yours,

ERNEST S. GRIFFITH,

Director, Legislative Reference Service.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, CRESTWOOD, N. Y.—

Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know that Agnes Smedley was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew it by official information. I also knew Miss Smedley many years ago.

Mr. MORRIS. There is no doubt at all about her being a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, no; not then or afterward.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that Mildred Price is associated with the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I know that from personal knowledge, having met Miss Price several times at the Daily Worker. When I say several, not too many. Secondly, from her attendance on occasion at large national committee meetings of the Communist Party. At the Daily Worker on two occasions that I can recall she brought Chinese Communists up there, three of them at one time and two at another. This was during the forties, and I just don't recall the years.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the names of the Chinese Communists?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not. I was introduced to them for an extensive period of time but my memory doesn't recall, at least at the present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, I show you a copy of a letter, our exhibit No. 99, which was introduced at the open hearing of August 14, 1951. This is a copy of a letter headed "The China Aid Council." I ask you if you know that organization to be a Communist-controlled organization? You will notice that Mildred Price was the executive secretary.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. This was not just a Communist-controlled organization. It was a Communist-created organization, and was, therefore, also Communist-controlled. It is what is popularly known as a Communist front.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. We had that testimony from Miss Elizabeth Bentley last week, Mr. Budenz. Did you know Miss Bentley when you were in the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I was introduced to her by Jacob Golos in order that she could take down stenographically my reports intended for the Soviet secret police. He couldn't do it constantly. He had been my intermediary for years, but after he pleaded guilty to being a foreign agent without having registered, he felt that he shouldn't too frequently be in contact with me, and he asked that I meet Miss

Bentley. That was for a very short period of time, because my activities in that respect ended about 6 months after I first met Miss Bentley. I used to have to call her up under the name of Helen Johns.

Mr. MORRIS. J-o-h-n-s?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Can you testify to the fact that she held a high place in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. She held a very important key position in the espionage apparatus of the Communist in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. You know that from your own experience?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know it from my experience. I know it from Mr. Golos' introduction. He was chairman of the control commission of the Communist Party, and from my own personal knowledge and of course mountains of evidence in other proceedings, was also for many years engaged in espionage activities in the United States, using the World Tourist Agency, of which he was the head, for that purpose. He was the center of false passports and things of that character.

He introduced Miss Bentley to me as one who already had won her place in confidential work for the party and that I could rely upon her completely, tell her anything and that that was equivalent to telling it to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, Miss Bentley testified that Mr. Golos was one of the three-man control commission. You have now said he was chairman of the control commission. Can you tell us who the other members were at any time?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I had many contacts with Mr. Golos as chairman of the control commission, since occasionally in addition to the secret work I was doing with the Soviet secret police, I also had the political responsibility of keeping watch over the staff of the Daily Worker and of other people in the publication field when the control commission demanded it. Consequently, I had many relationships with Mr. Golos. The control commission at that time was really more than three, but three were publicly named. That is publicly named within the party. They weren't publicly named so much outside for the general public, but I mean within the party. These three were generally named in the national committee with power to enlarge their numbers, which permitted them to make the control commission as large as they wished. But the three that were constantly named during that period were Jacob Golos, Charles or Clarence Derba (he used both names, and he spelled his name either D-i-r-b-a or D-e-r-b-a), and Dora Lipshitz.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, the name of John S. Service came up this morning. Will you tell us what you knew about John S. Service's connection with the Communist Party to be?

Mr. BUDENZ. John S. Service, at least from the official information I received, had many contacts with the party. He was designated as Lattimore's pupil in some of these discussions. He was designated as a man to be relied upon in the State Department, particularly in 1945 in the campaign against General Hurley. I have never heard him mentioned specifically as a Communist, but his relationship was certainly very close from all the official reports I received. You must understand that during a considerable period of time I was in the Communist Party, Mr. Service was in China and would not come so much directly to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. But did you know that the Communist Party relied on John Stewart Service to put over their policy in the Far East?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most specifically. That is to say, it came out very sharply in 1945 and the names of John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent were repeatedly mentioned as being dependable in the campaign within the State Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. May I interrupt at this point? You have a couple of times used the word "designated," Mr. Budenz. Did you make it clear for the record, do you think, by whom Mr. Service was designated?

Mr. BUDENZ. As what?

Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned that he was designated in several capacities. He was designated. Do you recall?

Mr. BUDENZ. Designated as Lattimore's pupil?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BUDENZ. I have heard that expression several times. My memory is that it came from Earl Browder and Jack Stachel.

Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't use that word in the sense of an official appointment, but rather as a characterization of him?

Mr. MORRIS. That was a characterization in the discussion in the Politburo.

Mr. SOURWINE. By more than one member of the Politburo?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. At more than one time?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was the same true with regard to our subsequent use of the word designation? You spoke of Mr. Lattimore in another capacity?

Mr. BUDENZ. Mr. Service, you mean?

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Service.

Mr. BUDENZ. Being designated as a man who was reliable.

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. This was used repeatedly. Perhaps if I search my memory further I could think of who these people were who mentioned him specifically, but it was within the Politburo.

Mr. SOURWINE. I simply wanted to clear up your connotation of the word designated, in your use of it, because otherwise the testimony might not be clear on that point.

Mr. BUDENZ. I see.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, yesterday you testified that at the time Owen Lattimore was with Henry Wallace in the Far East, you were approached by Jack Stachel and were told of his particular role, that is of Lattimore's particular role in the Communist organization. Was there any mention by Stachel at that time of John Carter Vincent's position in the Communist organization?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. So the testimony you gave this morning with respect to John Carter Vincent could be amplified by stating that Jack Stachel told you that on that particular occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes; that is very definite.

Mr. MORRIS. And did you hear on other occasions of John Carter Vincent?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; particularly during the period of 1945.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Nym Wales, who was the wife of Edgar Snow?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew her officially. During the past year I recall that I met her once, but I don't recall the occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. You don't recall the occasion?

Mr. BUDENZ. No.

Mr. MORRIS. But did you know that she was a Communist?

Mr. BUDENZ. Most decidedly. She was, so far as official reports went, a Communist before Snow was.

Mr. MORRIS. Before Edgar Snow was?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Senator SMITH. Is he the Snow who wrote the book, *People on Our Side*?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator SMITH. He also wrote *Red Star Over China*.

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. Can you recall anything about that book that would be of interest to this committee, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. He amended one edition of the book, as I recall, at the request of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, his first edition differed from the second edition?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir. I don't recall all the circumstances. By checking up on the book, I could, because I was in the midst of the discussions.

Mr. MORRIS. You participated in the discussion that led to the request on the part of the Communist Party to him to amend the first edition of his book?

Mr. BUDENZ. Either in those discussions or in subsequent discussions in which the matter was reviewed.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters in the files on Edgar Snow or Mrs. Edgar Snow that would be of interest to us now?

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated May 27, 1940, addressed to Edgar Snow, Esquire, Worcester House, Baguio, the Philippines, from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR SNOW: Your very important letter of May 3 with several enclosures has just arrived. I am sharing your letter and that of Mrs. Chuan with the following:

Miss Ida Pruitt
Harry Price
John Hersey
Frederick V. Field
Robert W. Barnett

I want to read another section of the letter.

Your Saturday Evening Post article was invaluable. All of your writing helps. Your discriminating analyses of China and the Far East today are of the greatest value to the future both of China and the United States.

That is signed "Edward C. Carter."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like that introduced into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH: So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 207" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 207

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, May 27, 1940.

EDGAR SNOW, Esq.,
Worcester House, Baguio, the Philippines.

DEAR SNOW: Your very important letter of May 3 with several enclosures has just arrived. I am sharing your letter and that of Mrs. Chuan with the following:

Miss Ida Pruitt
Harry Price
John Hersey
Frederick V. Field
Robert W. Barnett

You give me credit for more work on behalf of the industrial cooperatives than I am entitled to. I am afraid I have a one-track mind. For the past year I have felt that the only person in the world who could put the CIC on the map in the United States is yourself. I shall continue to do all in my limited power to get you to come to the United States for this purpose. You and you alone have the ability to raise money for progressive China from out and out capitalists. You are the only American who knows the CIC from the inside who at the same time has Nation-wide prestige in the United States.

I have done a little on behalf of Miss Pruitt, but it is discouraging, for she has been the personification of devotion to the cause, but does not inspire quite that confidence which is so desperately essential if things are to be done in a big way in this country.

Your Saturday Evening Post article was invaluable. All of your writing helps. Your discriminating analyses of China and the Far East today are of the greatest value to the future both of China and the United States.

Hoping that you can come to us soon, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Here is a review of *Red Star Over China*, by Edgar Snow. The review is by Edward C. Carter, published in *Pacific Affairs* for March 1938, pages 110 to 113. Mr. Carter:

The leaders of Red China represent to the peasants Franciscan simplicity, personal bravery, an abounding humor, and a strategic ingenuity of magical dimensions; but they represent, as well, a way of life that has convinced the masses that there at least are political leaders who will not betray them into the hands of the landlords and money lenders.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that excerpt from Edward C. Carter's book review of Edgar Snow's book be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 208" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 208

RED STAR OVER CHINA, BY EDGAR SNOW, REVIEWED BY EDWARD C. CARTER

The leaders of Red China represent to the peasants Franciscan simplicity, personal bravery, an abounding humor, and a strategic ingenuity of magical dimensions; but they represent, as well, a way of life that has convinced the masses that there at last are political leaders who will not betray them into the hands of the landlords and money lenders (*Pacific Affairs*, March 1938, pp. 110-113).

Mr. MANDEL. Quoting again from *Pacific Affairs* of September 1937, page 247, in regard to Edgar Snow. He is called:

Edgar Snow—the first foreign newspaper correspondent to be given free access to the Red districts of China, spent 4 months in Soviet territory in 1936.

Mr. MORRIS. May that extract made by Mr. Mandel be incorporated into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 209" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 209

Edgar Snow—the first foreign newspaper correspondent to be given free access to the Red districts of China, spent 4 months in Soviet territory in 1936 (Pacific Affairs, September 1937, p. 247).

Mr. MANDEL. And finally a quotation from Pacific Affairs of September 1939 reviewing Inside Red China, by Nym Wales. The review is by Olga Lang:

It is curious how much of their good reputation abroad the Chinese Communists owe to one man—Edgar Snow * * * Nym Wales, as the wife of Edgar Snow, will inevitably have her work compared with that of her famous husband. * * * She is not impartial. She thoroughly approves of the Chinese Communists. * * * So she writes with gay excitement and eager partisanship.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that extract be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 210" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 210

INSIDE RED CHINA, BY NYM WALES

It is curious how much of their good reputation abroad the Chinese Communists owe to one man—Edgar Snow * * * Nym Wales, as the wife of Edgar Snow, will inevitably have her work compared with that of her famous husband. * * * She is not impartial. She thoroughly approves of the Chinese Communists. * * * So she writes with gay excitement and eager partisanship. (By O. L. (Olga Lang), Pacific Affairs, September 1939.)

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Mary Van Kleeck?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have known her personally as a Communist and known her for many years.

Mr. MORRIS. You met her under circumstances indicating that she was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. She is Mary Van Kleeck, of the Russell Sage Foundation; that is, she is an officer of the foundation. That doesn't indict the whole foundation.

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here on the stationery of the International Industrial Relations Institute, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated January 22, 1937, addressed to Frederick V. Field, signed Mary Van Kleeck.

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am very glad to become a member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I shall of course have a special interest in bringing about appropriate cooperation between the International Industrial Relations Institute and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter be introduced into the record to be marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

Mr. MORRIS. The purpose of that is to show Miss Van Kleeck's membership in the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 211" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 211

INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE,
New York, January 22, 1937.

MR. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
*Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.*

DEAR MR. FIELD: I am very glad to become a member of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I shall, of course, have a special interest in bringing about appropriate cooperation between the International Industrial Relations Institute and the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

MR. MANDEL. I have a letter dated May 2, 1933, to Mary Van Kleeck, signed Joseph Barnes:

DEAR MISS VAN KLEECK: I am very glad, indeed, to sign the statement concerning the Soviet Union which you have sent me. I am afraid that I am very optimistic as to the possibility of such good advice being followed by Mr. Roosevelt, but I am glad that you are at least seeing to it that the idea is expressed to him as forcefully as possible.

I am enclosing my small contribution to the expenses of the project.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that letter be introduced into the record to be marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 212" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 212

MAY 2, 1933.

MISS MARY VAN KLEECK,
*Russell Sage Foundation,
130 East Twenty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MISS VAN KLEECK: I am very glad, indeed, to sign the statement concerning the Soviet Union which you have sent me. I am afraid that I am very optimistic as to the possibility of such good advice being followed by Mr. Roosevelt, but I am glad that you are at least seeing to it that the idea is expressed to him as forcefully as possible.

I am enclosing my small contribution to the expenses of the project.

Very sincerely yours,

JOSEPH BARNES.

MR. MANDEL. Another letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations on the letter head marked "130 East Twenty-second Street, New York City," which is the Russell Sage Foundation where Miss Van Kleeck was employed, dated March 23, 1938, to Mr. E. C. Carter, signed Mary Van Kleeck.

DEAR MR. CARTER: You said that you wanted the manuscript of my radio speech of last night on the Moscow trials. I do not think that it can be of any real service to you, but I send it nevertheless by way of expressing my best wishes for your address tomorrow night. I hear that you are also giving a broadcast. I am sure that you will render fine service this week in the interest of a better understanding of this complicated situation.

With cordial greetings, I am,

Sincerely yours.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 213" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 213

130 EAST TWENTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, March 23, 1938.

MR. E. C. CARTER,
The Inquiry,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: You said that you wanted the manuscript of my radio speech of last night on the Moscow trials. I do not think that it can be of any real service to you, but I send it nevertheless by way of expressing my best wishes for your address tomorrow night. I hear that you are also giving a broadcast. I am sure that you will render fine service this week in the interest of a better understanding of this complicated situation.

With cordial greetings, I am

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

MR. MANDEL. On the same letterhead, dated April 20, 1938, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations addressed to Mr. E. C. Carter from Mary Van Kleeck.

The full text of Newton D. Baker's statement on the Moscow trials at the Fourth Annual Women's Congress in Chicago in March 1937 was published in the April 1937 issue of *Soviet Russia Today*.

I am mindful of your request for a list of liberals present at the dinner with Mr. Troyanovsky and I shall send it as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, let me tell you how much I enjoyed your review of *Red Star Over China*. It seems to me a very fair appraisal and criticism of the book.

Have you seen the *Labor Monthly* published in London? The current issue is called the *Crisis Issue* and the comment on the Moscow trials is very interesting. Incidentally it supports essentially my remarks in the broadcast, a fact which I am glad to report to Pacific Affairs.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 214" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 214

NEW YORK CITY, April 20, 1938.

MR. E. C. CARTER,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York.

DEAR MR. CARTER: The full text of Newton D. Baker's statement on the Moscow trials at the Fourth Annual Women's Congress in Chicago in March 1937 was published in the April 1937 issue of *Soviet Russia Today*.

I am mindful of your request for a list of liberals present at the dinner with Mr. Troyanovsky and I shall send it as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, let me tell you how much I enjoyed your review of *Red Star Over China*. It seems to me a very fair appraisal and criticism of the book.

Have you seen the *labor monthly* published in London? The current issue is called the *Crisis Issue* and the comment on the Moscow trials is very interesting. Incidentally, it supports essentially my remarks in the broadcast—a fact which I am glad to report to Pacific Affairs.

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

MR. MANDEL. On the same letterhead dated May 26, 1938, to E. C. Carter from Mary Van Kleeck:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Will you be one of a group of 10 or 12 of different related professions to cooperate in giving a dinner on Tuesday, May 31, to Deputy Commissioner Vassily Bourghman, who is now in this country arranging plans

for the Soviet pavilion at the New York World's Fair? Mr. Bourgman sails Wednesday morning, so the plans are being hurriedly made. We shall also invite as our guest Mr. Constantin Oumansky, counsel of the Soviet Embassy.

* * * * *

The dinner will be at 7 o'clock, at the Cosmopolitan Club, 122 East Sixty-sixth Street * * *.

I have read excerpts from the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced in the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 215" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 215

NEW YORK CITY, May 26, 1938.

Mr. E. C. CARTER,

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York, N. Y.*

DEAR MR. CARTER: Will you be one of a group of 10 or 12 of different related professions to cooperate in giving a dinner on Tuesday, May 31, to Deputy Commissioner Vassily Bourgman, who is now in this country arranging plans for the Soviet pavilion at the New York World's Fair? Mr. Bourgman sails Wednesday morning, so the plans are being hurriedly made. We shall also invite as our guest Mr. Constantin Oumansky, counsel of the Soviet Embassy.

The suggestion for this plan has been made to me by Mr. Simon Breines, who is associated in the architectural planning of the building. He and I believe it is not too early to begin to plan the exhibits. Suggestions from American friends on this point will be welcome. The building will undoubtedly be a central point of interest for visitors, as was the Soviet building at the Paris exposition.

The dinner will be at 7 o'clock at the Cosmopolitan Club, 122 East Sixty-sixth Street, where a room will be reserved in my name as a member. The cost for each member of the group of hosts will be \$2.75.

As the time is short, I should greatly appreciate your telephoning or telegraphing your response tomorrow, Friday, to me at my office at the above address (GRamercy 5-7060).

Sincerely yours,

MARY VAN KLEECK.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Vilhjalmur Stefansson?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know from official reports that he is a Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was a member of many Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is where much of the discussion around him centers. He was a member of so many, I think the word countless can be used without exaggeration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if the interruption may be permitted, the name that you are discussing is not a common one, but would it be improper to identify the particular Stefansson to whom you now refer?

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Vilhjalmur, V-i-l-h-j-a-l-m-u-r, Stefansson, S-t-e-f-a-n-s-s-o-n.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the first name m-u-r or m-a-l?

Mr. MANDEL. m-u-r.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you continue, Mr. Budenz.

Mr. BUDENZ. He has been very much interested in the Arctic. In fact, his latest book on geopolitics, on the Arctic, with contributions by Mr. Lattimore to it, shows, although in a very involved and I should say semischolarly way, that Soviet Russia is impregnable because it has control of the heartland.

Mr. MORRIS. Is he an explorer, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir; he has been an explorer.

Mr. MORRIS. You are testifying that party discussions indicated that he was on many Communist-front organizations?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very many indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. Is it your testimony that in addition to being a member of many Communist-front organizations, he was also a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct. It was on the occasion of the Communist fronts precisely that I recall his association being officially brought to my attention.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you put into the record letters that will indicate Mr. Stefansson's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I have a letter here dated January 26, 1939, addressed to Philip J. Jaffe from Edward C. Carter, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR JAFFE: This is to express the hope that you and Mrs. Jaffe will attend the opening of the Arctic exhibition at the Natural History Museum on Sunday, February 5, at 3:30 p. m., under the auspices of the American Russian Institute. Stefansson, the great explorer, and Oumansky will both speak. The exhibit is on a very important subject. I will send you the details later.

Oumansky, by the way, is the Russian Ambassador.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 216" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 216

NEW YORK, N. Y., *January 26, 1939.*

PHILIP J. JAFFE, Esq.,

49 East Ninth Street, New York, N. Y.

DEAR JAFFE: This is to express the hope that you and Mrs. Jaffe will attend the opening of an Arctic exhibition at the Natural History Museum on Sunday, February 5, at 3:30 p. m., under the auspices of the American Russian Institute. Stefansson, the great explorer, and Oumansky will both speak. The exhibit is on a very important subject. I will send you the details later.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a memo dated April 2, 1940, presumably Frederick V. Field, from ECC, presumably E. C. Carter. This memo says:

I have just had word from Cripps—

that would be the British Foreign Minister—

that he will accept my invitation for dinner on the evening of Thursday the 11th.

Then there is listed those who are invited, presumably the IPR, and among those is the name of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, along with Frederick V. Field and others.

Senator SMITH. Will you state where that came from?

Mr. MANDEL. From the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 217" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 217

APRIL 2, 1940.

F. V. F. from E. C. C.

I have just had word from Cripps that he will accept my invitation for dinner on the evening of Thursday the 11th. This takes the place of the dinner to which I had invited you for this week. I hope you can come.

Before I send out all of the invitations that I would like to, I wish you would glance through the list below and let me know what four or five people had better be eliminated and what four or five people are important to add from the American Council point of view.

The private room at the Gladstone only holds 20 at the outside and I had rather thought that a meeting of more than 20 might inhibit complete candor on Cripps' part.

Frederick V. Field, yes.

P. E. Corbett, yes.

W. W. Lockwood, yes.

W. B. Osgood Field, Jr.

Philip C. Jessup, no.

Joe Barnes, no.

Harriet Moore, yes.

Mrs. Eliot Pratt, no.

Vilhjalmur Stefansson, yes.

Rose Rubin

Rose Somerville

Robert S. Lynd

Win. W. Lancaster

Ruth Carter, yes.

Jack Shepherd, yes.

Kathleen Barnes, yes.

Robert W. Barnett, yes.

Ch'ao-ting Chi, yes.

Andrew Grajdanzev.

Edward C. Carter, yes.

Sir Stafford Cripps, yes.

Rossinger, yes.

T. A. Bisson, no.

Harry Price, yes.

Luther Tucker, no.

Sam Harper, no.

John Hazard.

W. D. C.

Faymonville, yes.

Geoffrey Wilson, ?.

McCann, no.

Muhle, yes.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally I have a letter taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations dated March 14, 1938, addressed to Mr. Frederick V. Field, from Edward C. Carter, as follows:

DEAR FRED: I have accepted Corliss Lamont's invitation to speak at the Hippodrome on the evening of Thursday, March 24, on the Soviet Union and present world events. The other speakers will be Troyanovsky and Stefansson. I am wondering whether there are any points that you would like me to make on behalf of the American Council. The meeting is held under the auspices of an ad hoc committee of which Corliss Lamont is chairman.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that an ad hoc committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. I believe it would be an ad hoc committee of the American Council of the Soviet-American Friendship.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 218" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 218

NEW YORK CITY, March 14, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,
San Francisco.

DEAR FRED: I have accepted Corliss Lamont's invitation to speak at the Hippodrome on the evening of Thursday, March 24, on the Soviet Union and present world events. The other speakers will be Troyanovsky and Stefansson. I am wondering whether there are any points that you would like me to make on behalf of the American Council. The meeting is held under the auspices of an ad hoc committee of which Corliss Lamont is chairman.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Anna Louise Strong?

Mr. BUDENZ. I knew her very well indeed for a number of years.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Always she was during my membership in the party.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a long and trusted member of the party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Very much so; engaged in the confidential work for the Communist International. That was told me by J. Peters and many others.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you any letters indicating that Anna Louise Strong was associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MANDEL. Her book is reviewed entitled "This Soviet World," in *Pacific Affairs* for December 1936, on pages 611 to 612. She has an article in *Pacific Affairs* for June 1941, on page 11, entitled "Eighth Route Regions in North China," and also an article "Dawn Out of China," appearing in *Pacific Affairs* for September 1949, on page 454.

Here is also an excerpt from *Pacific Affairs* for December 1936 appearing on pages 611 and 612 in the review of this *Soviet World* by Anna Louise Strong, the review being written by Owen Lattimore, and I quote:

Her book as a whole is good confrontation of the Soviet ideas of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of regimentation.

Mr. MORRIS. May those references of Mr. Mandel be incorporated? Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 219" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 219

ANNA LOUISE STRONG

Strong, Anna Louise, *This Soviet World*, 611-612, reviewed.

Source: Volume 9, December 1936, *Pacific Affairs* (p. 14).

Strong, Anna Louise, *Eighth Route Regions in North China*, 154-165, article.

Source: Volume 14, June 1941, *Pacific Affairs* (p. 11).

Strong, A. L., *Dawn Out of China*, 302.

Source: *Pacific Affairs*, Volume 22, September 1949 (p. 454).

This Soviet World, by ANNA LOUISE STRONG

(Reviewed by Owen Lattimore, p. 611-612)

"Her book as a whole is a good confrontation of the Soviet idea of democracy, originality and individuality, and the foreign idea of regimentation" (*Pacific Affairs*, December 1936).

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Ella Winter, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know of her by official declarations.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know she is a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Oh, yes, repeatedly and over my entire period of membership. She was a very active Communist.

Mr. MORRIS. Is her membership in the Communist Party rather an open fact?

Mr. BUDENZ. I think it must be open. Many people know it.

Mr. SOURWINE. When you say repeatedly, Mr. Budenz, you don't mean she was repeatedly a member. You mean that you repeatedly heard references to her within the party.

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right, and official references. She was quite active and reports of hers or reference to her work on the west coast

and in other places came to the attention of the national headquarters repeatedly.

Mr. MANDEL. Ella Winter is the author of a book review appearing in *Pacific Affairs* in 1934, pages 473 and 474. In the March 1935 issue of *Pacific Affairs*, on page 87, we find the following quote in reference to Ella Winter, and her article *What Next in California*. And it says she speaks of the hard-hitting and hard-fighting minority that heads the workers' fight in California, the Communist Party."

Then we have some letters here. One is a letter dated February 8, 1935, to Mrs. Ella Winter from Catherine Porter, who has been previously identified as a member of the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DEAR MRS. WINTER: Thank you for your note of the 24th. Your editorial was received in ample time after all. The March issue of the magazine is now in the press and you will receive your copy shortly.

Enclosed is our check for \$25 in payment for the editorial.

I am somewhat embarrassed about the book review, especially since I see that Joe Barnes was quite indefinite about the matter in his letter of September 24. As a matter of fact, we do not pay for book reviews, and this has always been made quite clear to our reviewers * * *.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may this and the reviews mentioned by Mr. Mandel by Ella Winter be incorporated into the record?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 220 and 221" and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 220

ELLA WINTER

Articles in *Pacific Affairs*: Book review, 1934, pages 473-474.

Ella Winter, *What Next in California*, speaks of "the hard-fighting and hard-hitting minority that heads the workers' fight in California, the Communist Party" (*Pacific Affairs*, p. 87, March 1935).

EXHIBIT No. 221

FEBRUARY 8, 1935.

Mrs. ELLA WINTER,
Box 855, Carmel, Calif.

DEAR MRS. WINTER: Thank you for your note of the 24th. Your editorial was received in ample time after all. The March issue of the magazine is now in the press and you will receive your copy shortly.

Enclosed is our check for \$25 in payment for the editorial.

I am somewhat embarrassed about the book review, especially since I see that Joe Barnes was quite indefinite about the matter in his letter of September 24. As a matter of fact, we do not pay for book reviews, and this has always been made quite clear to our reviewers. Ordinarily editorials are not paid for, either, but Mr. Lattimore made a special exception in your case as he was very anxious to have that subject treated by you. I am more than sorry that the question of fee for book reviews was not made clear to you earlier.

Sincerely yours,

CATHERINE PORTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Finally, I have a list of articles by Ella Winter which appeared in the *Daily Worker* with the dates and pages which I would like to introduce into the record.

Mr. MORRIS. And the purpose of this is to show that Ella Winter contributed to the *Daily Worker* and was at the same time a contributor to the Institute of Pacific Relations? Is that the purpose of that, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you accept that into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 122" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 222

ELLA WINTER

Following is a list of contributions to the Communist publication, the Daily Worker, and the Worker, by Ella Winter:

Worker. (See Daily Worker for December 24, 1931, p. 3).

Daily Worker. (See issue of June 25, 1934, p. 5, col. 1).

Worker. (See Daily Worker December 21, 1935, p. 3).

Daily Worker. (See issue of March 6, 1936, p. 5).

Daily Worker. (See issue of August 12, 1936, p. 1).

Daily Worker. (See issue of February 12, 1937, p. 2).

Daily Worker. (See issue of October 3, 1947, p. 6).

Daily Worker. (See issue of October 2, 1947, p. 6).

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record to show that when we had a discussion this morning about certain policies represented by the Daily Worker as being the policy of the United States State Department issued by Sumner Welles, we have nothing at this time to show what the State Department's official attitude was at that time. I suggest that we set in motion an inquiry to find out exactly what the situation was so that the record will be complete in that respect.

Senator SMITH. So that the record may carry a copy of whatever statement was made by Mr. Welles at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes. In other words, I think the record should have the official statement.

Senator SMITH. I think so, too. We will follow up on that.

Mr. SOURWINE. In expanding on that, in fairness to the State Department might it be well if the committee requested the Department for a brief statement of what the Department's official policy was at that particular time and permit it to be entered in the record?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. May the order be made for entry of it at the point where reference was made in this morning's hearing?

Senator SMITH. Yes. It would seem to me that the statement which was printed in the Daily Worker, if that is called to the attention of the State Department, they can say whether or not they issued such a statement as was attributed to Mr. Welles. They either know or don't know whether or not such a statement was issued.

Mr. MORRIS. Our record has nothing to show that.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce at this time for the following probative value, letters from the Institute of Pacific Relations files by and concerning Sumner Welles. The purpose of introducing these letters is to show the degree of influence that the Institute of Pacific Relations was able to bear on Sumner Welles, who was for a period of time Under Secretary of State. I wonder if you will receive those letters into evidence at this time.

Senator SMITH. Not for the purpose—

Mr. MORRIS. For that particular purpose.

Senator SMITH. For that particular purpose only, yes.

Mr. MANDEL. I have here a letter dated October 21, 1946, addressed to R. M. Fowler, 2279 Sun Life Building, Montreal, Canada, from Edward C. Carter.

Senator SMITH. Where was that found?

Mr. MANDEL. Found in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I quote an excerpt from that letter:

DEAR BOB: I understand that Mr. Sumner Welles is going to be your guest shortly. As you know, he is really a very great man and a terrible loss to the United States State Department. You ought to know that consistently throughout the last 10 years whenever I have gone to Welles with any request on behalf of the IPR he has instantaneously and generously responded—cutting red tape—speeding the IPR on its way. He has always professed sincere admiration for the work of the IPR. A few months ago, he accepted the chairmanship of the Washington group of the IPR on the understanding that he couldn't give time actively for several months so we have not been making demands on him, but expect his help at a few key points during the coming winter. I am sure he will have greatly enjoyed his Canadian trip.

That is an excerpt from the letter.

Senator SMITH. What is the date?

Mr. MORRIS. October 21, 1946. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record for the stipulated purpose that I have indicated?

Senator SMITH. Yes. Have you identified the file?

Mr. MORRIS. It is significant, Senator. We want it introduced for that particular purpose, which I think is apparent from reading that letter.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 223" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 223

OCTOBER 21, 1946.

R. M. FOWLER, ESQ.,
2279 Sun Life Building,
Montreal, Canada.

DEAR BOB: I understand that Mr. Sumner Welles is going to be your guest shortly. As you know, he is really a very great man and a terrible loss to the United States State Department. You ought to know that consistently throughout the last 10 years whenever I have gone to Welles with any request on behalf of the IPR he has instantaneously and generously responded—cutting red tape—speeding the IPR on its way. He has always professed sincere admiration for the work of the IPR. A few months ago, he accepted the chairmanship of the Washington group of the IPR on the understanding that he couldn't give time actively for several months so we have not been making demands on him, but expect his help at a few key points during the coming winter. I am sure he will have greatly enjoyed his Canadian trip.

If it is natural for you to do so, I hope you will draw him out a bit on the IPR—remind him that the Canadian Institute is the very honored Canadian section of the IPR and, if you get any reaction that would be helpful to me, be sure and let me know.

It would do no harm for you to place on one of your tables in your library at home in Montreal a copy of *Windows on the Pacific* and IPR books which I am mailing to you today under separate cover.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter date June 6, 1946 to The Honorable Sumner Welles, from Edward C. Carter, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I read the last paragraph:

I was greatly intrigued by Walter Lippman's suggestion this morning that you become the American delegate on the Security Council. This would certainly be a great step forward and I hope Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes will so regard

it. Although my own personal preference would be to see you serving as Secretary of State, perhaps this is too ideal a solution to hope for.

Mr. MORRIS. May we introduce that into the record, and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 224" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 224

JUNE 6, 1946.

The Honorable SUMNER WELLES,

P. O. Box 4669, Anacostia Station, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. WELLES: Would there be any chance of your having half an hour free when Mr. Pollard and I could call on you at Oxon Hill any time on Tuesday, June 11, before 3:30 p. m.? I have to be at Mr. Justice Black's at 4 p. m. and then go to the station to take the train for Detroit. But any time in the morning or early afternoon would be convenient for me and Mr. Pollard.

Lord Inverchapel has asked that the dinner which we wanted to give him be postponed until the autumn. He apparently wants to get acclimatized before doing much speaking.

As example is frequently more persuasive than exhortation, I am wondering whether you would be able to consider making a contribution of \$1,500 this year to the over-all national budget of the American Council of \$250,000. Such a gift would carry great weight with others, both nationally and in the Washington area, and would be of great material aid in our plans for a more adequate service in Washington.

I was greatly intrigued by Walter Lippmann's suggestion this morning that you become the American delegate on the Security Council. This would certainly be a great step forward and I hope Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes will so regard it. Although my own personal preference would be to see you serving as Secretary of State, perhaps this is too ideal a solution to hope for.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated March 15, 1946, addressed to the Honorable Sumner Welles from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MR. WELLES: This is to inquire the approximate date of your return to Washington. A few days after your return I would like to call to see you when you might conveniently spare an hour for an unhurried talk regarding IPR problems and policies. Demands on the IPR are steadily increasing, and we want sound advice as to which of the many calls are more important.

That is signed by Edward C. Carter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 225" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 225

MARCH 15, 1946.

The Honorable SUMNER WELLES,

250 Via Bellaria, West Palm Beach, Fla.

DEAR MR. WELLES: This is to inquire the approximate date of your return to Washington. A few days after your return I would like to call to see you when you might conveniently spare an hour for an unhurried talk regarding IPR problems and policies. Demands on the IPR are steadily increasing and we want sound advice as to which of the many calls are most important.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter on the stationery of Sumner Welles dated April 22, 1946, to Mr. Carter, and signed by Sumner Welles:

DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of April 19. Your letter of April 8, of which you have been kind enough to enclose a copy, crossed my most

recent letter to you in the mails. The information you send me with regard to the selection of a vice chairman of the Washington group is of course most agreeable to me. I do not know Mr. Graves personally, but I shall needless to say be delighted to be associated with him.

With kind regards, believe me, sincerely yours.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I introduce that into the record and ask to have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit.

Senator SMITH. Where was this found?

Mr. MANDEL. That is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 226" and is as follows:)

OXON HILL MANOR, OXON HILL, MD.,
April 22, 1946.

EDWARD C. CARTER, ESQ.,
Director, American Council,
Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc.,
1 East Fifty-fourth Street,
New York, N. Y.

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: Thank you for your letter of April 19.

Your letter of April 8, of which you have been kind enough to enclose a copy, crossed my most recent letter to you in the mails.

The information you send me with regard to the selection of the vice chairman of the Washington group is, of course, most agreeable to me. I do not know Mr. Graves personally, but I shall, needless to say, be delighted to be associated with him.

With my kind regards, believe me

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated June 30, 1942, addressed to Mr. Harold Young, Assistant to the Vice President, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C., from Edward C. Carter.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: This is to thank you for your letter of June 11, asking whether I could call to see you next time I visit Washington.

I am planning to be there all day Thursday, July 2, and would appreciate the privilege of talking with you. I am relatively free all day except that I am tied up from 12:30 to 1 with an engagement with Mr. Welles.

Ultimately I am anxious to talk about our proposed IPR conference with Mr. Wallace, but I can do this on some other visit after you and I have had our preliminary talk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

By way of explanation, Mr. Young was Mr. Wallace's secretary.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into the record and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. Is he referring there to Mr. Henry Wallace?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes.

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 227," and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 227

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York City, June 30, 1942.

MR. HAROLD YOUNG,
Assistant to the Vice President,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. YOUNG: This is to thank you for your letter of June 11, asking whether I could call to see you next time I visit Washington.

I am planning to be there all day Thursday, July 2, and would appreciate the privilege of talking with you. I am relatively free all day except that I am tied up from 12:30 to 1 with an engagement with Mr. Welles.

Ultimately I am anxious to talk about our proposed IPR conference with Mr. Wallace, but I can do this on some other visit after you and I have had our preliminary talk.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a letter dated June 29, 1938, addressed to Frederick V. Field. The letter is unsigned. It is taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The letter reads as follows:

DEAR FRED: Upon advancing into Carter's office, your June 23 letter in hand, I was confronted with his air-mail letter to you of June 27, enclosing the letter to John Thompson. There is nothing more to add at the moment, though I know that Carter is keeping in touch with Welles and Duggan in the State Department and with any other contacts and suggestions that he can find, and would welcome any specific suggestions you might make as to how the Pacific Council could explore the possibilities more thoroughly. At present it appears that any contacts we might develop in that part of the world would have to be through individuals, as unofficial organizations in the field of foreign affairs seem to be nonexistent. Could you let us know exactly what the members of the American Council to which you refer would propose doing?

The rest is a comment I don't think it necessary to read.

Mr. SOURWINE. You spoke of that as a letter. As a matter of fact, it is a carbon copy of a letter; is it not?

Mr. MANDEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. The original letter may well have been signed and, for all you know, was signed; is that correct?

Mr. MANDEL. So it would appear.

Mr. SOURWINE. You do not know whether the original letter was sent?

Mr. MANDEL. I do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I note that the address on the letter is 129 East Fifty-second Street, which is the address of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Will you receive that into evidence, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 228" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 228

129 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET,
New York, June 29, 1938.

Mr. FREDERICK V. FIELD,

1795 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR FRED: Upon advancing into Carter's office, your June 23 letter in hand, I was confronted with his air-mail letter to you of June 27 enclosing the letter to John Thompson. There is nothing more to add at the moment, though I know that Carter is keeping in touch with Welles and Duggan in the State Department and with any other contacts and suggestions that he can find, and would welcome any specific suggestions you might make as to how the Pacific Council could explore the possibilities more thoroughly. At present it appears that any contacts we might develop in that part of the world would have to be through individuals, as unofficial organizations in the field of foreign affairs seem to be nonexistent. Could you let us know exactly what the members of the American Council to which you refer would propose doing?

With reference to your query about Saionji you will have already seen in Carter's long letter to Alsberg that he had invited Saionji to come over. We have now heard that it will be impossible for him to come, but that Takayanagi

will be coming in July to discuss the various problems raised for the Japanese Council by the secretariat inquiry. Carter will be writing you in detail about this point, so I won't elaborate.

I delivered the Bretholtz family, bag and baggage, at 24 West Fifty-fifth this morning. They are extremely pleased to be there, and we are planning to drink a suitable toast to the absentee landlord on Friday evening.

My regards to Edith and Lila and Gail.

As ever,

MR. MANDEL. I have here a letter, a carbon of a letter, from the Department of State, dated March 17, 1942. It comes from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, and signed by Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary, and attached is a small slip which says: "Please note that this is not to be published," with the initials "ECC" presumably E. C. Carter. This is the letter:

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: I have your letter of March 11, 1942, in which you inquire with regard to the practical value of the publications and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The receipt is also acknowledged of similar letters addressed to other officers of the Department.

The importance of the development of an informed public opinion with regard to problems affecting foreign relations requires no special emphasis. In the development of such a public opinion, a valuable service is rendered by organizations which seek to present in readily accessible form studies by serious scholars of current problems and to stimulate an intelligent discussion of these problems. While for obvious reasons the Department of State has necessarily adopted the practice of refraining from endorsing or sponsoring any particular private organization, I am glad to say that in the opinion of officers of the Department who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of the institute have been of interest and value, and the institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion.

I note and appreciate your statement that you propose not to use this letter publicly.

MR. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that and mark it as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 229" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 229

Please note that this is not to be published—E. C. C. [Typewritten note attached to letter.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D. C., March 17, 1942.

MR. EDWARD CARTER.

*Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street, New York, N. Y.*

MY DEAR MR. CARTER: I have your letter of March 11, 1942, in which you inquire with regard to the practical value of the publications and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The importance of the development of an informed public opinion with regard to problems affecting foreign relations requires no special emphasis. In the development of such a public opinion, a valuable service is rendered by organizations which seek to present in readily accessible form studies by serious scholars of current problems and to stimulate an intelligent discussion of these problems. While for obvious reasons the Department of State has necessarily adopted the practice of refraining from endorsing or sponsoring any particular private organization, I am glad to say that, in the opinion of officers of the Department who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of the institute have been of interest and

value, and the institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion.

I note and appreciate your statement that you propose not to use this letter publicly.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES,
Acting Secretary.

Mr. MANDEL. Next is a photostat of a letter on the stationery of the Department of State, dated July 2, 1940. This photostat was made at my direction from the document in the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It is addressed to Mr. Edward C. Carter, signed Sumner Welles, Under Secretary.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Please accept my thanks for your courtesy in sending me, with your letter of June 28, 1940, a first draft of Mr. Lattimore's article "Empire Lies in the East." I have noted with interest the contents of the article and am bringing it to the attention of some of my associates here for their information."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, will you accept that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 230" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 230

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 2, 1940.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,

Secretary-General, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, N. Y.

DEAR MR. CARTER: Please accept my thanks for your courtesy in sending me with your letter of June 28, 1940, a first draft of Mr. Lattimore's article, "Empire Lies in the East."

I have noted with interest the contents of the article and am bringing it to the attention of some of my associates here for their information.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES, *Under Secretary.*

Mr. MANDEL. The next is a letter, a copy of a letter from Harper & Bros., dated July 31, 1946, from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, addressed to Mr. Carter, E. C. Carter:

As I phoned your office today, we are to publish this fall a book by Sumner Welles to be entitled "Where Are We Heading?" which will deal with various aspects of the present international scene.

The book is to contain a few maps, one of which is to be a map of China showing the areas controlled by the National and Communist Governments. When we asked Mr. Welles for further details in this connection, which we could turn over to the professional map men, he replied, "I would suggest that the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, might be the best authority on the second map (that of China) and I have no doubt that Mr. Carter will take a personal interest in giving us all the help needed."

That is an excerpt from the letter.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce this into the record, again for the same limited purpose?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

Mr. MORRIS. May it be marked the next consecutive exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 231" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 231

HARPER & BROS.,
New York, N. Y., July 31, 1946.

Mr. EDWARD C. CARTER,
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations,
New York City.

DEAR MR. CARTER: AS I phoned your office today, we are to publish this fall a book by Sumner Welles to be entitled "Where Are We Heading?" which will deal with various aspects of the present international scene.

The book is to contain a few maps, one of which is to be a map of China showing the areas controlled by the National and Communist Governments. When we asked Mr. Welles for further details in this connection, which we could turn over to the professional map man, he replied, "I would suggest that the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, might be the best authority on the second map (that of China) and I have no doubt that Mr. Carter will take a personal interest in giving us all the help needed."

Any information which you or your organization can give us will be greatly appreciated. You may think it wise to use shading to indicate not only the known controlled areas, but also disputed areas or regions where the boundaries are now in doubt.

We shall look forward to hearing from you in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

BEULAH HAGEN,
Assistant to Cass Canfield.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter to Miss Beulah Hagen, of Harper Bros., taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, dated August 1, 1946, from Edward C. Carter:

DEAR MISS HAGEN: Your letter of July 31 reached me this morning with Mr. Sumner Welles' suggestion that we cooperate in supplying your map maker with data showing the areas of China controlled by the Nationalist and Communist Governments. This is to assure you that we will do our best to give you the expert help Mr. Welles and you desire. It is somewhat of a tricky business because some of the marginal areas are in a constant state of flux.

Those of my colleagues who have the most precise data happen to be away from the office this week, but if you can wait until next week I think we can be of assistance.

Perhaps you will want to send up your map maker with such material as he already has, and then we can tackle the problem together.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce that into evidence and have it marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 232" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 232

AUGUST 1, 1946.

Miss BEULAH HAGEN,
Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS HAGEN: Your letter of July 31 reached me this morning with Mr. Sumner Welles' suggestion that we cooperate in supplying your map maker with data showing the areas of China controlled by the Nationalist and Communist Governments. This is to assure you that we will do our best to give you the expert help Mr. Welles and you desire. It is somewhat of a tricky business because some of the marginal areas are in a constant state of flux.

Those of my colleagues who have the most precise data happen to be away from the office this week, but if you can wait until next week I think we can be of assistance.

Perhaps you will want to send up your map maker with such material as he already has, and then we can tackle the problem together.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. The next letter that Mr. Mandel is about to read I think will give significance to the last two, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MANDEL. This is a letter dated August 6, 1946, to Miss Beulah Hagan, taken from the files of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and I read the next to the last paragraph.

Mr. MORRIS. Who wrote this letter, Mr. Mandel?

Mr. MANDEL. This is from Edward C. Carter to Miss Beulah Hagan, of Harper Bros.

Whether you will want to adopt our consultant's broader phrase for the Communists by calling the area Communist-Democrats is up to you and Mr. Welles. It has this advantage: that it gives cognizance to the fact that in many areas the sympathizers with the third party—the Democratic League—are working hard to bring about a coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, doesn't that further show something else? Would you read the preceding paragraph, too?

Mr. MANDEL (reading:)

I think you can improve on the designation of the Times map by using the word "Kuomintang" at the top and the bottom in place of "Nationalists."

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, the idea there was to make the recommendation that the "Nationalists" be changed to "Kuomintang" and the term "Communists" be changed to "Communist-Democrats."

Do you have any comment to make on that, Mr. Budenz?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have not, except I think it speaks for itself.

Mr. MORRIS. May that be introduced into the record and marked as the next consecutive exhibit?

Senator SMITH. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 233" and is as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 233

AUGUST 6, 1946.

MISS BEULAH HAGEN,
Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y.

DEAR MISS HAGEN: My third consultant has just brought in this copy of the New York Times map of Sunday, July 28, with a few changes in ink.

He thinks that this is about as nearly accurate as you can get from this distance.

He has located Changchun, which I incorrectly on the phone this morning, thought the Times had put in the Communist area. But this is not the case.

The name "Changchun" at the spot indicated should certainly be included in Mr. Welles' map.

Then it is rather important to add to the map "Kalgan" and to show the cross-country railroad which my consultant has put in in pen.

I think you can improve on the designation of the Times map by using the word "Kuomintang" at the top and the bottom in place of "Nationalists."

Whether you will want to adopt our consultant's broader phrase for the Communists by calling the area Communist-Democrats is up to you and Mr. Welles. It has this advantage: that it gives cognizance to the fact that in many areas the sympathizers with the third party—the Democratic League—are working hard to bring about a coalition between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

If I get any further details I will let you know.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD C. CARTER.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz, do you know Ilona Ralf Sues?

Mr. BUDENZ. I do. I know her personally.

Mr. MORRIS. Was she a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. She was a member of the Communist Party who, under Communist orders, entered the home of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. MORRIS. Entered the home of Chiang Kai-shek?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. She was a friend or attendant or secretary or something of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, if I remember correctly. At any rate she had very close relationships with Chiang Kai-shek. When I say "entered the home," I don't necessarily mean she lived there, though my impression is that she did.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean she had access to the family circle?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. You knew her to be a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. I have met her personally as a member of the Communist Party and I have talked to her at some length about her experiences.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know that she wrote *Shark Fins and Millet*?

Mr. BUDENZ. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, have you available now—

Mr. MANDEL. Not now.

Mr. MORRIS. May we submit the information on Miss Ilona Ralf Sues later in the record?

Do you know Andrew Steiger?

Mr. BUDENZ. I know him through official words in the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know he was a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes. According to my memory he wrote a number of pro-Communist articles some years ago. I mean for the *Daily Worker*. That is my remembrance.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Budenz can testify more extensively along the lines that we are pursuing today, but we would like to develop our research a bit to keep pace with that, and we ask that Mr. Budenz, after a few final questions, be permitted to leave but stay under subpoena for a short period of time.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Morris, if you are going to stop at this time asking Mr. Budenz questions about the names of persons, I would like to inquire. Mr. Budenz has now testified on 2 days with respect to a number of names. Do you know how many of the persons who have been established as associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations Mr. Budenz has now identified as Communists?

Mr. MORRIS. My count runs to 43, Mr. Sourwine.

Mr. SOURWINE. Including the last name that was identified today?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were all of those names included in the list that was made a part of the record earlier, of persons who had connections with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Mr. MORRIS. No; there are some additions. There are some we did not have on the original list of 82.

Mr. SOURWINE. That were brought out by Mr. Budenz yesterday or today for the first time?

Mr. MORRIS. That is right, Mr. Sourwine. One other thing, Mr. Budenz. One of the Senators asked me if you would expatiate just a bit on the official Communist policy adopted in official meetings of the Communist Party to bring about the conquest of China. One of the members of the committee asked if you would further develop that.

Mr. BUDENZ. Of course the Communist Party changed its tactics and

also its propaganda in accordance with the instructions from Moscow. If I had known this question was going to be asked, I could have brought you exactly the period by dates, but from my memory I don't want to be too exact. Originally the Communists in China were represented as extreme revolutionists. They were establishing soviets. At the same time, though, China occupied in Communist activities and propaganda a very prominent part always. From the very beginning of my entry into the party China was considered to be a key to world conquest. This is borne out by the constant emphasis of the Communist Party itself in demonstrations and in the publications on that score.

Now, as time went forward, particularly with the Communist Party in the United States, under the people's front policy, developing infiltration, and becoming more powerful in its influence in the country through its various agents, the policy in regard to China likewise was given a new twist, and as we see, the effort was to promote the idea of the Chinese Communists being a democratic force.

This was contrary to the previous propaganda.

After that, there was developed a coalition government, and this began, of course, in 1943, but it takes some time for a line to develop. It came to fruition in 1944 and 1945. And after I left the party, the idea of coalition government was stressed very emphatically as a task put upon the American Communist Party to win the United States to the idea of coalition government in China.

It was pointed out that this was an application of the constant Communist tactic of the united front, whereby you united with those who wished to destroy. This coalition government was to be applied not only in China but in Poland and the eastern European states and was to be popularized in the United States. We were particularly to stress it, though, in regard to China, in order to bring about a Red China, as Earl Browder said in speaking to the national committee as early as the latter part of 1943, and again in 1944. The task given to the American party by Moscow was to so condition American opinion and the American Government as to assure a Red Poland and a Red China at that particular time, this under the banner of coalition government.

Senator WATKINS. How did they react to General Marshall's appointment as Ambassador to succeed Patrick Hurley?

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, may I say that that point came up this morning.

Mr. Budenz left the Communist Party in 1945, and I think at that time General Marshall had not assumed the position of Secretary of State.

Mr. BUDENZ. General Hurley had not yet resigned?

Senator WATKINS. In other words, the witness does not know how they officially reacted to it.

Mr. BUDENZ. I do not, except from reading the Daily Worker, and I could not inform you on that offhand.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Budenz would like to restrict his testimony, and we are asking him to, to only those incidents that took place during the period of his membership in the Communist Party.

Mr. Budenz, will you supplement the testimony you have just given, namely, that the coalition government was the official Communist

Party policy, by going through your personal records and sending to the committee whatever additional documents you can give along those lines?

Mr. BUDENZ. I shall, very gladly.

Mr. MORRIS. And Mr. Sourwine, when you asked the question before about how many people were identified, I want to stress that that number did not include incidental names that turned up in the course of testimony that were not directly related to the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One name I had in mind is Louis Dolivet.

Mr. SOURWINE. I meant to inquire with regard to names that you had posed to Mr. Budenz for purposes of identification.

Mr. MORRIS. My figure includes only those who were associated directly with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

And Mr. Budenz, will you remain available to this committee, so that we can get these last bits of testimony straightened out?

Mr. BUDENZ. Yes, sir.

I would like to put on the record here in that respect, so that it won't be forgotten by me or the committee, that among these documents will be a statement by the Chinese Communist Party to the Communists, that while the Communists were to the outer world advocating coalition government, the Chinese Communists were telling the Communists of the world that they were for coalition government in order to destroy Chiang Kai-shek and impair American imperialism.

Senator SMITH. The hearing will recess now until further call of the chairman as to when the next meeting will be held.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p. m., Thursday, August 23, 1951, the hearing was recessed subject to the call of the chairman.)

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.)

A	Page
ABC stabilization fund.....	481
Acheson, Dean.....	428, 444, 445, 494, 639
Ackerman, Dr. Phyllis.....	410, 620, 622
Adams, Samuel.....	548
Adler, Solomon (Schloma).....	420, 434, 493
Administrator of Export Control.....	390
AFL. (See American Federation of Labor.)	
Agriculture Department.....	419, 432, 464, 477, 488, 577
Air Force (United States).....	597
Akiyama.....	369
Al.....	421
Allen, Edward W.....	568
Allen, James S.....	439, 471, 640
Allen, Raymond B.....	568
Allied Labor News.....	658, 659, 662
Allied Powers.....	354, 379, 419, 560, 561, 562, 617, 622
Allied Supreme Command.....	611, 615
All India National Congress.....	656
Alling, Paul.....	445
Alsberg.....	365, 366, 694
Alson, Joseph.....	603
Amerasia.....	439, 474, 518, 555, 569, 572, 609, 618, 619, 625, 653, 661, 665
American and Allied War Relief.....	445
American-British-Chinese currency stabilization fund.....	390
American Committee for Chinese War Orphans. (See China Aid Council.)	
American Committee for International Studies.....	390
American Communist Party. (See Communist Party, United States.)	
American Consulate (Harbin).....	507, 508
American Consulate (Shanghai).....	507
American Council on Education.....	445
American Council Paper No. 2.....	572, 573
American Embassy (Chungking).....	638
American Embassy (Nanking).....	493
American Embassy (Tokyo).....	451
American Express Co. (Hong Kong).....	660, 661
American Federation of Labor.....	444, 445, 607, 633, 640, 658, 669
American Fisheries Publications.....	648
American Friends of the Chinese People.....	411, 439
American League for Peace and Democracy. (See China Aid Council.)	
American Legion.....	377, 399
American Navy.....	379
American occupation authorities (Japan).....	367
American Peace Mobilization.....	527
American Populist.....	565
American President Lines.....	444
American Red Cross.....	432
American Revolution.....	544
American-Russian Institute.....	433, 444, 488, 645, 663, 664, 686
American School (Shanghai).....	577
American Society for Russian Relief.....	539

	Page
Americans United	633
Anderson, Sherwood	411
Anglo-German-American cartel system	608
Angus	471, 472
Annals	571, 572
Anti-Hitler Germans	464
AP (<i>see</i> Associated Press)	386
A. P. O.	395, 396, 426, 427, 652
Argall, Phyllis	668
Army Air Intelligence. (<i>See</i> Army Intelligence.)	
Army Intelligence (Military Intelligence Division)	353,
354, 357, 359, 388, 391, 392, 393, 394, 400, 416, 417, 481, 572, 573	
Army and Navy Club (Washington, D. C.)	586
Arnold, John (<i>see</i> Abraham Chapman)	643
Arnold, Julian	576, 577
Asahi Institute of the Far East	362, 363
Asahi Shimbun	367, 370
Asia Magazine	396
Asiaticus	425
Associated Press (AP)	386
Atcheson, George	618
Atherton, J. Ballard	578
Atkinson, Brooks	638
Atkinson, Henry A.	409, 410
Atlanta prison	543
Atlantic Charter	613, 633
Atlantic Monthly	544
Atomic Energy Commission	486
Austern, Miss Hilda (Mrs. Bretholz)	414,
418, 471, 476, 641, 642, 660, 663, 664, 695	
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin	385, 386
Australian Legation (Washington, D. C.)	440
Axis	495, 597, 598, 600, 607, 638

B

Bachrach, Marian	581
Badoglio	552
Baidukov, George	645
Baikal-Amur Railway	675
Baker, Newton D.	684
Balamuth, Louis	485, 486, 487
Ball, W. McMahon	385
Ballantine, Joseph W.	568, 618
Bank of Indochina	669
Barlow, Samuel L. M.	410
Barnes, Joseph	424,
425, 431, 432, 444, 490, 491, 494, 541, 542, 543, 544, 648, 683, 687, 689	
Barnes, Kathleen	644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 687
Barnett, Robert W. (Bob)	389,
391, 397, 445, 474, 481, 575, 576, 577, 651, 660, 670, 671, 680, 681, 687	
Barrett, Col. David	636, 638
Bassett, Arthur	432
Bates, Searle	432, 444
Batory (steamship)	590, 591
Baudoin, Paul	669
Baumgartner, Dr. Leona	410
Baxter, James P.	428, 444
Bean, Louis	432
Beecroft, Eric	445, 483
Belshaw	577
Bentley, Elizabeth (Helen Johns)	403, 447, 452, 652, 660, 677, 678
Benzon, Wilfred	441
Berg, Dorothy	390
Berle, Adolph A.	432, 444, 445, 602, 603
Berliner, Taggeblatt	371

	Page
Bethune, Dr. Norman	560
Bett, Mr.	386
Beukema, Col. Herman	432, 444
Bibby, Dr. Henry L.	409, 410
Biddle, Attorney General	409
Big Four	611
Biggerstaff, Knight	568
Big Three	606, 607
Binder, Carroll	432, 444
Biographical Register (Department of State)	495, 497, 576, 577
Bissell, General	495
Bisson, T. A.	386,
	387, 389, 393, 474, 477, 479, 529, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 620,
	622, 657, 658, 687
Bittelman, Alexander	555, 556
Blankfort, Michael	582
Bloch, Kurt	390, 474, 475
Blos, Dr. Peter	410
Board of Economic Warfare	384, 385, 393, 419, 432, 440, 443, 444
Bolsheviks	476, 647
Bolton, Frances	440
Bonnet, George	603
Boone Daniel	547, 549
Borg, Dorothy	474
Borton, Hugh	471, 472, 568
Bourgman, Vassily	684, 685
Bradley, Lyman R.	409, 410, 659, 660
Brando de Boukelitz	501
Brandt	473
Braunich, Arthur	487
Breines, Simon	685
Bretholz, Mrs. (See Miss Hilda Austern.)	
Bretholz family	695
Bretton Woods	607
Bridges, Styles	639
British Embassy (Tokyo)	372, 373, 374
British Embassy (Washington, D. C.)	440
British Government	390
British Labor Government	617
British Navy	578
Broek	660
Brooks, Overton	597
Brothman, Abraham	404
Browder, Earl	405,
	415, 435, 438, 520, 521, 528, 535, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 548, 550,
	551, 559, 560, 562, 563, 564, 593, 594, 595, 598, 599, 600, 601, 605, 626,
	643, 644, 657, 679, 700.
Brown, Fred	520, 521
Brown, H. Clifford	568
Brown, Irving	640
Brown, John	548
Brown, Norman	444, 445, 446, 483
Brownell, Lincoln C.	568
Budenz, Louis Francis	513, 701
Bunch	445
Bunche, Ralph	432, 440, 443
Bundy, Harvey	446
Burden, W. A. M.	494
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce	432, 577
Bureau of the Budget	432
Burma Road	382
Burnham, James	674
Bykov, Col. Boris	488, 489, 490
Byrnes, James F.	617, 618, 619, 633, 637, 639, 691, 692

C

	Page
California University	375, 427, 444, 450, 474, 476, 670
Cameron, Angus	649, 650
Canadian diplomatic mission in Tokyo	375
Canadian Embassy (Tokyo)	374, 375, 450, 451
Canadian External Affairs Ministry	451
Canadian Foreign Service	378
Canadian Legation (Washington, D. C.)	440
Canfield, Cass	697
Canning, William Martin	466, 487
Carlin, Beatrice	447
Carlson, Gen. Evans F.	580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588
Carmon, Walt	496
Carnegie Corp.	433
Carter, Edward C.	355, 364, 366, 373-375, 378, 382, 383, 385, 390-392, 399, 408, 424-426, 428-434, 438, 440, 449-466, 470, 471, 473, 474, 476, 477, 481, 483, 526, 528, 535, 536, 537, 539, 568, 573, 574, 583-589, 590, 591, 620, 630, 631, 642, 643, 648, 660, 661, 664, 669-673, 680, 681, 683, 684-687, 691, 692, 694-698
Carter, Mrs. Edward C.	409, 410, 620, 622
Carter, Ruth	687
Carter, William D.	414, 415
CBS. (See Columbia Broadcasting System.)	
Central Powers	379
Chamberlain, William Henry	676
Chambers, Jay David Whittaker	420, 421, 487-497
Chapman, Abraham (John Arnold)	640, 643, 644
Chen, Mrs.	537
Chi, Dr. Chao Ting	409, 410, 411, 426, 431, 435, 474, 475, 481, 525, 687
Chicago Daily News	432, 444
Chicago University	445, 474, 475, 485
Childs, Morris	605
China Aid Council	406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 416, 436, 437, 677
China defense supplies	440
China Handbook	536
China spy ring	367, 370
China Today	652, 653
Chinese Communist Army	384, 531, 532, 582, 612
Chinese Central Government	623, 635
Chinese Communists. (See Communist Party, China.)	
Chinese Government. (See Nationalist Chinese Government.)	
Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance	411
Chinese News Service	535, 536, 537
Ching-wei, Wang	476
Chitral (steamship)	648
Cholmeley, Elsie Fairfax (Mary Epstein)	589, 590, 591
Chou, Professor	651
Christian Science Monitor	634, 635
Chuan, Mrs.	680, 681
Chung-han, General Hu	596
Churchill, Winston	616, 617
Church League for Industrial Democracy	411
CIAA. (See Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.)	
CIC	388, 591
CIO. (See Congress of Industrial Organizations.)	
CIO News	445
City College. (See College of the City of New York.)	
City College Teacher-Worker	467, 486
Civil War	545
Clapper, Raymond	433, 444
Claridge Hotel	478
Clark, Tom	581
Clayton, Will	494
Cleeve, Miss	472
Clise, Charles F.	568
Clubb, Oliver Edmond	495, 496

	Page
Coe, Frank	425, 426, 440, 443, 445, 446, 495
Coffee, Congressman	446
Coffee, John M.	444, 633
COI. (See Coordinator of Information.)	
College of the City of New York (City College)	466, 467, 469, 485, 486, 487
Collier, John	495
Collins, Henry	488, 489
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)	390
Columbia University	373, 374, 403, 433, 444, 449, 466, 467, 469, 474, 475, 476, 482, 483, 484, 485, 493, 494, 670
Comintern	383
Commerce Department	390
Commission on Publications	514
Committee on Appropriations (watchdog committee)	485
Communist-Democrats	698
Communist International	405, 514, 520, 521, 541, 545, 565, 640, 659
Communist International (Seventh World Congress)	545, 565
Communist Party	373, 374, 381, 382, 386, 397, 399, 403-407, 412, 415-417, 421-423, 426, 431, 438, 439, 441-443, 446, 447, 450, 452, 453, 456, 460, 466, 467, 469, 472, 476, 482, 483-488, 490-493, 496, 472, 476, 482, 483-488, 490, 493, 496, 510, 513, 525, 527-530, 532-535, 540-547, 550-552, 554-563, 565-567, 572, 580, 581, 583, 584, 588, 593, 599, 601, 602, 604, 605, 619, 621, 623-626, 630-632, 634-640, 641, 643, 644, 646-650, 652, 654, 657-659, 662, 665, 667, 674, 677-680, 682, 686, 688, 689, 698-700.
Communist Party (China)	377, 397, 398, 407, 434, 435, 436, 437, 456, 457, 458, 459, 461, 464, 465, 473, 521, 525, 529, 532, 533, 534, 538, 560, 563, 564, 565, 581, 582, 583, 594, 599, 600, 634, 635, 637, 638, 654, 656, 657, 658, 677, 682, 696, 697, 700, 701.
Communist Party (France)	501
Communist Party (Japan)	368, 398, 504, 505, 510, 511, 667
Communist Party (Massachusetts)	649
Communist Party (Philippines)	641
Communist Party (underground)	488
Communist Party (United States)	403, 404, 405, 413, 435, 490, 510, 511, 517, 518, 544, 560, 581, 605, 608, 609, 649, 700.
Communist Political Association	604, 605, 607
Condliffe	471, 660
Congressional Record	492
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)	414, 433, 441, 444, 445, 559, 607, 622, 633, 635, 674
Congress of the United States. (See United States Congress.)	
Connally	606
Constitution. (See United States Constitution.)	
Coons, Arthur G.	568
Coordinator of Information	390, 393, 396, 432, 483
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA)	439
Coplon, Judith	558
Corbett, P. E.	473, 474, 687
Cornell University	441
Cosmopolitan Club	685
Cotten, Mrs. Elizabeth B.	409, 410
Conder Committee. (See New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools.)	
Council on African Affairs	622
Council of American-Soviet Friendship	630, 631
Council for Pan-American Democracy	540
Counterintelligence	388
Coville, Cabot	440
Cowles, Gardner	433, 446
CPA. (See Communist Party, United States.)	
Creel, Herrlee G.	475
Cressey, George B.	568
Cripps, Sir Stafford	686, 687
Croly, Herbert	548

	Page
Culbertson, Lt. J. S.....	573
Currie, Lauchlin.....	382, 413, 414, 417, 418, 419, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 433, 434, 443, 444, 479, 480, 494, 585, 586, 594, 595, 598, 599, 600, 652.

D

Dabney, Virginius.....	494
Dafoe, Mr. J. W.....	365, 576, 577, 580, 663, 664
Daily Worker.....	460, 466, 514, 515, 516, 517, 529, 530, 531, 535, 539, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 560, 561, 594, 595, 598, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 626, 631, 632, 634, 635, 637, 639, 640, 641, 643, 652, 654, 655, 657, 658, 659, 662, 665, 666, 674, 677, 678, 689, 690, 699, 700.
Daniel, Mrs. Judith.....	440
Davidson, Maurice P.....	620, 622
Davies, John.....	426, 427, 439, 652
Davies, Joseph.....	432
Davies, R. A.....	663, 664
Davis, Benjamin, Jr.....	605
Davis, Elmer.....	613
Deane, Hugh.....	396, 397
DeBecker, E. V. A.....	358
De Boukelitz, Brando.....	501
DeCaux, Len.....	425, 426, 441, 444, 445, 493, 494, 674
Declaration of Independence.....	369
Deimel, Henry.....	477
De Jong, Miss Ellen Van Zyll.....	390, 475, 476, 481
DeLacy, Hugh.....	633
Democratic League.....	698
Dennergy.....	471
Dennett, Raymond.....	494, 628
Dennett, Tyler.....	425, 426, 433
Dennis, Eugene.....	605
Dennison, Eleanor.....	444
Department of the Army.....	386, 387, 388
Department of External Affairs of Canada.....	373, 376
Department of Justice.....	492, 529, 590, 591
Derba, Charles. (<i>See</i> Clarence Dirba.)	
Des Moines Register and Tribune.....	433
Despres, Emile.....	443, 446
Dial Press, Inc.....	664, 674, 675, 676
Dickover, Erle R.....	618
Dies.....	597
Dillingham, Walter F.....	568
Dirba, Clarence (Charles Derba).....	678
Dirkson, Ambassador.....	373
Dobbs, Mrs.....	481
Dodd, William E., Sr.....	411
Dolivet, Louis.....	701
Dollard, Charles.....	433
Domei.....	373, 395
Donovan, Colonel.....	390
Donovan, General.....	413
Dooman, Eugene C.....	604, 616, 617, 618, 619, 623, 626, 639
Doreen (<i>see also</i> Doreen Holland).....	660
Doriot.....	597
Douglas, Helen Gahagan.....	633
Downing.....	476
Duggan, Lawrence.....	488, 489, 490, 491, 694
Dulles, John Foster.....	452, 464
Dumbarton Oaks.....	607
Dunn, James C.....	639
Du Pont.....	666

E		Page
Earle, Edward M.	-----	444
ECA. (See Economic Cooperation Administration.)	-----	
Eckhardt, Tibor	-----	603
Eckhart, Joseph	-----	446, 447
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)	-----	485
Eddy, Sherwood	-----	411
Edith	-----	695
Eighteenth Party Congress	-----	646
Eighth Route Army	370, 407, 434, 532, 596, 599, 607, 615, 622, 688	
Eisler, Gerhard	-----	514, 555, 580
Eliot, Charles W.	-----	568, 570
Eliot, Thomas	-----	444
Elsie	-----	436, 661, 652
Emeny, Brooks	425, 526, 433, 444,	568
Emerson	-----	547
Emerson, Rupert	432, 444, 445, 446, 475, 494,	568
Engels	-----	517, 548
Enlai, Chou (Chow)	-----	426
En-po, Gen. Tang	-----	596
Epstein, Israel	435, 436, 452, 453, 455, 456, 458, 460, 463, 464, 465, 466, 545, 589, 590, 591, 620, 622, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 651, 662	
Epstein, Mary. (See Elsie Fairfax Cholmeley.)	-----	
Espil, Ambassador	-----	603
Executive Offices of the President	429, 430, 433, 568, 570,	586
F		
Fahs, C B.	-----	432, 471, 577
Fairbank, John K.	-----	378,
	383, 399, 426, 427, 436, 437, 474, 479, 480, 481, 482, 568, 628, 629, 630, 650, 651 652.	
Fairbank, Wilma	-----	389, 427, 479
Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC)	-----	608
Far Eastern Division (See State Department.)	-----	
Far Eastern Survey	-----	376,
	377, 384, 385, 390, 394, 397, 435, 436, 468, 469, 481, 533, 534, 536, 538, 539, 574, 582, 621, 622, 643, 644, 645, 667, 668.	
Farley, Miriam	-----	387,
	389, 390, 394, 395, 396, 397, 472, 474, 475, 476, 564, 628,	629
Farm Information	-----	489
Farm Research	-----	489
Farm Security Administration (FSA)	-----	419
Farquhar, Sammy	-----	660
Fascist Party	404, 560, 570, 603, 606, 607, 608, 612, 613,	638
Faymonville, Col. Carl	-----	494, 586, 687
FEA. (See Foreign Economic Administration.)	-----	
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	354, 412, 484, 492, 514	
Federal Reserve Bank	-----	390, 433, 444
Federal Reserve Board	-----	444
Federated Press	-----	493, 668, 669
FEPC. (See Fair Employment Practices Commission.)	-----	
Field, Frederick Vanderbilt (Frederick Spencer)	-----	364,
	365, 388, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 425, 426, 433, 438, 444, 460, 461, 465, 475, 477, 488, 490, 491, 494, 517, 518, 520, 521, 523, 526, 527, 528, 529, 539, 540, 541, 550, 551, 571, 572, 581, 584, 585, 588, 620, 622, 648, 653, 659, 661, 662, 680, 681, 682, 683, 686, 687, 694.	
Field, Noel	-----	489
Field, W. B. Osgood, Jr.	-----	687
Fighting French delegation	-----	440
Finestone	-----	668
Finkelstein, Moses	-----	482, 483, 485
Finley. (See Moses Finkelstein.)	-----	
Fischer, Louis	-----	645, 649
Fisher, G. W.	-----	568
Fisher, Francis MacCracken	-----	427, 652
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy	-----	577

	Page
Florence (Italy) University	403
Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley	605
Fo, Sun	455, 456, 457, 465
Ford, Miss Ann	452, 463, 464, 590
Ford Foundation	484
Ford, James	605
Fordham University	513
Foreign Affairs Council (Cleveland)	433
Foreign Correspondents Club	536, 538
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA)	417, 478, 479, 495
Foreign Policy Association	384, 468, 474, 481, 482
Forkner, Dr. Claude E	409
Forkner, Mrs. Lucy	409, 410
Forman, Dr. Clark	655
Forman, Harrison	460, 466, 556, 557, 636, 637, 638, 654
Forsyth, Margaret	409, 410
Fortune	390
Fortune Round Table	474
Foster, William Z	548, 556, 559, 605
Fourth Annual Women's Congress (Chicago)	684
Fourth Army	532, 596, 599, 607, 615, 622
Fowler, R. M.	691
Fox, Melvin J.	620, 622
France	596, 602, 603, 607
Frankfurter Zeitung	360, 504
Freeman, Mansfield	494
Freeman, Miller	568, 570
Freeman, R. E.	494
Free World	562
Freiheit	643
French Communists. (See Communist Party, France.)	
French Embassy (Tokyo)	400
French police	384
French secret police	355
Friedman, Irving	390, 481
Friends of Chinese Democracy	621, 622
Friends of Soviet Russia	631, 674
Frink, Mrs. Angelika	410
FSA. (See Farm Security Administration.)	
Fuller, Richard E.	568

G

Gail	695
Gallup Poll	569, 570
Gamble, Sidney D.	568
Gannes, Harry	520, 521, 526
Gardner, Virginia	639
Gauss, Clarence E.	638
Geiger, Theodore	484
General Electric Co.	433, 445
General Staff. (See War Department, General Staff.)	
Geoffrey (see Chen Han-seng)	660
George III.	636
George Washington University	440
Gerbode, Martha A.	568
Gerlach, Talitha	409, 410, 588, 589, 590, 591, 620, 622
German Army	508
German Embassy (Nagoya)	503, 504
German Embassy (Tokyo)	379, 508
German Statistical Yearbook	500
Gerson, Simon	542, 543
GHQ, SCAP	395, 396
Gianini Foundation	375, 450, 474, 476, 670
Gibson, Hugh	444
Glasser, Harold	441

	Page
GMAC	660
Goglidze, Sergei	626, 627
Gold, Ben	555
Gold, Mike	652
Goldstein, M	645
Golos, Jacob	404, 405, 407, 412, 421, 437, 438, 439, 441, 447, 677, 678
Goodrich, L. Carrington	475, 568
Goshal, Kumar	654, 655
Grad, Andrew. (See Grajdanzev.)	
Grady, Henry F	432, 444
Graham, Prof. Frank	411
Grajdanzev, Andrew	387, 389, 390, 391, 392, 394, 399, 475, 476, 687
Granich, Grace	529, 652
Granich, Max	652
Graves, Kizer & Graves	571
Graves, Mortimer	571, 630, 631, 693
Greater New York Industrial Council (CIO)	414
Green, Gilbert	605
Greenberg, Michael	413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 440, 444, 445, 476, 481, 665
Greene, J. Woodall	358, 368
Green, Kay	477
Grew, Joseph B	604, 609, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 623, 665, 666
Griffith, Ernest S	674, 677
Gruening, Ernest H	432
Guggenheimer, Mrs.	411
Gulick, Luther H	432
Gumperz, Hede. (See Hede Massing.)	

H

Habberton, B. John	590, 591
Hagen, Beulah	697, 698
Hager, Read	446
Haideo, Ohashi	369, 371
Hamano	578
Hamilton, Maxwell	428, 444
Handbook of the Sixth Conference (IPR)	362, 363
Hansen, Alvin H	444
Han-seng, Chen	431, 525, 660, 661
Haring, Douglas G	668
Harmon, Francis E	528
Harondar, E. V	645, 646, 647
Harper & Bros	696, 697, 698
Harper, Sam	687
Harris, Lem	541
Hart, Admiral	446
Hart, Dr. George H. C	440
Harvard University	445, 451, 474, 475, 603, 671
Havas	501
Hathaway, Comrade	555, 674
Hayang Arsenal	496
Hayden, J. R	432, 476
Hazard, John N	627, 687
Healey, Ned R	633
Hearst	545, 596, 597
Heaton, Dr. Claude E	409, 410
Herod, W. H	433, 444
Hidemi. (See Hotsumi Ozaki.)	
Hindustani News	360
Hindustani Times	400, 401
Hippodrome (New York)	687
Hirohito, Emperor	609, 611, 616, 617, 666
Hiss, Alger	428, 432, 441, 445, 446, 481, 482, 489, 492, 494, 497
Hitler, Adolph	380, 464, 522, 527, 528, 567, 596, 597, 598, 602, 603, 606, 664, 675
Hitler-Stalin Pact	522, 527

	Page
Hoey, Senator	407
Hoffman, Paul G.	444
Holland, W. L.	375, 378, 383, 384, 385, 393, 394, 395, 399, 408, 414, 415, 418, 427, 436, 440, 450, 451, 470, 471, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 479, 480, 481, 482, 535, 536, 537, 539, 568, 571, 574, 628, 629, 651, 652, 659, 660, 661, 663, 664, 670.
Holmes, Judge	571, 572
Hoover, Herbert	606, 607, 617, 633, 638
Hoover, J. Edgar	369
Hoover Republicans	632
Hopkins	446
Hopper	578, 579, 580
Hornbeck, Stanley K.	428, 432, 443, 444
Hotel Claridge	478
Hot Springs Conference (IPR)	355, 628
Hotzumi. (<i>See</i> Hotsumi Ozaki.)	
House of Representatives	433
Houston, General Sam	548
Howard, Roy	596, 597
Hsia, C. L.	535, 536, 537, 538, 539
Hsiang	427
Hsu, Yung-ying	415
Hubbard, G. E.	480, 481
Hudson, Roy	605
Huff, Henry	567
Hughes, Charles Evans	462
Hull, Secretary	396, 580
Hunter	494
Hurley, Gen. Patrick	604, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 620, 622, 623, 624, 626, 631, 632, 633, 634, 636, 637, 638, 639, 654, 655, 656, 678, 700
Hu Shih	427
Hutchins, Grace	496

I

Ickes, Mr. Harold	384
Immigration and Naturalization Service	590, 591
India-American Conference (IPR)	469, 474
India Government Trade Commissioners Office	480, 481
Indian Council of World Affairs	469
Indian railways	483
Indian Service	495
Indusco	590
Inquiry	684
INS. (<i>See</i> International News Service.)	386
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton	444, 474
Institute of Oceanography	648
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)	375, 578, 381, 384, 386, 388, 389, 391, 392, 394, 395, 399, 406-409, 412-418, 424-438, 440, 441, 443, 445-447, 451, 452, 462, 467, 468, 470, 471, 474, 475, 477-484, 487, 488, 491, 492-494, 497, 506, 516, 517, 518, 522, 524, 525, 527-530, 535, 536-540, 541, 549-551, 567, 568-570, 571-576, 581- 583, 587, 589, 591, 593, 620-622, 628, 629, 634, 640-646, 650-653, 659- 661, 663-665, 667-670, 672, 674-676, 682-686, 688-697, 699, 701.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American Council)	364, 366, 384, 385, 389, 390, 391, 394, 425, 426, 431, 432, 443, 446, 451, 469, 470, 472, 473, 474, 480, 481, 494, 515, 518, 527, 528, 533, 534, 536, 537, 538, 540, 564, 565, 566, 568, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 628, 646, 650, 663, 668, 682, 683, 687, 692, 693, 694, 696, 697.
Institute of Pacific Relations (American-Pacific conference)	504
Institute of Pacific Relations (biennial report)	564
Institute of Pacific Relations (Chinese)	427, 535, 537, 538, 539, 651
Institute of Pacific Relations (eighth conference)	571, 641, 663
Institute of Pacific Relations (fifth conference)	571
Institute of Pacific Relations (India-American Conference, American dele- gation)	469, 474

	Page
Institute of Pacific Relations (international branch)-----	364,
	389, 415, 425, 451, 468, 475, 536, 571, 582
Institute of Pacific Relations (Japanese council)-----	363,
	364, 365, 366, 375, 450, 505, 653, 695
Institute of Pacific Relations (Latin-American division)-----	491
Institute of Pacific Relations (ninth conference)-----	394, 468, 494, 628, 641, 642
Institute of Pacific Relations (Pacific council)-----	365,
	366, 425, 426, 480, 481, 494, 537, 663, 664, 694
Institute of Pacific Relations (political intelligence department)-----	480, 481
Institute of Pacific Relations (popular pamphlet series)-----	564
Institute of Pacific Relations (seventh conference)-----	468
Institute of Pacific Relations (sixth conference)-----	361-363, 364, 576, 641, 642
Institute of Pacific Relations (tenth conference)-----	571
Institute of Pacific Relations (U. S. S. R. Council)-----	645, 646
Institute of Pacific Relations (Virginia Beach conference)-----	641, 642
Institute of Pacific Relations (Yosemite conference)-----	361-363,
	364, 576, 641, 642, 661, 662
Intelligence. (<i>See</i> Army Intelligence.)-----	
Inter-Continent News-----	529, 531
Interior Department-----	475, 477
International Communist Party. (<i>See</i> Communist Party, International.)-----	
International correspondence-----	511
International General Electric Co-----	433, 444
International Industrial Relations Institute-----	682, 683
International Labor Office-----	441, 489
International Missionary Council-----	432, 444
International News Service (INS)-----	386
International Publishers-----	517, 647
International Secretariat-----	389,
	451, 468, 475, 536, 537, 571, 582, 641, 642, 661, 663, 664
International Workers Order-----	515, 540
Inverchapel, Lord-----	692
Iranian Institute-----	621, 622
Ishii-----	365
Italian Fascist Party-----	404
Italian Library of Information-----	404
Ives, Senator-----	452, 464

J

Jabitzu. (*See* Zaibatsu.)

Jacob-----	506
Jacoby, Annalee-----	458, 460, 465, 466
Jaffe, Philip J.-----	409, 410, 437, 477, 618, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 686
Jaffe, Mrs. Philip J.-----	686
Japanese Army-----	355, 359, 361, 368, 379
Japanese Attorney General's Office (special investigation bureau)-----	499
Japanese Broadcasting Co-----	614
Japanese Cabinet-----	367
Japanese Communist Party. (<i>See</i> Communist Party, Japan.)-----	
Japanese Council. (<i>See</i> Institute of Pacific Relations, Japanese Council.)-----	
Japanese Diet-----	667
Japanese Government-----	360, 366, 372, 398, 499, 500, 503, 579, 613, 617, 645
Japanese Navy-----	355, 361, 379
Japanese Peace Society-----	411
Japanese police-----	366
Japanese secret service-----	371
Japanese State Department-----	363, 367, 379
Jean, Sally Lucas-----	409, 410
Jenkins, Shirley-----	376
Jenkinson, Anthony-----	658, 659, 660, 661, 662
Jerome, V. J.-----	554
Jessup, Dr. Philip C.-----	425, 431, 432, 433, 443, 444, 477, 495, 527, 528, 663, 670, 687
Jessup, Mrs. Philip C.-----	409, 410
Jiji Press (English edition)-----	395
Johns, Helen. (<i>See</i> Elizabeth Bentley.)-----	
Johns Hopkins University-----	385, 474, 561, 570, 670

	Page
Johnson, Joseph E.....	568
Johnson, Nelson T.....	582
Johnston, Eric.....	494
Johnstone, William C.....	440, 477
Joint Chiefs of Staff.....	382
Jones, Joseph.....	441
Journal-American.....	619
Justice Department. (<i>See</i> Department of Justice.)	

K

Kai-shek, Chiang.....	381,
382, 390, 436, 450, 451, 456, 457, 461, 462, 496, 529, 530, 531, 533, 551,	
557, 561, 594, 596, 599, 600, 606, 610, 612, 614, 615, 616, 617, 622, 623,	
635, 637, 638, 639, 698, 701.	
Kai-shek, Madam Chiang.....	435
Kates, Beatrice.....	410, 427
Katsuyo, Mrs. Takeshita.....	499
Kawai, Teikichi (<i>see also</i> Mrs. Max Klausen).....	367, 369, 383
Kazakevich, Vladimir.....	441
Keenan, Joseph D.....	640
Keenleyside, Hugh L.....	472
Kennedy, George.....	475
Kentucky University.....	475
Kerensky, Alexander.....	566, 603
Kernpictai (gendarmierie).....	395
Kerr, George H.....	392, 393, 394
Kesting.....	375
Kimball, Dan A.....	671, 672
Kintner, Robert.....	603
Kirchwey, Freda.....	620
Kirk, Grayson.....	494
Kizer, Benjamin H.....	425, 426, 433,
443, 444, 494, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578	
Klausen, Max.....	370, 371, 372, 379, 381, 383, 500, 501, 507, 508, 509
Klausen, Mrs. Max (<i>see also</i> Teikichi Kawai).....	367, 369, 383
Knopf, Alfred.....	473, 474, 655
Knox.....	446
Kokusai Tshuin. (<i>See</i> International correspondence.)	
Konoye Cabinet.....	363, 366, 367, 379, 381, 382, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506
Konoye, Prince. (<i>See</i> Konoye Cabinet.)	
Koshiro.....	369
Kramer, Charles.....	441, 442
Kuhn, Mrs. Irene.....	377, 399
Kuomintang Government.....	455, 458, 460, 461, 464, 465, 466, 476, 532, 538, 596, 599,
600, 610, 612, 613, 614, 615, 635, 636, 638-651, 654, 655, 656, 658, 698	
Kuroda, Rev. Andrew Y.....	499
Kwantung Army.....	509, 616

L

Labor Committee (House).....	515
Labor-Management Charter.....	608
Labor Monthly (London).....	684
Lacam, Guy.....	668
Ladejinsky, Wolf.....	477
Lafayette.....	636
Lamont, Corliss.....	573, 574, 673, 674, 687
Lamott, Willis.....	668
Lancaster, William W.....	687
Landon.....	450
Lane, Clayton.....	474, 568
Lang, Olga.....	682
Lapin, Adam.....	602
Lasker, Bruno.....	571
Latin-American Section (OSS).....	419

	Page
Lattimore, Owen J.....	373-375,
378, 382, 385, 386, 390, 414, 415, 424, 425, 433, 439, 454, 455, 458-460,	
462, 465, 472-478, 481, 483, 494, 521-526, 529, 549, 550-558, 560-563,	
568-570, 578, 583, 584, 624, 625, 627, 654, 655, 657, 658, 669, 670, 678,	
679, 685, 688, 689, 696.	
Laval.....	597
League Against War and Fascism.....	447
League of Nations.....	489, 579
League of Women Shoppers.....	411
Leaning.....	476
Lee.....	476, 477, 580
Lee, Duncan Chapin.....	365, 409, 410
Lee, Dr. Kan.....	440
Legislative Reference Service (Library of Congress).....	674, 677
Lengyel, Emil.....	675
Lenin, Vladimir I.....	515, 517, 559, 565, 647
Leonard.....	477
Levy, Roger.....	668, 670, 671
Lewis, John L.....	638
<i>Liberte</i> (steamship).....	590, 591
Liberty League.....	546
Library of Congress.....	462, 674, 676, 677
Lila.....	695
Lilenthal, Philip E.....	450, 451, 471, 481, 659, 660
Lincoln Battalion.....	598
Linebarger.....	661
Lippmann, Walter.....	406, 494, 691, 692
Lipshitz, Dora.....	678
Little, Brown & Co.....	452, 463, 464, 465, 590, 609, 650, 665, 666, 668
Little, General.....	446
Little, Herbert S.....	568
Liu, Wellington.....	650, 651
Lochhead, Archie.....	433
Lockwood, William.....	383,
384, 385, 390, 395, 396, 399, 425, 426, 427, 428, 431, 432, 445, 446, 474,	
477, 481, 568, 572, 573, 575, 576, 577, 661, 687.	
Loomis, Charles F.....	568
Lovett, Prof. Robert M.....	411
Lowrey, Dr. Lawson G.....	410
Loyalist Spain.....	569, 570
Luce, Henry R.....	433, 444, 660
Ludden, Raymond T.....	636, 637, 638
Lyell, Sir Charles.....	545
Lynd, Robert S.....	687

M

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas.....	354, 395, 396, 618, 638, 639, 640
MacKay, James A.....	494, 568
MacNair, Harley F.....	474
Magruder, General.....	446
Mandel, William.....	662, 663, 664, 674, 675, 676, 677
Manhattan High School of Aviation Trades.....	473, 474
Mannerheim Finland.....	596
Maquis.....	464
Marine Corps.....	583, 584, 585, 597, 633
Marini, Ferruci.....	520
Marshall, Clifford B.....	568
Marshall, George C.....	452, 459, 463, 464, 465, 508, 633, 700
Martin, Charles E.....	568
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute (Moscow).....	517
Marx, Karl.....	515, 517, 545, 546, 547, 548, 552, 565, 630, 647
Maryland University.....	589, 590, 591
Massing, Hede.....	358, 489, 490
Matsukata.....	364, 365

	Page
Matsuo.....	395, 477
Maxwell, General.....	390
Mayer, Arthur.....	574, 575
Mazuruk.....	626, 627
McCann.....	687
McCloy, John J.....	639
McConnell, Dorothy.....	409, 410
McConnell, Bishop Francis J.....	411
McCormick.....	596, 597
McCoy, General.....	495
McGraw-Hill.....	377
McGuffey Eclectic Readers.....	545
McLaughlin, Mrs.....	477
McLean, Evalyn Walsh.....	603
Meija restoration.....	366, 375
Meldon, John.....	619
Merchant Marine (U. S.).....	405
Mercury.....	399
Merrill, Lewis.....	477, 620, 622
Methodist Federation for Social Service.....	411
Michigan University.....	474
MID (Military Intelligence Division). (<i>See Army Intelligence.</i>).....	
Midkiff, Frank E.....	568
Midwest Daily Record.....	514, 523
Mikhailov, Nicholas.....	663, 664
Military Intelligence Division (MID). (<i>See Army Intelligence.</i>).....	
Miller, Robert.....	439
Mills, Mr.....	375, 414
Mills College. (<i>See Mills Summer Institute.</i>).....	
Mills Summer Institute.....	584, 585
Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, CIO.....	622
Minor, Robert.....	548, 595, 598, 599, 600, 605
Mirror.....	619
Mitchell, Kate L.....	474, 477, 654, 655, 660, 663, 664
Mitsubishi.....	666
Mitsui.....	666
Mitsusada, Mr. Yoshikawa.....	359, 360
Moffat, Abbot Low.....	494
Molyneaux, Peter.....	433
Mon-lin, Dr. Chiang.....	651
Mont Tremblant Conference.....	425, 443, 446, 571, 573, 641, 650, 663, 674
Moore, Harriet Lucy.....	433, 438, 443, 444, 472, 530, 549, 550, 628, 629, 647, 687
Morgan, Gwen.....	560
Morgenthau, Mr.....	419, 420, 422, 423, 431, 556, 604
Morgenthau plan.....	556, 604
Morrison, George A.....	494
Morrison, Ian.....	668
Morse, Senator.....	452, 464
Morton, Rev. Richard.....	621, 622
Moscow Radio.....	395
Motylev, V. E.....	577, 578, 579, 580
Muhle.....	687
Munichmen.....	597, 598, 603
Munitions Assignments Board.....	446
Murphy, J. Morden.....	568
Murray full-employment bill.....	640
Murray, Philip.....	559
Murray, Wallace.....	428, 445
Mussolini, Benito.....	602
Myers, Frederick N.....	621, 622
Myyagi.....	372

N

Nagakura.....	578
NAM.....	605, 606
Nanking University.....	444

	Page
Nathan, Robert	432, 444
Nation	563, 564, 620, 622
National Board (Politburo)	398,
516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 526, 528, 529, 535, 543, 549, 550,	
555, 556, 558, 559, 581, 600, 604, 605, 608, 616, 619, 625, 631, 650,	
657, 659, 665, 667, 679.	
National CIO Committee for American and Allied War Relief	433
National Credit Office	475
National Labor Relations Board	555
National Lawyers Guild	621, 622
National League of Women Voters	444
National Maritime Union	621, 622
National Peking University	539
National Recovery Administration (NRA)	488, 657
National Resources Planning Board	432, 568, 570, 571, 572, 573
National War Fund, Inc.	410
National War Labor Board	571
Nationalist Chinese Government	390, 435,
450, 456, 457, 461, 462, 463, 475, 531, 533, 535, 536, 537, 538, 551,	
563, 581, 599, 600, 612, 696, 697.	
Natural History Museum (New York)	686
Naval School of Military Government and Administration (Columbia University)	494
Navy Department	382, 390, 422,
433, 445, 446, 464, 583, 584, 597, 613, 614, 618, 639, 671, 672, 673	
Nazi Party	504, 596, 605, 606
Nelson, Donald	638
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Council	440
Neutrality Act	447
New Century Publishers, Inc.	540
New Life Movement	476
New Masses	460, 465, 495, 496, 540, 657, 658
New York China Daily News	634, 635, 636
New York City Board of Education	470, 486, 515
New York Herald Tribune	542, 612, 613, 614, 633
New York Post	609
New York Star (formerly PM)	542
New York State Legislative Committee on the Public Schools (Coudert committee)	469
New York State Legislative Record	486
New York Times	454, 455, 456, 458, 459, 465, 495, 614, 634, 635, 674, 676, 698
New York Worlds Fair	685
New York World-Telegram	485
Nine Power Treaty	579, 580
Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (<i>see also</i> Institute of Pacific Relations)	394
Nisei	355, 362
Nixon, Senator Richard M.	492
NKVD. (<i>See</i> OGPU.)	
NMU	405
Nock, Albert J.	545
Norman, Herbert	373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 449, 450, 451, 471
North American Group (Military Intelligence Service)	573
North Dakota Non-Partisan League	565
North, Joe	654
North Manchuria Railway	579
Northern Pacific international planning project	568, 569, 570
Northwest Regional Planning Commission	444
Notestein, Ada Comstock	494
Noyes, Mrs. C. Reinold	410
NRA. (<i>See</i> National Recovery Administration.)	

O

Oakie, John H.	584, 585
Office of Censorship (Washington, D. C.)	568, 569, 570

	Page
Office of Education. (<i>See</i> U. S. Office of Education.)	
Office of Export Control	481
Office of Price Administration (OPA)	390, 432, 444, 446, 608
Office of Strategic Services (OSS)	412, 413, 419, 428, 440, 443, 444
Office of War Information (OWI)	378, 383, 399, 414, 437, 444, 446, 613, 652
OGPU (Soviet military intelligence)	360, 404
Ohashi, Haideo	369, 371
Okashi	510
Oklahoma Republican State Convention (1926)	637
OPA. (<i>See</i> Office of Price Administration.)	
Orchard, John E.	474
OSS (<i>See</i> Office of Strategic Services.)	
Ott, General	379, 501, 503, 504, 508
Oumansky, Constantine	603, 685, 686
Overseas Masonic Lodge (Providence, R. I.)	638
Owen	661
OWI. (<i>See</i> Office of War Information.)	
Oxon Hill Manor	693
Oya, Kuso	614
Ozaki, Hotsumi	355, 361-
	364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 379, 381, 501, 503, 504, 505, 506, 509

P

Pacific Affairs	373, 375, 376, 377, 378, 389, 390, 415, 416, 417, 418, 462, 468, 473, 481, 522, 529, 550, 551, 582, 644, 645, 648, 649, 651, 653, 657, 661, 668, 669, 670, 681, 682, 684, 688
Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission	433
Pacific Worker	511
Paddock, Bishop Robert L.	411
Page, Walter Hines	483, 561
Paine, Thomas	548
Panama Canal Record	647
<i>Panay.</i> (<i>See</i> U. S. S. <i>Panay.</i>)	
Parker, Philo W.	528
Parliament	617
Parsons, Miss Katrine	440
Pasvolsky	428
Paterson, Ellis E.	633
Patterson-McCormick	596, 597
Peake, Cyrus H.	474, 670
Pearl Harbor	419, 464, 501, 502, 510, 663, 664, 665, 667
Pearl Harbor hearing	380, 381
Pearson, L. B.	440
Peffer, Nathaniel	471, 474, 477, 670
Peking National University	539
Pence, Captain	494
Pentagon	420
Peoples Anti-Japanese Military-Political University	657
Perkins, Milo	428, 432, 443, 444, 445
Perlo Group (<i>see also</i> Victor Perlo)	441
Perlo, Victor	441, 442
Petain	669
Peters, J.	490, 493, 494, 514, 520, 526, 542, 543, 590, 634, 654, 688
Petrov, Ivan Petrovich	566
Phil	375
Phillips, J. W.	653
Phillips, William	568, 656
Pinner, Dr. Max	410
PM. (<i>See</i> New York Star.)	
Politburo: (<i>See</i> National Board.)	
Politburo (Moscow)	517, 526, 539, 541, 551, 552, 555, 556, 558, 625, 630, 631, 657
Pollard, Mr.	692
Pope, Arthur Upham	409, 621, 622
Popper, Martin	621, 622
Populist	565
Porter, Catherine	390, 476, 477, 483, 536, 537, 689

	Page
Porter, Paul	640, 661
Potsdam declaration	354, 368, 369, 395, 611
Powell, Webster Clay	488, 489
Pratt, Mrs. Eliot	687
Presidential directive	387, 388
Press Hotel	538
Price, Harry	477, 680, 681, 687
Price, Mary	406, 407, 413
Price, Mildred	407, 408, 409, 410, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 436, 437, 438, 439, 677
Princeton University	444, 474, 481, 535, 537
Princeton University Press	468
Private IPR discussion group on United Nations cooperation	440
Procope, Hjalmar	603
Progressives	632
Progressive ticket	407
Pruitt, Miss Ida	680, 681
Pruitt, Ian	587
Public Affairs pamphlets	564

R

Radio news room (<i>see also</i> Coordinator of Information)	396
Railroad Brotherhood	607
Rand, Christopher	455, 465
Randolph A. Philip	411
Red Army (fourth section)	507
Red Army (Russia)	383, 501, 597, 605
Red Guards (Russian)	566
Register of State Department. (<i>See</i> Biographical Register, Department of State.)	
Reichswehr	380
Reid, Mrs. Ogden	444
Remer, C. F.	393, 443, 445, 446, 474, 476
Republican Party	544, 547, 638, 639
Research committee	477
Reynal & Hitchcock	626, 627
Reynaud	669
Riefler, Winfield	432
Riess, La Verne	566
Robinson, Reid	622
Rockefeller fellowship (Harvard)	451
Rockefeller Foundation	433, 451, 473, 474
Rockefeller, Nelson	439
Rockport Press	538
Rogge, Mr.	357
Rogoff, Vladimir N.	529, 530, 531, 539
Rogov, Vladimir. (<i>See</i> Vladimir Rogoff.)	
Roosevelt, President	381, 382, 390, 528, 584, 586, 596, 597, 599, 600, 606, 607, 633, 637, 638, 639, 640, 656, 657, 683
Root, Elihu	462
Ropes, E. C.	432
Rose	578
Rosinger, Lawrence K.	467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 481, 482, 654, 655, 670, 671, 687
Rossiter	477
Roth, Andrew	472, 477, 609, 625, 654, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673
Round table	577
Royal Commission	365
Royal Institute (London)	390
Royall, Mr.	357
Rubin, Rose	687
Rue, Edgar H.	409, 410
Ruskin	547
Russell Sage Foundation	682, 683

Russian-American Institute. (<i>See</i> American Russian Institute.)	Page
Russian Army	359, 361, 362, 364
Russian Calendar (old)	566
Russian Secret Police. (<i>See</i> Soviet Military Intelligence.)	
Russian War Relief	438, 549, 630, 631

S

Saionji, Kimikazu	364, 365, 366, 504, 506, 694
Saionji, Prince	366
Salisbury, Lawrence E.	621, 622
Sam	421
Sanger, Mr. Richard R.	384, 385
Sano Hotel	371
Sansom, Sir George	440
Santo	514
Saposs, David	640
Saturday Evening Post	680, 681
Saturday Review of Literature	674, 675
Savage, Charles	633, 634
Sayers, Mentana	407, 408, 409, 410
Sayers, Michael	407
Sayre, Francis B.	432
SCAP	373, 374, 386, 395, 396
Schillinglaw	577, 579, 580
Schneiderman, William	605
School of Chinese Studies (Columbia University)	449
Schwellenbach, Judge Lewis B.	433, 444
Scripps-Howard newspapers	444, 619
Secretariat	390, 481, 629
Security Council	691, 692
Security in the Pacific	394
Sellers, Dick	668
Service, Jack	427, 652
Service, John Stewart	618, 619, 624, 626, 631, 632, 633, 679
Shanghai Monthly Bulletin	397
Sharp, Lt. Col. Frederick D.	391, 392
Sheean, Vincent	622
Shepherd, Jack	476, 659, 660, 687
Sherwood, Robert	446
Shi-chieh, Wong	651
Shields, Art	614, 633, 639
Shih, Hu	427
Shih-Kai, Yuan	466
Shiman, Russell G.	475, 477
Shiskin, Boris	444, 445
Shoemaker, Colonel	494
Shoemaker, James H.	432, 568
Shotwell, James T.	444, 661, 662
Siberian Railways. (<i>See</i> Trans-Siberian Ry.)	
Sillen, Samuel	460, 466, 665, 666
Silverman, George	423
Silvermaster, N. Gregory	418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 434, 439, 440
Simmons College	474
Simms, William Philip	597
Simon, Helen	634, 635
Simpson, "Sockless Jerry"	548
Sinclair, Gregg M.	568
Sino-American Corp.	475
Sixth Conference (IPR)	362
Smedley, Agnes	355-362, 367, 368, 369, 370, 377, 380, 383, 384, 399, 460, 466, 496, 506, 507, 658, 677
Smith, Paul C.	568
Smith, Sydney	477
Snow, Edgar	458, 460, 465, 680, 681, 682
Snow, Mrs. Edgar (Nym Wales)	622, 680, 682
Social-Democrat	640

	Page
Somerville, Rose	687
Soong, Dr. T. V.	537
Sorge, Richard	354, 356, 358-362, 364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 379, 380, 381, 383, 384, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 511
Southern Council for Human Welfare	407
South Manchurian Railway	509
Southwest Associated University (Kunming)	651
Soviet Army	379
Soviet Embassy	631, 685
Soviet Embassy (Tokyo)	372
Soviet Embassy Consulate	529, 555
Soviet Fourth Army	383
Soviet military intelligence	360, 404, 412, 417, 424, 435, 507, 520, 678
Soviet Russia Today	530, 549, 662, 684
Soviet Trade Union	529, 531
Soviet Union	377, 381, 398, 404, 459, 508, 516, 517, 523, 525, 530, 546, 548, 550, 554, 562, 563, 567, 577, 578, 579, 580, 587, 603, 604, 606, 613, 623, 638, 645, 646, 647, 663, 664, 675, 676, 677, 683, 685, 687
Spanish Republican Government	636
Spencer, Frederick. (See Frederick Vanderbilt Field.)	
Spenser, Hazelton	570
Sproul, Allan	433, 444
Sproul, R. G.	444, 568
Sprout, Harold	494
Stachel, Jack	527, 535, 550, 552, 553, 555, 556, 558, 567, 595, 626, 679
Staley, Prof. Eugene	411, 432, 651
Stalin, Josef	517, 522, 527, 555, 559, 563, 565, 627, 647, 657
Standard Oil Co.	548, 666
Starobin, Joseph	611, 632, 636, 637, 654, 655
Stassen, Commodore	494
State Committee of New York	588
State Department	364, 380, 391, 417, 421, 424, 425, 428, 432, 439, 440, 443-445, 452, 462, 463, 464, 477-479, 488-490, 495, 497, 560, 576, 577, 580, 589, 591, 594, 595, 597-599, 601-604, 606, 607, 609, 610, 612-614, 616, 619, 623-627, 631- 633, 636, 638, 639, 654, 655, 678, 679, 690, 691, 694-696.
State Department (Biographical Register)	495, 497, 576, 577
State Department (Division of Chinese Affairs)	618
State Department (Division of Cultural Relations)	479
State Department (Far Eastern Division)	417, 462, 463, 604, 616, 626, 628
State Department (Foreign Economic Administration for Chinese Affairs)	627
State Department (Latin-American Division)	488
State Department (Near Eastern Division)	428, 445
Steele, Arch T.	455, 465, 612
Stefansson, Vilhjalmur	685, 686, 687
Steiger, Andrew	663, 664, 699
Steiger, G. Nye	474
Stein, Guenther	355, 356, 359-362, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 383, 384, 385, 386, 398, 399, 400, 401, 460, 466, 506, 536, 538, 539, 556, 557, 634, 635, 636, 654, 655
Sterling, J. Wallace	568
Stettinius	606
Stevens, Adlai	446
Stevens, Mackenzie	589, 590
Stewart, John R.	475, 482
Stewart, Marguerite Ann	565, 566, 660
Stewart, Maxwell S.	411, 563, 564, 565, 566, 629, 630
Stilwell, Gen. Joseph	614, 615, 636, 637, 638
Stimson, Secretary	446, 580
Stinebower, L. D.	432
Stone, I. N.	668
Stone, Mark	668
Stone, William T.	432, 443, 444, 445
Straus, Donald B.	568
Straus, Robert K.	389, 390, 391

	Page
Strong, Anna Louise	688
Stuart, Leighton	455, 456, 461, 465
Studebaker, John W.	444
Sues, Ilona Ralf	622, 698, 699
Sumitomo	666
Sunday Worker	594, 611
Sundborg, George	572, 573
Sun Fo	455, 456, 457, 465
Sunset Farm	365
Sun Yat-sen	476
Sun Yat-sen, Madam	436, 437, 455, 456, 457, 465
Sweet	585
Sweetland, Monroe	433, 445
Swing, Raymond Gram	495, 565
SWINK	639
Swope, Gerard	568
Symposium on Chinese culture	427

T

Taft, Robert	603, 611
Taguchi	369
Taiheiyo Rodo-sha. (<i>See</i> Pacific Worker).	
Takahashi	578
Takayanagi	366, 694
Tamura	579, 580
Tao-ming, Mme. Woi	409
Tariff Commission	481
Tarr, Mr. Edgar J.	535, 537, 663, 664
Tasca	477
Tass	529, 539
Taylor, Admiral	578, 579
Taylor, George E.	417, 418, 568
Taylor, William	421
Tee-Van, Mrs. John	410
Teh, Chou	377, 384, 614, 615, 657
Tehran Conference	606
Teikichi, Kawai	367
Tenney, Helen	419
Terrall, Robert	659
Tewksbury, Donal G.	568
Texas Weekly	433
Thompson, John	694
Thompson, Laura	375
Thompson, Robert	605
Thompson, Virginia	476
Thoreau	547
Thorner, Daniel	483
Thurber, Mr.	391, 392
Tiffany, Mrs. Gordon M.	409, 410
Tijo Cabinet	503
Time, Inc.	433, 444
Time Magazine	487
Timoshenko	597
Tirana, R.	440
Tixier, A. P.	440
Tojo Cabinet	503
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun	362, 363
Tokyo Criminal Court	500
Tokyo Criminal District Court, Procuration Bureau	500
Toledano, Ralph	399
Tong, Chu	634, 636
Tong, Hollington K.	536, 538
Toynbee	471
Trachtenberg, Alexander	517, 529, 540, 647, 650
Trans-Siberian Railway	389, 390, 391, 392, 675, 676

	Page
Treasury Department.....	390,
419, 420, 421, 428, 432, 434, 440, 441, 443, 444, 446, 464, 491,	493
Tribune.....	456
Trotsky, Leon.....	554, 674
Trojanovsky, Mr.....	684, 687
Truman, President.....	388,
607, 608, 613, 617, 620, 622, 623, 632, 633, 637, 639, 640, 691,	692
Tsarism.....	476
Tse-tung, Mao.....	615
Tsung-nan, Gen. Hu.....	610
Tsuru, Shigeto.....	510
Tuan-sheng, Chien.....	651
Tucker, Luther.....	687
Tugwell, Mr.....	546
Tydings, Senator.....	515

U

Ullman, William Ludwig.....	421
Un-American Activities Committee.....	492, 509, 510, 515
United China Relief, Inc.....	410, 444, 585
United Church Council for Democracy.....	621, 622
United Electrical Radio, and Machine Workers Union.....	516
United Nations.....	353, 435, 440, 562, 571, 598, 600, 611, 641
United Nations World.....	562
United Office and Professional Workers of America (UOPWA).....	620, 622
United Press.....	539, 556, 557, 616
United States Army.....	353, 354, 356, 357, 359, 386, 387, 390,
405, 416, 417, 419, 568-570, 596, 597, 598, 608, 618, 623, 636, 642, 646	646
United States Army Corps of Engineers.....	672, 673
United States Bureau of Navigation.....	672, 673
United States Chamber of Commerce.....	640
United States Congress.....	444, 462, 603, 606
United States Constitution.....	545
United States District Court (Spokane, Wash.).....	433, 444
United States District Court (Washington, D. C.).....	665, 671, 672
United States Government.....	387, 389, 390, 397, 405, 413, 419, 421, 435, 475,
480, 481, 484, 485, 491, 527, 545, 558, 584, 586, 596, 599, 601, 672	381
United States-Japanese negotiations.....	381
United States Military Academy. (See West Point Military Academy.)	
United States Naval Reserve.....	609, 671, 672
United States Navy.....	382, 390,
422, 433, 445, 446, 464, 583, 584, 597, 613, 614, 618, 639, 671, 672, 673	444
United States Office of Education.....	444
United States Steel Corp.....	546
Universal Trading Corp.....	390, 433, 474
University of California.....	375, 427, 444, 450, 474, 476, 670
University of Chicago.....	445, 474, 475, 485
University of Chicago Press.....	571
University of Cincinnati.....	474
University of Kentucky.....	475
University of Maryland.....	589, 590, 591
University of Michigan.....	474
University of Nanking.....	444
University of Princeton.....	444, 474, 481, 535, 537
UNRRA (Atlantic City conference).....	478
UNRRA (China office).....	571
UPOWA (United Office and Professional Workers).....	408
Ushiba.....	363, 364, 365, 471, 510
U. S. S. Panay.....	618
U. S. S. R.....	377,
381, 398, 404, 459, 508, 516, 517, 523, 525, 530, 546, 548, 550, 554, 562,	563, 567, 577, 578, 579, 580, 587, 603, 604, 606, 613, 623, 638, 645, 646,
647, 649, 663, 664, 675, 676, 677, 683, 685, 687.	

	V	Page
Vandenberg, Arthur H.	452, 463, 464, 597, 606, 611, 633	633
Vandenbosch, Amry		475
Vanderbilt, Commodore		494
Van Kleeck, Mary	682, 683, 684, 685	685
Van Mook		578, 580
Vassar College		403
Veterans' Administration		608
Vichy France		596, 603
Viet-Nam		464
Vinacke, Harold M.		474
Vince, Jacob		432
Vincent, John Carter	452, 463, 464, 465, 478, 494, 618, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 679	679
"Vinegar Joe." (See General Joseph Stilwell.)		
Viner, Jacob		445
Von Dirksen		503
Voorhis, Jerry		433
Voukelitch, Branko de		372, 373
	W	
Wagner-Murray-Dingell social security bill		608
Wahs		578
Wales, Nym. (See Mrs. Edgar Snow.)		
Wallace, Henry A.	432, 444, 550, 552, 553, 625, 626, 627, 679, 693, 694	694
Walter Hines Page School of International Relations		483, 561
Wang, Mr.		651
Wang Ching-wei		476
War and the Working Class	529, 530, 531, 539	539
War Department (General Staff)		393, 394
War Department (United States)		353, 354, 357, 359, 367, 378, 382, 384, 388, 390, 391-394, 400, 406, 416, 417, 464, 481, 568-570, 572, 573, 603, 610, 639, 642, 646, 659, 660.
War Labor Board		571
War Production Board	432, 441, 444, 603	603
War Production Board (WPB)		640
Ward, Dr. Harry F.		411
Ward, Lester F.		548
Ware Group. (See Harold Ware.)		
Ware, Harold		488, 489
Washington, George		636
Washington Information Center on the U. S. S. R.		630, 631
Washington State University		575
Washington Treaty	576, 577, 578, 579	579
"Watchdog committee" (Committee on Appropriations)		485
Watt, Mr. Alan		440
Watt, Robert J.		494
Watts, Richard		622, 668
Waymack, W. W.	444, 495, 568	568
W. D. C.		637
Webb, Beatrice		645, 649
Webb, Sidney		645, 649
Webster, Daniel		548
Webster Publishing Co.		565, 566
Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert	604, 612, 613, 614, 617, 620, 622, 623, 624, 636	636
Weiner, Robert William		528, 540, 541
Weintraub, David		441
Welles, Benjamin		455, 465
Welles, Sumner	444, 455, 494, 568, 595, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698.	698
Wellington		661
West Point Military Academy		432, 444
Wheatley, Dr. George M.		410
Wheeler, Leslie		432
Wheeler, W. M.		597

	Page
White, Harry Dexter-----	382, 419,
420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 428, 431, 434, 443, 444, 445, 446, 491, 492, 494	
White House-----	382,
413, 414, 424, 425, 426, 427, 429, 430, 433, 434, 443, 444, 479, 480, 528,	
586, 633, 639, 652.	
White Russians-----	441
White, Theodore-----	458, 460, 465, 466
Wigmore-----	519
Wilbur, Brayton-----	425, 426, 494, 568
Wilbur, Ray Lyman-----	444, 477
Wilkie, Wendell-----	433
Williams, Albert Rhys-----	645, 648, 649
Williamson, John-----	605
Willie, Dirty-----	619
Willits, Joseph H-----	433
Willoughby, Maj. Gen. Charles A-----	353-401
Wilson, C. E-----	433, 445
Wilson, Howard-----	445, 494
Wilson, Geoffrey-----	687
Wilson, Woodrow-----	603
Windows on the Pacific-----	389
Winter, Ella-----	688, 689, 690
Winter Palace (Russia)-----	566
Wise, Rabbi Stephen S-----	411
Wittfogel, Dr. Karl August-----	373,
374, 375, 376, 386, 449, 450, 475, 476, 483	
Womens Congress. (See Fourth Annual Womens Congress.)	
Wood, Herbert J-----	568
Worcester House-----	680, 681
Worker-----	639, 690
Workers and Peasants Party (Japan)-----	667
World Federation of Trade Unions-----	607
World Labor Conference-----	606, 607
World Telegram-----	441
World Tourist Agency-----	678
World War I-----	578, 637
WPB. (See War Production Board.)	
Wrenn, Heaton L-----	565
Wright-----	579
Wright, Louise L-----	568
Wu-Keu, Miss Liu-----	436

X

Xavier University-----	466
------------------------	-----

Y

Yakut Republic-----	675
Yale University-----	475
Yalta Agreement-----	606, 607
Yamakawa, Dr-----	364, 365
Yarnell, Adm. H. E-----	433, 445, 477, 481, 495
Yasuda-----	666
Yasou-----	364, 365, 395, 450, 476
Yasuto-----	375
Yat-sen, Sun-----	476
Yat-sen, Madam Sun-----	436, 437, 455, 456, 457, 565
Yergan, Dr. Max-----	622
YMCA. (See Young Mens Christian Ass'n)	
Yosemite Conference. (See Institute of Pacific Relations Yosemite Conference.)	
Yoshikawa, Mitsusada-----	499-511
Young Communist League-----	594, 598
Young Mens Christian Association (YMCA)-----	633
Young Womens Christian Association (YWCA)-----	590, 591, 620, 621, 622
Yusami, Rokuro-----	358

	Page
Yutang, Mrs. Lin-----	409, 410
Yu-wan, Liu-----	426, 427, 537, 652
YWCA. (See Young Women's Christian Association.)	

Z

Zacharias, Capt. E. M-----	613, 614
Zaibatsu-----	556, 560, 561, 562, 666

X

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